Griffith v. SSA

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff Catherine D. Griffith's Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 6 ] is DENIED. 2. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin's Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 7 ] is GRANTED. 3. The decision of Administrative Law Judge Todd Spangler is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 10/7/13.(SYD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)
CATHERINE D. GRIFFITH,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
V.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)

Civil Action No. 6: 13-23-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

*** *** *** ***
This matter is pending for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by Plaintiff Catherine D. Griffith (“Griffith” or “the Claimant”) and Defendant Carolyn W.
Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). [Record Nos. 6, 7]
Griffith argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the evidence.
She seeks reversal of the ALJ’s decision and an award of benefits. The Commissioner
contends that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be
affirmed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grant the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment. The relief sought by Griffith will be denied.
I.
On March 29, 2010, Griffith applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). [Tr., pp. 133-139] She alleged a disability

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beginning April 15, 2009. [Tr., p. 169] Her applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. [Tr., pp. 64, 76] Griffith, along with her attorney Julie Atkins and
vocational expert (“VE”) William W. Ellis appeared before ALJ Todd Spangler on June 2,
2011 for an administrative hearing. [Tr., p. 11] On September 13, 2011, ALJ Spangler issued
a decision, finding that Griffith was not disabled under section 416.920(g) of the Act. [Tr.,
p. 21]
Griffith was twenty-one years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. [Tr., p. 20] She
completed eleven years of special education and previously worked part-time in a Kroger
deli department. [Tr., pp. 36-37, 159] Her alleged disability stems from bipolar disorder,
depression, and a nervous condition. [Tr., pp. 157] After reviewing the record and the
testimony presented during the administrative hearing, the ALJ concluded that Griffith
suffered from a combination of severe impairments, including anxiety and depressive orders.
[Tr., p. 13] Notwithstanding these impairments, ALJ Spangler found that Griffith retained
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at all exertional levels, but limited
her to “work that involves only simple, routine tasks with no more than casual contact with
coworkers and the general public, and requires a task-oriented setting that involves few
changes in routine.” [Tr., p. 15]
The ALJ found that Griffith did not have any past relevant work. [Tr., p. 20]
However, considering the Claimant’s age, testimony of the VE, education, work experience,
and RFC, ALJ Spangler found that Griffith could perform other jobs such as kitchen helper,
janitor, and laundry worker. [Tr., p. 21] After determining that Griffith could perform other
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work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that
Griffith was not disabled. As a result of the ALJ’s assessment Griffith was denied SSI. [Id.]
II.
Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in
‘substantial gainful activity’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of at least one year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502
F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007). A claimant’s Social Security disability determination is made
by an ALJ in accordance with “a five-step ‘sequential evaluation process.’” Combs v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)). If the claimant satisfies the first four steps of the process, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner with respect to the fifth step. See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336
F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not engaged in substantial gainful
employment at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the
claimant must show that she suffers from a severe impairment or combination of
impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial
gainful employment and has a severe impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve
months and which meets or equals a listed impairment, she will be considered disabled
without regard to age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Fourth, if
the Commissioner cannot make a determination of disability based on medical evaluations
and current work activity and the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner will
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then review the claimant’s RFC and relevant past work to determine whether she can perform
her past work. If she can, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
Under the fifth step of the analysis, if the claimant’s impairment prevents her from
doing past work, the Commissioner will consider her RFC, age, education, and past work
experience to determine whether she can perform other work. If she cannot perform other
work, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). The
Commissioner has the burden of proof only on “‘the fifth step, proving that there is work
available in the economy that the claimant can perform.’” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312
F. App’x 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391
(6th Cir. 1999)).
Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007). The substantial-evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice
within which decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court.
McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006). Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support
the conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bass v. McMahon, 499
F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed
even if the Court would decide the case differently and even if the claimant’s position is also
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supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th
Cir. 2007); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007); Longworth v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III.
Griffith raises two primary issues in her motion for summary judgment. First, she
claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that she does not have a medically determinable
mental impairment regarding her intellectual functioning. [Record No. 6, p. 6] Second, she
asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on a hypothetical to VE Ellis that did not accurately
describe her. Griffith contends that this resulted in VE’s testimony that does not carry the
Commissioner’s burden of proof at the final step in the evaluation process. [Record No. 6,
p. 8]
A.

