Kelly v. SSA
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: It is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 05/22/2014.(KJA)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
at LONDON
Civil Action No. 13-92-HRW
SANDRA KELLY,
v.
PLAINTIFF,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge
a final decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The Court having
reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties,
and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons set forth herein, finds that
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence
and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits on October 22,2009, alleging disability
beginning on April 30, 2005, due to back pain, an anxiety disorder, panic attacks
and depression (Tr. 148). This application was denied initially and on
reconsideration. On May 14, 2012, an administrative hearing was conducted by
Administrative Law Judge Daniel Traver (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff,
accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Dinah Smith, a vocational
expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F .R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the
following five-step sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff
was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not
disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his
impairment(s) must be severe before he can be found to be disabled based
upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a
severe impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for
a continuous period of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or
impairments) meets or medically equals a listed impairment contained in
Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No.4, the claimant is disabled without
further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him
from doing his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from
performing his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant
numbers in the national economy that accommodates his residual functional
capacity and vocational factors, he is not disabled.
2
On June 8, 2012, the ALJ issued his decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled (Tr. 18-41). Plaintiff was 37 years old at the time of the hearing decision
(Tr.39). She has a OED (Tr. 154). Her past relevant work experience consists of
work as a tax preparer and customer service representative (Tr. 39).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability
(Tr.20).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the right knee,
anxiety and depression, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the
Regulations (Tr. 20-22).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments, individually or in
combination, did not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments (Tr.
22). In doing so, the ALJ specifically considered listings 1.02, 1.04, 12.04 and
12.06 (Tr. 22-23).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant
work (Tr. 39) but determined that he/she has the residual functional capacity
("RFC") to perform a range of light work (Tr. 23-24). He specified that she could
perform no more than occasional postural activities such as stooping, kneeling,
3
crouching, crawling, and climbing ramps or stairs with no climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. The ALJ also found that her job must allow
a sit/stand option at 30 minute intervals over the course of the work day and that
Plaintiff must
avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and situational hazards such as
unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. The ALJ also found Plaintiff could
understand and remember simple and detailed instructions and procedures; sustain
attention, concentration, and pace for simple task completion within regular
tolerances including for two hour blocks of time; interact adequately with peers
and supervisors for task completion and interact on at least an occasional basis
with the public; and adapt adequately to work demands and situational changes
given reasonable support.
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in
the national and regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 40).
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the
sequential evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the
ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter
filed this civil action seeking a reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both
4
parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos. 10 and 11] and
this matter is ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is
supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d
383,387 (6 th Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary ofHealth
and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524,535 (6 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957
(1983). "The court may not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence,
nor decide questions of credibility." Bradley v. Secretary ofHealth and Human
Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6 th Cir. 1988). Finally, this Court must defer to the
Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence
supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273
5
(6th Cir.1997).
B.
Plaintiff's Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's finding of no disability is erroneous
because: (1) the ALJ did not give appropriate weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's
treating physician, Charles Johnson, M.D. and (2) the ALJ failed to consider
whether the combined effect of Plaintiff's impairments would be sufficient to
render her disabled.
C.
Analysis of Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiff's first claim of error is that the ALJ did not give appropriate weight
to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Charles Johnson, M.D.
In order to be given controlling weight, the opinions of a treating source on
issues involving the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments must be well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,
and be consistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(d)(2). The Court is mindful of the fact that the Commissioner is not
bound by a treating physician's opinion. Such opinions receive great weight only
if they are supported by sufficient medical data. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431,
435 (6 th Cir. 1985)(citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored the opinion of Dr. Johnson. However, a
6
review of the ALl's opinion showed the ALJ included a detailed description of
Plaintiffs visits with Dr. Johnson, the ALJ discussed Dr. Johnson's opinions, and
the ALJ properly explained why he gave Dr. Johnson's opinion little weight (Tr.
27-39).
Dr. Johnson provided two opinions (Tr. 38). In July 2010, Dr. Johnson
completed a functional assessment form in which he opined Plaintiff could not do
any sitting, standing, or walking; she could not lift any weight; and she could not
perform any postural movements (Tr. 285). In January 2012, Dr. Johnson
completed another form in which he opined Plaintiff could sit or stand for fifteen
minutes at a time; sit and stand/walk for less than two hours each in an eight-hour
workday; needed to take unscheduled breaks during the workday and had to
elevate her legs with prolonged sitting; and could lift less than ten pounds
occasionally (Tr. 346-48).
In discounting these opinions, the ALJ explained that Dr. Johnson's
findings did not support his opinions of disability and his opinions were
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record (Tr. 39). First, the
ALJ noted significant gaps in Dr. Johnson's treatment of Plaintiff, including five
and six month gaps of treatment (Tr. 29-30, 34). Furthermore, as the ALJ noted,
Dr. Johnson's progress notes did not show the kinds of consistent objective
7
findings typically associated with disabling pain (Tr. 39, 305, 309, 311, 313, 319,
321,323,332,336,338).
In addition to finding that Dr. Johnson's progress notes did not support his
opinions of disability, the ALJ recognized that Dr. Johnson's opinions were
inconsistent with the other evidence in the record (Tr. 39). For example, that of
John Gedmark, M.D., a state agency consultant. In April 2010 reviewed a
significant portion of the record and concluded Plaintiff could lift or carry twenty
pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand or walk for about six hours
in an eight-hour workday; sit for about six hours in an eight hour workday;
occasionally perform postural movements except no climbing ladders, rope or
scaffolds; and no concentrated exposure to vibration or hazards (Tr. 277- 84).
This opinion undermines Dr. Johnson's opinions and provides substantial
evidence for the ALl's RFC finding.
The ALJ reasonably gave Dr. Johnson's opinions little weight because they
were not adequately supported and inconsistent with the other evidence in the
record.
Plaintiff's second claim of error is that the ALJ failed to consider whether
the combined effect of Plaintiff's impairments would be sufficient to render her
disabled.
8
A review of the hearing decision reveals that the ALJ considered Plaintiffs
impairments in combination at various stages in his evaluation. The ALJ
discussed Plaintiff s impairments, both physical and mental, both severe and non
severe, at Step 3 of the sequential evaluation process, and specified that he
considered the same, alone and "in combination" (Tr. 22). Such articulations
have been found to be sufficient upon review. See Gooch v. Secretary ofHealth
and Human Services, 833 F.2d 589,592 (6 th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated in Loy v. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, "[a]n
ALI's individual discussion of multiple impairments does not imply that he failed
to consider the effect of the impairments in combination, where the ALJ
specifically refers to a 'combination of impairments' in finding that the plaintiff
does not meet the listings." Loy v. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, 901
F.2d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court finds that the ALJ's approach in this
case passes Gooch and Loy muster and that Plaintiffs argument in this regard is
without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALI's decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion
9
for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant
will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
ThiS~ay of May, 2014.
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?