Morgan v. SSA

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED (1) that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 10 ] is DENIED; and (2) that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 13 ] is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 11/26/2013.(KJA)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON
MARLENE MORGAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social
Security
Defendant

Case No. 6:13-cv-00067-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

***

This

matter

is

before

the

Court

upon

cross-motions

for

summary judgment [DE 10, 13] on Plaintiff’s appeal, pursuant to
42

U.S.C.

§

405(g),

of

the

Commissioner’s

denial

of

her

application for disability insurance benefits. The Court, having
reviewed

the

record

and

the

parties’

motions,

will

deny

Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendant’s motion.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND THE
BACKGROUND IN THE INSTANT MATTER

FACTUAL

AND

PROCEDURAL

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), conducts a five-step
analysis to determine disability:
1. An individual who is working and engaging in
substantial
gainful
activity
is
not
disabled,
regardless of the claimant's medical condition.
2. An individual who is working but does not have a
“severe” impairment which significantly limits his
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities
is not disabled.
1 

3. If an individual is not working and has a severe
impairment which “meets the duration requirement and
is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed
impairment(s)”, then he is disabled regardless of
other factors.
4. If a decision cannot be reached based on current
work activity and medical facts alone, and the
claimant has a severe impairment, then the Secretary
reviews the claimant's residual functional capacity
and the physical and mental demands of the claimant's
previous work. If the claimant is able to continue to
do this previous work, then he is not disabled.
5. If the claimant cannot do any work he did in the
past because of a severe impairment, then the
Secretary considers his residual functional capacity,
age, education, and past work experience to see if he
can do other work. If he cannot, the claimant is
disabled.
Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110
(6th

Cir.

1994)

(citing

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1520

(1982)).

“The

burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four
steps of this process to prove that he is disabled.” Id. “If the
analysis
claimant

reaches
is

the

not

fifth

step

without

disabled,

the

forty-six

years

a

finding

that

the

burden

transfers

to

the

old

the

Secretary.” Id.
Plaintiff

was

on

alleged

onset

date. [Tr. 21]. She has a high school education and past work
experience as a clerk at Wal-Mart. Id. Plaintiff filed a Title
II

application

for

a

period

of

disability

and

disability

insurance benefits on June 5, 2009, alleging disability as of
2 

April

26,

2009

[Tr.

14].

The

claim

was

denied

initially

on

September 3, 2009, as well as upon reconsideration on December
10, 2009 [TR. 58-61, 65-67]. Plaintiff requested a hearing with
the ALJ, which took place on May 17, 2011. [Tr. 26-48] The ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision denying disability on June 17,
2011. [Tr. 14-22].
In the instant matter, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s claim
using

the

five-step

analysis.

The

ALJ

first

found

that

the

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset date. [Tr. 16]. Under the second step, the ALJ
found that the Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
polyneuropathy
testing,

of

chronic

the

upper

neck

and

and

lower

low

back

extremities
pain

per

EMG

secondary

to

degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine with
disc

bulges

at

multiple

levels

in

the

cervical

spine

and

hypertrophic facet changes of the cervical and lumbar spine,
bilateral SI joint sclerosis, and hypertension. [Tr. 16].
During

step

three

of

the

analysis,

the

ALJ

considered

Plaintiff’s impairments and decided that she did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets the criteria
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [Tr. 19].
After careful consideration of the entire record, the ALJ found
at step four that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
3 

(“RFC”) to perform a limited range of light and sedentary work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) but was unable to perform
any past relevant work as a Wal-Mart clerk. In addition, the ALJ
disregarded

the

opinion

of

Dr.

James

Chaney,

Plaintiff’s

treating physician, that she is disabled. In step five, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and
the testimony of a vocational expert and determined that jobs
exist

in

significant

numbers

in

the

national

economy

which

Plaintiff could perform, such as bench work, cashier or sales
work, and/or clerical work. [Tr. 21-22]. As a result, the ALJ
determined

that

Plaintiff

is

not

disabled

under

the

Social

Security Act. [Tr. 22].
In
benefit

evaluating
of

treating

the

the

Plaintiff’s

treatment

physician,

the

records
report

claims,
of

of

Dr.
Dr.

the

ALJ

Chaney,
Ballard

had

the

Plaintiff’s
Wright,

who

performed a consultative evaluation of Plaintiff at Dr. Chaney’s
request, the opinion of Christopher Rymond, a vocational expert,
the internal medicine examination report of Dr. Barry Burchett,
and a physical RFC assessment by Dr. P. Saranga, a state agency
physician. [Tr. 17-18, 20, 22, 221-227, 309-316].
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported

by

substantial

evidence

of

record.

Specifically,

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not afford appropriate weight
4 

to the opinion of Dr. Chaney and that he did not give adequate
reasoning for discounting his medical opinion. Plaintiff also
argues

that

the

ALJ

failed

to

consider

her

impairments

in

combination in finding that she did not have an impairment that
met

or

equals

one

of

the

listed

impairments.

The

Court

has

considered the Plaintiff and Commissioner’s arguments and the
administrative record and, for the reasons stated below, affirms
the Commissioner’s decision.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to an

inquiry

into

whether

the

ALJ’s

findings

were

supported

by

substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Warner v. Comm'r of
Soc.

Sec.,

375

F.3d

387,

390

(6th

Cir.

2004).

Substantial

evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v.
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir.
1994).

This

Court

may

not

try

the

case

de

novo,

resolve

conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility.
Id.

