Colyer v. Speedway LLC et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Speedway's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 17 ] is GRANTED; and (2) The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment contemporaneously herewith. (3) Consequently, the final pre-trial conference in this case scheduled for Monday, November 25, 2013, and the jury trial scheduled for Monday, December 9, 2013, are hereby CANCELLED. Signed by Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove on 11/08/2013.(KJA)cc: COR, London Court Diary, Jury Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON

CATHY COLYER,

Plaintiff,
v.
SPEEDWAY, LLC, and
SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, LLC,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 12-47-GFVT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

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While walking down an aisle in a gas station, Plaintiff Cathy Colyer tripped on a
cardboard box that was sitting on the floor. Although she did not fall down, Colyer
injured her shoulder when she caught herself on a nearby ATM machine and later
brought suit for damages. This matter is before the Court upon the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants Speedway, LLC and Speedway Superamerica, LLC
(collectively “Speedway”). [R. 17.] Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to Speedway’s liability, its motion will be GRANTED.
I
On the evening of September 30, 2010, between 9:45 and 10:00 p.m., Plaintiff
Cathy Colyer stopped at a Speedway gas station in Somerset, Kentucky, on her way
home from playing bingo. [R. 17-1 at 2; Colyer Depo. at 43.] Colyer testified that the
weather was clear and “pretty” when she entered the store to purchase a 2-liter bottle of
Mountain Dew for her son. [R. 17-1 at 2; Colyer Depo. at 43, 47.] Store employee

Audrey Hargis testified that the Speedway store had just received a shipment of
merchandise a few minutes before Colyer arrived, and that the employees were in the
process of unpacking the boxes and re-stocking the shelves. [R. 17-1 at 2; Hargis Depo.
at 7-8.] Colyer admitted that she noticed the presence of the cardboard boxes in the store,
and then walked down an aisle toward the location of the 2-liters in the back corner.
Colyer Depo at 61. After selecting a 2-liter of Mountain Dew, Colyer went back up the
aisle toward the cash register.1 Id. at 57-58. Colyer testified that although she saw a
cardboard box sitting in the aisle that she walked down, she attempted to walk around the
box by maneuvering to the left side of the aisle. Id. at 73, 81-82. As she passed the
cardboard box, Colyer’s leg hit the box, causing her to lose her balance and stumble. Id.
at 64. Colyer caught herself on a nearby ATM machine, which she hit with her hand and
possibly her right arm, but she did not fall to the ground or drop the Mountain Dew. Id.
at 66-69. Colyer testified that neither the ATM machine, the box, nor anything else
moved significantly when she tripped. Id. at 68.
Colyer described the box as being about eighteen inches wide and “maybe a foot
tall” or less, to the best of her recollection. Id. at 59. She conceded that when she was
walking back toward the register, she clearly saw the box as she was approaching it, and
that nothing blocked her view of the ground or of her feet while she was walking. Id. at
62-63. Colyer also testified that there were multiple paths back to the cash register, but

1

Colyer first testified that she went up a different aisle to the cash register than the one she had first gone
down to get the soda, but after seeing surveillance photos from the store, Colyer changed her testimony to
admit that she walked back up the same aisle to the register that she had used when going toward the 2-liter
display, thus indicating that she had walked by the cardboard box successfully the first time. [R. 17-1 at 2;
Colyer Depo. at 99-101.]

