Thornsberry v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff Hubert Thornsberry's motion for summary judgment [Record No. 11 ] is DENIED. 2. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin's motion for summary judgment [Record No. 12 ] is GRANTED. 3. The decision of Administrative Law Judge Ronald M. Kayser will be AFFIRMED by separate Judgment entered this date. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 8/5/2016.(RBB)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)
HUBERT THORNSBERRY,
Plaintiff,
V.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 6: 15-169-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

*** *** *** ***

This matter is pending for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment filed

by Plaintiff Hubert Thornsberry (“Thornsberry” or “the Claimant”) and Defendant Carolyn
W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). [Record Nos.
11, 12] Thornsberry argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in concluding
that he is not entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. However, the
Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and
should be affirmed.
As discussed more fully below, the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of
Thornsberry’s treating, non-treating, and non-examining sources.

The record also

demonstrates that the ALJ properly assessed the Claimant’s credibility. Further, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Thornsberry can perform medium work, with
some restrictions. As a result, the Court will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny the
relief requested by Thornsberry.
-1 

I.
On February 11, 2013, Thornsberry filed a Title II application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits.1 [Administrative Transcript, “Tr.,” p. 158] He
alleged a disability beginning June 7, 2011. [Id.] Thornsberry, along with attorney Tina
Frederick and vocational expert (“VE”) Robert Piper, appeared before ALJ Ronald M.
Kayser on April 4, 2014, for an administrative hearing. [Id., pp. 2764] On July 22, 2014,
ALJ Kayser found that Thornsberry was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). [Id., p. 21] Thornsberry appealed the ALJ’s determination
to the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) Appeals Council.

However, the SSA

Appeals Council declined the Claimant’s request for review. [Id., p. 1]
Thornsberry was 56 years-old when his alleged disability began, and 59 years-old at
the time of the ALJ’s decision. [Tr., pp. 21, 158] He completed the ninth grade but has not
obtained his GED. Thornsberry previously worked as a truck driver hauling phosphate. [Id.,
pp. 32, 181] After considering the testimony presented during the administrative hearing and
reviewing the record, the ALJ concluded that Thornsberry suffers from two severe
impairments: heart and back problems. [Id., p. 16] Notwithstanding these impairments, the
ALJ determined that the Claimant maintained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform medium work, except that he could only:
occasional[ly] climb ladders, ropes, and scaffold; frequently climb ramps and
stairs; and occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl.
[Tr., p. 17]

1

Although Thornsberry’s memorandum also references supplemental security income
(“SSI”), the record does not confirm that he filed an application for SSI. [Record No. 11-1, p. 1]
-2 

After considering Thornsberry’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, ALJ
Kayser concluded that the Claimant could perform a significant number of jobs in the
national economy, including: hand packager, machine operator/feeder, and cleaner. [Id., pp.
20−21] As a result, the ALJ determined that Thornsberry was not disabled from June 7,
2011, through the date of the administrative hearing. [Id.]
II.
Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in
‘substantial gainful activity,’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of at least one year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502
F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant’s Social
Security disability determination is made by an ALJ in accordance with “a five-step
‘sequential evaluation process.’” Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). If the claimant satisfies the first four
steps of the process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner with respect to the fifth step. See
Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
A claimant must first demonstrate that he is not engaged in substantial gainful
employment at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the
claimant must show that he suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

Third, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful

employment and has a severe impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months
and which meets or equals a listed impairment, he will be considered disabled without regard
to age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
-3-

Fourth, if the

Commissioner cannot make a determination of disability based on medical evaluations and
current work activity and the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner will then
review the claimant’s RFC and relevant past work to determine whether he can perform his
past work. If he can, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Under the fifth step of the analysis, if the claimant’s impairments prevent him from
doing past work, the Commissioner will consider his RFC, age, education, and past work
experience to determine whether he can perform other work. If he cannot perform other
work, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The
Commissioner has the burden of proof only on “‘the fifth step, proving that there is work
available in the economy that the claimant can perform.’” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312
F. App’x 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391
(6th Cir. 1999)).
Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007). The substantial-evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice
within which decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court.
McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006).

Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support
the conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bass v. McMahon, 499
F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).

-4 

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed
even if the Court would decide the case differently and even if the claimant’s position is also
supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.
2007); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). In other words, the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III.
Thornsberry claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that he has an RFC of medium
work, with certain constraints.2 [Record No. 11-1, p. 9] Residual functional capacity is “an

2

The Claimant vaguely “alleges severe impairments consisting of back pain, hypertension,
kidney stones, hyperglycemia, hypercholesteremia.” [Record No. 11-1, p. 2] He also briefly
points out that he suffers from depression, as well as a host of other conditions. [Id., pp. 5, 11]
However, “[i]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 573 F. App’x
540, 543 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 256 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Although Thornsberry details his medical history [id., pp. 2−3], he does not provide any rationale
for why the aforementioned conditions are severe.
An impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits” a claimant’s “physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities,” either by itself or in combination with other impairments. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Most of Thornsberry’s medical history relating to kidney stones,
hypertension, hyperglycemia and high cholesterol pertains to before 2011. [See id., referring to
Tr., pp. 215, 427, 429, 433] Thornsberry was still able to work during that time. Further, in
describing his post-2010 medical history, Thornsberry merely lists his diagnoses. For example,
he indicates that he “presented with history of hypertension, hyperlipidemia, diabetes” and that
he was “diagnosed” with those conditions and others. [Record No. 11-1, p. 4] But a long history
of treatment for a condition does not establish a severe impairment. Thornsberry fails to state
how those problems would limit his ability to do basic work activities. As a result, his mere
assertion that he suffered from additional severe impairments is insufficient to support his claim.
See, e.g., Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014) (deeming “cursory
argument” regarding severity of a limitation waived where claimant only “briefly” addressed the
-5 

assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental
activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). The RFC determination is a matter reserved for the ALJ. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Bass, 499 F.3d at 511−12. In making this determination, the
ALJ considers the medical evidence, the non-medical evidence, and the claimant’s
credibility. Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010). An
ALJ’s RFC finding will be upheld where it is supported by substantial evidence.
“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). In arguing that
the ALJ erred in determining that Thornsberry can perform medium work, with certain
restrictions, Thornsberry first asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his
treating physician. [Record No. 11-1, p. 2] Second, he claims that the ALJ improperly
accorded greater weight to a non-examining source opinion. [Id., p. 8] Third, he takes issue
with the ALJ’s assessment of his subjective complaints. [Id., pp. 5−6] None of these
arguments are persuasive.
A.

Dr. Faughn

Thornsberry contends that the ALJ improperly assigned less weight to treating
physician Laura Faughn’s opinion than to the opinion of the state agency reviewing
physician, Casey Alsop. [Record No. 11-1, p. 8] Dr. Faughn stated that Thornsberry was
unable to work because he could only: (i) stand and walk for less than two hours per day; (ii)
sit less than two hours per day; (iii) occasionally lift five pounds; (iv) frequently lift no

issue, focusing on the “diagnosis”); Williamson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-731, 2016
WL 255033, *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2016).
-6 

