Caldwell v. USA et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. The petition for writ of mandamus [R. 1 ] which Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr. has filed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; 2. The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment; and 3. This proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's active docket.Case Terminated. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 11/23/2015. (RBB)cc: COR, paper ocpy to Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr., via US Mail.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
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CALVIN C. CALDWELL, JR.,
Petitioner,
V.
USA, et al.,
Respondents.

Civil Action No. 6:14-225-DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

*** *** *** ***
Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr. is an inmate confined by the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) in the Mansfield Correctional Institution which is
located in Mansfield, Ohio.1 Proceeding without counsel, Caldwell has filed a petition
for writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651. [R. 1] Caldwell complains
about the status of his pending state court criminal proceeding, and asks this Court to
enter an order directing the Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) to return $2,200.00 in
currency which it allegedly seized from him on February 11, 2013.
Caldwell has named three respondents to this action: (1) the United States of
America; (2) Terry Beckner, whom Caldwell identifies as an official of the Laurel County
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office in London, Kentucky; and (3) Jackie Steele, whom
Caldwell identifies as an official in the Laurel County Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office
in London, Kentucky. Caldwell has previously been granted in forma pauperis status in
this proceeding. [R. 9]

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Caldwell’s ODRC inmate number is 625-525.

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The Court conducts a preliminary review of Caldwell’s mandamus petition
because he asserts claims against government officials, and because he has been
granted in forma pauperis status in this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A. In
such cases, a district court must dismiss any action which (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
Because Caldwell is proceeding without an attorney, the Court liberally construes
his claims and accepts his factual allegations as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

For the

reasons set forth below, however, the Court will dismiss Caldwell’s mandamus petition
without prejudice based on federal abstention principles.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION
On June 21, 2013, Caldwell, along with another defendant, was indicted in the
Laurel County Circuit Court and charged with Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in
the First Degree, as well as two counts of being a Persistent Felony Offender.
Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Burk W. Webb, Jr., and Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr., No. 13CR-111-002 (Division I) (“the State Court Criminal Case”).

The publicly available

indictment alleges that the trafficking offense occurred on February 11, 2013, in Laurel
County, Kentucky.
In his mandamus petition, Caldwell alleges that the KSP improperly seized
$2,200.00 from him when he was arrested on February 11, 2013; that he hired a local
attorney, Kenneth A. Sizemore of London, Kentucky, to represent him to recover the

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seized funds; that as a result of the State Court Criminal Case, Kentucky officials placed
a detainer on him and served it on the Warden of the Mansfield Correctional Institution;
and that Kenneth Sizemore failed to recover the funds seized by the KSP. Caldwell
seeks an order from this Court directing the respondents to return to him the $2,200.00
which the KSP seized from him.
DISCUSSION
The publicly available docket sheet of the State Court Criminal Case reflects that
numerous events have transpired in that proceeding, but that as of November 20, 2015,
the State Court Criminal Case is still pending against Caldwell in the Laurel County
Circuit Court. As for Caldwell’s current allegation that nothing is being done in that case
to cause his seized money to be returned to him, the docket sheet of the State Court
Criminal Case reveals that on July 27, 2015, Caldwell filed a pro se motion requesting
the return of the seized $2,200.00; that on August 11, 2015, the Laurel County Circuit
Court denied Caldwell’s motion; and that a status hearing is scheduled for
approximately eleven months from now, on October 24, 2016. The August 11, 2015,
Order explains the status of both the criminal charges against Caldwell, and the status
of his request for the refund of the seized $2,200.00 in currency.2 The August 11, 2015,
Order states:
ORDER OVERRULING MOTION TO
RETURN SEIZED FUNDS
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This matter is before the Court upon Motion To Return Seized
Funds filed by the Defendant, Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr.
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Caldwell alleges that the State Court Criminal Case was dismissed on May 17, 2013, see R. 1. p. 5, but
the docket sheet reveals that the Laurel County Grand Jury indicted Burk and Caldwell on June 21, 2013.
The August 11, 2015, summarizes the current status of the criminal charges pending against Caldwell.