2

that other boxes besides the one she tripped over were in the other aisles as well. Id. at
60-61.
After regaining her composure, Colyer proceeded to the cash register to purchase
the Mountain Dew and told the employee at the register that she had tripped on the box
and that the boxes in the store were dangerous. Id. at 70-72. Colyer did not tell anyone
she was injured because she did not think she was hurt until after she had left the store.
Id. at 70-72. Upon leaving the store, Colyer drove herself to her son’s house to drop off
his Mountain Dew and then drove to her own house. Id. at 73. Later that night, Colyer
began to experience pain in her shoulder. Id. at 74-75. She went to a doctor the next
day, had several tests done, and continued to have shoulder and neck pain. Id. at 74-77.
According to her deposition testimony, Colyer ultimately had surgery on her shoulder
and on her neck, but she could not recall what kind of surgeries they were. Id. at 85-88.
Colyer does not dispute any of these facts, but she asserts that an additional
important fact is that the store was cluttered with boxes “thru [sic] out the store.”2 [R. 19
at 3.] The Court notes, however, that Speedway objects to this characterization of the
store because the evidence in the record does not support that description. [R. 22 at 7.]
The Court agrees with Speedway that describing the store as being cluttered with boxes
everywhere is inaccurate, given the situation of unpacking new merchandise, and that the
deposition testimony and pictures submitted to the Court do not support Colyer’s
description of the store.

2

The Court notes that Colyer’s counsel spelled the word “through” as “thru” four different times in his
brief. Counsel should be advised that shorthand commonly used for texting is inappropriate for briefs filed
in federal court.

3

This action is in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Ms. Colyer is a resident of Kentucky, and Speedway is an LLC organized under
the laws of the state of Delaware. [R. 1 at 2.] Speedway, LLC, has only one member,
Marathon Petroleum Corporation (“MPC”) Investment LLC, which is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. Thus, complete diversity exists
among the parties. Colyer has not set forth a specific amount of damages, but on January
4, 2012, as part of the discovery process, Speedway served Colyer with an Interrogatory
asking about the amount in controversy and asking Colyer to sign a stipulation that her
damages did not exceed $75,000. [R. 1 at 2.] Colyer did not respond to the
Interrogatory. Speedway has also served Requests for Admissions, seeking an admission
from Ms. Colyer that her damages exceed $75,000, but Colyer never responded to that
request either, and therefore her lack of response is deemed an admission under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 36 (a)(3) and (b). Because Kentucky is the forum state, its substantive law will be
used. Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006). However,
federal procedural law will govern as applicable, including in establishing the appropriate
summary judgment standard. Weaver v. Caldwell Tanks, Inc., 190 F. App’x 404, 408
(6th Cir. 2006).
II
A
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

4

56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). “A genuine dispute
exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows
‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Olinger v. Corp.
of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion
and identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The
movant may satisfy its burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant
has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come
forward with specific facts to demonstrate there is a genuine issue. Hall Holding, 285
F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). In applying the summary judgment
standard, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Yet even when construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party still “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushitu Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Rather, the Federal

5

Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to present “specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
B
The Defendant Speedway has moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Speedway had no duty to warn Colyer of the cardboard box because it was an open and
obvious condition that Colyer admitted to have seen. Further, Speedway contends that
Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, has not made the open and
obvious doctrine inapplicable; but rather that McIntosh set out three narrow exceptions to
the open and obvious doctrine, none of which fit Ms. Colyer’s situation. [R. 17 at 5-7, 912]. In response to Speedway’s arguments, Colyer claims that the McIntosh case did not
set out three narrow exceptions to the open and obvious doctrine, but merely described
three examples of situations in which it would be foreseeable to the premises owner that
an invitee would get hurt. [R. 19 at 5-6]. Colyer also argues that despite her awareness
of the cardboard box, the fact that such boxes were on the floor constitutes an
unreasonable danger which Speedway should have foreseen could cause injury to
invitees. [R. 19 at 7]. Therefore, Colyer argues that whether her injury was foreseeable
constitutes a disputed fact that should be decided by a jury rather than by summary
judgment.3 [R. 19 at 7-8].
Ms. Colyer’s claim is based on premises liability law, which is a sub-category of
general negligence law. In order to state a claim for negligence, Colyer must establish

3

The Court notes that it is somewhat difficult to ascertain Colyer's exact line of argument because the brief
filed on Colyer's behalf contains so many grammatical, punctuation, spelling, and citation errors. This
summary of Colyer's argument, therefore, is the Court's best attempt at determining her position.

