Brown v. Stacy et al

Filing 69

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) Defendant's Objections (Doc. #63) to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #62) are overruled. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #62) is adopted as th e findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court; 2) Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. #52 and 54) are denied; and 3) TELEPHONE CONFERENCE set for 2/22/2018 at 10:00 AM in COVINGTON before Judge David L. Bunning. Counsel shall dial in to this conference call five (5) minutes before the scheduled time by following these steps: See Order for details. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 2/2/18.(RC)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-91-DLB-EBA
NATHANIAL BROWN

VS.

PLAINTIFF

ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RYAN STACY, et al.

DEFENDANTS
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of

United States Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins (Doc. # 62), wherein he recommends
that the Court deny both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
(Docs. # 52 and 54). Defendants having objected to the R&R (Doc. # 63), and Plaintiff
having responded to those objections (Doc. # 65), the R&R is now ripe for the Court’s
review.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Defendants’ arguments are
without merit, overrules the objections, and adopts the R&R as the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Court.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The events giving rise to this action occurred on September 13, 2015. (Doc. # 62

at 1). During that time, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Kentucky Department of Corrections
at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (“Complex”) in West Liberty, Kentucky. Id.
The incident began when Defendant William Wells, a corrections officer, removed a food
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tray from Plaintiff’s possession. Id. at 2. A conversation ensued, during which Defendant
Wells applied force to Plaintiff’s arm and pinned him against a nearby structure. Id.
Afterwards, Defendants Jonathon Dingus and Ryan Stacy, two other corrections officers,
handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in a “chicken wing restraint.” Id.
After Plaintiff was restrained, Defendants Dingus and Stacy removed him from the
cafeteria, where another officer, Defendant Conner Hall placed leg restraints on him and
took him to the Segregation Area. Id. Once in the Segregation Area, Plaintiff was rushed
to an empty shower stall. Id. What occurred inside the shower stall is contested. Id. It
is known, however, that Nurse Lewis observed bruising around Plaintiff’s wrists upon her
entry into the shower stall. Id. Plaintiff was then placed in a restraint chair and taken to
the entrance of the Segregation Area, where he was surrounded by all Defendants, Nurse
Lewis, and an unidentified female nurse. Id. While restrained in the chair, Lieutenant
Kevin Dennis used scissors to remove Plaintiff’s clothing—leaving only his boxer shorts.
Id. Nurse Lewis noted a “deep abrasion” to the top of Plaintiff’s head. Id. Plaintiff also
appeared “drowsy” with “eyes red,” Plaintiff’s pupils were “pinpoint,” and he exhibited a
“sluggish” reaction to light and slurred speech. Id. at 2-3.
After Plaintiff’s head wound was addressed, he was taken to an observation cell,
where he remained for approximately one to two hours. Id. at 3. Plaintiff was removed
from the restraint chair, but stayed in the Segregation Unit, where he remained for nine
days. Id. During this time, Plaintiff was denied access to additional clothes beyond his
boxer shorts, soap, toothpaste, blankets, sockets, and was forced to sleep on a metal
rack. Id. Plaintiff was removed from the Segregation Unit on November 25, 2015, and
was moved to another institution on January 5, 2016. Id.

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Plaintiff initiated the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 27, 2016,
alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. (Doc. # 1). On July 26, 2016, a Memorandum Opinion and Order
was issued by this Court, dismissing Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendant Wells. (Doc. # 7). However, the Order permitted the Plaintiff to pursue his
Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Ryan Stacy, Conner Hall, Aaron Potter,
and Jonathon Dingus. Id. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 10, 2017
(Doc. # 52), which was referred to Magistrate Judge Atkins for the preparation of an R&R.
(Doc. # 33). Later, Defendants Ryan Stacy, Johnathan Dingus, Conner Hall, and Aaron
Potter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was also referred to Magistrate Judge
Atkins. (Doc. # 54). On December 5, 2017, Magistrate Judge Atkins issued an R&R
recommending that the Court deny both the Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 62).
Defendants filed Objections to the R&R, alleging four specific errors.1 (Doc. # 63).
First, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge should have considered whether
Plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis when deciding whether summary judgment was
appropriate. Id. at 1-3. Second, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge improperly
considered “handcuffing” in denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at
3. Specifically, Defendants argue that none of the allegations concerning handcuffing
should be permitted to proceed because Plaintiff never alleged that he complained that
his handcuffs were too tight. Id. Third, Defendants argue that summary judgment should
have been granted in favor of Defendant Hall. (Doc. # 63 at 4). Specifically, because

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Plaintiff has not objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that his Motion for Summary
Judgment be denied.