5 

III. ANALYSIS
A.
Plaintiff

first

argues

that

the

ALJ

did

not

give

appropriate weight to the opinion of Dr. Chaney. This Court does
not

find

this

argument

persuasive,

as

the

ALJ

properly

discounted Dr. Chaney’s opinion of disability.
The ALJ may grant controlling weight to the opinion of a
treating

physician

if

it

“is

well-supported

by

medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]
case record.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544
(6th Cir. 2004)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). However, the
ALJ is not bound by the treating physician’s opinion and may
reject it for good reason. Id.
The

ALJ

recognized

Dr.

Chaney

as

a

treating

physician.

[T.R. 16-17]. Although Dr. Chaney considered Plaintiff to be
disabled,

the

ALJ

ultimately

has

the

responsibility

of

determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of
disabled. Warner, 375 F.3d at 390 (citing Harris v. Heckler, 756
F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). Disregarding Dr. Chaney’s opinion
that Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ reasoned that “magnetic
resonance imageries, electromyogram/nerve conduction study, and
physical examinations do not show any objective basis for such a
6 

restrictive residual functional capacity.” [T.R. 20]. Indeed,
Dr.

Burchett’s

August

2009

report

indicated

that

Plaintiff

ambulated with a normal gait, did not require the use of a
handheld assistive device, and appeared stable at station and
comfortable in the supine and sitting positions. Dr. Burchett
also reported that Plaintiff’s straight leg test was negative,
her

range

of

motion

of

the

spine

was

normal,

deep

tendon

reflexes were normal and symmetrical, and light touch sensation
seemed to be intact. [T.R. 223-224]. In addition, Dr. Saranga
determined in an RFC assessment that Plaintiff was not disabled,
making his opinion contrary to Dr. Chaney’s as well.
However, in discounting a treating physician’s opinion, an
ALJ must apply certain factors, such as
the length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion,
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole,
and the specialization of the treating source.
Wilson, 373 F.3d at 544 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
While the ALJ in the instant matter did not offer an analysis of
each of these factors, the fact that he gave sufficient reasons
for not granting Dr. Chaney’s opinion controlling weight meets
the goal of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) and does not warrant
reversal. Hall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 148 F. App'x 456, 462
(6th

Cir.

2005)

(citing

Wilson,
7 

378

F.3d

at

547);

see

also

Nelson

v.

Comm'r

of

2006)(holding

that

requiring

to

ALJ

controlling
ALJ's

opinions
Chaney’s

ALJ's
provide

weight

failure
was

Soc.

to

to

opinion

was

195

F.

good

462

(6th

goal

of

regulation

reasons

for

sources'

weight

error).

App'x

met

analysis

treating

specify

harmless

Sec.,

he

The

opinions,

gave

record

inconsistent

with

failure

give
thus,

sources'

reflects
other

to

and

treating

Cir.

that

Dr.

substantial

evidence in the record, and the ALJ gave good reason for not
granting it controlling weight.
B.
Plaintiff’s

second

argument

is

that

the

ALJ

failed

to

consider the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments. The ALJ
must consider the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments
without regard to whether any single impairment, if considered
separately, would be of sufficient severity to render a claimant
disabled. Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 980 F.2d
1066,

1071

(6th

Cir.

Despite

Plaintiff’s

finding

of

fact

1992)

argument

the

ALJ

(citing

20

to

contrary,

the

acknowledged

C.F.R.

§
in

404.1523).
the

Plaintiff’s

third

“severe

impairments,” and in the fourth finding of fact stated that
“[t]he claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” [T.R.
8 

16, 19] (emphasis added). In his fifth finding the ALJ stated
also

that

Plaintiff’s

he

considered

“symptoms”

“all

(plural)

symptoms”

several

and

times.

referenced

[T.R.

19-20].

Finally, the ALJ’s “discussion of multiple impairments does not
imply that he failed to consider the effect of the impairments
in

combination,

where

the

ALJ

specifically

refers

to

a

‘combination of impairments’ in finding that the plaintiff does
not meet the listings.” Loy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990)(citing Gooch v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987)). As
a

result,

the

Court

finds

that

the

ALJ

properly

considered

Plaintiff’s impairments singly and in combination.
C.
Plaintiff’s

final

argument

is

that

a

reasonable

person

could not conclude and justify that she is not disabled in light
of

the

substantial

limitations

assigned

by

her

treating

physician and the evidence of the record. The Court finds that
this argument lacks merit as well.
The ALJ found at step four of his analysis that Plaintiff
could no longer perform any past relevant work. [T.R. 20] At
step five though, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, and determined that jobs exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
9 

perform.

[T.R.

21].

This

determination

was

aided

by

the

testimony of Christopher Rymond, a vocational expert. The ALJ
posed a series of hypothetical questions that took all of the
limitations he identified in his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC
into

consideration.

Given

these

factors,

Rymond

identified

a

series of occupations that the Plaintiff could perform, such as
bench work, cashier and sales work, and clerical work. [T.R. 4447]. As a result, the vocational expert provided substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not
disabled.
As a final matter, Plaintiff contends that her testimony
was ignored. The ALJ found that the allegations “are not fully
credible,” and that “at hearing, claimant did not appear in any
outward

distress

and

responded

appropriately

to

questions

without any indication of distraction due to any cause.” [T.R.
20]. As stated above, the Court does not resolve matters of
credibility, Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286, and the Court will consider
this argument no further.
In conclusion, the objective evidence in this case did not
establish the Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision.

10 

IV.

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court concludes

that

Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

Defendant

is

warranted.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
(1)

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 10]

is DENIED; and
(2)

that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 13]

is GRANTED.
This the 26th day of November, 2013.

11