6

that Speedway 1) owed her a duty, 2) breached that duty, 3) and that the alleged breach
was the legal cause of her injury. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88-89
(Ky. 2003); Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1992).
The parties’ arguments concerning the summary judgment motion in this case focus
primarily on the duty element.4 Whether a duty exists is “a question of law to be decided
by the court.” Spears v. Schneider, 2013 WL 3480315, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 12,
2013) (citing Pathways, 113 S.W.3d at 89). Under Kentucky premises liability law,
when the public is invited to visit a property, the owner of the property “‘has a general
duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and
warn invitees of dangers that are latent, unknown, or not obvious.’” Lucas v. Gateway
Community Servs. Org., 343 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Ky. App. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. B & R
Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001)). The type of duty owed depends in part on
the status of the person coming onto the premises. Miracle v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP,
659 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (E.D. Ky. 2009). In this case, as a customer, Ms. Colyer clearly
entered the premises as an invitee. Speedway owned the property and therefore owed a
duty to all invitees to exercise ordinary care to maintain its store in a reasonably safe
condition. Lucas, 343 S.W.3d at 343.
An exception to this general rule is that the owner of the premises does not have a
duty to warn invitees of open and obvious conditions of which a reasonable person would
be aware. Horne v. Precision Cars of Lexington, Inc., 170 S.W. 3d 364, 368-69 (Ky.

4

The Court notes that the parties do not present any evidence concerning Colyer’s injuries other than her
statements in the deposition testimony, nor do the parties engage in any argument concerning the causation
and injury elements of Colyer’s negligence claim. However, the Court, and apparently the parties, believe
this case can be resolved on the duty element without reaching causation or injury.

7

2005) (citing Bonn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Ky. 1969)
(“Reasonable care on the part of the possessor of business premises does not ordinarily
require precaution or even warning against dangers that are known to the visitor or so
obvious to him that he may be expected to discover them.”)); see also Lanier v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Ky. 2003) (stating that the owner “is not an insurer
against all accidents on the premises”) (citation omitted). At issue in this case is whether
Speedway owed Ms. Colyer a heightened duty to warn or otherwise protect her from
tripping over the cardboard box.
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that in 2010, the Kentucky Supreme
Court modified Kentucky’s doctrine on open and obvious dangers in Kentucky River
Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, but the doctrine has not been abrogated
entirely. Roberts v. Jewish Hosp., Inc., 2013 WL 5048294, at *5 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
2013); Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 2011 WL 2496182, at *2 (Ky. Ct.
App. June 24, 2011); see also Lucas, 343 S.W.3d at 344-46 (recognizing that McIntosh
altered the traditional application of the open and obvious doctrine but still granting
summary judgment to defendant because the hazardous condition at issue was
sufficiently obvious to plaintiff that defendant had no duty to warn or correct the
condition). In this case, Speedway is correct in asserting that Kentucky law still
recognizes that land owners “cannot be held liable to invitees who are injured by open
and obvious dangers.” Spears, 2013 WL 3480315, at *2 (quoting McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d
at 388). However, McIntosh has altered the open and obvious doctrine by introducing a
two-part inquiry, as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that is more

8

compatible with the modern approach of assessing comparative fault instead of
contributory negligence. Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385,
389 (Ky. 2010); Lucas, 343 S.W.3d at 344; Spears, 2013 WL 3480315, at *3. Under this
modified approach, Kentucky courts must determine: 1) whether the hazard at issue was
open and obvious; and, if so, 2) whether the owner of the premises could have reasonably
foreseen that an invitee would be injured by the dangerous condition. Key v. United
States, 2013 WL 1411217, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2013); Spears, 2013 WL 3480315, at
*3. In other words, McIntosh did not eliminate the open and obvious doctrine, but it did
introduce an additional determination of whether the plaintiff’s injury was reasonably
foreseeable despite the condition’s open and obvious nature. Moore v. St. Joseph Health
System, Inc., 2012 WL 1886660, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. May 25, 2012).
In the case at hand, the disagreement between the parties centers on their differing
interpretations of McIntosh. In that case, McIntosh was a paramedic who tripped on an
unmarked curb and fell outside the entrance to an emergency room while she was
transporting a critically ill patient to a hospital. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d at 387. Although
McIntosh was aware of the structure of the curb and had crossed it multiple times before
without incident, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that McIntosh’s injury was
foreseeable because the hospital had good reason to expect that paramedics would likely
be distracted by emergency situations and the need to focus on their patients such that
they would not pay close attention to the condition of the curb. Id. at 393-94. Because it
was reasonable to expect that paramedics entering the emergency room with patients
would involve stressful situations, it was likely that they might forget about the curb even

