Hoover v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED (1) that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 11 ] is DENIED; and (2) that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 12 ] is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 09/29/2014.(KJA)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON
ANTHONY D. HOOVER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

Case No. 6:13-cv-157-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

***

This

matter

is

before

the

Court

upon

cross-motions

for

summary judgment [DE 11, 12] on Plaintiff’s appeal, pursuant to
42

U.S.C.

§

405(g),

of

the

Commissioner’s

denial

of

his

application for disability insurance benefits. The Court, having
reviewed

the

record

and

the

parties’

motions,

will

deny

Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendant’s motion.
I.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), conducts a five-step
analysis to determine disability:
1. An individual who is working and engaging in
substantial
gainful
activity
is
not
disabled,
regardless of the claimant's medical condition.
2. An individual who is working but does not have a
“severe” impairment which significantly limits his
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities
is not disabled.
1 

3. If an individual is not working and has a severe
impairment which “meets the duration requirement and
is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed
impairment(s)”, then he is disabled regardless of
other factors.
4. If a decision cannot be reached based on current
work activity and medical facts alone, and the
claimant has a severe impairment, then the Secretary
reviews the claimant's residual functional capacity
and the physical and mental demands of the claimant's
previous work. If the claimant is able to continue to
do this previous work, then he is not disabled.
5. If the claimant cannot do any work he did in the
past because of a severe impairment, then the
Secretary considers his residual functional capacity,
age, education, and past work experience to see if he
can do other work. If he cannot, the claimant is
disabled.
Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110
(6th

Cir.

1994)

(citing

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1520

(1982)).

“The

burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four
steps of this process to prove that he is disabled.” Id. “If the
analysis
claimant

reaches
is

the

not

fifth

disabled,

step

without

the

burden

a

finding

that

the

transfers

to

the

Secretary.” Id.

II.
Plaintiff

was

thirty-seven

years

of

age

on

his

alleged

onset date and forty-four years of age on the date of the ALJ's
decision (Tr. 11, 35, 187, 191, 230). He had a limited education
and past relevant work as a construction worker and mobile home
2 

worker (Tr. 35-38, 49-50, 63, 233-41, 257-58, 305). Plaintiff
alleged

he

was

disabled

due

to

back

problems

and

manic

depression (Tr. 257). He also alleged problems with his left arm
beginning in January 2011 (Tr. 277, 290).
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and Supplemental Security Income
on March 17, 2010, alleging he became disabled on January 1,
2005 (Tr. 187, 191, 230). After a hearing, an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision on February 21, 2012, denying
Plaintiff's applications (Tr. 11, 32).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's application using the fivestep sequential evaluation process (Tr. 15-16). At step one, the
ALJ

noted

evidence

indicated

Plaintiff

had

worked

since

his

alleged onset date, but the ALJ found, for the purpose of his
decision,

that

Plaintiff's

work

activity

was

not

substantial

gainful activity (Tr. 16-17). At steps two and three, the ALJ
found Plaintiff had severe impairments, but he did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a
listed impairment (Tr. 17). The ALJ then found Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with
additional limitations (Tr. 19). At step four, the ALJ found
Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work (Tr. 24).
Proceeding to the fifth and final step, the ALJ found Plaintiff
3 

could perform other work as identified by the vocational expert
(VE) and, therefore, was not disabled (Tr. 24-26, 63-64).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review
on

June

27,

2013

(Tr.

1).

Plaintiff

has

exhausted

his

administrative remedies, and this case is ripe for review under
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & 1383(c)(3).
III.
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to an
inquiry

into

whether

the

ALJ’s

findings

were

supported

by

substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Warner v. Comm'r of
Soc.

Sec.,

375

F.3d

387,

390

(6th

Cir.

2004).

Substantial

evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v.
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir.
1994).

This

Court

may

not

try

the

case

de

novo,

resolve

conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility.
Id.

“As

long

as

substantial

evidence

supports

the

Commissioner's decision, we must defer to it, even if there is
substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an
opposite conclusion....” Warner, 375 F.3d at 390 (quoting Wright
v.

Massanari,

321

F.3d

611,

614

4 

(6th

Cir.

2003);

Key

v.

Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
IV.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ (1) ignored the opinions of his treating physicians and
failed to give appropriate weight to their opinions or to give
adequate reasoning for “refusing to accept the opinions of two
treating

physicians;”

(2)

failed

to

consider

the

combined

effects of all of his impairments without regard to whether
those

impairments,

if

considered

separately,

would

be

of

sufficient severity to render Plaintiff disabled; (3) failed to
consider

the

durational

requirement

of

substantial

gainful

activity and not merely the ability to find a job and physically
perform it; and, ultimately, (4) rendered a decision which was
unsupported by the evidence of record.