amount of weight; (v) never bend, stoop, or balance; and (vi) occasionally climb ladders and
stairs and use his hands in repetitive actions. [Tr., p. 499] Further, she determined that he
would need to be absent from work more than four days per month. [Id.]
ALJ Kayser did not accord controlling weight to Dr. Faughn’s opinion because it was
“excessive compared to her treatment notes” and inconsistent with the record as a whole.
[Id., p. 19] Generally, the ALJ must give the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight
if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the claimant’s record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However, an ALJ is “not bound by conclusory statements of
doctors, particularly where they are unsupported by detailed objective criteria and
documentation.’” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In determining the appropriate weight to give a treating physician’s medical opinion,
the ALJ looks to: (i) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (ii) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (iii) the supportability of
the opinion; (iv) the consistency of the opinion with regard to the record as a whole; (v)
whether the treating source is a specialist in the area of his or her opinion; and (vi) any other
factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)−(6).
Here, the ALJ provided a valid reason for discounting Dr. Faughn’s opinion, stating
that it conflicted with her objective findings. See Kornecky, 167 F. App’x at 509; Payne v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F. App’x 109, 112−13 (6th Cir. 2010). [Tr., p. 19] For example,
the ALJ explained that Dr. Faughn reported Thornsberry’s heart to have “regular rhythm
-7 

with no murmur” and that his lungs were “clear with no rales, wheezing, or rhonchi.” [Id.,
referring to p. 515]

Further, Dr. Faughn indicated that Thornsberry had showed no

respiratory distress and no cardiovascular issues. [Id., p. 510] Moreover, she found that
Thornsberry’s neck was supple, his cranial nerves were intact, and he had no gallbladder
stones. [Id., pp. 510, 519] Because Dr. Faughn’s opinion conflicted with her findings, the
ALJ was entitled to give it less weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).
The ALJ also explained that Dr. Faughn’s opinion was inconsistent with the record as
a whole. [Tr., p. 19] For instance, in January 2011, treating nurse practitioner Mary
Landsberger noted no heart murmurs, regular heart rate and rhythm, clear lungs, and no
wheezes, rhonchi, or rales. [Id., p. 425] She also noted a supple neck and no edema in the
Claimant’s extremities. [Id.] While nurse practitioners are considered “other sources” under
the regulations and are not entitled to the same controlling weight to which acceptable
medical sources are entitled, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1), the ALJ should still give “specific
consideration” to their assessments. See Cruse, 502 F.3d at 541.
Subsequently, in January 2013, treating physician Salem Hannah noted no chest pain,
claudication, or dyspnea; clear lungs; normal respiratory effort; regular heart rate and
rhythm; and no heart murmurs, gallops, or rubs. [Id., pp. 464−65] In addition, Dr. Hannah’s
examination revealed that Thornsberry had a normal range of motion, normal muscle
strength, and stability in his extremities. [Id., p. 466]
ALJ Kayser also reasoned that an X-ray in September 2013 revealed only “mild”
problems associated with the Claimant’s lumbar spine. [Id., p. 19, referring to p. 474] More
specifically, treating physician Andrew Sparkman determined that Thornsberry had no acute
-8 

fracture of the thoracic spine and only a “[v]ery mild wedge deformity of T6 and T7.” [Id.,
p. 474] Dr. Sparkman also noted that the Claimant’s kidneys were normal. [Id., p. 483] It is
clear that the objective medical evidence does not support Dr. Faughn’s opinion that
Thornsberry could not perform any work. As a result, the ALJ was entitled to discount it.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Moreover, such an opinion is reserved to the ALJ. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); S.S.R. 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, *1 (July 2, 1996). Therefore, ALJ
Kayser did not err in according less weight to Dr. Faughn’s opinion.
B.

Dr. Alsop

Thornsberry argues that the ALJ erred in giving greater weight to state agency
reviewing physician Dr. Alsop’s opinion. [Record No. 11-1, p. 8] Findings of fact made by
state agency reviewing physicians are treated as expert opinion evidence of non-examining
sources. S.S.R. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, *2 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ must consider the
relevant factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) in determining the weight to give these
opinions. In appropriate circumstances, opinions from state agency medical consultants may
be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources. Brooks v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2013).
The ALJ accorded more weight to Dr. Alsop’s opinion regarding Thornsberry’s work
constraints because it was more consistent with the treating sources’ objective findings,
including Dr. Faughn’s objective findings. See Brooks, 531 F. App’x at 642. [Tr., pp.
1819] For example, ALJ Kayser noted that Thornsberry’s stress test in August 2013
showed “fair exercise tolerance” and “no clear-cut ischemia.” [Id., p. 18, referring to p. 475]
Regarding the Claimant’s back condition, the ALJ referenced X-rays from August 2013
-9 

