Salyers et al v. United States Bureau of Prisons et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Dfts Laurel County Detention Center; Laurel County Kentucky; Laurel County Fiscal Court; Jamie Mosley; David Westerfield; Roy Crawford; Danny Smith; Teddy Benge; Jeff Book; Billy Oakley; and Noah Bakers motion to dis miss or in the alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings [Record No. 32 ] is GRANTED. 2. The claims asserted in this action against these Defendants are DISMISSED, with prejudice. Plfs' claims against Southern Health Partners, Inc., rema in. Jeff Book, Roy Crawford, Laurel County Detention Center, Laurel County Fiscal Court, Laurel County, Kentucky, Jamie Mosley, Billy Oakley, Danny Smith, David Westerfield, Noah Baker and Teddy Benge terminated. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 4/21/2014.(RBB)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)
MICHAEL SALYERS, et ux.,
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Plaintiffs,
V.
LAUREL COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 6: 13-109-DCR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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This matter is pending for consideration of the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Laurel County Detention Center; Laurel County, Kentucky;
Laurel County Fiscal Court; Jamie Mosley; David Westerfield; Roy Crawford; Danny Smith;
Teddy Benge; Jeff Book; Billy Oakley; and Noah Baker (collectively, the “Laurel County
Defendants”). [Record No. 32]1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the relief
sought, and dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants.
I.
This matter arises out of Plaintiff Michael Salyers’ (“Salyers”) confinement at the Laurel
County Detention Center. Salyers entered a guilty plea to conspiring to buy votes on February
8, 2012. [See United States v. Michael Salyers, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Ky., Central Div. at
1
The original motion also asserted that the Laurel County Defendants were entitled to immunity from
the plaintiffs’ claims. However, based on plaintiffs’ concessions, the question of immunity is moot. [Record
No. 39, p. 13]
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Lexington, Case No. 5: 11-143-KKC; Record No. 56.] Following his plea, Salyers was
sentenced by United States District Judge Karen Caldwell to sixty days’ incarceration, followed
by a one-year term of supervised release. [Id., at Record No. 93]
Salyers alleges that, on the first day he was confined, he was medically evaluated and his
vital signs were normal.2 His blood pressure was 138/74 and his heart rate was 80 bpm. [Record
No. 27, ¶24] However, he alleges that on the following day, “corrections officers” found him
clutching his chest, complaining of pain, nausea, and shortness of breath, and that he had
vomited. [Id., ¶25] Salyers was brought to another floor in the facility for medical monitoring.
At that time, his blood pressure had increased to 207/124 and his heart rate had increased to 120
bpm. [Id., ¶26] At some point while he was being evaluated by a nurse or a doctor, Salyers told
medical personnel that “he had been taking Xanax on the street.” [Id., ¶27] The plaintiffs assert
that Salyers was mis-diagnosed by a nurse, guard, and other unknown defendants. Medical
records indicate that he was placed on medical watch per detoxification procedures based on the
belief that Salyers was suffering from withdrawal symptoms. [Id.] Later tests indicated that
Salyers had actually suffered a heart attack.
Salyers and his wife, Cathy Salyers, filed this action on June 3, 2013, asserting claims
against the following parties: (i) United States Bureau of Prisons; (ii) Charles E. Samuels, Jr.;
2
Prior to Salyers commencing service of his sentence, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) received his
presentence investigation report (“PSR”), which indicated that Salyers was in generally good health. [Record
No. 27, ¶18, 19] However, the PSR indicated that Salyers was diagnosed with diabetes three years earlier,
and that he had been prescribed Effexor for depression and Xanax for anxiety. [Id.] Salyers advised
detention center staff of those conditions and his medications when he reported for service of his sentence.
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(iii) the Laurel County Detention Center3; (iv) Laurel County, Kentucky; (v) the Laurel County
Fiscal Court; (vi) Jamie Mosley; (vii) David Westerfield; (viii) County Magistrates Roy
Crawford, Danny Smith; Teddy Benge; Jeff Book; Billy Oakley; and Noah Baker4; (ix) Southern
Health Partners, Inc.; and (x) John and Jane Does 1-10. Against the BOP and Samuels, the
plaintiffs alleged that the BOP and Samuels were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. They alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Laurel County Defendants, and medical negligence claims against
Southern Health Partners, Inc. Mrs. Salyers also has asserted a claim for loss of consortium.5
After the plaintiffs amended their original complaint, the Court granted Defendants
Samuels’ and the United States Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) renewed motion to dismiss, finding
that the plaintiffs’ claims against the BOP and the official capacity claims against Samuels were
barred by sovereign immunity. Additionally, the Court concluded that the claims against
Samuels in his individual capacity were deficient because the plaintiffs did not assert that
Samuels expressly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any improper conduct.
