Sams v. SSA

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 9/26/17.(SYD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
at LONDON

Civil Action No. 16-142
JEFFREY EDWARD SAMS,

v.

PLAINTIFF,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits. The Court having reviewed the record in this case and
the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the
reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his current application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits in May I June 2013, alleging disability beginning in January 2013, due
to fibromyalgia, gout, rheumatoid arthritis, diverticulitis, deafness in left ear, high cholesterol and
anxiety (Tr. 219). This application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter,
upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge
Todd Spangler (hereinafter "ALJ''), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the
hearing, William Ellis, a vocational expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.

At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff was 40 years
old at the time of the hearing decision. He has a high school education plus one year of college
and has worked as security guard and janitor.
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability.
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, rheumatoid
arthritis and gout, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments.

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The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work and, further,
determined that he has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of light work
with certain restrictions. Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner . Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment and this matter is ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner

v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not try the case de nova nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."

Bradley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir.1997).

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B.

PlaintifPs Contentions on Appeal

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ' s finding of no disability is erroneous because: (1) the
ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion of his treating physician Amjad Ali, M.D.; (2) the ALJ
did not properly consider Plaintiffs fibromyalgia and (3) the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiffs
credibility.
C.

Analysis of Contentions on Appeal

Plaintiffs first claim of error is that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion of his
treating physician Amjad Ali, M.D.
In order to be given controlling weight, the opinions of a treating source on issues

involving the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments must be well supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and be consistent with other
substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). The Court is mindful of the
fact that the Commissioner is not bound by a treating physician's opinion. Such opinions receive
great weight only if they are supported by sufficient medical data. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d
431, 435 (6 1h Cir. 1985).
Dr. Ali provided a medical source statement in January 2015, in which he opined, among
other things, that Plaintiff could lift and carry less than ten pounds; sit and stand for 15 minutes
at a time each and two hours in an 8-hour workday each; and would miss work about three times
in a month for his alleged impairments or treatment (Tr. 456-458).
The ALJ did not assign Dr. Ali's opinion "great weight" and explained his reasons for
doing so. First, he noted that the January 2015 medical source statement did not appear to be
supported by clinical or diagnostic data, but, rather seemed to be a recitation pf Plaintiffs

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symptoms. In addition, the ALJ noted that Dr. Ali's treatment notes did not support the severe
restrictions he suggested in is January 2015 statement. The ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff
followed-up with Dr. Ali every three months; however, most examinations were benign, and his
opinion was not consistent with the other medical evidence of record and objective clinical
findings did not support Dr. Ali's overly restrictive opinion. Finally, the ALJ pointed out that
Dr. Ali's overly restrictive form assessment of Plaintiff's physical limitations stood in contrast to
the other medical evidence in the record. For example, consultative physician, Donna Sadler,
M.D. Dr. Sadler opined that Plaintiff could perform light exertion work with additional postural
and manipulative limitations (Tr. 77-80). The ALJ reasonably considered Dr. Sadler's opinions
"within the entire body of evidence." Indeed, the ALJ's decision was consistent with or even
more restrictive than the state agency medical consultant's opinions of record.
The Court finds no error in the ALJ' s consideration of Dr. Ali's opinion.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider his alleged fibromyalgia. In
doing so, he contends that Rogers v. Commissioner, 486 F.3d 234 (6 1h Cir. 2007) directs the
undersigned to find error in this case. However, Plaintiff's reliance on Rogers is misplaced.
while the Court in Rogers held that the ALJ erred in failing to find fibromyalgia to be a severe
impairment, that is not what the ALJ did here. Instead, the ALJ found that, indeed, fibromyalgia
was a severe impairment. Moreover, a diagnosis of fibromyalgia does not automatically entitle
one to disability benefits. See Torres v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 490 F.App'x 748, 754 (6th Cir.
2012).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his credibility.
It is well established that as the "ALJ has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of a

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witness, his conclusions with respect to credibility should not be discarded lightly and should be
accorded deference." Hardaway v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922, 928
(6th Cir. 1987). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiffs credibility to be "poor" with regard to her
allegations of disabling pain. (Tr. 22). Subjective claims of disabling pain must be supported by
objective medical evidence. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801F.2d847,
852-853 (6th Cir. 1986). Based upon the record, Plaintiffs subjective complaints do not pass

Duncan muster.
As the ALJ pointed out, the medical evidence before him supported the conclusion that
Plaintiff's allegations as to the severity of his symptoms were not entirely believable, and the
ALJ found objective medical findings, medical source opinions, Plaintiff's inconsistent
statements, and his course of treatment all supported his finding that his symptoms were not as
severe as he alleged. And, with the exception of Dr. Ali's medical source statement, the opinions
or objective findings from the acceptable medical sources including Drs. Sadler, Burkhart, Hays
and Demaree, did not support Plaintiff's claims of disabling symptoms.
Plaintiffs argument about the "pain standard is unclear. specificity-he has not
explained how the ALJ violated the "pain standard," nor has he discussed how the factors of 20
C.F.R. 416.929© support his credibility. Notwithstanding his bald assertion of error, his brief is
devoid of any references to the transcript, statements from physicians or citations to caselaw in
this regard. Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing disability. See C.F.R. §§
404.1512(a), 416.912 (a). See also, Foster v. Halter, 279 F.2d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001).

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III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALI' s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be
SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This

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of September, 2017.
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Signed By:

Henrl{.B. Wilhoit. Jr.
United States District Judge