Scott v. Hammons et al
Filing
63
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff Larry W. Scott, Jr.'s Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Disposition [R. 61 ] are OVERRULED;2. The Magistrate Judge's Recommended Disposition [R. 60 ] is ADOPTED as and for the Opinion of this Court; 3. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 54 ] is GRANTED; 4. Plaintiff's Motion [R. 55 ] is DENIED for failure to specify the relief requested, as required by Local Rule 7.1(a); and 5. JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants Mills and Dunn will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 02/16/2018.(KJA)cc: COR, mailed paper copy to pro se filer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
LARRY W. SCOTT, JR.,
Plaintiff,
V.
MARY HAMMONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No.: 6:16-cv-0018-GFVT-HAI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Steven Mills and Bonnie Dunn. [R. 54.] This matter was referred to United States Magistrate
Judge Hanly A. Ingram, who filed a Recommended Disposition (also known as a “Report and
Recommendation” or “R&R”) recommending that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
be granted. [R. 60.]
The Plaintiff, Larry W. Scott, Jr., filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Jailers Mary Hammons and Linda Smallwood, Officer Steve Owens, United States
Marshal Greg Bobblitt, Commonwealth’s Attorney Jackie Steele, Knox County Circuit Judge
Gregory Lay, Deputy Jailer Steven Mills, and Nurse Bonnie Dunn. [R. 1.] This Court
previously dismissed claims against all defendants except Deputy Jailer Mills and Nurse Dunn.
[R. 28.] Ms. Dunn and Mr. Mills filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on July 14, 2017.
[R. 54.] Subsequently, Mr. Scott filed what the Court construes as a Response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 55.] On November 29, 2017, Judge Ingram issued his R&R
and directed the parties to file objections within fourteen days. [R. 60.] Mr. Scott objected;
however, his objections were not postmarked until December 19, 2017, and were not filed until
December 21, 2017. [R. 61.]
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), a petitioner has fourteen days after
service to register any objections to the Recommended Disposition or else waive his right to
appeal. In order to receive de novo review by this Court, any objection to the recommended
disposition must be specific. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). A specific
objection “explain[s] and cite[s] specific portions of the report which [counsel] deem[s]
problematic.” Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007). A general objection that
fails to identify specific factual or legal issues from the recommendation, however, is not
permitted since it only duplicates the Magistrate’s efforts and wastes judicial economy. Howard
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). When no objections are
made, this Court is not required to “review . . . a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under
a de novo or any other standard . . . .” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Parties who
fail to object to a Magistrate’s report and recommendation are also barred from appealing a
district court’s order adopting the report and recommendation. See United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Mr. Scott’s objections were not timely, as they were filed more than fourteen days after
Judge Ingram’s Recommended Disposition. Further, Mr. Scott gave no explanation as to why
the filing was tardy. However, even if his objections were timely, Mr. Scott fails to raise specific
objections to the Recommended Disposition. Rather than filing specific objections pointing to
issues with the Magistrate’s R&R, Mr. Scott merely summarizes his complaint, including claims
against defendants previously dismissed, and requests leave to appeal the Recommendation. [R.
61.] These objections are not sufficiently definite to trigger the Court’s obligation to conduct a
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de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).
While the Court acknowledges its duty to review Mr. Scott’s filings under a more lenient
standard than the one applied to attorneys because he is proceeding pro se, see Franklin v. Rose,
765 F.2d 82, 84-85 (6th Cir. 1985), the Court has examined the record and ultimately agrees with
Judge Ingram’s recommendation. For the following reasons, Mr. Scott’s objections [R. 61] will
be OVERRULED, and Judge Ingram’s Recommended Disposition [R. 60] will be ADOPTED.
I
Judge Ingram set forth the factual and procedural background of the case in his
Recommended Disposition. Below, the Court mentions the key facts to frame its discussion and
analysis but, otherwise, incorporates Judge Ingram’s discussion of the record into this Order.
Mr. Larry Scott was arrested on September 5, 2015, for failure to comply with Kentucky
sex offender registration requirements, a violation of KRS § 17.510(11), as well as being a
persistent felony offender, a violation of KRS § 532.080(3). [R. 1-1.] During the pendency of
his case, Mr. Scott was housed at the Knox County Detention Center (KCDC). [R. 1.] His case
was ultimately dismissed by the Knox County Circuit Court on April 11, 2016. [R. 28.]
During his time at KCDC, Mr. Scott alleged that Deputy Jailer Steven Mills attacked him
from behind by dragging him backwards, swinging him violently “from side to side,” and
choking him unconscious, ultimately resulting in injuries to Mr. Scott’s neck and elbow. [R. 1 at
23.] Initially, Mr. Scott claimed this attack was unprovoked. Id. However, he later indicated
Mr. Mills had attempted to restrain him after Mr. Scott and another inmate were involved in an
altercation. [R. 56 at 4; R. 49 at 6.] Mr. Mills maintains that he never assaulted Mr. Scott, but
did use some force to prevent further altercation. [R. 54-8; R. 54-11.]