Griffith’s Intellectual Functioning

Griffith first alleges error with the ALJ’s finding that she did not have a medically
determinable mental impairment regarding her intellectual functioning. [Record No. 6, p. 6]
Griffith claims that “vocationally relevant restrictions attributable to the claimant’s mental
impairments preclude successful performance of competitive employment.” [Id.] She argues
that the ALJ relied upon his own opinion without support of the record and that his alleged
error was not harmless. [Record No. 6, p. 8; Record No. 8, p. 1] The Commissioner
responds that the ALJ properly considered Griffith’s intellectual functioning throughout the
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evaluation. Alternatively, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s finding of Griffith’s
intellectual functioning as not a “medically determinable mental impairment” is no more than
harmless error. [Record No. 7, p. 3]
1.

Medically Determinable Impairment

Griffith argues that, despite not suffering from an intellectual disability pursuant to
Listing 12.05C, she still has an intellectual impairment. [Record No. 6, p. 7] Contrary to
Griffith’s claims, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Griffith did not have
a medically determinable intellectual impairment. The ALJ analyzed the evidence from the
relevant period and that evidence supports his determination.1
On September 9, 2010, consultative health examiner Dr. Baggs stated that Griffith’s
intellectual functioning was only “below average” and her insight and personal judgment
were fair. [Tr., p. 266] Dr. Baggs does not state that Griffith had any form of intellectual
impairment besides an intellectual functioning that is “below average.” [Tr., pp. 260-68]
The records from Cumberland River Comprehensive Care Center (“CRCCC”) generated
during the relevant period by psychologist Brittany Gilliam M.S., L.P.A. and Dr. Syed Raza,
state that Griffith’s estimated intelligence is “below average” as well as classifying her
thought processes as “logical/goal driven” and “reality oriented.” [Tr., pp. 242, 325] They
also conclude that Griffith has no functional impairment in her cognitive/intellectual

1
The period to evaluate Griffith’s SSI claim starts when she filed her SSI application in March
2010 and continued to the date of the ALJ’s decision on September 13, 2010. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.330,
416.335; Casey, 987 F.2d at 1233.
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functioning. [Tr., pp. 226, 330] The CRCCC records also indicated that any borderline
intellectual functioning had been ruled out for Griffith. [Tr., p. 243] Additionally, Griffith
never alleged any intellectual impairment in her application for SSI. [Tr., p. 157] In short,
this evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Griffith did not have a medically
determinable intellectual impairment.
2.

Playing Doctor

Griffith also contends that ALJ Spangler impermissibly used Griffith’s adaptive
functioning scores to rebut her IQ score of 61. [Record No. 6, p. 8] She claims that, due to
this impermissible use of adaptive functioning, the ALJ “relied on his own medical opinion
without corresponding support in the record.” [Id.] Griffith states that because the ALJ did
not consult a medical advisor or obtain interrogatories from an agency psychologist regarding
her intellectual functioning he succumbed to “playing doctor” and improperly concluded that
Griffith has no intellectual impairment. [Id.]
ALJs are given discretion by the regulations to seek expert opinions when determining
a claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. 416.927(e)(2)(iii). Griffith’s contention that the ALJ
erred by failing to consult a medical advisor or obtain interrogatories from an agency
psychologist is without merit. She does not cite any authority showing that an ALJ must
consult a medical advisor or obtain interrogatories from an agency psychologist. In fact, the
regulations “provide discretion rather than a mandate to the ALJ to decide whether to solicit
medical expert testimony.” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x 181, 189 (6th
Cir.2009) cf. Meece v. Barnhart, 192 Fed. App’x. 456, 465 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an
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ALJ may not substitute his own medical judgment for that of the treating physician where
the opinion of the treating physician is supported by the medical evidence.) Here, the ALJ
did not substitute his opinion for that of a treating physician or make independent findings.
The medical evidence demonstrates that Griffith was merely below average in her intellectual
functioning. In several places in the record the evidence demonstrates that there is no
functional impairment in her intellectual capability. Records from the CRCCC state that
Griffith’s intellect was below average, which is a category above a borderline intellectual
functioning impairment. [Tr., pp. 242, 325] Her thought processes were found to be logic
driven and she was found to not suffer from any functional intellectual impairment. [Tr., pp.
226, 330] In addition, Dr. Baggs only describes Griffith’s intellectual functioning as below
average. [Tr., p. 266] Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Griffith had no intellectual impairment. The ALJ considered the medical evidence and
concluded that Griffith had the intellectual capacity to perform simple, routine tasks and the
medical record supports this conclusion. [Tr., pp. 17-19]
3.

