Brown v. Stacy et al
Filing
74
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: 1) Dfts' second motion for s/j 71 is GRANTED; 2) Action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the docket; 3) Jgm in favor of the dfts shall be filed contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 03/28/18. (MRS)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-91-DLB-EBA
NATHANIAL BROWN
VS.
PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RYAN STACY, et al.
DEFENDANTS
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff
Nathanial Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. # 71). Specifically,
Defendants claim that because Plaintiff failed to file his grievances within the five-day
deadline, Plaintiff’s grievances were properly denied as untimely and this action is barred
under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) for failure to properly exhaust
administrative remedies. Id. at 2. Plaintiff having responded to Defendants’ Motion (Doc.
# 72), and Defendants having filed their reply (Doc. # 73), the Motion is ripe for review.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.1
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
1
The factual and procedural background surrounding this action contained in the Court’s previous
Order Adopting the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Atkins (Doc. # 69) is hereby
incorporated by reference into this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
1
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of “showing the absence of any genuine
issues of material fact.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must cite to evidence in
the record upon which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict” in its favor; a mere
“scintilla of evidence” will not do. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52
(1986). At the summary-judgment stage, a court “views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2008).
B.
Compliance with the grievance policy was not unavailable to Plaintiff.
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing suit in the district court. Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
Specifically, it states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2004)). The prisoner has the burden of
proving that a grievance has been fully exhausted. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488
(6th Cir. 2002).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not
jurisdictional; it is mandatory, even if proceeding through the prison administrative system
would be futile. Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999). In the event that a
prisoner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the complaint must be
dismissed. Jones Bey, 407 F.3d at 806.
2
For a prisoner to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, he must strictly
comply with the facility’s deadlines and other procedural rules because “no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of
its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-1 (2006). Strict compliance is
necessary because “a prisoner wishing to bypass available administrative remedies could
simply file a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file on time, and then
when the “prison rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner [could] proceed directly
to federal court.” Id. at 91. Of particular relevance here, “an untimely or otherwise
improper grievance, even though appealed through all steps of a grievance procedure,
does not fulfill the PLRA exhaustion requirement.” Id.
In this respect, Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
because he was required to file “[a] grievance about a personal and specific incident …
within five (5) business days after the incident occur[ed],” but he did not file his grievance
until nearly a month after the incident. (Doc. # 71-1 at 3).
To comply with the PLRA, however, a prisoner need exhaust only “available”
administrative remedies. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016). That is, an inmate
must exhaust available remedies, but failure to exhaust unavailable remedies will not bar
his claim.
For purposes of the PLRA, “available” means “‘capable of use for the
accomplishment of a purpose,’ and that which ‘is accessible or may be obtained.’” Id. at
1859. Thus, before the Court can conclude that Plaintiff’s claim is barred under the PLRA
for failure to exhaust, the Court must consider whether the grievance procedure was truly
available to Plaintiff during the nine-day period in which he was placed in segregation.
3
The Plaintiff urges the Court to find that he lacked an available administrative
remedy, thereby excusing his obligation to exhaust. (Doc. # 72). Plaintiff’s argument is
two-fold. First, he argues that because he was on a 15-minute watch and was denied
access to pen and paper, the grievance procedure was made unavailable to him. Id. at
4. Second, he argues that because he was not made aware of any additional avenues
to timely file his grievances, the grievance procedure was made unavailable to him by the
Defendants and prison officials. Id.
Defendants present a compelling argument to refute Plaintiff’s notion that the
grievance procedure was unavailable to him.
In essence, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s segregation did not prohibit him from filing a grievance. (Doc. # 71-1 at 5).
Defendants point to two avenues that were available to Plaintiff, despite being held on a
15-minute watch. First, Plaintiff could have contacted the prison’s Grievance Coordinator
who would have written and filed the grievance on the Plaintiff’s behalf. 2 Id. Second,
Plaintiff could have orally requested to file a motion for extension of time to file a grievance
or request.3 Id. at 7.
The Court agrees with the Defendants. The Sixth Circuit “requires an inmate to
make affirmative efforts to comply with the administrative procedures” and the Court is
left to analyze “whether those efforts to exhaust were sufficient under the circumstances.”
Risher v. Lappin, 639 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that
he took any affirmative steps to file his grievances. Instead, Plaintiff has merely alleged
2
Under the prison’s grievance policy, the Grievance Coordinator has a duty to “[m]onitor operation
of the grievance process,” and “[e]nsure compliance with established time limits throughout the process.”
(Doc. # 71-1 at 6).
3
Furthermore, the prison’s grievance policy also provides that “[a]n inmate may request that his time
limit be extended by the Grievance Coordinator for just cause.” Id. at 7.
4
that he was unable to file the grievances because he did not have access to pen and
paper and was unaware of any additional avenues to file the grievances. Under the
circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust were insufficient.
The prison’s grievance procedure provided two avenues that Plaintiff failed to
pursue.
While it is undisputed that the grievance policy did not explicitly provide
procedures tailored to Plaintiff’s particular scenario, the policy provided two additional
avenues that would have allowed Plaintiff to file his timely grievances. The Sixth Circuit
has held that this type of grievance policy is sufficient, finding that “a jail’s grievance policy
need not explicitly provide for all possible scenarios in which a prisoner may seek to file
a grievance.” Napier v. Laurel Cty., 636 F.3d 218, 223 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, when a
reasonable policy is in place, but is silent or vague in a particular circumstance, court
must looks to see whether the prisoner has attempted to satisfy the requirements of the
policy.” Id. Plaintiff’s attempts to comply with the policy were insufficient. Furthermore,
Plaintiff’s argument that the avenues were unavailable to him because he was not made
aware of them is similarly lacking. Ignorance of a prison grievance policy does not excuse
compliance with it. Id. at 222 n.2. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, as required by the PLRA, and his claims must be dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1)
Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 71) is hereby
granted;
(2)
This action is dismissed and stricken from the Court’s active docket; and
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(3)
A Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be filed contemporaneously
herewith.
This 28th day of March, 2018.
K:\DATA\ORDERS\London\2016\16-91 Order Granting MSJ.docx
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