revealing only “mild disc space narrowing at L5-S1.” [Id., p. 19, referring to p. 477] He
also highlighted that, in January 2013, Thornsberry demonstrated no joint swelling, muscle
weakness, myalgia, myositis, or neck pain. [Id., p. 19, referring to p. 469] In addition, as
discussed above, Dr. Faughn’s examination revealed clear lungs and no heart murmur. [Id.,
p. 19, referring to pp. 510, 515] Moreover, Dr. Alsop’s opinion was comparable to the
opinion of another state agency reviewing physician—Dr. Alex Guerrero.3 [Id., p. 77]
Because the ALJ assessed the consistency of the non-examining source opinion with the
record as a whole, he did not err.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4).

While certain

examinations revealed conditions affecting Thornsberry’s heart and lungs,4 ample evidence

3

In fact, the ALJ incorporated into his RFC finding some of the additional restrictions
noted by Dr. Guerrero. [Compare Tr., p. 17 with p. 77]

4

For instance, Dr. Faughn noted that Thornsberry “awaken[ed] at night unable to breathe”
and had frequent heartburn. [Tr., p. 510] She also reported that Thornsberry had joint pain and
weakness. [Id., p. 514] However, because such findings seem to be based on the Claimant’s
subjective complaints, the ALJ was entitled to discount them insofar as they conflicted with Dr.
Faughn’s other findings and the objective medical evidence in the record. See Tate v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 467 F. App’x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2012). Likewise, Dr. Hannah indicated that the
Claimant experienced chills, fatigue, generalized weakness, malaise, lightheadedness,
arthralgias, myalgia, and back pain, findings which also largely rely on Thornsberry’s self-report.
[Id., p. 464]
Although Dr. Sparkman noted “multilevel degenerative disc disease with disc space
narrowing and anterior osteophyte formation,” he did not diagnose even mild spinal stenosis,
indicating that Thornsberry was only in the early stages of degenerative disc disease. See
SPINE
INSTITUTE,
available
at
Moderate
Spinal
Stenosis,
LASER
https://www.laserspineinstitute.com/back_problems/spinal_stenosis/moderate/
(last
visited
August 4, 2016). [Tr., p. 474] Dr. Sparkman also noted that Thornsberry had an ejection
fraction of 44% during the stress test. [Id., p. 475] While that range is below normal, it does not
confirm diagnosis of heart failure. See Ejection Fraction, CLEVELAND CLINIC, available at
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/heart/disorders/heart-failure-what-is/ejectionfraction (last
visited August 4, 2016). In any event, these findings do not negate the fact that other substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding. See Smith, 482 F.3d at 876. 
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supported the ALJ’s decision, and the Court will not reweigh the evidence.

See

McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833.
C.