Harmless Error

Alternatively, even if the ALJ committed error it would be considered harmless.
Griffith asserts that the ALJ improperly disregarded her intellectual functioning as nonsevere and that error was not harmless. [Record No. 8, p. 1] Griffith’s contention that the
Commissioner conceded that the ALJ improperly concluded that she did not have a medically
determinable mental impairment is incorrect. [Record No. 8, p. 1] In fact, the Commissioner
claims that the ALJ’s finding was supported by the record but alternatively claims that if it was
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not, any error was harmless. [Record No. 7, p. 4] See Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482

F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding if an agency has failed to adhere to its own
procedures, we will not remand for further administrative proceedings unless “the claimant
has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s
procedural lapses.”) (citations omitted); NLRB v. Wyman–Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766
(1969) (noting that courts are not required to “convert judicial review of agency action into
a ping-pong game” where “remand would be an idle and useless formality”); Fisher v. Bowen,
869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense
requires the Commissioner to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason
to believe that remand might lead to a different result”) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 61. While the ALJ did not classify Griffith’s impairments as severe, this is not reversible
error. Anthony v. Astrue, 266 F. App’x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) See Maziarz v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the failure to find
that an impairment was severe was harmless error where other impairments were deemed
severe).
The ALJ considered Griffith’s intellectual functioning at all stages of his analysis even
though he decided it was not severe enough to be classified as a medically determinable
impairment. ALJ Spangler specifically discussed and considered Griffith’s intellectual
functioning and IQ score when determining her RFC. [Tr., pp. 18-20] He concluded that
she had the capacity to understand and remember simple instructions based upon the medical
evidence of Dr. Baggs, the CRCCC records, the opinions of Dr. Athy and Dr. Demaree, and
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evidence of Griffith’s daily functioning. [Id.] The ALJ’s continued discussion of Griffith’s
intellectual impairments, in spite of his determination of their severity, shows that even if he
had committed error it was harmless.
B.

ALJ’s Hypothetical to the VE

Griffith next claims that the ALJ relied on a hypothetical that did not accurately
describe her functional capabilties which resulted in testimony that does not carry the
Commissioner’s burden of proof at the final step in the sequential evaluation process.
[Record No. 6, p. 8] Specifically, Griffith asserts that ALJ Spangler did not adopt all of the
restrictions assessed by agency reviewing psychologists Dr. Athy and Dr. Demaree. [Record
No. 6, p. 9] Second, Griffith contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical did not describe Griffith
because it did not include the restrictions opined by Dr. Baggs. [Id. at 10] Third, Griffith
argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical was inadequate because he failed to inform the VE that
Griffith’s general learning ability (“GLA”) was in the bottom tenth percentile of the national
population. [Id. at 11] The Commissioner claims that the ALJ’s RFC finding and
hypothetical question to the VE accurately describes Griffith and her mental limitations.
[Record No. 7, p. 7] The Commissioner also asserts that Griffith has not shown that she
needs more restrictive mental limitations than those determined by the ALJ. [Id.]
1.

