Stephens et al v. General Electric Company

Filing 102

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 53 is GRANTED. Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously herewith.. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 11/7/2017.(JMB)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON

BELINDA G. STEPHENS and LENA
VAUGHT,

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Plaintiffs,
V.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendant.
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Case No. 6:16-cv-00115-GFVT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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Belinda G. Stephens and Lena Vaught believe they were discriminated against when
General Electric terminated their employment in August of 2014. As explained below, this
termination was a reduction in force, and Stephens and Vaught have not identified facts that
establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination. Even if they could, Stephens and
Vaught have not demonstrated that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the termination
offered by General Electric are pretextual. For that reason, General Electric’s request for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
I
Defendant General Electric hired both Plaintiffs Belinda Stephens and Lena Vaught as
Standardizers (R4 classification) on November 26, 2011 to work in General Electric’s Somerset
Glass Plant. [R. 53-6; R. 53-7; R. 80 at 4.] In August of 2014, General Electric placed several
hourly employees, including Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught, on “layoff status.” [R. 53-3 at 58;
R. 53-4 at 5.] While General Electric experienced several incidences of layoffs during the course
of its operations, the current claims of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught only relate to the August

2014 layoff. [R. 53-3 at 59; R. 53-4 at 32–33.] This layoff eliminated ten hourly positions, four
of which were R4 positions. [R. 53-15 at 17–18.] It also began a complicated process of
“bumping” senior employees into lower job classifications, in other words, a laid off employee
with a higher classification, such as R23, “bumps” a more junior employee in a lower position,
such as R10, as long as he/she was qualified for the R10 position. Six R4 employees and four
R5 employees were placed on layoff status. [R. 53-1 at 9.] The six laid off R4 employees were
all women over the age of 40 (Sandra Dancy, age 62; Gaitha Flynn, age 60; Trulayne Mink, age
55; Linda Price, age 57; Belinda Stephens, age 58; and Lena Vaught, age 58). The four R5
employees were all male (James Gilmore, age 49; Aaron Irvine, age 31; John Linkes, age 44; and
David Pitman, age 57). Id. However, though General Electric did ultimately lay off the six
female R4 employees, General Electric “deferred layoff” for the four male R5 employees in
order to fill R5 and R4/R5 positions that were vacant prior to the August 2014 layoff and to
maintain temporary employees. Id. at 10. Gilmore and Irvine both served in Associate Press
Operator (APO) and/or Press Operator (PO) positions prior to the creation of additional R4/R5
positions, and neither Gilmore nor Irvine seem to have retained their APO and/or PO duties in
addition to the R4/R5 positions. [R. 53-1 at 9.] According to documents submitted by General
Electric, PO is a classification of R18, and APO is a classification of R12. [See R.53-19 at 1.]
General Electric claims that these four men were retained on a temporary basis for both R5 and
R4/R5 positions. [R. 53-1 at 10.]
During the August 2014 termination, General Electric retained four existing R4/R5
positions and created two additional R4/R5 positions. [R 53-15 at 8.] At that time, two of the
four retained R4/R5 positions were occupied (by James Wesley, Male, age 51, and Barbara
Wilson, Female, age 53) and two were “vacant.” Id. In the course of the August 2014