[Record No. 31] Thereafter, the Laurel County Defendants again moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims against them under Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3
The plaintiffs concede that the Laurel County Detention Center should be dismissed from this action,
based on the holding in Smith v. Franklin Cnty., 227 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D.K.Y. 2002). [Record No. 38,
p. 18]
4
The plaintiffs concede that Laurel County, Kentucky, is the proper party, and that the claims against
the magistrates in their official capacity should be dismissed. [Record No. 38, p. 18]
5
The plaintiffs correctly note that this is a derivative claim and do not object to the dismissal of this
claim.
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II.
The analysis is essentially the same for motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule
12(c). On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may look only to the pleadings
themselves and exhibits incorporated by reference into the complaint. Weiner v. Klais & Co.,
108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). In other words, the Court is limited to the facts alleged in the
pleadings. When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine
whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Thus, although the complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion
to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
6
As the defendants note, the plaintiffs make no mention of federal pleading standards post Iqbal and
Twombly, instead citing cases from before the modern pleading requirements. In so doing, the plaintiffs
continue to urge the Court to follow the law as they wish it to be, rather than what the law actually is.
However — as the Court previously stated — Iqbal is applicable and its holdings provide the lens through
which this Court views the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. [Record No. 31, p. 10]
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III.
A.
Deliberate Indifference
The Supreme Court has held that “to state a cognizable claim [under the Eighth
Amendment with regard to medical care] a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Therefore, a prisoner must show both “deliberate
indifference” and “serious medical needs.” Id. The Eighth Amendment contains both an
objective and a subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). The objective
component requires the existence of a “sufficiently serious medical need.” Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). For the purpose of this motion, the
defendants do not dispute that Salyers had a serious medical need.7 [Record No. 39, p. 5] Thus,
the determinative issue becomes whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the subjective
component of deliberate indifference.
i.
Individual Laurel County Defendants8
“Deliberate indifference” means that prison medical staff knew of the inmate’s serious
medical needs, but intentionally disregarded an excessive risk of harm to the inmate, or that
prison guards or medical staff intentionally prevented the inmate from receiving prescribed
7
Because the defendants concede that Salyers’ medical condition was serious, the Court need not
address the plaintiffs’ arguments on this point, including the lengthy discussion of Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
895. [See Record No. 38, pp. 6-8.]
8
The plaintiffs conflate their claims against the Laurel County defendants as individuals and against
Laurel County as a governmental entity. Further, to the extent that the plaintiffs attempt to state a claim for
supervisory liability, that claim will be dismissed. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (liability in a § 1983 action
cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior).
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treatment or intentionally delayed or denied him access to medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104-105; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To succeed on a deliberate indifference
claim, a plaintiff must show that the official is aware of facts from which he could have inferred
that an excessive risk to the health of an inmate existed; the official actually drew the inference
that the detainee was at an excessive risk of harm; and, having so inferred, the official failed to
take adequate precautions to prevent the harm from befalling the inmate. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994); see also Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Deliberate indifference may be “manifested by prison
doctors in their response to a prisoner’s needs or by prison [staff] in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added).
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ claims against them are deficient because there
are no facts relating to any specific Laurel County Defendant, nor are there any facts that show
that any of the Laurel County Defendants had knowledge of Salyers’ condition. See Horn v.
Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) (Knowledge that a prisoner has
a serious medical condition “is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.”); see also
Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2005) (The “subjective
component [of knowledge] must be addressed for each defendant individually.”) Although the
plaintiffs have alleged that Salyers exhibited the symptoms of a heart attack, they fail to claim
that any of the individual defendants actually observed those symptoms. [Record No. 27, ¶26]
The Amended Complaint states that Salyers begged “Detention Center personnel” to be taken
to the hospital, but it does not allege that any of these individual defendants are the officials to
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whom Mr. Salyers made those pleas.9 Nor are any of the individual defendants named as those
who placed Salyers on medical watch to follow detoxification procedures. In short, there are no
allegations that any of the individual Laurel County Defendants10 had knowledge of Salyers’
serious condition.
The plaintiffs themselves point out the deficiencies in their pleadings, noting that “based
[on] the facts in the Amended Complaint, Mr. Salyers has alleged that Laurel County was either
grossly negligent in its duties or it has a policy that assumed he was suffering from withdrawal
from Xanax and held in a drunk tank, despite his pleas to be taken to the hospital.” [Record No.
38, pp. 3-4] Yet deliberate indifference “is a very high standard of culpability, exceeding gross
negligence.” Ross v. Duggan, 402 F.3d 575, 590 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). It is also
insufficient under Sixth Circuit precedent to alleged that the defendants should have perceived
Salyers’ serious medical risk but did not. Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir.
2001) (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.”). Likewise, an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel is insufficient to
state a claim for deliberate indifference. Instead, the plaintiffs must assert that officials refused
9
The Amended Complaint references only “corrections officers,” “detention center personnel and/or
contractors” and a “nurse and/or doctor.” The individual Laurel County defendants are not corrections
officers, detention center personnel, or nurses and/or doctors.
