Carpenter et al v. Renfro Valley, LLC
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 34 ] is GRANTED, the case will be STRICKEN from the record, and an appropriate judgment will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 3/2/15.(SYD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
AUDREY CARPENTER and
SANDRA RAMSEY,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
RENFRO VALLEY, LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil No. 12-82-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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Renfro Valley is a destination for live music, dining, shopping, lodging, and
entertainment in the heart of Central Kentucky. In July 2010, shortly after taking the
helm as Renfro Valley’s Chief Executive and Operating Officer, Vicki Kidd terminated
employees Audrey Carpenter and Sandra Ramsey. Carpenter and Ramsey now sue
Renfro Valley, alleging they were discriminated against on the basis of both their age and
sex/gender in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. As neither plaintiff has
presented a genuine issue for a jury to consider as to the question of pretext, summary
judgment will be GRANTED in favor of Renfro Valley.
I
After Vicki Kidd was hired as Renfro Valley’s Chief Executive and Operating
Officer, her first task was to assess Renfro Valley’s property, employees and
entertainment. [R. 34-3 at 1; R. 35-6 at 17.] Carpenter recalls Kidd saying that “she had
90 days to make some changes,” including “eliminat[ing] some things that would help
save money” and also increasing accountability in the various departments, with the
ultimate aim of making Renfro valley more profitable and efficient. [R. 34-4 at 30, 3536.] As Ramsey put it, Kidd was “trying to help Renfro Valley to make a profit because
it was financially, you know, unstable.” [R. 34-5 at 5.] During this period of evaluation,
Kidd determined that Carpenter and Ramsey needed to be let go.
Audrey Carpenter worked in personnel and payroll between 2006 and the date of
her termination. [R. 34-4 at 14. ] Shortly after coming on board, Kidd actually promoted
Carpenter to the post of Human Resources manager. [R. 34-4 at 17-18.] In this capacity,
Carpenter’s responsibilities remained generally the same but Carpenter was also tasked
with preparing an employee handbook. [Id.] After spending some time at Renfro, Kidd
“found fault” with Carpenters “work ethic and skill level in her accounting/human
resources position.” [R. 34-3 at 2-3.] Kidd also stated that the personnel files that
Carpenter was responsible for keeping were “very poor and disorganized,” Carpenter
seemed unable to do payroll without the help of others, and that the personnel manual
Carpenter had been tasked with preparing was not satisfactorily completed. [Id.] Finally,
Kidd noted that Carpenter made mistakes in preparing tax documents that resulted in
Renfro having problems with the IRS. [Id.] Ultimately, Kidd recommended to the
owners of Renfro Valley that Carpenter be discharged. [Id.]
Sandra Ramsey worked at Renfro from 2003 to 2007, left, and then was rehired in
August of 2007. [R. 34-5 at 16-18.] Ramsey was primarily responsible for marketing,
graphic design and producing a newsletter, titled The Bugle. [R. 34-5 at 18-22.] Kidd
similarly evaluated Ramsey, finding “fault with [her] work ethic,” and noting that her
work product was not of the “professional quality” that she expected. [R. 34-3 at 2.]
Additionally, Kidd determined that The Bugle was “outdated, not cost-effective and
2
would be discontinued after the December 2010 issue.” [Id.] “Based on [Kidd’s]
analysis of [Ramsey’s] job performance, the fact that "The Bugle" was being
discontinued, [Kidd’s] mandate to make the company more efficient and profitable, and
the needs and goals for the sales and marketing department in the future,” Kidd
recommended that Ramsey be discharged. [R. 34-3 at 2.]
On January 25, 2011, Kidd called Carpenter, Ramsey and Tammy Clontz, a
contract employee and the supervisor of Carpenter and Ramsey, into her office and let
them all know they were being terminated. [R. 34-4 at 37; R. 34-5 at 35.] At the time,
Kidd’s stated reason for terminating them was because Renfro Valley was “going in a
different direction.” [R. 34-4 at 38; R. 34-5 at 63.]