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Plaintiff could not have known Defendants’ state of mind, Defendants argue that the
Magistrate Judge should not have considered Plaintiff’s statement in the Complaint that
“[o]n the way to segregation, Stacy, Dingus, and Hall intentionally crashed Browns head
into every door and door frame between the prison’s basement A.K.A. ‘Phase 1 pill call’
and the segregation dorm.” Id. Lastly, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has not
alleged any resulting injury from Defendant Wells’s conduct, he should be absolved from
liability. (Doc. # 63 at 5). Each objection will be addressed in turn.
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Standards of Review

The Court reviews de novo portions of the R&R to which specific objections have
been raised. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Where no objections
are raised, or the objections are vague or conclusory, the Court is not required to review
under a de novo, or any other, standard. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985);
United States v. Jenkins, No. 6:12-cr-13-GFVT, 2017 WL 3431834, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug.
8, 2017).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists where “there is
sufficient evidence … for a jury to return a verdict for” the non-moving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The “moving party bears the burden of
showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008). Once a party files a properly supported motion
for summary judgment, by either affirmatively negating an essential element of the non-

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moving party’s claim or establishing an affirmative defense, “the adverse party must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250. However, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving
party’s] position will be insufficient.” Id. at 252.
The Court must “accept Plaintiff’s evidence as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in [her] favor.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The Court is not permitted to “make credibility
determinations” or “weigh the evidence when determining whether an issue of fact
remains for trial.” Id. (citing Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001)).
“The ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.’” Back v. Nestle USA, Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). If there is a dispute over facts that might affect the
outcome of the case under governing law, the entry of summary judgment is precluded.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
As the moving parties, the Defendants must shoulder the burden of showing the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element of
Plaintiff’s claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Assuming Defendants satisfy their burden,
the Plaintiff “must—by deposition, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions
on file—show specific facts that reveal a genuine issue for trial.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 726
(citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

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B.

Eighth Amendment and Excessive Force

An inmate’s post-conviction excessive force claim must be raised “exclusively
under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.”

Pelfrey v.

Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1995). In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
112 (1992), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for analyzing excessive force claims
under the Eighth Amendment: “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7.
The maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be
subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law; however, “a
violation of the Eighth Amendment will nevertheless occur if the offending conduct reflects
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Pelfrey, 43 F.3d at 1037. Factors to
consider is the extent of the injury suffered by an inmate, “the need for application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the threat
‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
C.

Defendants’ Objections

Defendants’ first objection questions the Magistrate Judge’s reading of Williams v.
Curtin, 635 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 2011), inasmuch as the Court considered a de minimis
injury when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Defendants argue
that a court may consider whether an injury is de minimis in deciding whether to grant or
deny a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 63 at 2). Defendants assert that even if
the de minimis injury suffered by Plaintiff alone is not enough to grant summary judgment,
the nature of the injuries, combined with the minimal use of force, supports granting

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summary judgment. Id.
Defendants’ objection amounts to a distinction without a difference. The objective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim “requires the pain inflicted to be sufficiently
serious.” Williams, 635 F.3d at 383. However, “[t]he seriousness of the injuries are not
dispositive; as the Supreme Court has held, ‘[w]hen prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are violated ...
whether or not significant injury is evident.” Id. at 383. The proper inquiry focuses on “the
nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34
(2010). Thus, while it may be true that a court may properly consider whether an injury
is de minimis, the determination that an injury is de minimis is not dispositive of an official’s
liability. Instead, the critical question is whether “the actual or threatened force was de
minimis.” Id. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge properly considered Plaintiff’s injuries
and the Defendants’ use of force.
Defendants further argue that the nature of Plaintiff’s injuries, combined with the
officials’ minimal use of force, warrants summary judgment in their favor. Defendants are
mistaken. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court “must view the
evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’” Talon v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
1861, 1866 (2014). As the Magistrate Judge explained, there remain material, factual
questions concerning the nature of Plaintiff’s injuries and the Defendants’ use of force
that precludes granting summary judgment. Defendants’ first objection is overruled.
Next, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge improperly considered
“handcuffing” in denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 63 at 3).

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Specifically, Defendants argue that none of the allegations concerning handcuffing should
be permitted to proceed because Plaintiff never alleged that he complained that his
handcuffs were too tight.

Id.

Defendants, however, improperly discount Plaintiff’s

allegation that the handcuffs were placed so tight that Plaintiff “squealed in pain” upon
placement of the handcuffs, allegedly causing Plaintiff’s wrists to be bruised for several
days. (Doc. # 62 at 6).
Defendants cite to Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d. 394, 401 (6th
Cir. 2009), which requires a plaintiff to offer sufficient evidence to a create a genuine issue
of material fact that: (1) he or she complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer
ignored those complaints; (3) and the plaintiff experienced some physical injury resulting
from the handcuffing. As the Magistrate Judge found, Plaintiff has put forth sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to all three factors. While it may be true that
Plaintiff did not explicitly state that the handcuffs were too tight, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s alleged squeal from the pain is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material
fact.

Additionally, accepting Plaintiff’s evidence as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor, it is also proper to infer that the officers ignored Plaintiff’s
complaints because the handcuffs were not removed.

Lastly, Plaintiff’s evidence

supports his claim that he experienced pain, given the alleged bruising on his wrists
caused by the handcuffs.
Defendants’ further claim that even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff’s “squeal”
is sufficient to satisfy the first requirement, the Defendants could not have reasonably
known that their conduct would violate the Constitution (Doc. # 63 at 4) (citing Lee v.
Norwalk, 529 F. App’x 778 (6th Cir. 2013)). Defendants’ reliance upon Lee is misplaced

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because the facts in this case are wholly distinguishable.