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termination, General Electric filled the two vacant positions with Dan Stogsdill (Male, age 54)
and Marty Wilson (Male, age 54), pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. General
Electric placed Tony Burris (Male, age 54) and Hank Petrey (Male, age 54) into the two newlycreated R4/R5 positions also consistent with the collective bargaining agreement. Id. General
Electric’s personnel files indicate that Burris already worked in the R4/R5 position as of January
2, 2013, and therefore already performed the duties associated with the R4 and R5 positions in
August of 2014. [R. 80-12.] The personnel files also reflect that Petrey held an R12 position of
APO when General Electric created the new R4/R5 position. [R. 80-13.] The files do not
suggest Petrey continued his R12 duties in addition to the R4/R5 duties. Id.
Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught filed an EEOC claim in 2015 [R. 80-8 at 5] before
bringing this action in 2016 [R. 1]. They allege age and gender discrimination, claiming General
Electric violated Title VII and KRS Chapter 344 by terminating their employment. [R. 1.]
General Electric filed a motion for summary judgment claiming (1) the termination of Ms.
Stephens’s and Ms. Vaught’s employment was a reduction in force as a matter of law; (2) Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or gender
discrimination under the heightened standard applicable to a reduction in force; and (3) even if
they could establish a prima facie case, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught could not show that
General Electric’s non-discriminatory business reason for the reduction in force was somehow
pretextual. [R. 53-1 at 1.] Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught responded, alleging issues of material
fact as to each of these claims. [R. 80.]
II
A
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

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as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56. “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the
evidence shows ‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Olinger
v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and
identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its
burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has satisfied this
burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific
facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall Holding,
285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do
more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present
significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment.”
Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted).
When applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259
F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
However, the Court is under no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a

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genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the
nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions
of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
B
Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught allege General Electric violated their rights under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and/or
the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS § 344.450 which, among other things, prohibits employers
from discharging employees on the basis of either sex or age (40 years or older). Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 344.040(1). Age discrimination claims brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
(“KCRA”) are analyzed under the same framework used to analyze similar federal claims. See
Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 393–94 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Claims brought under
the KCRA are ‘analyzed in the same manner’ as ADEA claims.”) (citing Harker v. Fed. Land
Bank of Louisville, 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1984)). “ADEA claims are in turn analyzed under
the same framework as that employed under Title VII.” Rutherford v. Britthaven, Inc., 452 F.
App'x 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 335 (6th
Cir. 2003)). Similarly, because the Kentucky Civil Rights Act “mirrors Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, [gender] discrimination claims under the KCRA are to be evaluated using
the federal standard of gender discrimination.” Bargo v. Goodwill Indus. of Kentucky, Inc., 969
F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (citing Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 758 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
A plaintiff may prove both age and gender discrimination through the use of either direct
or circumstantial evidence. Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009);
Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2012). “Direct evidence

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of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful
discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions.” Geiger, 579 F.3d at
620 (quoting Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Circumstantial evidence is “proof that does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but
does allow a fact finder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred.” Id. In this
case, neither Ms. Stephens nor Ms. Vaught have produced any direct evidence of discrimination,
nor do they argue direct evidence exists; thus, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught bear the burden of
proving a circumstantial case.
When a plaintiff seeks to prove intentional discrimination with circumstantial evidence, a
burden shifting framework applies, as established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973); Geiger, 579 F.3d at 621; see also Blizzard v. Marion Technical Coll., 698 F.3d
275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2359 (2013). Under McDonnell Douglas, Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Schoonmaker
v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, LLC, 595 F.3d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)). If successful, the burden then
shifts to the defendant employer to “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Allen, 545 F.3d at 394). Once this showing has been
made, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the employer’s
explanation was merely pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. Importantly, the burden of
production shifts throughout the analysis, but the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to
“demonstrate that age [or gender] was the ‘but-for’ cause of their employer’s adverse action.” Id.
(citing Geiger, 579 F.3d at 620; Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 623 n. 4
(2009)) (internal quotations omitted).