For the reasons stated

below, the Court disagrees and concludes that the decision of
the ALJ is adequately supported by substantial evidence.
A.
First, Plaintiff asserts that ALJ should have accepted that
his treating physician, Betty Crispin, M.D., had been treating
him

for

many

years

and

given

controlling

weight

to

her

assessment of limitations that would clearly not allow him to
work.

He argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the weight to
5 

be given to that assessment when he afforded it less weight
because he found that Dr. Crispin had seen Plaintiff only a few
times

and

had

not

treated

Plaintiff’s

back

when,

in

fact,

Plaintiff had been treated at the same office where Dr. Crispin
worked

since

failing
treating

to

2004.

afford

Next,

he

argues

that

appropriate

weight

to

psychiatrist,

Dr.

Zev

the

the

Zusman,

ALJ

erred

opinion

who

of

assigned

in
his
him

emotional limitations which would not have permitted substantial
gainful work activity.

The Court has carefully considered these

arguments and, ultimately, disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument
as the ALJ’s decision about the weight to be afforded to the
opinion of Drs. Crispin and Zusman is supported by evidence of
record.
In

evaluating

a

doctor’s

opinion,

the

ALJ

considers

a

number of factors, including whether the doctor examined the
claimant, whether the doctor treated the claimant, the evidence
the doctor presents to support his or her opinion, whether the
doctor's opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and
the

doctor's

416.927(c).

specialty.
Generally,

See
a

20

treating

C.F.R.

§§

physician’s

404.1527(c),
opinion

is

entitled to more weight and an ALJ must give good reasons for
discounting a treating physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
6 

710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013); Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).

Where “the opinion of

a treating source is not accorded controlling weight, an ALJ
must apply certain factors ... in determining what weight to
give the opinion.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
Specifically,

§

404.1527(d)

of

the

SSA's

regulations

prescribes that the ALJ is to consider (1) the length of the
treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, (2) the
nature

and

extent

supportability

of

of
the

the

treatment

opinion,

(4)

relationship,
the

(3)

consistency

the

of

the

opinion with the record as a whole, and (5) the specialization
of the treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The regulation
further

assures

claimants

that

reasons

in

notice

determination

our

of

“[w]e

will
or

always

give

decision

for

good
the

weight we give your treating source's opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2).

Further, although doctors' opinions about what

a

still

claimant

can

do

or

the

claimant's

restrictions

are

relevant evidence, such opinions are not determinative because
the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant's RFC.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(2), 404.1513(b)(6), 404.1527(d)(2),
404.1545(a)(3),
416.927(d)(2),

404.1546(c),
416.945(a)(3),

416.912(b)(2),
416.946(c);

SSR

416.913(b)(6),
96-5p,

61

Fed.

Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
7 

391 F. App'x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010); Poe v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 342 F. App'x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009).
The

ALJ

in

of

Drs.

opinions

the

present

Crispin

matter

and

dealt

properly

Zusman.

The

with

the

did

not

ALJ

“completely ignore[. . .]” the opinions of Dr. Crispin and Dr.
Zusman

as

Plaintiff

contends.

(Tr.

23-24);

[DE

11

at

4].

Rather, he engaged with their observations and opinions in an
in-depth and meaningful way.
of the ALJ’s decision.
the

opinions

offered

This much is clear from the face

Further, while he ultimately discounted
by

Drs.

Crispin

and

Zusman,

the

ALJ

considered their opinions and provided good reasons, supported
by substantial evidence, for such treatment of their opinions.
(Tr. 23-24, 922-25, 954-58.)
It was not error for the ALJ to note and consider relevant
the fact that Dr. Crispin, while a treating physician, did not
have a long relationship with her patient as one might normally
expect for a treating physician.

(Tr. 23, 767-78, 871-77, 927-

29); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Dr. Crispin
candidly admitted in her January 2012 opinion that she had seen
Plaintiff
which

only

serves

conclusion
Plaintiff's

intermittently
as

that

since

substantial

evidence

she

a

condition.

lacked

(Tr.
8 

March
to

2011,
support

longitudinal
954);

see

a

statement
the

ALJ’s

perspective

on

20

§§

C.F.R.

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). No one disputes that Plaintiff
had been treated at the same office where Dr. Crispin worked
since 2004, [De 11 at 2-3], but, as Dr. Crispin acknowledged,
she did not have contact with Plaintiff until March 2, 2011,
when she saw him as a "new" patient (Tr. 776, 954).