9

if they were previously aware of its condition. Id. Given the facts of that case, the court
emphasized that courts in Kentucky should no longer view an open and obvious danger
as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery, but should instead focus on the foreseeability
of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 392.
In determining the duty of a premises owner, the McIntosh court specifically
adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support of this position as
follows:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite
such knowledge.
Id. at 389 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965)). The court went on
to stress that this approach is consistent with Kentucky’s traditional focus on
foreseeability by saying that “‘[t]he most important factor in determining whether a duty
exists is foreseeability.’” Id. at 390 (quoting Pathways, 113 S.W.3d at 89).
However, the McIntosh court also emphasized that its holding did not abolish the
open and obvious doctrine as a defense to landowners, nor did it completely eliminate
any comparative fault which a plaintiff might have. According to the Kentucky Supreme
Court,
[w]hile ‘open and obvious danger’ is no longer a complete defense under
the Restatement, it is nonetheless a heightened type of danger which
places a higher duty on the plaintiff to look out for his own safety. Such a

10

condition, being open and obvious, should usually be noticed by a plaintiff
who is paying reasonable attention. Yet the plaintiff is not completely
without a defense to this: there could be foreseeable distraction, or the
intervention of a third party pushing the plaintiff into the danger, for
example.
Id. at 392. Thus, the holding in McIntosh prevents premises owners from using the open
and obvious doctrine as a complete defense and makes available to plaintiffs “the defense
of foreseeable distraction” in certain situations. Id. at 394.
1
In light of the framework required by McIntosh, the Court must first address
whether the presence of the cardboard box was an open and obvious condition. A
condition is obvious if “both the condition and the risk are apparent to . . . a reasonable
man in the position of the visitor exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and
judgment.” Lucas, 343 S.W.3d at 345 (citing Bonn v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 440 S.W.2d
526, 529 (Ky. 1969)). Based on the testimony and the attached exhibits and pictures in
the case at hand, the presence of the cardboard box sitting in the aisle was open and
obvious. Ms. Colyer testified that she clearly saw the box in the aisle, and that nothing
was obstructing her view of the ground, her feet, or the position of the box. Colyer Depo.
at 62-63. She further conceded that she could see the box from several steps away. Id. at
62. She also admitted that there were alternative routes to the cash register, but that she
chose to walk down that particular aisle anyway. Id. at 60. Colyer testified that the floor
around the box was not wet or slippery, id. at 6; and she admitted that because nothing

11

else was blocking her path, she concluded that she was able to walk down the aisle
despite the box’s presence. Id. at 73. Thus, there is nothing about the cardboard box that
was a hidden or latent danger, and Colyer was not unaware of the risk of tripping.
Colyer does not dispute these facts, but merely asserts “that there where [sic]
boxes thru [sic] out [sic] the store, not just where Mrs. Colyer fell. The store was
cluttered with boxes.” [R. 19 at 3.] As support for this characterization of the store’s
allegedly dangerous condition, Colyer asserts that “thru [sic] her testimony and store
manager, Mike Elliott, and, [sic] store employee, Audrey Hargis established [sic]” that
boxes were scattered all over the floor.5 [R. 19 at 3.] However, Colyer has not
established this fact. The deposition of store employee Audrey Hargis merely represents
that at least one box was stacked on top of some Pepsi crates, but that it was “not actually
in [sic] the floor.” Hargis Depo. at 25-26. The pictures referenced in Colyer’s brief do
not show that the store, or even the area Colyer was walking, was “cluttered” with boxes.
See Elliott exhibits 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.6 Furthermore, Colyer’s deposition testimony
does not say how many boxes there were, or where they were, and her testimony
indicates that there was only one box in the aisle she walked down. Colyer Depo. at 112.
Consequently, Colyer’s unsupported assertion that the store was “cluttered” does not