Kidd never issued a written reprimand to Carpenter, never performed a formal
performance review or evaluation, never disciplined Carpenter, nor did she speak with
her supervisor, Tammy Clontz, about her performance prior to her termination. [R. 35 at
5 (referring to R. 35-7 at 10-11; 18).] Similarly, Kidd did not meet with Ramsey nor did
she discuss Ramsey’s performance, position, or responsibilities with Clontz prior to
Ramsey’s termination. [R.35-6 at 6.]
On May 6, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Rockcastle Circuit Court, alleging
discrimination due to both age and gender. [R. 1-2.] The case was subsequently
removed to this Court. [R. 1.] Carpenter was fifty-three years old at the time of her
termination [R. 1-2 at 3; R. 34-4 at 17] and Ramsey was fifty-one. [R. 1-2 at 3; R. 34-5
at 14.]
When initially asked why she was terminated, Carpenter responded, “I really
don’t know.” [R. 34-4 at 44.] She did not know who decided to terminate her and had
3
heard nothing about the reason for it. [Id. at 45.] According to Carpenter, the man that
replaced her, David Brummett, is probably about forty years old. [R. 34-4 at 47.] When
Carpenter was asked more pointedly why she believes that her termination was due to age
she said, “[b]ecause I’ve never been reprimanded before…” [R. 34-4 at 52.] When again
asked why she believed she was terminated due to gender, she replied, “[t]his is just
what I feel inside my heart. Ms. Kidd got along better with the male gender than she did
the female gender.” [R. 34-4 at 53.] In support of this perceived disparity, Carpenter
notes that Kidd’s tone and voice were different in staff meetings depending on whether
Kidd was talking to men or women. [Id.]
When Ramsey was asked why she believed that she had been terminated, she also
said, “I really don’t know.” [R. 34-5 at 45.] When pushed to provide more detail, she
explained that she thought her termination was due to her age and gender because a
younger man replaced her. [Id.]
II
A
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). “A genuine dispute
exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows
‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Olinger v.
Corp. of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
4
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc.,
259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving
party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those
parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v.
Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its
burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the
non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to
demonstrate there is a genuine issue. Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.) Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do more than show there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present significant probative evidence
in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The trial court is under no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is
bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Instead, “the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s attention to
those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue
of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d at 655.
B
The Plaintiffs allege that Renfro Valley violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
KRS § 344.450 which, among other things, prohibits employers from discharging
5
employees on the basis of either sex or age (40 years or older). Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. §
344.040(1). Age discrimination claims brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights act are
analyzed under the same framework used to analyze similar federal claims. See Allen v.
Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Claims brought under the
KCRA are ‘analyzed in the same manner’ as ADEA claims.”) (citing Harker v. Fed.
Land Bank of Louisville, 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1984)). “ADEA claims are in turn
analyzed under the same framework as that employed under Title VII.” Rutherford v.
Britthaven, Inc., 452 F. App'x 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Grosjean v. First Energy
Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 2003)). Similarly, because the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act “mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [gender] discrimination claims
under the KCRA are to be evaluated using the federal standard of gender discrimination.”
Bargo v. Goodwill Indus. of Kentucky, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (E.D. Ky. 2013)
(citing Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 2000)).
A plaintiff may prove both age and gender discrimination through the use of
either direct or circumstantial evidence. Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614, 620
(6th Cir. 2009); Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 648-49 (6th Cir.
2012). “Direct evidence of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires
the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer's actions.” Id. (quoting Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564,
570 (6th Cir. 2003)). Circumstantial evidence is “proof that does not on its face establish
discriminatory animus, but does allow a fact finder to draw a reasonable inference that
discrimination occurred.” Id. In this case, the Plaintiffs produce no direct evidence of
discrimination, so they bear the burden of proving a circumstantial case.