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To establish a prima facie case of age or sex discrimination, Ms. Stephens and Ms.
Vaught must demonstrate at the time of termination: (1) they belonged as members of a
protected class or, in the case of age discrimination, over the age of 40; (2) General Electric
subjected them to an adverse employment action; (3) they were qualified for the position they
held; and (4) circumstances exist that support an inference of discrimination. Blizzard, 698 F.3d
at 283; Vincent v. Brewer Co., 514 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2007); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
453 F.3d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 2006). In the context of age discrimination the fourth element
requires a showing that the plaintiff was replaced by someone substantially younger. See
Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2003).
General Electric does not dispute that Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught have met the first
three criteria for a prima facie case of discrimination. As women, both Ms. Stephens and Ms.
Vaught are members of a protected class. Vincent, 514 F.3d at 494 (citing Valentine-Johnson v.
Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 814 (6th Cir. 2004)). General Electric also recognizes that both Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught were fifty-eight years old at the time of their termination in 2014. [R.
53-1 at 9.] Second, “[a]n employer's decision to discharge an employee is a classic example of
an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862,
868 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2007)). Here, General Electric does not dispute Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught
were placed on layoff status in 2014. [R. 53-1 at 9.] Third, General Electric agrees that both Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught were qualified to work as Standardizers (“R4 classification) when they
were placed on layoff status in 2014. [R. 53-1 at 7.] In fact, General Electric admits Ms.
Stephens was qualified, not only in the R4 position which she held at the time of the layoff, but
also the QC Control Systems Clerk (“R10 classification”). Id. Additionally, General Electric
provided work histories of both Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught. These do not show any

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inadequacies in their qualifications, any disciplinary measures taken against them, or any
complaints concerning their work. [R. 53-6; R 53-7]. That brings us to the fourth prong:
circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 283; Vincent,
514 F.3d at 494; Vickers, 453 F.3d at 769.
C
General Electric’s Motion for Summary Judgment does not address the traditional
standard under Grosjean and Blizzard. Instead, General Electric presumes its personnel action
was a “reduction in force” (RIF). [See generally, R. 53-1.] If Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught
were terminated as part of a RIF, then they need to provide “additional direct, circumstantial, or
statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge
for impermissible reasons.” Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990). This
is a heightened standard.
But Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught dispute General Electric’s classification of the
termination events as a RIF. They claim that the creation of additional R4/R5 positions takes
this case out of a RIF analysis. [R. 80 at 16.] However, a RIF occurs whenever an employer
eliminates one or more positions within the company. Barnes, 896 F2d at 1465. Documents
show that ten positions were eliminated, and of those ten positions, four employees were eligible
for early retirement or voluntary layoff, resulting in only six potential employee terminations.
[R. 54 at 2.] Even if no terminations occurred, a RIF only requires that the positions themselves
are eliminated. Termination of employees is not a prerequisite of a RIF. Wilson v. Ohio, 178 F.
App’x 457, 465 (6th Cir. 2006).
The positions eliminated here were four R4 positions, one R10 position, one R12
position, one R16 position, one R17 position, one R21 position, and one R23 position. [R. 54 at

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6.] After these positions were eliminated, General Electric created two additional R4/R5
positions, bringing the total number of R4/R5 positions to six, and General Electric filled the
vacancies in this category with at least three employees with less seniority than Ms. Stephens and
Ms. Vaught. [R 80-8 at 35.] Following discussions with the union, General Electric
immediately reduced the six R4/R5 positions and created three R4 positions and three R5
positions. Id. at 36. Regardless of these changes, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught do not contest
that GE changed the company structure, resulting in the elimination of one R4 position, one R10
position, one R12 position, one R16 position, one R17 position, one R21 position, and one R23
position. Because Barnes only requires one position to be eliminated for an RIF to occur,
General Electric’s employment changes in August 2014, as a matter of law, must be classified as
a “reduction in force.” Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught are therefore subject to the heightened
standard to establish a prima facie case for discrimination. Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465.
D
Ultimately, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught fail to establish a prima facie case for
employment discrimination. To support an inference of discrimination under the traditional
standard, they must show they were replaced by General Electric with someone substantially
younger. Grosjean, 349 F.3d at 336; Blizzard, 698 at 283. An age difference of ten years or
more is generally considered “significant” for the purposes of age discrimination. Grosjean, 349
F.3d at 336. An age difference of six years or less is not “significant;” age differences between
six and ten years can be “significant,” but are not presumed to be either “significant” or “not
significant.” Id. at 340. A terminated employee is not “replaced” if another employee is
assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in addition to already existing duties, or if the plaintiff’s