Dr. Jay Athy and Dr. Ann Demaree

Griffith claims ALJ Spangler improperly disregarded the findings of reviewing
psychologists Dr. Athy and Dr. Demaree found in Section I of the Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment (“MFRC”). [Record No. 6, p. 9] She claims that the
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reviewing psychologists found moderate difficulties in several areas and that the ALJ
improperly did not include them in his hypothetical. [Id. at 10] These findings include
moderate difficulties in:
(1) the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; (2) the ability
to carry out detailed instructions; (3) the ability to work in coordination with
or proximity to others without being distracted by them; (4) the ability to
complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without
an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (5) the ability to interact
with the general public; (6) the ability to get along with coworkers or peers
without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; (7) the ability to
respond appropriately to changes in the work setting
[Tr., pp. 285, 296] The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ was not required to include the
categories listed as “moderately limited” in his RFC finding and hypothetical question
because Section I of the Social Security Program Operational Manual System (“POMS”) is
not an assessment regarding functional capacity. [Record No. 7, pp. 7-8]
The Social Security Administration’s guidelines in POMS state that Section I “is
merely a worksheet to aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional limitations and
the adequacy of documentation and does not constitute the RFC assessment.” POMS DI
24510.060 As several courts that have addressed the issue have held, “section I of the POMS
form may be assigned little or no weight” because it is “not part of the final RFC finding”
in section III of POMS. Smith v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 635–37 (3rd
Cir. 2010); see also, Velez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:09-CV-0715, 2010 WL 1487599
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2010); Coleman v. Astrue, 3:10CV0464, 2010 WL 4955718 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 18, 2010). Thus, an ALJ does not commit error by failing to incorporate the Section
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I findings in his RFC determination. Moreover, when asking the VE a hypothetical, the
Sixth Circuit has held that a ALJ’s hypothetical question“need only reference all of a
claimant’s limitations, without reference to the claimant’s medical conditions.” Webb v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Foster, 348 F.3d at 356).
The VE’s testimony relies on the ALJ’s assessment of what the claimant “can and cannot
do.” Webb, 368 F.3d at 633
ALJ Spangler relied on the Section III findings of Dr. Demaree and Dr. Athy in his
RFC ruling. Section III lists the limitations of Griffith and the ALJ relied on those
limitations in his hypothetical to the VE. The ALJ’s assessment of what Griffith could or
could not do is based on substantial evidence and his hypothetical not reflecting the Section
I findings was not erroneous.
2.

Dr. Timothy Baggs

Griffith contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE was inaccurate because it did
not include the restrictions opined by Dr. Baggs. [Record No. 6, p. 10] The record shows
that Dr. Baggs is not a treating source and, therefore, his opinion is not entitled to special
consideration or weight. The ALJ stated that he gave the opinion of Dr. Baggs “appropriate
weight” and not controlling weight. [Tr., pp. 17-18, 260-68] The record shows that Dr.
Baggs is not a treating source. As such, his opinion requires no deference or special
consideration. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2); Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 Fed. App’x. 149,
157 (6th Cir. 2009). The RFC determination is to be made solely by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1546(c) In making this determination the ALJ considers the medical evidence, the non-12-

medical evidence and the claimant’s credibility, not exclusively the medical evidence. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), (3) & 404.1546(c) The Sixth Circuit has determined that “the

ALJ is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the claimant’s
testimony to form an assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Coldiron
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)
ALJ Spangler evaluated the entire evidentiary record and reached an RFC conclusion.
He is not required to adopt all of the findings of a consultative examiner. ALJ Spangler
considered other medical evidence in the record that contradicted Dr. Baggs’s assessment.
For example, Dr. Demaree’s assessment stated that Griffith has the ability to understand and
remember simple instructions, maintain sustained concentration and persistence in
completing tasks, and has no more than a moderate difficulty relating to people appropriately
and adapting to work stress. [Tr., p. 268] Dr. Baggs stated largely the same conclusion, but
added that Griffith has a moderately less to “possibly much less” ability to adapt to work
stress. [Id.] Dr. Athy reviewed Dr. Demaree’s assessment and affirmed her findings. [Tr.,
p. 297] The ALJ stated that he considered the evidence as a whole, that it was consistent
with his RFC finding, and that the record did not suggest that Griffith would have no useful
ability in her tolerance for work stress. [Tr., p. 18] He did not substitute his opinion for that
of a physician. The ALJ reviewed the entire record and made a determination based on the
evidence. His failure to include the entirety of Dr. Baggs’s opinion was not in error.
3.