6
When a plaintiff seeks to prove intentional discrimination with circumstantial
evidence, the burden shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) applies. Geiger, 579 F.3d at 621; see also Blizzard v. Marion Technical
Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2359 (2013). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiffs must first establish a prime facie case of
discrimination. Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, LLC, 595 F.3d 261, 264 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148
(2000)). If successful, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to “articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 264
(citing Allen, 545 F.3d at 394). Once this showing has been made, the burden of
production shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the employer’s explanation
was merely pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. (citing Allen, 545 F.3d at 394).
Importantly, the burden of production shifts throughout the analysis, but the burden of
persuasion remains on the plaintiff to “demonstrate that age [or gender] was the ‘but-for’
cause of their employer’s adverse action.” Id. (citing Geiger, 579 F.3d at 620; Gross, 557
U.S. at 623 n. 4) (internal quotations omitted).
1
For an individual to establish a prima facie case of age or sex discrimination they
must demonstrate they were: (1) members of a protected class or, in the case of age
discrimination, over the age of 40; (2) subjected to an adverse employment action; (3)
qualified for the position they held; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of
discrimination. Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 283; Vincent v. Brewer Co., 514 F.3d 489, 494 (6th
Cir. 2007); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 2006). In the
7
context of age discrimination the fourth element requires a showing that the plaintiff was
replaced by someone substantially younger. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs present prima facie cases of age and
gender discrimination, and the Court is satisfied that both Plaintiffs have made this
showing. Briefly, as women, Carpenter and Ramsey are members of the protected class.
Vincent, 514 F.3d at 494 (citing Valentine–Johnson v. Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 814 (6th Cir.
2004)). Carpenter was fifty-three years old [R. 1-2 at 3; R. 34-4 at 17] and Ramsey was
fifty-one [R. 1-2 at 3; R. 34-5 at 14] at the time of their termination. Second, “[a]n
employer's decision to discharge an employee is a classic example of an adverse
employment action.” Id. (citing Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 n.
2 (6th Cir. 2007)). Third, while Kidd has been critical of the Plaintiffs’ work ethic and
skill levels, the Defendants do not argue that they were not qualified for the positions.
Furthermore, while there is considerable testimony from Kidd that their performance was
sub-par, there was also no history of counseling them on their inadequacies. Finally,
Carpenter was replaced by David Brummett who she believes is about forty years old.
[R. 34-4 at 47] and Ramsey alleges that she was replaced by a man, Travis Gay, who she
believes to be younger than her although she does not identify his age [R. 34-5 at 45]. 1
2
Since the Plaintiffs have presented prima facie cases of discrimination, the burden
shifts to Renfro to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse
1
The Court notes that Jackie Morris, a female over the age of forty, was hired part-time, prior to
Carpenter’s termination, to assume some of Carpenter’s work. [R. 34-4 at 17.] From the record, however,
it appears that Brummett actually replaced Carpenter.
8
employment action. See Allen, 545 F.3d at 394 (citing Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 350). At
this stage, “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1981). Rather, Renfro’s burden is one only of production. “[T]he ultimate burden of
persuasion remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate that age [or sex] was the ‘but-for’
cause of their employer's adverse action.” Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d
806, 812 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
At the time of their termination, Kidd explained to both Carpenter and Ramsey
that Renfro was “going in a different direction” with the aim of making itself more
profitable and efficient. Since that time, Kidd has provided more specific reasons for the
terminations. With regard to Ramsey, Kidd explained that The Bugle, a publication that
Ramsey was responsible for producing, was “outdated, not cost-effective and would be
discontinued.” [R. 34-3 at 2.] Ramsey was also responsible for producing other
advertising materials, but Kidd explained that they were not of the quality that she
expected. [Id.] The record is inconsistent on the question of whether Kidd found fault
with Ms. Ramsey's work ethic, but it is quite clear that Kidd believed Ramsey to be
incapable of producing the types of sales and marketing materials that she sought. [Id.;
R. 35-7 at 48,72-73. ] Based on all the aforementioned reasons and also Kidd’s goal of
making the company more efficient and profitable, she recommended that Ramsey be
discharged. [Id.]
