Harris v. SSA
Filing
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OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [DE 9 ] is DENIED; 2. The Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [DE 10 ] is GRANTED; 3. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U. S.C. § 405(g) as it was supported by substantial evidence and was decided by proper legal standards; and 4. A judgment consistent with this Opinion & Order will be entered contemporaneously. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 08/11/2016.(KJA)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
ROGER LYNNE HARRIS,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-cv-36-KKC
Plaintiff,
V.
OPINION AND ORDER
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
*** *** ***
This matter is before the Court for consideration of cross-motions for summary
judgment. [DE 9; 10.] The Plaintiff, Roger Lynne Harris, brought this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial relief from an administrative decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying his claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The Court,
having reviewed the record, will affirm the Commissioner’s decision, as it is supported by
substantial evidence and was decided by the proper legal standards.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS
In determining whether a claimant has a compensable disability under the Social
Security Act, the regulations provide a five-step sequential process which the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) must follow. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Rabbers
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing the
administrative process). The five steps, in summary, are as follows:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not
disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment—i.e., an impairment that significantly limits his or her
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities—the claimant is not
disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the
listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations and meets the duration
requirement, the claimant is disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from doing his or
her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is not
disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the
claimant is disabled.
Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 404.1520(b)–(g)).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through the first four steps of the analysis; but if
the ALJ reaches the fifth step without finding the claimant disabled, then the burden shifts
to the Commissioner. Longworth v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir.
2005). The Commissioner satisfies the burden of proof at the fifth step by finding that the
claimant is qualified for—and capable of performing—jobs that are available in the national
economy and may rely upon the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) regarding the range
of potential jobs. Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2008).
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
Roger Lynne Harris (“Claimant”) filed his claim for SSI on February 17, 2012, alleging
an onset date of June 15, 2011. [TR 9.] The agency denied his application initially on
August 1, 2012, and upon reconsideration on October 25, 2012. Claimant requested review
by an ALJ, and a hearing was held on October 17, 2013. [TR 68–105.] The ALJ
subsequently issued an unfavorable decision on November 19, 2013. [TR 50–62.]
At the time the ALJ’s decision was rendered, Claimant was 53 years old. [TR 71.]
Claimant completed high school and has past relevant work as a carpenter/ hardwood floor
installer and as a tile flooring installer. [TR 60, 73-74.] He alleges disability due to back,
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shoulder, and knee injuries. [TR 55; 74-75.] Claimant’s insured status expires on December
31, 2016. [TR 55.]
First, the ALJ determined that Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged onset date of June 15, 2016. [TR 55.] Second, the ALJ found that Claimant
suffers
from
the
following
severe
impairments:
degenerative
disc
disease
and
spondylolisthesis in the lumbar spine, with surgical fusion at L4-S1 levels; bulging discs in
the cervical spine; chronic knee pain; and rotator cuff tears bilaterally, status-post rotator
cuff repair on the left. [TR 55.] Third, the ALJ determined that Claimant does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments. [TR 56.]
Next, the ALJ reviewed the record to determine Claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). RFC assesses a claimant’s maximum remaining capacity to perform work-related
activities despite the physical and mental limitations caused by the claimant’s disability. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1). In finding Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considered all
symptoms in light of the objective medical evidence and other relevant evidence, including
the following: (i) daily activities; (ii) location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
symptoms; (iii) precipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medication; (v) additional treatment; (vi) additional measures used to
relieve symptoms; and (vii) other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions
due to symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. After reviewing all of the evidence, the ALJ
determined that Claimant has the RFC to perform a reduced ranged of light work, stand
and walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for approximately six
hours in an eight-hour workday, can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, can
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occasionally push and pull with the bilateral upper extremities, can occasionally reach
overhead with the bilateral upper extremities, and should avoid all exposure to vibration,
use of moving machinery, and exposure to unprotected heights. [TR 56.]
After establishing Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ continued to the fourth step. The ALJ
asked the VE whether a hypothetical individual with Claimant’s vocational factors and
RFC could work as a hardwood floor installer or a tile floor installer [TR 99-100.] The VE
testified that this hypothetical individual could not perform any past relevant work. [TR
100]. Thus, the ALJ moved to the fifth step. The ALJ asked if this hypothetical individual
could make an adjustment to other work and the VE noted that this hypothetical individual
could perform a number of unskilled and light jobs, including small products assembly and
plastics inspector [TR 100-101.] Therefore, the ALJ found Claimant not disabled. [TR 6061.]
The ALJ’s decision that Claimant is not disabled became the final decision of the
Commissioner when the Appeals Commission subsequently denied Claimant’s request for
review on January 5, 2015. [TR 1-6]. Claimant has exhausted his administrative remedies
and filed a timely action in this Court. This case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
Lastly, Claimant states that he was subsequently awarded benefits and cites an award
letter dated June 2, 2015. [DE 11 at 1; 11-1 Exhibit A.] Thus, according to Claimant, the
only relief at issue in this appeal is Claimant’s entitlement to back pay for benefits from the
date of his application, February 17, 2012, through June 2, 2015. [DE 11 at 1.]
III. GENERAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed unless the ALJ applied the incorrect
legal standards or the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Lindsley v.
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Comm. of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence is ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In reviewing the decision of
the Commissioner, courts should not conduct a de novo review, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, or make credibility determinations. See Lindsley, 560 F.3d at 604–05. Courts
must look at the record as a whole, and “[t]he court ‘may not focus and base [its] decision
entirely on a single piece of evidence, and disregard other pertinent evidence.’” Sias v. Sec.
of H.H.S., 861 F.2d 475, 479 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Hephner v.
Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978)). Rather, courts must affirm the
Commissioner’s decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the court
may have decided the case differently. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389–90
(6th Cir. 1999).
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Claimant presents three main issues for review. First, he challenges the
ALJ’s decision to give little weight to his treating physician’s opinion. Second, Claimant
asserts that the ALJ erroneously found that his statements regarding the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were “not entirely credible.” Third,
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he is qualified for employment in the
national economy because the jobs that the ALJ cited are not available in the immediate
geographic area in which he lives.
1. The ALJ did not err in discounting the opinion of Claimant’s treating physician.
First, Claimant contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his treating
physician, Dr. James A. Chaney. Specifically, Claimant contends that the ALJ failed to
consider the length of time that Dr. Chaney treated him and the depth of knowledge that
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Dr. Chaney developed regarding Claimant’s medical conditions. [DE 9-1 at 9.] The Court
finds that, contrary to Claimant’s argument, the ALJ did in fact consider the lengthy
treatment relationship that Claimant had with Dr. Chaney. The ALJ’s decision to assign
little weight to Dr. Chaney’s opinion was otherwise supported by substantial evidence.
Opinions from treating sources are entitled to greater weight, as they are the medical
sources most likely to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of a claimant’s impairments.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However, a treating source opinion is only entitled to
controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
See id.; Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir 1993) (“This court has consistently
stated that the Secretary is not bound by the treating physician’s opinions, and that such
opinions receive great weight only if they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and
are consistent with the evidence.”).
In a letter dated January 17, 2013, Dr. Chaney opined that “[Claimant] is 100%
occupationally disable [sic] from any job.” [TR 473.] The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr.
Chaney’s opinion letter because Dr. Chaney was speaking to a determination that is
reserved to the Commissioner and the letter failed to list objective clinical findings. [TR 60.]
The ALJ was correct in noting that Dr. Chaney was offering an opinion on an issue that
is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (e)(1). As such, Dr. Chaney’s
opinion on that subject was not entitled to any special significance. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e)(3); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007) (“. . . controlling weight
will not be provided to a treating physician’s opinion on an issue reserved to the
Commissioner . . . .”). Thus, Dr. Chaney’s opinion that Claimant was occupationally
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disabled was not entitled to the deference normally afforded to a treating physician’s
opinion.
Even so, the ALJ was also correct in observing that Dr. Chaney’s letter failed to cite any
evidence in support of the opinion that Claimant was “100%” occupationally disabled. See
[TR 473.] The ALJ further discussed the opinions of a host of doctors that conflicted with
Dr. Chaney’s conclusion, including the examinations performed by Dr. Williams and Dr.
Reed. [TR 58-60.] Thus, Dr. Chaney’s opinion was not well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and was inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Accordingly, even if Dr.
Chaney had offered an opinion on an issue not reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ still
would have been correct in finding that his opinion was not entitled to deference.
Lastly, Claimant’s contention that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Chaney’s lengthy
treatment relationship is simply inaccurate. The ALJ specifically noted that he reviewed
“extensive primary care records” from Glendale Medical, where Dr. Chaney practiced. [TR
58.] The ALJ provided a detailed discussion of those records. [TR 58-59.] Claimant’s
argument that the ALJ failed to consider his longstanding relationship with Dr. Chaney is
therefore meritless.
2. Claimant waived his challenge to the ALJ’s credibility finding.
Second, Claimant makes only a bare allegation that the ALJ erred by finding that
Claimant’s description of the severity of his symptoms was “not entirely credible.” [DE 9-1
at 1.] In fact, Claimant makes this assertion in the first sentence of his Motion for
Summary Judgement, but does not develop his position with argument or supporting
evidence. Issues which are “adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” Kennedy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 87
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F. App'x 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.
1996)). Claimant failed to provide any explanation as to why he believes the ALJ made an
improper credibility determination, so he waived the argument.
Even if Claimant had not waived this argument, the ALJ’s credibility determination
was supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ can “properly determine that [a claimant’s]
subjective complaints [are] not credible in light of her ability to perform other tasks.”
Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ considered
the daily activities that Claimant discussed during his hearing, including walking to visit
family members, grocery shopping with his wife, feeding pets, driving 2-3 times per week,
and caring for his personal hygiene. [TR 59.] Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that Claimant
“overstated the effects of the severe impairments” was supported by substantial evidence.
[TR 59.]
3. The ALJ did not err in finding that Claimant is qualified for work in the national
economy.
Finally, Claimant asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that he could work as a small
products assembler or plastics inspector because those jobs do not exist in Leslie County,
Kentucky. [DE 9-1 at 6.] This argument is meritless because “the Commissioner is not
required to show that job opportunities exist within the local area” where the claimant
resides. Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 1999). Rather, an individual is
considered disabled if he is unable “to engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The ALJ relied on the
vocational expert’s testimony that Claimant could perform jobs that existed in the national
economy, namely small products assembly and plastics inspector. [TR 100-101.] The
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vocational expert’s testimony constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s
determination that jobs were available to Claimant in the national economy. Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Commissioner may rely on
the testimony of a vocational expert to find that the claimant possesses the capacity to
perform other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy.”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [DE 9] is DENIED;
2. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [DE 10] is GRANTED;
3. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) as it was supported by substantial evidence and was decided by proper legal
standards; and
4. A judgment consistent with this Opinion & Order will be entered contemporaneously.
Dated August 11, 2016.
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