Woods v. USA

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: 1) The magistrate judge's Recommended Disposition 173 is ADOPTED and INCORPORATED by reference; 2) Dft's objs 174 are OVERRULED; 3) Dft's petition 171 is TRANSFERRED to the 6CCA as a second or successive motion; 4) To the extent that Dft seeks add'l relief from this Court under 28:2255, that request is DENIED. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 3/1/16.(MRS)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
V.
ROY DEAN WOODS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

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Criminal Action No. 6: 03-67-DCR
and
Civil Action No. 6: 16-25-DCR-REW

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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Defendant/Movant Roy Dean Woods is currently serving a 365-month term of
imprisonment following his conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms and
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (e)(1). [Record No. 92] Woods
challenged his conviction on appeal but was unsuccessful. [Record Nos. 111, and 130]
Thereafter, Woods collaterally challenged his conviction through the filing of a late motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Record No. 135] Although untimely, the Court considered the merits
of Woods’ motion, but ultimately denied the relief sought. [Record No. 161] Again, Woods
appealed that determination, but again, Woods was unsuccessful. [Record Nos. 162, 165, and
167]
On February 5, 2016, Woods filed a second motion seeking to vacate his conviction under
28 U.S.C. §2255. [Record No. 171] Thereafter, United States Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier
issued a Recommended Disposition in which he recommended that Woods’ second § 2255
motion be referred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 1631. [Record No. 173]

Woods filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Recommended Disposition on February 29, 2016. [Record no. 174] The matter is currently
pending for consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s report and Woods’ objections. Having again
considered the record of this proceeding, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge Wier’s
Recommended Disposition in full and overrule Woods’ objections to that report.1
I.
In his current motion, Woods asserts that his original sentence was wrongfully enhanced
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). As a result of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), he contends that he no longer
qualifies for the ACCA enhancement. After noting that Woods has not followed the statutory
requirements for filing a second § 2255 motion with this Court, Magistrate Judge Wier also
explains why the merits of the defendant’s current request is without merit.
Simply put, the holding in Johnson is inapplicable here because Woods was not
sentenced under the residual clause of the ACCA. Repeating the Magistrate Judge’s explanation:
The Court also comments on the motion’s likely merit, as may be relevant to the
authorization decision. See, e.g., In re Owens, 525 F. App’x 287, 290 (6th Cir.
2013) (evaluating merit as part of authorization analysis and applying the prima
facie showing standard). Woods challenges his two Kentucky burglary 3rd
convictions as ACCA predicates post-Johnson. DE # 171. The record indicates
that Woods indisputably has two qualifying convictions (both for Kentucky
burglary 2nd), and the District Court previously found, in adjudicating Woods’s
first § 2255 motion, that Woods’s 1996 burglary 3rd conviction qualifies as a
generic burglary under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the related Supreme Court cases.
DE # 161, at 11 (“Woods pled guilty to entering a building with the intent to
commit a crime. Thus, he pled guilty to the essential elements of a burglary, as
The Court makes a de novo determination on those portions of the magistrate judge’s
recommendations to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).
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defined by Taylor.”); id. (“Therefore, the 1996 conviction, together with Woods’
two second-degree burglary convictions, was sufficient to support the ACCA
enhancement.”) [fn6]
[fn6] To the extent Woods argues that “Kentucky’s third degree burglary statute
. . . is not divisible even though it appears to be,” DE # 171, at 18, he is mistaken.
United States v. Brumback, 614 F. App’x 288, 292 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Kentucky’s
third-degree burglary statute is divisible.”). “Because the statute is divisible, [the
Court] employ[s] the modified categorical approach to determine if the offense
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.” Id. The District Court previously
employed an endorsed analysis of Shepard-approved documents. DE # 161, at
10-11.
The Sixth Circuit denied a COA on the same grounds. DE # 165, at 3 (“Woods
has the requisite number of predicate ACCA offenses, i.e., the two 2001 seconddegree burglary convictions and the 1996 third-degree burglary conviction.”).
Judge Reeves simply did not rest sentencing on the residual clause at issue in
Johnson, making Johnson irrelevant to Woods’s sentence.
Because Woods has three convictions that qualified as violent felonies under [the]
ACCA without application of the residual clause, he does not here truly present
a Johnson claim. A motion staked on Johnson is ill-founded, in this context,
because Judge Reeves did not employ the residual clause in assessing any of
Woods’s three predicates; Johnson thus would not modify or affect the sentencing
analysis as to Woods. The nominal Johnson claims here merely seek to
impermissibly revisit a non-residual clause decision by the District Court. Thus,
the motion presents no real Johnson claim.
[Record No. 173, pp. 5-6]
Through his objections, Woods challenges this Court earlier determination (for a second
time) that his earlier 1996 burglary conviction did not fit the definition of burglary under Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).2 But this Court, the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme

2 Woods is essentially arguing that, although he was not sentenced under the residual clause of the

ACCA, he should have been because he believes other sections of the ACCA were inapplicable.
Woods challenged the Court’s determination on direct appeal and through his first § 2255 motion.
However, Woods apparently believes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson provides
leverage to again argue that, while he was not sentenced under the residual clause, that section of
the ACCA should have been applied (albeit wrongfully). To Woods and many other incarcerated
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Court have either rejected this argument or have declined to review it. As a result, Woods’
primary argument is foreclosed from further review by this Court. However, Woods does not
object the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this matter must be transferred to the Sixth
Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

The magistrate judge’s Recommended Disposition [Record No. 173] is

ADOPTED and INCORPORATED by reference.
2.

Defendant Roy Dean Woods’ objections to the Recommended Disposition

[Record No. 174] are OVERRULED.
3.

Defendant Roy Dean Woods’ Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) [Record No.

171] is TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as a second
or successive § 2255 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and Rule 9 of the Rules Governing
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
4.

To the extent that Defendant Roy Dean Woods seeks additional relief from this

Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that request is DENIED in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a).

individuals, simply proclaiming “Johnson” is similar to Ali Baba uttering “Open Sesame!” The
mere mention of the word opens caves filled with treasures beyond description.
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This 1st day of March, 2016.

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