5

Once again, Colyer’s counsel is reminded that he should at least make a pretense of having proofread his
documents before filing them in federal court. The Court was hesitant to even cite to Colyer’s brief here,
given the poor quality of counsel’s writing.
6

The Court notes that Colyer has not provided any explanation about these pictures, the context in which
they were taken, or the identity of the people in the pictures. The brief filed on behalf of Colyer merely
cites generally to the pictures as support for her assertion that “the store was cluttered with boxes.” [R. 19
at 3.] The pictures, however, are so limited that they do not provide evidence of the store being filled with
boxes in an unreasonably dangerous manner.

12

create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the box was an open
and obvious danger.
Additionally, Colyer has not presented any evidence that the lighting was poor,
that she was in a hurry, or that anything prevented her from seeing the box on the floor.
Colyer clearly was aware of the box’s presence, and she apparently maneuvered around
the box successfully the first time she went down the aisle, see Colyer Depo. at 100-01,
which demonstrates she was also aware of the risk of tripping but chose to step around
the box anyway. Thus, the Court finds that there is no factual dispute as to whether the
box presented an open and obvious danger.
2
Colyer’s response to Speedway’s motion instead focuses on whether her injury
was foreseeable. In light of McIntosh’s warning against simply labeling a condition as
obvious and precluding liability, the Court will next consider whether Colyer’s injury
was foreseeable despite the obvious nature of the box’s placement.
Speedway interprets McIntosh as setting out three narrow exceptions to the open
and obvious doctrine based on the court’s extensive quotations from the Restatement,
particularly the part which states that an injury may be foreseeable when the owner of the
premises: 1) “has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he
will not discover what is obvious”; or 2) when the invitee’s distraction will cause him to
forget a danger previously discovered; or 3) when it is foreseeable that the invitee will
choose to encounter “the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his
position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.” [R. 17 at 7-8

13

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(A)(1) and McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d at 391,
393-94)]. According to Speedway, because Colyer’s situation does not fit these three
exceptions, Speedway is not liable. Colyer, however, argues that these three situations
listed in McIntosh are merely three examples of many possible situations in which the
open and obvious doctrine does not apply as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. [R. 19 at 6].
Given the language of McIntosh and subsequent caselaw interpreting it, the Court
is inclined to think that neither party is completely accurate in their characterization of
McIntosh’s impact. Some recent caselaw seems to indicate that McIntosh described three
limited exceptions, as Speedway argues. See, e.g., Key v. United States, 2013 WL
1411217, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2013) (stating that McIntosh “described three
circumstances where injuries are foreseeable – and thus where land possessors owe a
duty to invitees despite the obviousness of a condition”); Webb v. Dick’s Sporting Goods,
2011 WL 3362217, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App.) (interpreting McIntosh to mean that landowners
have a duty to protect invitees when it is “foreseeable that the invitee might: be
distracted, realize there is a danger but forget about that danger, or choose to ignore the
danger because the benefit outweighs the risk”). Yet the language in some cases also
focuses on foreseeability in more general terms. See, e.g. Powers v. Tirupathi
Hospitality, LLC, 2011 WL 251001, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2011) (denying summary
judgment to defendant because defendant “could have reasonably foreseen” that poor
weather conditions and a failure to spread salt on the ground could lead to plaintiff falling
on the ice and being injured). Still others appear to have construed McIntosh even more
narrowly than either party in this case by primarily focusing on the language about the

