Harrison v. Back
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted by Plaintiff James W. Harrison, a/k/a James William Harrison, against Defendant Jason K. Back under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (2) Harrison s common law claims against Defendant Jason K. Back, alleging assault, negligence, and wanton conduct, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Harrison's right to assert those claims in state court. (3) Judgment will be entered contemporaneously. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 4/21/16.(SYD)cc: mailed to pro se filer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
JAMES W. HARRISON,
a/k/a JAMES WILLIAM HARRISON,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:16-CV-63-KKC
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
JASON K. BACK, Deputy Sheriff,
Laurel County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendant.
Plaintiff James W. Harrison, a/k/a James William Harrison, is an inmate confined
by the Kentucky Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) in the Laurel County Detention
Center, which is located in London, Kentucky.
Proceeding without counsel, Harrison,
KDOC Inmate No. 198637, has filed a U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint [R. 1] in which
he asserts constitutional claims against Jason K. Back, whom Harrison identifies as a
Deputy Sheriff employed by the Laurel County Sheriff’s Department. Harrison alleges that
on March 2, 2015, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Back arrested him at the residence of Jo
Maggard, 115 Elmwood Court, London, Kentucky, and that during the course of the arrest,
Back applied unnecessary and excessive physical force to him, causing him to sustain
serious bodily injuries. By separate order, Harrison has been granted in forma pauperis
status.
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Harrison alleges that Back’s actions violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
and by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees a pre-trail
detainee’s right to be free from cruel and unusual conduct, such as excessive force by a state
actor.1
Harrison further contends that Back’s alleged conduct amounted to assault,
negligence, and wanton conduct, see R. 1, p. 3, all of which qualify as torts under common
law. Harrison asks that Defendant Back be “made to resign” from his position; be ordered
to undergo “…psychological examination to determine his eligibility to serve the public…,”
and be ordered to pay him $1 million in monetary damages. [R. 1, p. 9 § VI (“Relief”)]
The Court has conducted a preliminary review of Harrison’s complaint because he
asserts claims against a government official and because he has been granted pauper
status. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. In such cases, a district court must dismiss any
action which: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id. Because Harrison is not represented by an attorney, the Court liberally construes his
claims and accepts his factual allegations as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). But as explained
below, the Court determines that Harrison’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Back are time-barred, and must be dismissed with prejudice. The Court will also
Section 1983 does not confer substantive rights; rather, it is only a means to vindicate rights already conferred
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Excessive
force claims, however, can be raised under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. That amendment
which applies generally depends on the status of the plaintiff at the time of the incident; that is, whether the
plaintiff was a free citizen, convicted prisoner, or fit in some gray area in between the two. Lanman v. Hinson,
529 F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2008); Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures bars excessive force against free citizens, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 388
while the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars excessive force against convicted
persons. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-22 (1986). When a citizen does not fall clearly within either
category, e.g., pretrial detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment’s more generally applicable Due Process Clause
governs to bar a governmental official’s excessive use of force. See Lanman, 529 F.3d at 680–81; Phelps, 286
F.3d at 300.
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dismiss Harrison’s supplemental state law/common law claims alleging assault, negligence,
and wanton conduct, without prejudice to his rights to assert those claims in state court.
DISCUSSION
Harrison alleges that on March 2, 2015, Defendant Back unreasonably searched
and/or seized him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and applied excessive force
to him, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Complaint R. 1, pp. 2-3, § III
(A) and (B).
The Clerk of the Court did not actually receive and docket Harrison’s
complaint until Tuesday, April 19, 2016, but under the “prisoner mail-box rule,”2 Harrison’s
Complaint is considered to have been filed on April 8, 2016, the date which he identified on
the last page of his Complaint.
See id., p. 9.
But even using “April 8, 2016,” as the
applicable “filing” date, Harrison’s § 1983 complaint must be dismissed because it is barred
by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide its own statute of limitations, so federal
courts “borrow” the applicable limitations period from the state where the events occurred.
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79 (1985).
For constitutional torts committed in Kentucky, the one-year limitation period under Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) for bringing general personal injury actions applies. Collard v.
Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181–82 (6th Cir. 1990). Federal law governs when the
statute of limitations begins to run. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267; Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d
211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). A cause of
action accrues when “... the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the
Under the “prisoner mail-box” rule recognized by the Supreme Court, a prisoner’s complaint is deemed filed
on the date on which the prisoner certifies that he placed his complaint (or other legal pleading) in the prison’s
mail system. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 812–13 (6th Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (extending Houston).
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basis of his or her injury has occurred.” Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273
Here, Harrison unequivocally states that Defendant Back unreasonably seized him
and applied excessive force to him on March 2, 2015,3 meaning that Harrison either knew,
or should have known, about the facts underlying his constitutional claims on March 2,
2015. To satisfy Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions,
Harrison should have filed this § 1983 action asserting his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims on or before March 2, 2016. However, Harrison did not file his § 1983
complaint until April 8, 2016, over thirteen months after the events of March 2, 2015
allegedly transpired, and over one month after the one-year statute of limitations expired.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in cases of alleged Fourth
Amendment violations brought under § 1983, the statute of limitations begins to run on the
date that the alleged constitutional violations occurred (which, in this case, would be March
2, 2015).
