Caffie v. Holland
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Caffie's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Record No. 1 ] is DENIED. 2. This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Courts docket. 3. Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously in favor of the Respondent. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 07/08/2014.(KJA)cc: COR, mailed paper copy to pro se filer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)
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LARRY CAFFIE,
Petitioner,
V.
WARDEN J. C. HOLLAND,
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 6: 14-67-DCR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Larry Caffie is an inmate confined at the United States Penitentiary-McCreary in Pine
Knot, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney, Caffie has filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his sentence for a variety of
reasons. A § 2241 petition is not the proper avenue for obtaining the relief sought. As a
result, the petition will be denied.
I.
Following a 2006 bench trial, Caffie was found guilty of three counts of distributing
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(c) and one count of possession
with the intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A)(iii). United States v. Caffie, No. 1:06-CR-10029–001 (C. D. Ill. 2006). He was
sentenced to life imprisonment and ten years of supervised release on the possession charge,
and 168 months of imprisonment on the distribution charges, to run concurrently. [Id.,
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Record No. 63 therein]1 Caffie’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. United
States v. Caffie, 310 F. App’x 24 (7th Cir. 2009).
On July 2, 2009, Caffie filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Caffie v. United States, No. 1:09-CV-01231-JES (C.D. Ill.)
[Record No. 1 therein]. Caffie motion was based on an argument that the United States
failed to comply with the notice provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 851 and that the court improperly
enhanced his sentence due to his prior drug convictions. He further alleged that the court
improperly sentenced him for crack cocaine, that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel both at trial and on appeal, and that he was denied a meaningful appeal.
On June 16, 2011, the sentencing court denied Caffie’s § 2255 motion. [Id., Record
No. 11 therein] The court determined that Caffie had waived his claims challenging his
enhancement under § 851(a) because these were claims that should have been raised on
direct appeal. [Id.] The district court denied the remainder of Caffie’s claims because the
Seventh Circuit had previously rejected his arguments on direct appeal and because they
lacked merit. [Id., pp. 3-9 therein] Caffie also was denied a certificate of appealability.
[Record No. 27 therein; see also, Caffie v. United States v. United States, No. 11-2805 (7th
Cir. Feb. 13, 2012)] Thereafter, Caffie filed two motions, re-raising the same arguments in
various forms. [Id., Record No. 96 therein]; see also Caffie v. United States, No. 1:09-CV01231-JES (C.D. Ill) [Record No. 28 therein]. Both motions were construed as unauthorized
second or successive § 2255 petitions, and were denied.
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On February 13, 2012, the sentencing court entered an order granting Caffie’s motion to reduce the
sentence on the distribution conviction from 168 months to 140 months. [Id., Record No. 91 therein]
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Through the current § 2241 petition, Caffie asserts that his sentence was improperly
enhanced for a variety of reasons. [Record No. 1] He argues that he is actually innocent of
being a career offender, and that the district court should have imposed a sentence under the
guidelines rather than the statutorily-mandated term of life imprisonment based on his two
prior felony drug convictions. [Record No. 1, p. 4] Caffie also claims that his life sentence
is illegal because: (i) his two prior convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses for the
purposes of a sentence enhancement; (ii) the government did not file notice of its intention to
seek a sentence enhancement based on his prior convictions; and (iii) the district court did
not inquire about his prior convictions before enhancing his sentence in violation of § 851(b).
[Record No. 1, pp. 4-9]
II.
In conducting an initial review of habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the Court
must deny the relief sought “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)).
Because Caffie is not represented by an attorney, the Court evaluates his petition under a
more lenient standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321
F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). At this stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts Caffie’s
factual allegations as true and liberally construes his legal claims in his favor.
III.
Here, Caffie is not challenging the execution of his sentence under § 2241. United
States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Instead, he seeks to attack the
constitutionality of his life sentence on constitutional grounds. A federal prisoner may
challenge the legality of his detention under § 2241 only if his remedy under § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective. Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 2012). The
remedy under § 2255 is not considered “inadequate or ineffective” merely because relief
under that section has been denied previously, because the petitioner is procedurally barred
from pursuing relief under § 2255, or because he has been denied permission to file a second
or successive motion to vacate. Wooten, 677 F.3d at 307; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d
753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999).
To demonstrate inadequacy or ineffectiveness, a petitioner must establish that he is
actually innocent. Id. at 307. Actual innocence is defined as “factual innocence, not mere
legal insufficiency.” Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 590 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). A petitioner satisfy this burden by showing that
there has been “an intervening change in the law that establishes [his] actual innocence.” See
United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001).
In his § 2241 petition, Caffie simply reiterates his prior claims that have been rejected
numerous times. These arguments are impermissible under § 2241. See Hodgson v. Warren,
622 F.3d 591, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to
have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”) (quoting Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). Caffie previously raised these same arguments in his
§ 2255 motion and on appeal. That Caffie was unsuccessful on these claims in his § 2255
motion and was denied a certificate of appealability does not entitle him to relief under §
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2241.
Simply put, the remedy under § 2255 is not inadequate where a petitioner has
previously asserted a claim but was denied relief. Charles, 180 F.3d at 756-58; Rumler v.
Hemingway, 43 F. App'x 946, 947 (6th Cir. 2002). Section 2241 is not an additional,
alternative, or supplemental remedy to the one provided in § 2255. Charles, 180 F.3d at 758;
see also Lucas v. Berkebile, No. 7:11–28–HRW, 2012 WL 2342888, at *2 (E.D. Ky. June 19,
2012) (“Section 2241 is not an available to a petitioner who merely wishes to reargue claims
considered and rejected in a prior motion under Section 2255.”).
Further, Caffie does not allege that he is actually innocent of any of his convictions.
Instead, he alleges only that the district court improperly enhanced his sentence to a life term.
Claims of sentencing errors do not qualify as “actual innocence” claims under § 2241. See
Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (2003); Hayes v. Holland, 473 F. App’x 501, 502
(6th Cir. 2012) (“The savings clause of section 2255(e) does not apply to sentencing
claims”). The savings clause of § 2255 extends only to petitioners asserting actual innocence
claims regarding their convictions, not enhanced sentences. Jones v. Castillo, 489 F. App’x
864, 866 (6th Cir. 2012); Mackey v. Berkebile, No. 7:12-CV-10-KSF, 2012 WL 4433316
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-6202 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (sentencing error
claims do not qualify as claims of actual innocence under the savings clause).
Moreover, a petitioner generally must “show an intervening change in the law that
establishes his actual innocence . . . to obtain the benefit of the savings clause.” Enigwe v.
Bezy, 92 F. App’x 315, 317 (6th Cir. 2004). Importantly, the cases Caffie cites in support of
his petition do not apply retroactively. See Missouri v. Frye, ___U.S.___, 132 S.Ct. 1399
(2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). Neither of these cases
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announces a new constitutional rule and, therefore, do not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. See In re Liddell, 722 F.3d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 2013); Buenrostro v. United
States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); In re King, 697 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 2012); Hare
v. United States, 688 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1183
(10th Cir. April 23, 2013).
IV.
Caffie has not established that his remedy under § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective,
nor has he alleged a viable claim of actual innocence. For these reasons, Caffie has failed to
demonstrate that he is entitled to proceed under § 2241. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.
Caffie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[Record No. 1] is DENIED.
2.
This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.
3.
Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously in favor of the Respondent.
This 8th day of July, 2014.
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