14

plaintiff’s possible distraction and its effects. See True, 358 S.W.3d at 28 (relying on
McIntosh in order to affirm summary judgment in favor of the defendant mainly because
there was no evidence that plaintiff was distracted from his own duty to act reasonably
and ensure his own safety).
Regardless of whether the three examples discussed above are the only exceptions
to the open and obvious doctrine, or whether they are simply three of many possible
exceptions, the court in McIntosh distinctly emphasized the precise context of the facts in
that case. According to the court, “[i]t is important to stress the context in which
McIntosh sustained her injury: she was rushing a critically ill patient into a hospital, in an
effort to save his life.” McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d at 394. The court went on to say that the
“dire need to rush critically ill patients through the emergency room entrance should be
self-evident,” thus giving the owner of the premises “reason to expect that the invitee will
proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger” because the benefit of saving
someone’s life would outweigh the known risk. Id. The emergency situation in which it
would be expected that paramedics would be distracted and/or choose to step over the
curb despite the danger made McIntosh’s injury in that case foreseeable. No such
circumstances exist in Colyer’s situation. Colyer was simply purchasing a 2-liter drink,
she was not in a hurry, there was no emergency, and she has alleged no facts that would
lead the Court to conclude she was distracted in any way.
Indeed, the majority of later Kentucky Court of Appeals cases interpreting
McIntosh have focused their analysis on the three situations listed in McIntosh, or at least
have closely compared the facts of the cases confronting them with the particular factual

15

context of McIntosh. See, e.g. Roberts, 2013 WL 5048294, at *5 (holding that McIntosh
did not bar summary judgment in favor of defendant without evidence of plaintiff being
distracted, forgetful, or having been pushed into the hazard, and finding that plaintiff’s
case was dissimilar to McIntosh since she was not in an emergency situation or in a
hurry); Spears, 2013 WL 3480315, at *5 (finding that defendant had no reason to foresee
plaintiff’s injury because plaintiff was “not acting under time-sensitive or stressful
circumstances,” and plaintiff presented no evidence that she was distracted from her own
“duty to act reasonably to ensure her own safety” which was heightened by her
familiarity with the open and obvious danger); Key, 2013 WL 1411217, at *6 (affirming
summary judgment in favor of defendant because plaintiff presented no evidence that she
forgot about the danger previously encountered, or that she was distracted by some
outside force, or that her view was obstructed, or that she was in a hurry and acting under
stressful circumstances); Moore, 2012 WL 1886660, at *4 (finding that plaintiff did not
meet the requirements of McIntosh in asserting a defense because she presented no
evidence that she was “acting under circumstances that would have foreseeably distracted
her” from the obvious condition of the slippery floor); Lucas, 343 S.W.3d at 346 (finding
no disputed issues of material fact as to an open and obvious danger when plaintiff was
“not distracted by some outside force,” her view was not obstructed, and she “was not
acting under time-sensitive or stressful circumstances”); True v. Fath Bluegrass Manor
Apt., 358 S.W. 3d 23, 28 (Ky. App. 2011) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
defendant because “the exceptional circumstances of McIntosh” did not apply when
plaintiff presented no evidence of any distraction that would cause him to forget the

16

obvious danger of a loose railing); Shelton, 2011 WL 2496182, at *3-4 (finding that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate any issue of material fact as to defendant’s duty because
plaintiff was not acting under any stress or time constraints when she tripped, and that
preoccupation with “normal activities” is not the same as a distraction great enough to
make her forget about a known and obvious hazard).
Colyer’s case fits within this line of cases because she was aware of the presence
of the cardboard box, she was familiar with the situation since she had already walked
around the box once, and she has conceded that her view of the box was not obstructed in
any way. Colyer has not presented any evidence that she was distracted, that she was
acting under stressful or time-sensitive circumstances, that she forgot about the presence
of the box, or that there was any emergency involved with her purchase of a 2-liter of
Mountain Dew. Colyer has not even attempted to argue that her situation fit into the
examples (or exceptions) described in McIntosh, but simply asserts that it was
foreseeable that she could be injured by tripping over the cardboard box. Moreover,
Colyer has not cited any caselaw to support her position. Colyer’s brief merely
contradicts Speedway’s interpretation of McIntosh, but does not refer to any other cases
to show how her injury would have been foreseeable despite its obviousness.7 The trial
court is under no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine
issue of material fact,” and “the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the