In Lee, the plaintiff was

handcuffed during a “short drive to the police station” and the Court concluded that this
was not a sufficient amount of time for an officer to know that his conduct violated the
arrestee’s rights. Id. at 782. Here, however, Plaintiff claims—and Defendants do not
dispute—that he was handcuffed, shackled at the legs, and held in the "chicken wing"
position when he was forcibly taken to the Supervision Area. During that time, Plaintiff
"squealed in pain," and received a head injury that required immediate medical attention
and the filing of an incident report, noting that Plaintiff exhibited delayed reaction to light
and had a "deep abrasion" on his head. (Doc. # 62 at 2). Thus, this case bears no factual
similarity to Lee. Rather, this case is more akin to Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573 (6th
Cir. 2014), where a district court was reversed for granting a motion for summary
judgment in favor of prison guards, in the presence of nearly identical facts and arguments
to the case at bar. Thus, Defendants’ second objection is also overruled.
Defendants’ third objection focuses on Plaintiff’s inability to prove Defendants’
state of mind while transporting him from the prison’s basement to the segregation dorm.
(Doc. # 63 at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally crashed
Plaintiff’s head into every door and door frame between the two points. Id. Defendants
argue that the Magistrate Judge should not have considered Plaintiff’s statement because
“statements ‘made on belief or on information and belief cannot be utilized on a summary
judgment motion.’” Ondo v. Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 605 (6th Cir. 2015).
The law is clear that an “affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion
[for summary judgment] must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would
be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify

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on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). When allegations “go beyond personal
knowledge and extend to matters within [a person’s] belief,” they cannot be regarded as
evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 to defeat summary judgment. Ondo, 795 F.3d at 604.
However, here, the Magistrate Judge did not rely merely on Plaintiff’s statement
that the officers’ actions were intentional in denying summary judgment. Instead, he
relied on material factual discrepancies between Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ account of
the facts, all of which support denial of summary judgment. For example, Defendants
insist that Plaintiff has exaggerated his injuries and claim that the incident was an “isolated
mishap.” (Doc. # 63 at 5). However, Plaintiff’s account of the incident is far different;
Plaintiff alleges that the officers dragged him through prison hallways, while slamming his
head into each and every metal and concrete door and door facing. (Doc. # 65 at 5). In
short, the Magistrate Judge did not deny summary judgment merely because Plaintiff
alleged that the Defendants’ actions were intentional. Instead, the Magistrate Judge
properly concluded that because of the vastly differing factual scenarios alleged by
Plaintiff and Defendants, a clear dispute of material fact exists and, therefore, denial of
summary judgment was appropriate. Therefore, Defendants’ third objection is overruled.
In their fourth and final objection, Defendants seek dismissal of claims against
Defendant Wells because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of an injury resulting
from Defendant Wells’s alleged slamming of Plaintiff into a window. (Doc. # 63 at 5).
Specifically, Defendants argue that given the amount of force and the apparent lack of an
injury, the claim fails under the Eighth Amendment. Id. However, Defendants fail to
acknowledge Plaintiff’s evidence that Defendant Wells was one of several officers

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involved in the incident. Plaintiff claims that the incident began when Defendant Wells
twisted his arm behind his back, slammed him into a window pane, and then the other
officers handcuffed him, dropped him to the floor and picked him up in a chicken-wing
fashion, and then slammed his head against the doors along the way to the segregation
unit. (Doc. # 65 at 6). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Wells acted in concert with several
other Defendants during the incident.
Plaintiff’s evidence that Defendants’ collective actions caused his injuries is
sufficient, even if Plaintiff cannot prove which one of the Defendants’ actions caused each
specific injury.

Generally, the court must examine the conduct of each individual

defendant separately when determining whether each defendant violated the Eighth
Amendment and whether each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Cox v.

Pohlman, 2017 WL 3053622, at *9 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2017). Here, however, the
evidence indicates that Defendants acted in concert with one another. Id. Thus, the
Court finds that a “reasonable jury could find under these facts that if excessive force was
used against [Plaintiff], [all] Defendants engaged in excessive force.” Id. Therefore,
Defendants’ fifth objection is overruled.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge

Atkins’s thorough analysis and concludes that denial of summary judgment was
appropriate. As a result, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) Defendant’s Objections (Doc. # 63) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (Doc. # 62) are overruled.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation (Doc. # 62) is adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law

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of the Court;
(2)

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. # 52 and

54) are denied; and
(3)

This matter is scheduled for a Telephone Conference on Thursday,

February 22, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel shall dial in to this conference call five (5)
minutes before the scheduled time by following these steps:
*

Call AT&T Teleconferencing at 1-877-336-1839; and

*

Enter access code 8854898.

This 2nd day of February, 2018.

K:\DATA\ORDERS\London\2016\16-91 Order Adopting R&R.docx

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