10
The individual Laurel County Defendants include David Westerfield, the County Judge Executive,
and Defendants Roy Crawford, Danny Smith, Teddy Benge, Jeff Book, Billy Oakley, and Noah Baker, who
are all county magistrates. As the Court held previously, “when a plaintiff assert[s] that a high-ranking
government official was involved in unconstitutional actions, he or she needs to plead factual information
that allows a court to draw reasonable inferences that the official is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
[Record No. 31, p. 9]
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to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.
Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, the plaintiffs
allegations would allow the Court to plausibly infer that the Laurel County Defendants
intentionally refused to treat Salyers or intentionally treated him incorrectly.
ii.
Laurel County
The plaintiffs also seek to hold Laurel County liable as a municipality. As noted above,
they concede that the Laurel County Detention Center should be dismissed as a defendant,
leaving the Laurel County Fiscal Court and Laurel County, Kentucky, as the defendants subject
to such claims. To hold a government entity liable for the deprivation of constitutional rights,
a plaintiff must prove that the moving force behind the deprivation was a governmental policy
or custom. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 326 (1981) and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Under § 1983,
the plaintiffs must identify a policy, connect it to the county defendants (in this case, the Laurel
County Fiscal Court and Laurel County), and show injury due to the execution of that policy.
Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003).
Because the plaintiffs do not contend that any written policy exists that led to Salyers’
injuries, liability may only arise from custom, if it is “so permanent and well-settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The proffered
custom is that Laurel County has either failed to train its guards and medical personnel to
recognize the difference between drug withdrawal and a serious medical need, or that it has
failed to adopt an adequate policy to treat prisoners with symptoms exhibited by Salyers.
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The Amended Complaint contains the following allegations regarding these alleged
practices:
The mistreatment suffered by Michael Salyers was part of continuing pattern of
misconduct and/or conspiracy, and is the result of policies, procedures, customs
and practices of Laurel County, either written or unwritten. These practices
constitute an arbitrary use of government power, and show a total, intentional and
unreasonable disregard for and the deliberate indifference to the health and wellbeing and constitutional and common law rights of persons incarcerated at the
Laurel County Detention Center, including the Plaintiff. These policies or
customs include, but are not limited to: refusal to render necessary medical care
in light of emergent situations in order to save money at the expense of inmate
health; or a cookie cutter approach to all new inmates with some form of drug use
in their past who exhibit signs that may be applicable to drug withdrawal in order
to save money by not taking expensive trip[s] to the hospital or even having basic
diagnostic tools readily available to determine whether an inmate is undergoing
a serious medical condition instead of withdrawal.
[Record No. 27, ¶49] Further, the plaintiffs argue that there has been “at least one other young
lady who died under allegedly similar circumstances that has been reported in the news in
Kentucky.”11 [Record No. 38, p. 13]
To establish a claim based on inadequate training by a municipality, a plaintiff “must
show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the County has ignored a
history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient
and likely to cause injury.” Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005). In short, the
statement that another woman died under similar circumstances, even if true, does not show “a
history of abuse” such that the municipality disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
11
The plaintiffs also attach an unpublished case from Kentucky state court, White v. Southern Health
Partners, Inc., Nos. 20120-CA-001092-MR, 2012-CA-001106-MR (June 14, 2013), apparently as factual
support of their argument that Southern Health Partners provides inadequate care to inmates. [Record No.
38-1] However, Defendant Southern Health Partners, Inc., is not a party to this motion. And that case
occurred in a county other than Laurel County, Kentucky. The case provides no factual support for the
plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
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action. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must have
pleaded that “the governmental entity was aware of the unconstitutional acts of its employees
and failed to respond.” Sagan v. Sumn Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 726 F. Supp. 2d 868, 886 (M.D.
Tenn. 2010). As explained above, no such allegations exist.
Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly urged caution when courts are asked to infer
that the absence of a policy reflects a deliberate decision to act unconstitutionally. Calhoun v.
Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). Where the plaintiffs allege only one incident, rather than
alleging that the same problem has repeatedly occurred, the Court is loathe to draw such an
inference. Where, as here, a complaint is factually deficient, the plaintiffs are not entitled to fill
in the blanks by conducting discovery. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664-65; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007).
IV.
The Amended Complaint offers no more than a sheer possibility that the Laurel County
defendants are liable for the misconduct charged. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.
Defendants Laurel County Detention Center; Laurel County Kentucky; Laurel
County Fiscal Court; Jamie Mosley; David Westerfield; Roy Crawford; Danny Smith; Teddy
Benge; Jeff Book; Billy Oakley; and Noah Baker’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion
for judgment on the pleadings [Record No. 32] is GRANTED.
2.
The claims asserted in this action against these Defendants are DISMISSED, with
prejudice. The plaintiffs’ claims against Southern Health Partners, Inc., remain.
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This 21st day of April, 2014.
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