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duties are redistributed among other employees who are already performing related work. See
Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465.
Here, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught are unsure of who exactly shouldered their R4 duties
after the August 2014 RIF. In their response, they claim either Burris and Petrey (who filled the
newly created R4/R5 positions) or “some combination of Gilmore, Linkes, Pitman, and/or
Irvine,” all of whom were retained on a temporary basis for the R4/R5 and R5 positions,
“replaced” them. [R. 80 at 18.] All six of these retained employees were male, which supports
their claims for gender discrimination. However, of these six men, only Irvine (age 31) and
Linkes (age 44) are presumed to be of a significant age difference to support a claim for age
discrimination, while Gilmore (age 49) falls in the gray area between six and ten years’
difference. [Supra I.A.]
As for Petrey, he moved from an R12 position to an R4/R5 position in August 2014,
without retaining his R12 duties. [R. 80-13.] Reassigning an existing employee is analogous to
hiring a new employee to cover the duties of the terminated employee. See Tinker v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 127 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that promoting a part-time employee
to full-time status constituted “replacement” even if the duties of the retained employee never
change). Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Petrey’s employment
records seem to establish enough dispute of fact as to whether Petrey “replaced” Ms. Stephens
and Ms. Vaught and took over their duties, even though Petrey’s resulting job title was not the
same as their former positions. (See Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986))).
On the other hand, Burris moved to an R4/R5 position in 2013, well before the August
2014 RIF. [R. 80-12.] A terminated employee is not “replaced” if the plaintiff’s duties are

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redistributed among other employees who are already performing related work. Barnes, 896
F.2d at 1465. Even if Burris assumed their R4 duties in August 2014 as a result of the RIF, he
was already performing the R4 duties as part of his R4/R5 position; and thus, Burris could not
have “replaced” them as a matter of law. See id.
Similarly, Linkes served in a plant utility (R5) position beginning in 2013. [R. 80-11 at
2.] The record is unclear as to whether Linkes remained in the R5 position or if he moved into
the R4/R5 position after the August 2014 RIF. However, even assuming, as Ms. Stephens and
Ms. Vaught allege that Linkes moved into an R4/R5 position, taking over their duties, Linkes
retained his original R5 duties in addition to their R4 duties. And, as noted, a terminated
employee is not “replaced” if another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in
addition to already existing duties. Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465. Thus, because Linkes maintained
his R5 duties, at least from 2013 through 2015, he would take on Ms. Stephens’s and Ms.
Vaught’s R4 duties in addition to his own; and thus, Linkes could not have “replaced” them as a
matter of law. See id.
Gilmore presents a slightly different circumstance. He served as an APO and/or PO
employee (R12 and R18 positions) prior to the August RIF. [R. 80-11 at 1.] General Electric
indicates that Gilmore was retained on a temporary basis for both R5 and R4/R5 positions after
the August RIF. [R. 53-1 at 10.] While records show Gilmore returned to the APO position, at
least by 2015, General Electric does not allege that Gilmore retained his R12 duties while
performing as a temporary R5 or R4/R5. Id. Once again, reassigning an existing employee is
analogous to hiring a new employee to cover the duties of the terminated employee. See Tinker,
127 F.3d at 522. By performing the R4/R5 position, Gilmore would inevitably be performing R4
duties and therefore taking over Ms. Stephens’s and Ms. Vaught’s additional R4 duties if