Similarly, Kidd “found fault with Audrey Carpenter's work ethic and skill level in
her accounting/human resources position.” [Id. at 2-3.] According to Kidd, the files
Carpenter kept were disorganized and she seemed unable to perform her job duties
9
without the assistance of others. [Id.] Kidd also noted that Carpenter’s work product was
not satisfactory. Specifically, tax documents contained “incomplete or inaccurate social
security numbers and mistakes” which, in addition to other mistakes for which Carpenter
was at least partially responsible, led Renfro to have problems with the IRS. [Id.] Based
on the aforementioned and also Kidd’s “mandate to make the company more efficient
and profitable,” she recommended that Carpenter also be discharged. [Id. at 2-3.]
The above stated reasons for terminating the employment of the Plaintiffs are
legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Products, Inc., 515 F.3d
531, 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Poor performance is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating a person's employment and, by articulating such a reason, [the defendant]
met its initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework.”) The burden
shifts back to the Plaintiffs who must now show that these proffered reasons are nothing
more than pretext for illegal discrimination. Allen, 545 F.3d at 394.
3
To proceed to trial, the Plaintiffs must present facts sufficient for a jury to
“reasonably reject” Renfro’s explanation of why it fired them. Chen v. Dow Chem. Co.,
580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Mickey v. Zeidler Tool Die Co., 516 F.3d 516,
526 (6th Cir. 2009)). Pretext may be shown “either directly by persuading [the trier of
fact] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Manzer, 29
F.3d at 1081 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256)). “To make a submissible case on the
credibility of the employer's explanation, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
the evidence either (1) the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered
10
reasons did not actually motivate [the plaintiff's] discharge, or (3) that they were
insufficient to motivate discharge.” Id. at 1084; see also Vincent, 514 F.3d at 497
(applying standard to gender discrimination). The aforementioned “three-part test need
not be applied rigidly” because, “‘[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer
fire the employee for the stated reason or not?’” Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 285 (quoting Chen,
580 F.3d at 400 n. 4)). Showing the employer’s explanation lacked a basis in fact
requires the plaintiff to present “evidence that the proffered basis for the plaintiff's
discharge never happened, i.e., that they are ‘factually false.’” Rutherford v. Britthaven,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-51-GFVT, 2010 WL 2228359, at *7 (E.D. Ky. June 2, 2010) aff'd,
452 F. App'x 667 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1081).
The Plaintiffs need not, however, necessarily introduce evidence of discrimination
to overcome summary judgment:
…[J]udgment as a matter of law for the defendant in an employmentdiscrimination case may be appropriate under certain circumstances even if the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination and has shown pretext.
530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In other
circumstances, however, a prima facie case and a showing of pretext can support
a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 147–48, 120 S.Ct. 2097. “[B]ecause a prima
facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may permit
a finding of liability, [a court] err[s] in proceeding from the premise that a
plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of
discrimination.” Id. at 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Applying the rationale of Reeves to
the summary-judgment context, we have held that “to survive summary
judgment a plaintiff need only produce enough evidence to support a prima
facie case and to rebut, but not to disprove, the defendant's proffered
rationale.” Blair, 505 F.3d at 532.
…Summary judgment for the defendant may be appropriate even after the
plaintiff has presented evidence that the defendant's proffered reason for the
termination was false “if the record conclusively revealed some other,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue
11
and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 593-594 (6th Cir. 2012). In the case at hand, the
Plaintiffs argue that Renfro Valley’s stated reasons for their terminations lack a basis in
fact. The Court now considers each Plaintiff’s arguments in turn.
Carpenter claims that Kidd’s explanation for her termination “simply does not
stand up to the evidence” because:
•
At no time prior to the firing did defendant reprimand plaintiff for any
unsatisfactory work;
•
Defendant never undertook an evaluation of plaintiff’s work;
•
Defendant never spoke to plaintiff’s supervisor regarding her work;
•
Carpenter’s supervisor was not aware of the firing beforehand;
•
Had defendant consulted the plaintiff’s direct supervisor, defendant would
have learned that the plaintiffs work was far from unsatisfactory and was
instead considered exemplary by her direct supervisor;
•
Defendant has previously expressed a different reason for the firing,
namely that there was a “lack of work”.