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The Defendant alleges that upon his arrest $2,200.00 was “seized”
by the Kentucky State Police. The Court will note from the record that the
above Indictment has been dismissed administratively because the
Defendant is currently a fugitive. However, as the Court’s Order of
October 29, 2013, clearly reflects, the warrant of arrest for Defendant on
this Indictment is still active. Moreover, upon the Defendant’s arrest, the
Indictment may be re-instated by motion of the Commonwealth. When
this Indictment is re-instated upon Defendant’s return to the
Commonwealth, then the ultimate disposition of the case will
determine whether or not a forfeiture order will be entered pertaining
to Defendant’s cash. Until that time, however, the Kentucky State
Police will continue to hold the cash as evidence pending final
disposition.
[Order of 8/11/15 in the State Court Criminal Case (emphasis added)]
Thus, if the June 21, 2013 Indictment issued in the State Court Criminal Case is
reinstated (as the Laurel County Circuit Judge Gregory A. Lay indicates that it likely will
be) Caldwell will in fact face further prosecution upon his return to the Commonwealth of
Kentucky after he completes service of his current ODRC sentence. The Laurel County
Circuit Court clearly explained in its August 11, 2015 order that it retains authority to
render any and all future decisions relating to the disposition of the $2,200.00 in
currency seized from Caldwell on February 11, 2013. Thus, any and all issues relating
to those funds have been, and will remain, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Laurel Circuit Court. In this mandamus proceeding, Caldwell effectively asks this Court,
a federal district court, to intervene in the State Court Criminal Case, override the Laurel
County Circuit Court’s authority and/or micro-manage his criminal proceeding, and
direct the KSP to return his money to him.
Based on the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91
S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), Caldwell cannot obtain such relief from the named

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respondents in this mandamus proceeding. Under the Younger doctrine, a federal court
must decline to interfere with pending state proceedings that involve important state
interests unless extraordinary circumstances are present. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
“Younger abstention applies when the state proceeding (1) is currently pending, (2)
involves an important state interest, and (3) affords the plaintiff an adequate opportunity
to raise constitutional claims.” Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074
(6th Cir. 1998); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982); Hayse v. Wethington, 110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997).
All three factors that support abstention under Younger are present in this case.
First, the State Court Criminal Case is currently pending in a Kentucky state court,
which includes the future disposition of the seized $2,200.00 in currency. Second, the
State Court Criminal Case implicates an important state interest--a criminal prosecution-an area in which federal courts traditionally decline to interfere. See Younger, 401 U.S.
at 43–45; Leveye v. Metropolitan Public Defender’s Office, 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding that state court criminal proceedings traditionally implicate an
important state interest) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45). Third, no evidence exists
that the State Court Criminal Case, or any appeal that Caldwell could take therefrom,
would not provide an opportunity for Caldwell to raise his claims relating to his seized
money.
Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather based on “strong
policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n
v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512

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(1986). That logic clearly applies in this case: if this Court were to entertain Caldwell’s
mandamus petition, in which he asks this Court to order the KSP to return money
seized in connection his criminal arrest, it would be impermissibly interfering with the
State Court Criminal Case currently pending in the Laurel Circuit Court, as well as the
Order entered therein on August 11, 2015. The Court declines to do so. See Carroll,
139 F.3d at 1074-75 (“When a person is the target of an ongoing state action involving
important state interests, a party cannot interfere with the pending state action by
maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that could have been raised in the
state case.”); Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Squire v.
Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006); Sun Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921
F.2d 635, 68-42 (6th Cir. 1990).
Abstention is thus appropriate in this case with respect to Caldwell’s claims
seeking mandamus/injunctive relief.

See Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075 (holding that

Younger abstention may be applied where the plaintiff seeks both declaratory relief and
damages). A district court deciding to abstain under Younger has the option of either
dismissing the case without prejudice or holding the case in abeyance. Coles, 448 F.3d
at 866 (citing Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075). The Court elects to dismiss this proceeding
without prejudice instead of holding it abeyance.
Finally, the Court observes that the two mandamus statutes which Caldwell cites
provide no authority or support for the relief which he seeks. Although “[t]he district
courts ... have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed

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to the plaintiff,” 28 U.S.C. 1361, the Supreme Court has explained that mandamus relief
is a drastic remedy to be provided only in extraordinary circumstances. See Kerr v.
United States, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Specifically, mandamus relief is appropriate
only if the petitioner shows that his right to relief is “clear and indisputable,” and that
there exists “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.” Allied Chem.
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). Caldwell makes no such showing in this
case, given the fact that the Younger abstention doctrine bars his claims. Additionally,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act, another statute upon which Caldwell relies, provides
as follows:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
However, “[t]he All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that
are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the
particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428-29 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of
Corr. v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Caldwell has gratuitously (and/or cleverly) added the “USA” as a respondent to
this action, perhaps in an effort to invoke the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651.
But the fact remains that Caldwell was indicted in a Kentucky circuit court, not a federal
district court, and thus no “officer or employee of the United States” is involved in his
criminal proceeding, and therefore, neither statute provides a basis for his claims. As

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explained, Caldwell must pursue any claims regarding his criminal prosecution and/or
the funds seized from him in connection with that criminal prosecution in the State Court
Criminal Case. If dissatisfied there, Caldwell may file an appeal within the Kentucky
state court system. Thus, the Court will dismiss Caldwell’s mandamus petition without
prejudice to his right to assert his claims, if warranted, when State Court Criminal Case,
and any appeal therefrom, has concluded.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court being duly advised, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

The petition for writ of mandamus [R. 1] which Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr. has

filed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2.

The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment; and

3.

This proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s active

docket.
This 23rd day of November, 2015.

G:DATA\ORDERS\ProSe\14-225 Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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