Hampton v. Safeco Insurance Company of America

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 22 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 10/25/2013.(RBB)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-39-DLB-HAI
VERONICA HAMPTON

vs.

PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM ORDER

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA

DEFENDANT

************
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, (Doc. #22), which has been fully briefed (See Docs. # 30, 32). In its
motion, Defendant asserts that the matter is not yet ripe for review, and thus does not form
a “case or controversy” such that it is justiciable by a federal court. This assertion relies
entirely on a misunderstanding of the ripeness doctrine.
In the words of the Supreme Court, “[t]he basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200 (1983) (citing Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967)). In United Steelworkers of Am., Local 2116 v.
Cyclops Corp., 860 F.2d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit considered what,
precisely, counted as an “abstract disagreement.”

The defendant in that case had

transferred its pension obligations to another company. Id. at 191. The beneficiaries of the
pension argued that the way the transfer took place might deprive them in the future of their
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pension rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal on ripeness
grounds, because no beneficiaries had lost their pension money, and it was not clear that
they ever would in the future. Id. at 195. The plaintiff had not argued that they were owed
money already, id. at 191, and even admitted that at the time of the litigation, the funds had
been dispersed correctly. Id. So their claim was entirely hypothetical–based on what might
happen in the future, not on any present legal entitlement to funds.
This case presents the exact opposite situation. In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant “owes the difference between the replacement cost as determined by its
appraiser and the actual cash value which it tendered.” (Doc. #1-1, at 5). This is not an
abstract claim for some future benefit. It is an assertion that the Defendant owes the
Plaintiff money, and that Defendant owes that money now.
Defendant labors to show that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract is flawed.
Defendant notes, for instance, that Plaintiff appears to agree “that replacement cost is not
yet due until replacement is made of the property.” (Doc. #22-1, at 3). Defendant further
argues that, by the clear terms of the contract, Defendant owes no money until Plaintiff
makes repairs, as required by the contract. (Doc. #32, 2-6). Whether Defendant is right
regarding these assertions, they go the heart of Plaintiff’s claims on the merits. There is
no dispute that Plaintiff is suing the Defendant for a present injury, nor that Plaintiff claims
entitlement to relief now.
In its motion, Defendant thus relied on the wrong provision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1), which allows motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, is inappropriate when the Plaintiff claims entitlement to immediate relief, and
all other elements of subject matter jurisdiction are present. When, as in this case,
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defendants instead argue that the plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, the appropriate
motion is that controlled by Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. A Rule 12(b)(1)
motion is not the proper mechanism to make such arguments, and the “court will not, sua
sponte, transform a rule 12(b)(1) motion into a rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Wagner v. Ohio Bell
Tel. Co., 673 F. Supp. 908, 911 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. #22) is DENIED.
This 25th day of October, 2013.

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