Richardson v. Butler

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Petitioner Willie Rayshaun Richardson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. # 1 ) is DENIED; (2) This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket; and (3) Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 4/4/18. (MRS)cc: COR, Pro se filer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-71-DLB
WILLIE RICHARDSON
VS.

PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

S. BUTLER, Warden

RESPONDENT
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Inmate Willie Rayshaun Richardson has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. # 1). This matter is before the Court to
conduct the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).
In October 2008, a jury found Richardson guilty of conspiring to traffic in cocainebase in and around Grand Rapids, Michigan. Six months later he was sentenced to 360
months imprisonment for violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. United States v. Richardson,
No. 1:08-CR-65-RJJ (W.D. Mich. 2008). In his present petition, Richardson contends that
his confinement is illegal because the federal government lacks “territorial jurisdiction”
over state-owned lands within the United States, and Michigan did not cede nor did the
United States accept jurisdiction over the land where he committed his crimes. (Doc. # 1
at 2) (citing Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943)).
The Court must deny Richardson’s petition for two reasons. First, his challenge to
the trial court’s jurisdiction to convict and sentence him is one which he could and must
have brought at trial, on direct appeal, or in an initial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 2003). He may not use a habeas
corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for this purpose, as it does not constitute an
additional or alternative remedy to the one available under § 2255.

Hernandez v.

Lamanna, 16 F.App’x 317, 320 (6th Cir. 2001). Because “the savings clause has only
been applied to claims of actual innocence based upon Supreme Court decisions
announcing new rules of statutory construction unavailable for attack under section
2255[,]” Hayes v. Holland, 473 F.App’x 501, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2012), Richardson’s
jurisdictional attack is one which he must pursue under § 2255, not § 2241.
Second, Richardson’s claim is without merit. Only a small subset of federal crimes
must by their terms be committed on federal lands, which is to say “within the ... territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (commission of murder on federal
lands). Territorial jurisdiction includes “lands reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof.” 18 U.S.C. §
7(3). See also United States v. Gabrion, 517 F.3d 839, 845 n.5 (6th Cir. 2008). Because
the language of sections 841 and 846 of Title 21, United States Code, is not limited to
offenses committed within the “territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, Richard’s
argument is misplaced.
Nor is there any doubt that federal authorities possessed jurisdiction to prosecute
Richardson for his offenses. In most cases the criminal statute is not limited to offenses
committed within the “territorial jurisdiction” of the United States. Absent such restricting
language, the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal trial courts jurisdiction over “all crimes
and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States.” Many
modern criminal statutes were enacted by Congress pursuant to its authority under the
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Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 630 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

The statute under which Richardson was

convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 846, is one of them. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3). And the Supreme
Court has held that the Controlled Substances Act, which includes 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846,
is a valid exercise of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 13-17 (2005). See also United States v. Collier, 246 F.App’x 312, 337
(6th Cir. 2007) (“Whether on its face or as applied to Defendant, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
does not violate the Commerce Clause.”).

Because the United States possessed

jurisdiction to prosecute Richardson for federal offenses committed on state-owned land
near Grand Rapids, Michigan, his petition is without merit.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1)

Petitioner Willie Rayshaun Richardson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. #1) is DENIED;
(2)

This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket; and

(3)

Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum

Opinion and Order.
This 4th day of April, 2018.

K:\DATA\ORDERS\ProSe\Richardson 17-71-DLB Memorandum RBW.docx

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