GLA Guidelines
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Griffith next argues that ALJ Spangler failed to provide instructions to the VE that
Griffith’s general learning ability fell in the bottom tenth percentile of the national
population based on her IQ score. [Record No. 6, p. 11] Griffith claims that the jobs
described by the VE could not be performed by a person with her GLA and therefore ALJ
Spangler erred by not informing VE Ellis about Griffith’s general learning ability and
intellectual functioning. [Id. at 15] The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical
to the VE was not in error and that the ALJ was not required to include Griffith’s GLA in
his questions to the VE. [Record No. 7, pp. 11-14] ALJ Spangler asked the VE to assume
that the person in the hypothetical would be limited to simple, routine tasks with no more
than casual contact with workers and the general public, and a task oriented setting with few
changes in routine. [Tr., p. 51]
The ALJ did not err for failing to mention Griffith’s GLA to the VE. Griffith
contends that the ALJ erred because her IQ put her in the bottom tenth percentile of the
national population and the jobs offered by the VE were only suitable for the bottom third
of the population, excluding the bottom tenth percentile. [Record No. 6, pp. 11-15]
However, Griffith has failed to cite to any authority supporting the proposition that the ALJ
was required to exclude Griffith from the occupations identified by the VE based on her IQ
and GLA scores without regard to the other evidence. The GLA is one of several
classifications in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and Griffith has not
provided any authority requiring an ALJ to consider this specific classification of the DOT
to the exclusion of other relevant facts.
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This argument ignores evidence the ALJ considered that supported his finding that
Griffith was capable of performing the positions suggested by the VE. The ALJ found that
“the overall evidence does not establish that the claimant functions within the bottom 10%
of the population as contemplated by the DOT General Learning Ability aptitude.” [Tr., p.
19] When making this conclusion, the ALJ found that Griffith’s high school evaluation
assessed her verbal and non-verbal reasoning as average. [Id.] The ALJ specifically noted
Griffith’s adaptive behavior assessments were average in community use, home living, health
and safety, self care, and self direction. [Id. at 19-20] ALJ Spangler discussed how
Griffith’s General Adaptive Composite was 81, which was described as “low average.” [Id.]
The ALJ stated that the longitudinal record shows that Griffith is “able to function
independently, read most things, work when she chooses, maintain and operate her own
vehicle and deal with simple instructions” and that the most recent treatment notes show no
impairment in daily living or personal care. [Id.] The ALJ concluded that Griffith’s past IQ
scores were inconsistent with her current functioning and ability to learn.
The ALJ is permitted to rely on the VE’s answer to a hypothetical question to the
extent the assumptions included in the hypothetical are supported by substantial evidence.
Varley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). The VE’s
answers to these questions are substantial evidence “only if the question accurately portrays
[the claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.” [Id.] It was reasonable for
the ALJ to conclude that Griffith’s IQ score, dated from when she was in high school at age
17, does not currently reflect her learning aptitude at age 22, when compared to more recent
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medical evidence and her daily functioning. The ALJ did not err in determining that Griffith
has the ability to perform work that only involves simple, routine tasks with no more than
casual contact with coworkers and the public, that also has a task-oriented setting with few
changes in routine.
IV.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Griffith is not disabled under
the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act. Additionally, the Court rejects Griffith’s
arguments that the ALJ erred in evaluating the relevant medical evidence and testimony
presented for consideration in connection with her claims. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Catherine D. Griffith’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 6]

is DENIED.
2.

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No.

7] is GRANTED.
3.

The decision of Administrative Law Judge Todd Spangler is AFFIRMED.

This 7th day of October, 2013.

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