In other

words, the ALJ’s conclusion concerning the weight to be accorded
to her opinion was supported by the evidence in the record.
long-standing
physicians

relationship

in

the

office

with

other,

where

Dr.

individual

Crispin

Any

treating

practiced

is,

frankly, irrelevant to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Crispin’s
basis for evaluating Plaintiff.
Additionally,

the

evidence

of

record

supports

the

ALJ’s

conclusion that Dr. Crispin's treatment records do not support
her
(Tr.

opinion
17,

concerning
22,

23);

the

extent

see

20

of

Plaintiff’s

C.F.R.

§§

impairment.

404.1527(c)(3),

416.927(c)(3); Walters, 127 F.3d at 529-30; Bogle v. Sullivan,
998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993). As the Commissioner has
correctly pointed out, Dr. Crispin rarely treated Plaintiff for
his alleged back pain, and she did not note significant clinical
findings
opinion.

that

would

(Tr.

at

support
954-58;

the
see

extreme
also

limitations
Tr.

at

776

in

her

(noting

Plaintiff’s primary complaints of chest pain, headaches, left
arm numbness, and neck pain, with only a passing reference to
9 

upper back pain during a March 2, 2011, examination); Tr. at 777
(noting

Plaintiff

had

some

muscle

spasm

in

his

trapezius

muscles, exhibited positive straight leg raising and bowstring
testing, and complained of pain to palpation in his cervical and
lumbar

spine

but

describing

Plaintiff's

neck

pain

and

radiculopathy as new and his back pain as stable during March 2,
2011, examination; Tr. 767-68, 774-75 (noting lungs and heart
were

normal

and

that

Plaintiff

exhibited

muscle

spasm

and

tenderness in his trapezius and lumbar spine and complained of
pain when moving his neck but with no indication of positive
straight leg raising or bowstring testing during visits on March
11

and

18,

2011);

Tr.

at

769-71,

873-74

(noting

return

for

fasting laboratory testing with unchanged objective findings and
the fact that physician would no longer provide Plaintiff with
prescriptions for controlled medications because marijuana and
other substances not prescribed by her were found in his urine
drug screen the previous month); Tr. 871-72) (noting November 1,
2011, visit during which Plaintiff was only taking klonopin and
only

sought

refills

of

his

medications

for

hypertension

and

coughing and a referral to a pain clinic for his alleged neck
pain; noting display of tenderness in Plaintiff’s cervical spine
with otherwise unremarkable objective clinical findings); Tr. at
927 (noting treatment for hypertension and some tenderness in
10 

his cervical spine upon examination at January 9, 2012, visit);
Tr. at 772-73, 778 (noting that diagnostic studies ordered by
Dr. Crispin did not reveal significant findings as X-rays and an
MRI scan of Plaintiff's cervical spine showed degenerative disc
disease and cervical spasm with no cord signal abnormality, no
disc extrusion, only mild disc protrusion, and no pathologic
marrow edema).
Further, Dr. Crispin's clinical findings also undermine her
opinion regarding the deleterious effects of Plaintiff's mental
condition on his ability to work (Tr. 954-55, 958). Dr. Crispin
noted Plaintiff was alert; was oriented to time, place, and
person; had normal insight and judgment; and had a normal or
appropriate mood and affect (Tr. 768, 775, 776, 872, 874, 928).
Dr. Crispin's findings do not indicate Plaintiff's anxiety or
depression would have affected his attention, concentration, or
any other work-related activities. Dr. Crispin may have relied
on Plaintiff's allegations regarding the effects of his mental
condition

and

alleged

pain

on

his

ability

to

work,

but

a

claimant's subjective complaints are not a sufficient basis for
an opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); Tate v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 467 F. App'x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2012);
Walters, 127 F.3d at 529-30; Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347-48. Dr.
Crispin's objective findings and observations do not indicate
11 

Plaintiff's

mental

condition

was

as

limiting

as

she

opined,

which provides a basis of substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's decision to give little weight to Dr. Crispin's opinion.
See
F.3d

20

C.F.R.

at

§§

529-30;

conservative
undermines

404.1527(c)(3),
Bogle,

treatment

the

more

998
of

extreme

416.927(c)(3);

F.2d

at

Plaintiff
aspects

Walters,
Finally,

347-48.
by

of

Dr.

her

127
the

Cripsin

opinion.

also

See

20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(ii), 416.927(c)(2)(ii); Helm v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 405 F. App'x 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2011).
In other words, while Dr. Crispin did examine Plaintiff,
her

objective

medical

findings

do

not

indicate

Plaintiff's

physical or mental condition was as limiting as she opined,
which provides a basis of substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Crispin's opinion is inconsistent with
the record as a whole and his decision to give little weight to
Dr. Crispin's opinion. (Tr. 16-24; Tr. 311-24, 327-400, 402-05,
413-27, 429-58, 472-93, 497-512, 514-95, 726-31, 733-53, 798,
856,