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necessary. Drawing reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party, Gilmore’s
employment records establish enough dispute of fact as to whether Gilmore “replaced” Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught and took over their duties, even though Gilmore’s resulting job title
was not the same as their former positions. (See Logan, 259 F.3d at 566 (citing Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 255)).
Next comes Pitman. He served in a plant utility (R5) position beginning in 2011. [R. 8011 at 4.] Evidence provided is unclear as to whether Linkes remained in the R5 position or if he
moved into the R4/R5 position after the August 2014 RIF. However, even assuming, as Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught allege, Pitman moved into an R4/R5 position, taking over their duties,
Pitman retained his original R5 duties in addition to Ms. Stephens’s and Ms. Vaught’s R4 duties.
So, once again, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught were not “replaced” because another employee
was assigned to perform their duties in addition to already existing duties. Barnes, 896 F.2d at
1465. Thus, because Pitman maintained his R5 duties, at least from 2013 through 2015, he
merely took on their R4 duties in addition to his own; and thus, Pitman could not have
“replaced” them as a matter of law. See id.
Finally, Irvine also served as an APO/PO employee (R12 and R18 positions) prior to the
August RIF. [R. 80-11 at 3.] General Electric indicates Irvine was retained on a temporary basis
for both R5 and R4/R5 positions after the August RIF. [R. 53-1 at 10.] While records show
Irvine returned to the APO position, at least by 2015, General Electric does not allege that Irvine
retained his R12 duties while performing as a temporary R5 or R4/R5. Id. Reassigning an
existing employee is analogous to hiring a new employee to cover the duties of the terminated
employee. See Tinker, 127 F.3d at 522. Drawing reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party, Irvine’s employment records seem to establish enough dispute of fact as to

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whether Irvine “replaced” Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught and took over their duties, even though
Irvine’s resulting job title was not the same as their former positions. (See Logan, 259 F.3d at
566 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255)).
To summarize, out of the six men Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught identifies, only Petrey,
Gilmore, and Irvine could have possibly “replaced” them. All three were male, thus supporting
an inference of gender discrimination. However, Petrey, at age 54, was only four years younger
than Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught, and therefore was not “significantly” younger to support an
inference of age discrimination. Grosjean, 349 F.3d at 340. Gilmore, at age 49, was nine years
younger, and, under Grosjean, was probably young enough to have a “significant” age difference
from Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught. See id. at 339. Irvine, at age 31, is seventeen years younger
than Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught and definitely young enough to support an inference of age
discrimination. Id. at 340.
However, this was a reduction in force. Consequently, for a prima facie case, Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught must provide additional evidence that is either direct, circumstantial,
or statistical, indicating the employer singled out and terminated the plaintiff for “impermissible
reasons.” Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465. Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught only attempted to provide
circumstantial evidence, without offering any direct or statistical evidence [R. 80 at 19].
Circumstantial evidence is “proof that does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but
does allow a fact finder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred.” Geiger,
579 F3d at 620.
Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught introduced evidence showing that younger, male
employees were retained during the August RIF at General Electric in R4/R5 positions, a job
they seem to argue is comparable to their former R4 positions. However, simply because

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younger employees are retained during a RIF is not sufficient evidence to support a prima facie
case of discrimination. Adams v. Proto Plastics, Inc., 151 Fed. App’x 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2005).
Likewise, merely because all eliminated employees were women does not establish a prima facie
case of gender discrimination. See Slapak v. Tiger Management Group, LLC, 594 Fed. App’x
290, 295 (6th Cir. 2014). Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught must do more than show that all six
terminated employees were women over the age of 40.
One part to a prima facie case consists of showing that Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught
possessed “qualifications superior to those of a younger coworker working in the same position
as the plaintiff.” Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466. However, this determination cannot be “subjective”
based on whether the terminated employees feel as though they are better qualified. Copeland v.
Regent Electric, 499 Fed. App’x 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2012). Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught argue
the relative qualifications for R4/R5 positions were seniority and a willingness and ability to
serve in such positions. [R. 80 at 21.] Regardless of their willingness to train into those
positions, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught admit they never received such training and had never
worked as an R5 employee. [R. 53-3 at 49, 58; R. 53-4 at 19–20.] It is not sufficient for them to
show their willingness to train into the job, nor is it enough for them to show they were as
qualified as the men who remained in the company. Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught must be able
to show they possessed superior qualifications to those of their younger male coworkers.
Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466. They have not shown this. Out of the three men who could have
replaced them (Petrey, Gilmore, and Irvine), all three were trained and had experience working
in the R5 position while they did not. Even drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught, under Barnes, because they cannot prove any objective qualifications
superior to those held by their replacements, Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught fail to establish a