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Additionally, Mr. Scott claims he fell down the stairs in the recreation area sometime in
October 2015, resulting in injuries to his head and ankle. [R. 1 at 41.] He claims that employees
examined his ankle, which was “visibly swollen.” Id. Thereafter, he experienced seizures, and
KCDC employees placed him first in a restraint chair and then a medical cell with a mattress on
the floor. Id. at 41–45. Mr. Scott alleges that Ms. Dunn failed to provide him with adequate
medical care, but the only document that indicates she was aware of Mr. Scott’s fall is a
grievance form filed in the record without proof it was ever submitted to KCDC.1 [R. 9-1 at 4.]
II
In his R&R, Judge Ingram addressed whether Mr. Scott exhausted his administrative
remedies prior to bringing this federal action. [R. 60 at 6.] Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), Mr. Scott is prohibited from bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he has
attempted to do here, until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). This restriction also applies to pretrial detainees – such was Mr. Scott at the time of
the alleged events. See Arflack v. County of Henderson, Kentucky, 412 F. App’x 829, 831–32
(6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (holding that there
are no exceptions carved out of the PLRA). If a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim regarding
conditions in the prison while he is in custody, but did not exhaust all available administrative
remedies, the Court must dismiss the case. Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2003);
Napier v. Laurel County, 636 F.3d 218, 221 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011).
When Mr. Scott filed this § 1983 complaint he was in custody and, therefore, was
required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
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In his Complaint, Mr. Scott alleges Ms. Dunn told him he had developed knots in his lower back and high blood
pressure as a result of sleeping on the floor. [R. 1 at 45.] However, in the answers to interrogatories, he claims that
Ms. Dunn ignored his grievances and denied him medical treatment. [R. 49 at 4–5; R. 56 at 2.]
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Even construing his pleadings and filings liberally, Judge Ingram found no evidence suggesting
Mr. Scott ever filed a grievance concerning the alleged assault by Mr. Mills on September 17,
2015. [See R. 60 at 8-9.] This Court also has been unsuccessful in finding documentation in the
record sufficient to suggest Mr. Scott ever filed such a grievance. The Magistrate determined
that Mr. Scott, having not filed a grievance of this alleged assault, could not possibly have
exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to this event. [R. 60 at 10.] This Court agrees
and, therefore, must dismiss the claims against Deputy Jailer Steven Mills for failure to comply
with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
As to the claims against Ms. Dunn, Judge Ingram liberally construed a handwritten filing
dated “10/24” as a grievance against her despite no evidence indicating Mr. Scott ever filed or
submitted it to any KCDC employee. [See R. 60 at 9.] Regardless of the lack of proof showing
submission of this grievance, the Court acknowledges the more lenient standard for litigants
proceeding pro se and agrees with Judge Ingram that Mr. Scott’s claims against Ms. Dunn
survive summary judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 8485 (6th Cir. 1985).
However, Mr. Scott still fails to provide any existence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to his claims against Ms. Dunn. The Fourteenth Amendment requires prison officials to
provide humane conditions for confinement, including adequate food, clothing, and medical
care, as well as taking “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).
To show Ms. Dunn violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Scott must prove
that Ms. Dunn was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Scott. See
id. at 828 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)). This requires her to disregard a
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known excessive risk regarding Mr. Scott’s health and safety. See id. at 837.
Judge Ingram determined, and this Court agrees, that Mr. Scott could not provide
evidence that Ms. Dunn was aware of any such serious medical risk because he could not show
the grievance dated “10/24” was ever submitted to anyone at the jail, much less Ms. Dunn. [R.
60 at 13.] Because Mr. Scott has failed to prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Ms. Dunn was aware of the risk, his claims that Ms. Dunn violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights must be denied.
Finally, because Mr. Scott has not been able to prove Ms. Dunn was aware of any serious
medical risk, and because Mr. Scott is unable to prove Ms. Dunn violated any clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights, Ms. Dunn is entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
To determine if qualified immunity is applicable, the court first considers whether, “taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Next, the
Court determines if that right was “clearly established.” Id. Because this Court has already
determined that Ms. Dunn did not violate Mr. Scott’s constitutional rights, Mr. Scott fails under
the first prong of Saucier.
III
After reviewing de novo the entire record, as well as the relevant case law and statutory
authority, the Court agrees with Judge Ingram’s thorough analysis of Mr. Scott’s claims.
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as
follows:
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1.
Plaintiff Larry W. Scott, Jr.’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Disposition [R. 61] are OVERRULED;
2.
The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Disposition [R. 60] is ADOPTED as and
for the Opinion of this Court;
3.
The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 54] is GRANTED;
4.
Plaintiff’s Motion [R. 55] is DENIED for failure to specify the relief requested,
as required by Local Rule 7.1(a); and
5.
JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants Mills and Dunn will be entered
contemporaneously herewith.
This the 16th day of February, 2018.
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