Taniguchi v. Wilson et al
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Taniguchi's complaint [R. 1 ] is DISMISSED. 2. The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with this order. 3. This matter is STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 6/1/2016.(RBB)cc: COR, paper copy to JAY TANIGUCHI, via US Mail.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
JAY TANIGUCHI,
Civil Action No. 6: 15-126-KKC
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
ANGEL WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.
*** *** *** ***
Inmate Jay Taniguchi is confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Manchester, Kentucky (“FCI-Manchester”). Proceeding without counsel, Taniguchi
has filed a complaint asserting a civil rights claim pursuant to the doctrine announced
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Specifically, in his complaint Taniguchi alleges that Health Services
Administrator Angel Wilson and Clinical Director Dr. Luis Cordero declined to allow
him to use a beard trimmer instead of a razor to shave his beard even though he
suffers from pseudo folliculitis barbae (“PFB”), a condition involving ingrown hair on
the face and neck which is aggravated by shaving. Taniguchi contends that Wilson
and Cordero have displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and seeks damages and an order compelling the
defendants to allow him to use a beard trimmer. [R. 1]
I
The Court must conduct a preliminary review of Taniguchi’s complaint because
he has been granted permission to pay the filing fee in installments and because he
1
asserts claims against government officials. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. A district
court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). When testing
the sufficiency of Taniguchi’s complaint, the Court affords it a forgiving construction,
accepting as true all non-conclusory factual allegations and liberally construing its
legal claims in the plaintiff’s favor. Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 43738 (6th Cir. 2012)
In his complaint, Taniguchi explains that since 2001 he has been diagnosed
with various skin conditions which can cause irritation and inflammation. In 2006
when he was confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Beckley, West
Virginia, Dr. Roger Edwards and Clinical Director Dr. Dominick McLain issued a
memorandum permitting Taniguchi to use a beard trimmer instead of a razor because
of his PFB. [R. 1 at 9, 12; R. 1-1 at 107-09] After the Bureau of Prisons prohibited
the purchase and possession of such trimmers in 2010, Dr. McLain issued a new
memorandum classifying the beard trimmer as a medically necessary device for
Taniguchi. He was then permitted to retain his trimmer and obtain replacements on
a yearly basis as needed. Id. at 13.
Taniguchi was transferred to FCI-Manchester in March 2013. Dr. Cordero
conducted an initial health assessment of Taniguchi at that time, and characterized
his PFB as very mild. [R. 1-1 at 47-51] Over the next few months, HSA Wilson refused
to issue a memorandum indicating that a beard trimmer was medically necessary to
treat Taniguchi’s PFB following a conversation with Dr. Cordero. [R. 1 at 15-18; R. 11 at 53-] As a result, Taniguchi alleges that by December 2013 the symptoms of his
PFB, including irritated skin and lesions, had returned because the blades on his
2
existing trimmer had become dull and he had not been able to obtain a replacement
trimmer. Instead, medical staff prescribed Cephalexin for the condition, although
Taniguchi contends the medication did not help. [R. 1-1 at 61-67] Following two
March 2014 examinations, Cordero again concluded that Taniguchi’s PFB was mild
and did not require treatment. [R. 1 at 20-22; R. 1-1 at 69-79] Medical staff continued
to assess Taniguchi’s condition as mild following examinations in December 2014 and
January 2015. These records indicate that Taniguchi was not shaving at the time.
[R. 1-1 at 96-98, 100-103]
Taniguchi filed inmate grievances regarding this issue in October 2013, which
were denied at the institutional and regional levels in November 2013 and January
2014. Taniguchi appealed to the Central Office, which denied his appeal in March
2015. [R. 1 at 19-20, 25]
II
The Court must assess the viability of Taniguchi’s claim that the medical care
provided by the defendants was so lacking that it violated his rights under the
Constitution. The Eighth Amendment “forbids prison officials from ‘unnecessarily
and wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’
toward [his] serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F. 3d 890,
895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff
asserting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs must establish both the
objective and subjective components of such a claim. Jones v. Muskegon Co., 625 F.
3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires the plaintiff to show
that the medical condition is “sufficiently serious,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994), such as one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
3
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F. 3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted). The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that
prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff’s health but
consciously disregarded it. Cooper v. County of Washtenaw, 222 F. App’x 459, 466 (6th
Cir. 2007); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F. 3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1994).