[R. 35 at 8.] Even if the Court accepts all the above as true, Carpenter’s claims still fail.
First, while Carpenter’s performance was never formally reviewed [R. 35-7 at
46], it does not necessarily follow that Kidd’s concerns with Carpenter’s performance
have no basis in fact. Kidd noted that whenever she had a question of Carpenter, it was
as if Carpenter could not answer the question without the assistance of Tammy Clontz.
[Id. at 30.] Kidd testified that the personnel manual Carpenter was responsible for was a
“mess” and that files she kept were “not accurate.” [Id.] From Kidd’s perspective,
Carpenter, Ramsey and Clontz “were more interested …in cooking and congregating than
12
doing what they were hired to do.” [R. 35-7 at 29.] According to Kidd, the bottom line
was that Carpenter “couldn't do the job.” [R. 35-7.]
Second, Carpenter faults Kidd for never speaking to her supervisor, claims that
her supervisor was unaware of the firing, and, finally, that had the supervisor been
consulted Kidd would have learned that Carpenter’s work was “exemplary.” [R. 35 at 8.]
The supervisor to which Carpenter refers is Tammy Clontz. To support this point,
Carpenter has presented a letter of recommendation authored by Clontz. 2 If what is
contained in Clontz’s recommendation letter for Carpenter is an indication of what she
would have reported to Kidd, then there can be no doubt that Kidd would have heard a
glowing report. According to Clontz , Carpenter is “tenacious in completing her tasks,”
“always extremely efficient and vigilant,” “accepted and excelled at new responsibilities
and was recognized for her hard work through a long-overdue promotion to Director of
Human Resources,” and always went “above and beyond.” [Id.]
Kidd did consult with Clontz about Carpenter’s performance prior to promoting
Carpenter to the Human Resources position [R. 35-7 at 17-18] but did not talk with
Clontz about Carpenter’s termination. [Id. at 18]. Based on Kidd’s representations about
the relationship between Clontz, Carpenter, and Ramsey, and the fact that Clontz was
also terminated at the same time as both Carpenter and Ramsey, it is understandable that
Kidd did not consult with her. The fact that Clontz thinks highly of Carpenter is of little
significance. To let Clontz’s opinions of Carpenter’s work control would, in effect, put
2
Initially, in support of their response to the motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs produced
two letters from Clontz as exhibits. [R. 35-1; R. 35-3.] As originally submitted, neither of the letters were
appropriate for the Court to consider as they were unsworn and unaccompanied by an affidavit. The Court
provided the Plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this deficiency and they did. The letters were refiled with an
accompanying affidavits from Clontz who swears the letters were written by her and accurately recount her
recollections and opinions. See R. 41-1; 41-2.
13
Kidd’s subordinate in the driver’s seat. Also, it is worth noting that Clontz had earlier
reported less glowingly that Carpenter’s performance “was all right as long as someone
was telling her what to do.” [R. 35-7 at 29.]
Third, Carpenter notes that Kidd expressed a different reason for her termination,
namely a “lack of work,” in a form submitted to the division of unemployment. [See R.
35-2.] The Court need not speculate as to why Kidd would have provided the division of
unemployment with this stated reason because, as recognized in Griffin, summary
judgment may still be appropriate even where the plaintiff presents evidence that the
employer’s proffered reason for the termination was false. 689 F.3d at 594.
The Court also considers Carpenter’s testimony about her own termination.
When asked why she was terminated, she responded “I really don’t know.” [R. 34-4 at
44.] When more directly prodded on the point, Carpenter expressed her belief that it had
to be due to age “[b]ecause I’ve never been reprimanded before…” and due to gender
because “[t]his is just what I feel inside my heart. Ms. Kidd got along better with the
male gender than she did the female gender.” [R. 34-4 at 52-53.] Carpenter suggests that
Kidd’s tone and voice were different when talking to men and women in staff meetings.