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prima facie case for discrimination against General Electric.
E
Even if Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught were able to establish a prima facie case against
General Electric, they have provided no evidence that General Electric’s reasons for terminating
employment were pretextual. Once a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case for
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to “articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Schoonmaker v. Spartan
Graphics Leasing, LLC, 595 F.3d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Allen v. Highlands Hospital
Corp., 545 F.3d 287, 394 (6th Cir. 2008). After this showing has been made, the burden of
production shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the employer’s explanation was
merely pretext for intentional discrimination. Id.
In the case of work force reductions, the most common legitimate reason to terminate
employment is the RIF itself. Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990).
General Electric explains the company needed to reduce its workforce due to declining demand.
[R. 53-1.] Thus, by providing extensive evidence as to the August 2014 reduction in force [see
R. 54], General Electric could satisfy their burden of providing a nondiscriminatory reason. Ms.
Stephens and Ms. Vaught would then have to establish that the reduction in force was pretextual
for some other discriminatory purpose. Schoonmaker, 595 F.3d at 264. To do so, they must
show General Electric’s proffered reasons either (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually
motivate General Electric’s discharge of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught, or (3) were insufficient
to motivate General Electric’s discharge of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught. Allen, 545 F.3d at
396 (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught cannot show that General Electric’s reasons had no basis

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in fact. General Electric did conduct a reduction in force in August of 2014. [R. 54.] The
Somerset plant where they worked eventually closed on August 11, 2017, after years of other
reductions in force [see R. 54, R. 55, R. 56, and R. 57] still could not sustain the drop in demand
for General Electric’s product. (See Bill Mardis, Somerset GE plant’s doors close for good
today, Commonweal Journal, Aug. 11, 2017, http://www.somersetkentucky.com/news/somerset-ge-plant-s-doors-close-for-good-today/article_b3e0cefe-7e1311e7-ab8a-e329bc5bf565.html.)
Furthermore, General Electric selected Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught for termination
because they were not qualified to fill the open positions. Supra II.D. Ms. Stephens and Ms.
Vaught are unable to show that these reasons had no factual basis. They have provided no
evidence that the plant was not downsizing prior to ultimate closure, nor have they provided
factual evidence to show they were trained or had sufficient experience for the open positions.
Nor can they point to evidence showing these circumstances did not motivate General Electric’s
termination of them or that these reasons are in any way insufficient. While in some instances, a
defendant’s changing explanations may evidence pretext (see Fox v. Certainteed Corp., 198 F.3d
245 (6th Cir. 1999)), this is not the case here. Neither Ms. Stephens nor Ms. Vaught allege
retaliation, and the disparities in evidence do not raise any material issue in the case, rather these
disparities relate to whether they were offered training after the August 2014 RIF. [R. 80 at 32–
39.] Even if they were offered training for the R5 position, General Electric was downsizing the
Somerset plant due to decreased consumer demand and neither Ms. Stephens nor Ms. Vaught
were as qualified as other, retained employees to fill the vacant positions in the remaining
workforce, much less more qualified than the retained employees. Thus, even if they could
establish a prima facie case for discrimination, they cannot meet the burden of establishing

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General Electric’s reasons for terminating their employment to be pretextual.
III
The decision to close an industrial plant always presents difficult consequences for the
company, the town where the plant was located, and most of all, the plant’s former employees.
The General Electric plant in Somerset, Kentucky experienced an RIF in August of 2014, and
worsening market conditions ultimately led to the plant shuttering its doors in 2017. The
termination of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Vaught as employees of General Electric was a result of
this RIF, not because of any impermissible discrimination by General Electric. For the foregoing
reasons and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Court hereby ORDERS that the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 53] is GRANTED. Judgment in favor of
Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This 7th day of November, 2017.

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