Here, Taniguchi indicates that he suffers from PFB, a facial skin condition that
occurs when hair follicles curve back into the skin, which in turn causes it to become
inflamed or irritated. This condition, which is known colloquially as razor bumps, can
be made worse by shaving. While doubtless uncomfortable and unpleasant in its more
severe forms, Taniguchi’s physicians consistently characterized his condition as mild,
and courts have held that PFB does not constitute a sufficiently “serious medical need”
to satisfy the objective prong of a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Shabazz
v. Barnauskas, 790 F. 3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that PFB is not a
“serious medical condition” implicating the Eighth Amendment); Cleveland v. Thaler,
64 F. App’x 417, 418 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that PFB did not pose a serious risk of
injury); Turner v. Buckmaster, 958 F. 2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that while “PFB
may range in seriousness from mild to moderate to severe,” a plaintiff who does not
produce evidence that his PFB was of the severe variety fails to establish that his
claim involves a “serious medical need,” warranting dismissal); Northern v. Fuchs, No.
07-C-142-S, 2007 WL 5325868, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. July 16, 2007) (“Although PFB is an
annoying skin condition there is no evidence that it is a serious medical condition.”);
Latham v. Johnson, No. 07-C-142-S, 2008 WL 153765, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2008)
(“The razor bumps that plaintiff alleges, which result from ingrown hairs, even if left
untreated, constitute a minimal medical need.”); Bruno v. Parekh, No. 2: 06-CV-432-
4
FTM-29SPC, 2008 WL 2413997, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2008) (concluding that PFB
is not a serious medical condition because “[t]he condition of Plaintiff's skin after
shaving is not one that if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.”).
The Court agrees that where Taniguchi’s medical records are devoid of any indication
either than his condition was severe or could exacerbate any other medical condition,
he fails to satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, Taniguchi’s allegations fail to
support any claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his PFB
symptoms. When Taniguchi arrived at FCI-Manchester in March 2013, Dr. Cordero
examined Taniguchi and exercised his medical judgment to conclude that his PFB was
very mild. [R. 1-1 at 47-51] When Taniguchi complained again of PFB symptoms in
December 2013, staff tried a prescription of Cephalexin for the condition. [R. 1-1 at
61-67] Subsequent examinations throughout 2014 indicate that Taniguchi exhibited
at most mild symptoms of the condition. [R. 1-1 at 69-79]
At bottom, Taniguchi’s claim is based upon his belief that one doctor’s
recommendation that he should be permitted to use a beard trimmer in lieu of shaving
was the only medically-appropriate treatment plan for his PFB, while the medical
opinion of his subsequent treating physician that his condition was mild and could be
addressed by other means was incorrect. But where a prisoner has been examined
and treatment provided but the prisoner merely disagrees with the course of care
determined by his treating physician in the exercise of his medical judgment, his claim
sounds in state tort law – it does not state a viable claim of deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment.
Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. County of
Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[w]here a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts
5
are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize
claims that sound in state tort law.”); Durham v. Nu’Man, 97 F. 3d 862, 868-69 (6th
Cir. 1996); Rodriquez v. Lappin, No. 08-347-GFVT, 2009 WL 2969510, at *5-6 (E.D.
Ky. Sept. 11, 2009). Even “[w]hen a prison doctor provides treatment, albeit carelessly
or inefficaciously, to a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s needs, but merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F. 3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
In sum, Taniguchi’s “disagreement with the exhaustive testing and treatment
he received while incarcerated does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”
Lyons v. Brandy, 430 F. App’x 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107;
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)). See also Pierce v. Scott, 46
F. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2002) (prison officials’ refusal to issue permanent shaving pass
to inmate with PFB fails to state a claim under Eighth Amendment); Millet v.
Tomkins, 52 F. 3d 338 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of claim of deliberate
indifference where prison medical staff treated plaintiff’s PFB with medication);
Childers v. Lewis, 924 F. 2d 608 (9th Cir. 1991) (no deliberate indifference where
prison officials examined the plaintiff on many occasions, treated his condition and
gave him instruction on how to shave properly); Small v. Cole, No. 2: 04-CV-180, 2005
WL 2219269, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2005) (prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim
based upon treatment of his PFB with benzoyl peroxide, trifamicinlone, and
sulfamethoxazol trimeth amounted to nothing more than disagreement with
treatment plan, and failed to establish viable claim of deliberate indifference). The
Court reaches no conclusion whether the care provided fell below the applicable
standard of care and hence may establish a claim of medical negligence under state
6
law.
But Taniguchi’s allegations do not support any claim that his health care
providers were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition. Accordingly, his
Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Taniguchi’s complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED.
2.
The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with this order.
3.
This matter is STRICKEN from the docket.
Dated June 1, 2016.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?