See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007).
Further, the courts have
consistently held that related Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging the use of excessive
force during an arrest arise on the date on that allegedly excessive force was applied, and
that they are thus are subject to the forum state’s applicable statute of limitations. See,
e.g., Michel v. City of Akron, 278 F. App’x 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2008); Hodge v. City of Elyria,
126 F. App’x 222 225 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that unconstitutional excessive force alleged
in § 1983 action occurred at time that cocaine possession suspect was arrested, and that
Ohio’s applicable Ohio statute of limitations began to accrue on day of arrest; although
suspect purportedly did not realize permanent nature of his injuries until three months
Harrison further alleges that Defendant Back beat him so severely that “…law enforcement personnel had me
immediately transported to Saint Joseph Hospital.” [R. 1, p. 2, § III (A)]. Thus, it cannot be construed that
Harrison was unaware of his injuries on March 2, 2015, or that his injuries and the resulting harm from them
did not manifest until after March 2, 2015.
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after arrest, actual harm resulted from the alleged choking and hitting by officers during
arrest); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Wallace to hold claims
that arrestee-plaintiff’s claims against arresting officer and others, alleging arrest without
probable cause and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state law
claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, accrued, for limitations
purposes, on date of arrest, and were barred by Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations);
Stimac v. Bostick, 7 F.3d 235, 1993 WL 384999, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1993) (holding that
plaintiff’s claims alleging invasion of privacy during the criminal investigation, illegal
seizure of automobile, and excessive force during arrest, were all barred by the three-year
statute of limitations applicable to civil rights actions filed in Michigan); Gonzalez v.
Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998); Sublett v. White, No. 5:12CV-P97-R (W. D. Ky.
Sept. 21, 2012) ; Holley v. Metro Nashville Police Dept., No. 3:15-CV-01148, 2015 WL
7016465, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2015) (citing Wallace and finding that the plaintiff’s
claims alleging excessive force and unlawful arrest were time barred under Tennessee law,
and were not “….tolled by …charges or even a conviction.”) Thus, Harrison’s 1983 claims
alleging excessive force and/or unreasonable search and seizure are barred by Kentucky’s
one-year statute of limitations set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a).
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a complaint can be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations of the complaint demonstrate that
the claim would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. LRL Properties v.
Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has
also held that when the face of the complaint shows that an action is time-barred, the case
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may be dismissed summarily upon screening. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
That outcome is appropriate for this proceeding.
Here, as discussed, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct described in Harrison’s
complaint took place on March 2, 2015, but Harrison did not file this action until April 8,
2016, over one month beyond the expiration of Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations
period. Given the facts as articulated by Harrison, this § 1983 action is time-barred, and
thus no judicial purpose would be served in requiring Defendant Back to respond and
allowing this matter to proceed. See Castillo v. Grogan, 52 Fed. App’x 750, 751 (6th Cir.
2002) (district court may sua sponte dismiss complaint as time-barred when the defect is
obvious); Alston v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, 28 F. App’x 475, 476 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“Because the statute of limitations was obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte
dismissal of the complaint was appropriate.”) (citing Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d
Cir. 1995)); Fraley v. Ohio Gallia County, No. 97-3564, 1998 WL 789385 * 1 (6th Cir. Oct.
30, 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of § 1983 action filed after applicable two-year
statute of limitations had expired);
Brown v. University of Kentucky Comprehensive
Assessment & Training Services, No. 12-CV-123-KSF, 2013 WL 990423, at *7 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 13, 2013) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 claims sua ponte where it was clear from
the face of the complaint that they were time-barred); aff’d, Brown v. University of Kentucky
Comprehensive Assessment & Training Services, No. 13-5500 (6th Cir. Jun 19, 2014)).
Thus, the Court will sua sponte dismiss Harrison’s § 1983 claims as facially time-barred.
Finally, Harrison contends that Defendant Back’s alleged conduct constituted
assault, negligence, and wanton conduct, under Kentucky common law. The Court has
dismissed Harrison’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, leaving Harrison’s pendant
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state law claims as the only surviving claims in this action. A district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims
over which it possessed original jurisdiction. Gibbs v. Montgomery County Agricultural
Society, 140 F. Supp.2d 835, 845 (6th Cir. 2001); Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226,
233 (6th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that if all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, remaining state-law claims generally should be dismissed as well.
Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 233; see also Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284,
1287 (6th Cir. 1992).
Consistent with this principle, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Harrison’s state law claims alleging assault, negligence, and wanton
conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). For the reasons discussed herein, the state court
would also likely determine that Harrison’s common law claims are time-barred under Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1), but Harrison is free to pursue those claims in state court if he so
chooses.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court being advised, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1)
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted by Plaintiff James
W. Harrison, a/k/a James William Harrison, against Defendant Jason K. Back under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(2)
Harrison’s common law claims against Defendant Jason K. Back, alleging
assault, negligence, and wanton conduct, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
Harrison’s right to assert those claims in state court.
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(3)
Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order in favor of Defendant Jason K. Back, Deputy Sheriff with the Laurel
County Sheriff’s Department in London, Kentucky.
This April 21, 2016.
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