Thornsberry’s Subjective Complaints

Thornsberry also seems to assert that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his
credibility. [Record No. 11-1, pp. 5−6] The Claimant testified that he lives alone and can
cook, clean, bathe himself, and dress himself, but his sister-in-law does most of the cooking.
[Tr., pp. 46, 49] In addition, he indicated that he can walk a fourth of a mile and lift five to
eight pounds. [Id., p. 49] Further, Thornsberry testified that he can reach overhead with his
left arm but that his right arm goes numb. [Id., p. 50] He also claimed that he could only sit
for ten to fifteen minutes without shifting and could only stand for ten minutes at a time.
[Id., p. 51]
An ALJ determination regarding a claimant’s credibility is entitled to great deference
because the ALJ is able to “observe the claimant and judge [his] subjective complaints.”
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). However, an ALJ who rejects a
claimant’s testimony must clearly state his reasons. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036
(6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has a two-prong test for evaluating subjective allegations.
First, the Court examines whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition. Hash v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 309 F. App’x 981, 990
(6th Cir. 2009). Second, it examines whether the medical condition can reasonably be
expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Id. The ALJ followed this test, finding that
Thornsberry was credible regarding the nature of his impairments and that those impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. [Tr., p. 18] He did not find
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Thornsberry credible, however, in his claims regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms. [Id.]
The ALJ provided six reasons for discounting the Claimant’s testimony. First, he
noted that Thornsberry offered different reasons why his last job ended. [Tr., p. 19] For
example, Thornsberry claimed that he was fired, but he also stated that he quit because he
had conflicts with people at work and because his hand numbness caused problems. [Id., pp.
35, 180] Thornsberry’s inconsistent self-reports suggest that his impairments were not so
restrictive that they caused him to leave his job. See, e.g., Black v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 5:11CV2770, 2012 WL 4506018, *10 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2012) (determining
that claimant’s credibility was weakened when she stated that she lost her job because she
either went to prison or experienced health problems).
Second, the ALJ commented on the Claimant’s failure to take any prescription pain
medication or comply with diet and exercise restrictions. [Id., pp. 18−19] While an ALJ
should not draw inferences about a claimant’s symptoms “without first considering any
explanations that the individual may provide,” S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *7 (July 2,
1996), Thornsberry’s failure to implement the recommended diet and exercise plans is not
attributable to his financial problems. Further, the ALJ’s other reasons for discounting
Thornsberry’s credibility undermine Thornsberry’s assertion that “he failed to follow the
prescribed course of treatment purely for financial reasons.” See Battice v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:12-CV-1389, 2014 WL 1366489, *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014); see also
McClellan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-12435, 2014 WL 4473869, *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
14, 2014).
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Third, the ALJ appropriately highlighted the discrepancy between Thornsberry’s
testimony and the objective medical evidence, discussed in detail above. S.S.R. 96-7p, at *1.
[Tr., p. 19] Fourth, the ALJ discounted Thornsberry’s testimony because he was able to
work for five years after discovering and being treated for coronary artery disease. [Id.]
Other cases suggest that a claimant’s ability to return to work after prior treatments or
surgeries reduces the claimant’s credibility. See, e.g., Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:12-cv-366, 2013 WL 2243097, *5 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2013); Heythaler v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 09-CV-10267, 2010 WL 3489547, *9 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 30, 2010). Fifth, ALJ
Kayser explained that he observed malingering behavior by Thornsberry when he exited the
hearing. [Id.] Such behavior reduced the Claimant’s credibility. See Pentecost v. Astrue,
No. 3:12-0154, 2013 WL 2434987, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 4, 2013).
Finally, the ALJ found Thornsberry’s alleged limitations inconsistent with his daily
activities.

[Id., p. 19]

An ALJ may consider the claimant’s daily living activities in

assessing his credibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Crisp v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
790 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1986). Thornsberry testified that he could cook and clean. [Id.,
p. 46] Due to the ALJ’s consideration of those daily activities, he did not err in according
less weight to Thornsberry’s allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms. See S.S.R.
96-7p, at *3.
While one of the ALJ’s six reasons for discrediting the Claimant’s testimony may not
be entirely valid, any error is harmless. See Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709,
714 (6th Cir. 2012). Because Thornsberry’s testimony conflicted with the objective medical

- 13  

evidence and his own report of his daily activities, the ALJ did not err in according it little
weight.
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows
1.

Plaintiff Hubert Thornsberry’s motion for summary judgment [Record No. 11]

is DENIED.
2.

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin’s motion for summary judgment [Record No.

12] is GRANTED.
3.

The decision of Administrative Law Judge Ronald M. Kayser will be

AFFIRMED by separate Judgment entered this date.
This 5th day of August, 2016.

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