7

The Court would have welcomed further discussion of the applicability of McIntosh to the particular facts
of Colyer’s case, but Colyer’s counsel apparently did not think it necessary to conduct additional research
on the matter or bring such research to the Court’s attention. The Court notes that numerous cases have
been decided since McIntosh that have interpreted it and applied it to a wide variety of premises liability
claims, yet Colyer’s counsel apparently felt no compulsion to attempt to argue how Colyer’s case could fit
into the existing framework of caselaw interpreting McIntosh’s modified standard.

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court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to
create a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir.2001).
Thus, absent some evidence that Colyer’s injury was foreseeable, the Court would
have to engage in speculation about hypothetical circumstances that could make Colyer’s
case analogous to the situation in McIntosh. Conclusory allegations and assertions that
are unsupported, and even contradicted, by the record will not survive a motion for
summary judgment. See Matsushitu, 475 U.S. 587. Even if Colyer’s case were
submitted to a jury at trial, she would still be required to present evidence that her injury
was foreseeable. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Lewis, 343 S.W.3d at 436 (finding
that assertions unsupported by affirmative evidence in the record “are merely
unsupported claims” which cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment); Key, 2013
WL 1411217, at *5-6. Here, Colyer has not met her burden of presenting “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial,” and
the Court must grant summary judgment to Speedway. Lewis, 343 S.W.3d at 436.
3
Finally, Colyer has also requested punitive damages. It appears that Colyer has
conceded this point, [see R. 19 at 9 (stating that “in all condor [sic] its [sic] appears that
punitive damages are not applicable”)], but the Court nevertheless will address the matter
for the sake of clarifying the record. Punitive damages are only recoverable in Kentucky
if the plaintiff can show that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care, that he was
ultimately negligent, and also that the defendant exhibited wanton or reckless disregard
for others through his conduct. City of Middlesboro v. Brown, 63 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Ky.

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2002) (quoting Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389-90 (Ky.
1985)). The plaintiff must establish the reckless or wanton disregard for others by clear
and convincing evidence. Embry v. Geo, 478 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
Colyer has not alleged any facts that would support a finding that Speedway acted
wantonly or with recklessness. The only argument that Coyer has presented as to why
she is entitled to punitive damages is that having boxes on the floor of the store could
constitute “wanton and reckless disregard for customer safety.” [R. 19 at 8.] Unpacking
boxes in order to re-stock the shelves in a store is hardly egregious behavior that would
warrant punitive damages. Colyer also has not alleged that Speedway acted with an “evil
motive” or an intent to harm anyone. See Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 389 (specifying that
punitive damages in tort claims should be reserved for misconduct that is “outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others”). Therefore, the Court finds that punitive damages are inappropriate in this case,
and denies the Plaintiff’s request for them.
III
In conclusion, Colyer has not presented any evidence to support that Speedway
owed a heightened duty to warn or otherwise protect Colyer from the cardboard box,
which was an open and obvious condition. Nor has Colyer presented any evidence to
show that her injury was foreseeable, despite the obviousness of the box. Moreover, even
if Colyer had met her burden on the elements of duty and breach, she has not submitted
evidence, or even any arguments, concerning causation or injury. The Court therefore
finds that Ms. Colyer has not demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact

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concerning the elements of her negligence claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is HEREBY
ORDERED:
(1)

Speedway’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 17] is GRANTED; and

(2)

The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment contemporaneously

herewith.
(3)

Consequently, the final pre-trial conference in this case scheduled for

Monday, November 25, 2013, and the jury trial scheduled for Monday, December 9,
2013, are hereby CANCELLED.
This 8th day of November, 2013.

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