[Id.]
Ramsey presents an even weaker case. She argues that she did much more than
just work on The Bugle, but that Kidd downplayed these other duties when she decided to
terminate her. [R. 35 at 9.] In Ramsey’s eyes, the only way to explain Kidd’s focus is by
assuming the termination was pretextual. This is simply incorrect. In addition to
determining that The Bugle was “outdated, not cost-effective and would be discontinued
after the December 2010 issue,” Kidd also noted that Ramsey’s other work product was
14
not of the “professional quality” that she expected. [R. 34-3 at 2.] She specifically cited
to one instance around Thanksgiving time where Ramsey designed an advertisement that
contained a turkey that looked as if it had been hand-drawn. [R. 35-7 at 71.] This was
not the quality work that Kidd expected and, in the end, she did not believe that Ramsey
was capable of producing the professional graphics they were seeking. [Id.]
Ramsey also presents a recommendation letter authored by Clontz, wherein it is
reported that Ramsey’s “articles [in The Bugle] were interesting and full of fun facts,”
that she “is as honest as the day is long,” and that “her work ethic is above reproach.” [R.
41-1.] None of these statements call Kidd’s reasoning into doubt. The Bugle might have
been interesting and fun but, according to Kidd, it was not profitable.
Ramsey’s own testimony fails to help her case. When asked why she had been
terminated, she responded, “I really don’t know,” and when pushed to provide more
detail, she explained that she thought she was terminated from Renfro Valley due to her
age and gender because a younger man replaced her. [R. 34-5 at 45.]
Finally, Ramsey also expresses concern that Kidd stated one of the reasons for the
termination was to save Renfro money while, at the same time, Kidd was unaware of how
much Ramsey was paid. [Id.] The Court does not understand why Kidd would have to
know what Ramsey’s salary was to know that Renfro would save money by severing ties
with her. Unless one assumes that Ramsey was volunteering, her termination would save
Renfro money.
No evidence has been presented that could lead a jury to reasonably find that the
Plaintiffs’ terminations were motivated by discrimination. The best evidence that
Plaintiffs have to tie their terminations to age and gender is that both were replaced by
15
younger men. Even this argument is substantially weakened when one considers that
Kidd is a female over the age of 40, that many of Carpenter’s duties were given to Jackie
Morris who is a female over the age of 40, and that the younger man who was hired to
take over for Carpenter was subsequently terminated for “not doing his job” and was
replaced by a female, Emily Bullock. [R. 35-6 at 5; R. 34-4 at 17; R. 35-7 at 51-52.]
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suspicions and allegations, the evidence shows that Kidd
was brought to Renfro to “right the ship.” As explained by the Plaintiffs, Kidd “had 90
days to make some changes,” including “eliminat[ing] some things that would help save
money” while also increasing accountability with the aim of making Renfro more
profitable and efficient. [R. 34-4 at 30, 35-36; R. 34-5 at 5.] While the Plaintiffs might
not agree with the decisions made by Renfro’s management during this time of transition,
it is not for the Court or a jury to second guess these business decisions absent some
stronger showing that illegal discrimination occurred. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220
F.3d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is inappropriate for the judiciary to substitute its
judgment for that of management.”)
In sum, the Plaintiffs have failed to show beyond a preponderance of the evidence
that Renfro’s stated reasons are untrue or lack a basis in fact. Quite to the contrary,
Renfro has convinced this Court that the stated non-discriminatory reasons are the actual
reasons the Plaintiffs were terminated. It is worth noting, however, that even if the
Defendants were mistaken in how they assessed the Plaintiffs’ performance or duties,
“[w]hen an employer reasonably and honestly relies on particularized facts in making an
employment decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its conclusion
16
is later shown to be ‘mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.’” Chen, 580 F.3d at 401
(citing Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 713-715 (6th Cir. 2007)).
III
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED
that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 34] is GRANTED, the case will
be STRICKEN from the record, and an appropriate judgment will be entered
contemporaneously herewith.
This 2nd day of March, 2015.
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