864,

940-52

conclusions
doctors

of

Plaintiff

and

(recording

as

well

medical

who

found

as

observations,
conservative

professionals
no

who

abnormalities

examinations,
treatment

examined
regarding

by

and

and
other

treated

Plaintiff’s

lungs, hearts, musculoskeletal system, or neurological function
and/or who did not otherwise indicate in their records that they
12 

believed that he was as limited as Dr. Crispin opined); (Tr.
313, 324, 334, 346, 350, 360, 367, 373-75, 386, 392-93, 475-76,
488, 733, 740, 747) (recording and noting diagnostic studies,
including x-rays and MRI scans of Plaintiff's spine, which did
not

reveal

noteworthy

404.1527(c)(4),

abnormalities);

416.927(c)(4);

Walters,

see
127

20

C.F.R.

F.3d

at

§§

529-30;

Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347-48; Helm, 405 F. App'x at 1001-02; see
also Blacha v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231
(6th

Cir.

1990)

(noting

claimant's

conservative

treatment

undermined his subjective complaints of disabling limitations).
The

opinion

of

Robert

Brown,

M.D.,

the

State

agency

medical consultant, also supports the ALJ's decision to give
little weight to Dr. Crispin's opinion (Tr. 23, 104-06). State
agency consultants are highly qualified specialists who are also
experts in the Social Security disability programs, and their
opinions

may

supports

their

be

entitled

opinions.

to
See

great
20

weight

C.F.R.

§§

if

the

evidence

404.1527(e)(2)(i),

416.927(e)(2)(i); SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,466-01 (July 2,
1996). Although the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt
by finding he was more limited than found by Dr. Brown, Dr.
Brown's opinion is supported by the record and provides further
evidence to support the ALJ's decision to give less weight than
he might otherwise give to Dr. Crispin's opinion. See 20 C.F.R.
13 

§§

404.1512(b)(8),

404.1545(a)(3),

404.1527(c)(3),

416.912(b)(8),

(c)(4),

(e)(2)(ii),

416.927(c)(3),

(c)(4),

(e)(2)(ii), 416.945(a)(3); SSR 96-6p; Norris v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 461 F. App'x 433, 438-40 (6th Cir. 2012); McGrew v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App'x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009); McClanahan v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 839 (6th Cir. 2006). Given
the evidence of record, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
decision to give little weight to Dr. Crispin's opinion.
The

ALJ

also

provided

good

reasons,

supported

by

substantial evidence, for discounting Dr. Zusman's opinion (Tr.
23-24, 922-25). As the ALJ noted, Dr. Zusman saw Plaintiff only
a few times, and he did not provide a basis for his opinion.
(Tr.

24,

922-25);

416.927(c)(2),

see

20

(c)(3).

C.F.R.

Dr.

§§

Zusman's

404.1527(c)(2),
treatment

(c)(3),

records,

as

discussed by the ALJ, also do not support his opinion (Tr. 17,
22-24,

407-11,

878-80);

see

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1527(c)(3),

416.927(c)(3); Walters, 127 F.3d at 529-30; Bogle, 998 F.2d at
347-48.

Dr.

Zusman

saw

Plaintiff

twice

in

April

2009,

and,

although he noted Plaintiff was anxious and depressed, his other
clinical findings were unremarkable, including normal speech,
goal-directed thought processes, no delusions or hallucinations,
and no suicidal ideation. (Tr. 408, 411). Dr. Zusman did not see
Plaintiff

again

until

November
14 

and

December

2011,

when

his

clinical findings were essentially the same. (Tr. 879-80). Dr.
Zusman's

unremarkable

extreme

limitations

objective
in

his

findings
opinion

do
and

not

support

instead

the

provide

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision to discount
Dr.

Zusman's

opinion.

Moreover,

Dr.

Zusman's

minimal

and

conservative treatment of Plaintiff provides another reason why
Dr. Zusman's opinion was not entitled to any relevant weight
(Tr.

24);

see

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1527(c)(2)(ii),

416.927(c)(2)(ii); Helm, 405 F. App'x at 1001-02.
Dr. Zusman's opinion also is inconsistent with the record
as a whole, as discussed by the ALJ (Tr. 16-24). See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4); Walters, 127 F.3d at 529-30;
Bogle,

998

examination

F.2d
of

at

347-48.

Plaintiff

A

by

consultative

Emily

Skaggs,

psychological
Psy.D.,

was

unremarkable, including normal attention and concentration, no
memory deficits, normal speech and thought processes, and intact
judgment and insight. (Tr. 719-24). Dr. Skaggs opined Plaintiff
had only slight or moderate limitations, meaning Plaintiff was
able to function at least satisfactorily, which further supports
the ALJ's findings. (Tr. 24, 722-23). Other records indicate
Plaintiff had no mental health complaints or he specifically
denied

anxiety

or

depression;

mental

examinations

also

were

unremarkable, although he exhibited increased signs when he was
15 

abusing drugs or alcohol (Tr. 311, 314, 316, 318-20, 322-23,
328, 337, 345, 356, 367, 380, 386, 402-05, 414-23, 425-27, 43037, 439-40, 442-48, 455-58, 480, 483, 489, 492, 515, 530, 54849, 735, 738, 742, 745, 749, 752, 864, 940-42, 948-49). The
medical records do not indicate Plaintiff's mental condition was
as limiting as Dr. Zusman opined and instead provide substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's decision to discount Dr. Zusman's
opinion.
In

addition,

the

opinions

of

Corine

Samwel,

Ph.D.,

and

Robert Hess, Ph.D., the State agency psychological consultants,
support the ALJ's decision to discount Dr. Zusman's opinion.
(Tr. 24, 74-76, 102-04); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i),
416.927(e)(2)(i); SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,466-01 (July 2,
1996). Although the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt
by

finding

he

limitations,
Plaintiff

did

had

the

severe

opinions

not

have

a

mental
of

impairments

and
Dr.

resulting

Dr.

Samwel

and

Hess

severe

mental

impairment

that

provides

further evidence undermining Dr. Zusman's opinion. See 20 C.F.R.
§§

404.1512(b)(8),

404.1527(c)(4),

(e)(2)(ii),

416.912(b)(8),

416.927(c)(4), (e)(2)(ii); SSR 96-6p; Norris, 461 F. App'x at
438-40; McGrew, 343 F. App'x at 32; McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 839.
Thus, the record provides substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's decision to discount Dr. Zusman's opinion.
16 

B.
Next, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly considered
Plaintiff's condition as a whole in rendering his findings (Tr.
16-24); see Loy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d
1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990); Gooch v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 591-92 (6th Cir. 1987). Moreover, the ALJ
found Plaintiff had "severe impairments" and did not have a
"combination

of

impairment,

impairments"

which

is

that

sufficient

met
to

or

equaled

establish

a

that

listed

the

ALJ

consider the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments (Tr.
17); see Loy, 901 F.2d at 1310; Neeley v. Astrue, No. 6:12-cv27-JMH,

2012

WL

3683532,

at

*5

(E.D.

Ky.

Aug.

27,

2012).

Plaintiff also failed to explain in what way the ALJ did not
consider the combined effect of his impairments, and he failed
to

show

that

his

impairments

caused

disabling

or

additional

limitations on his ability to work. See Neeley, 2012 WL 3683532,
at *5.
C.
Plaintiff also offers a conclusory argument that that the
ALJ should have considered a "durational requirement," but he
did expand on his argument or provide any citations to support
such an argument. [DE 11 at 2.] The Court considers it waived
and will address this argument no further.
17 

See Hollon ex rel.

Hollon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir.
2006); see also McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th
Cir.

1997)

("'[I]ssues

unaccompanied

by

some

adverted
effort

at

to

in

a

developed

perfunctory

manner,

argumentation,

are

deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to
. . . put flesh on its bones.'" (internal citation omitted)).
V.
Ultimately, Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving his
condition

caused

disabling

limitations.

See

42

U.S.C.

§§

423(d)(5)(A), 1382(a)(3)(H)(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c),
404.1529(a), 416.912(a), (c), 416.929(a); Foster, 279 F.3d at
353; Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347. The ALJ properly considered the
relevant evidence and performed his duty as the trier of fact of
resolving any conflicts in the evidence. See Walters, 127 F.3d
at 528. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of
Plaintiff's RFC and hypothetical question to the VE (Tr. 19,
63). Therefore, the VE's testimony provides substantial evidence
to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform other
work. (Tr. 25-26, 63-64); see Foster, 279 F.3d at 356-57; Varley
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779-80 (6th
Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings and

18 

his

conclusion

that

Plaintiff

was

not

disabled

within

the

meaning of the Social Security Act.
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court concludes
that

Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

Defendant

is

warranted.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
(1)

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 11]

is DENIED; and
(2)

that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 12]

is GRANTED.
This the 29th day of September, 2014.

19