Watford v. Ormond

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED as follows:(1) Watford's Motion to file an amended petition (Doc. # 13 ) is GRANTED; (2) Watford' Motion to transfer his petition to the Northern District of Indiana (Doc. # 13) is DENIED; (3) Wa tfords amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. # 13-1) is DENIED; (4) Watford's Motion for an order directing the respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted (Doc. # 14 ) is DENIED; (5) The Court will enter a corresponding Judgment; and (6) This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 3/22/18.(SYD)cc: mailed to pro se filer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-322-DLB
JOHN JOSE WATFORD
VS.

PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

J. RAY ORMOND, Warden,

RESPONDENT
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

In November 2017, federal inmate John Jose Watford filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. # 1). Watford subsequently filed an
amended petition pursuant to directions from the Court. (Doc. # 11). Watford has now
filed a Motion to Amend his petition a second time, and has tendered the proposed
amended petition. (Doc. # 13). Because the tendered second amended petition is not
materially different from the first, the Court will grant Watford’s Motion to Amend. This
tendered amended petition (Doc. # 13-1) will stand as his final petition in this matter.
In the same motion, Watford requests that this Court transfer his § 2241 petition to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, which is the court that
imposed his sentence. As grounds, Watford asserts that unlike the Sixth Circuit, courts
within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognize as retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review those decisions of the Supreme Court upon which
he relies in his petition, including Mathis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016), Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); and Begay v. United States,

553 U.S. 137 (2008). While Watford relies upon Holt v. United States, 843 F. 3d 720 (7th
Cir. 2016) for this proposition, it holds just the opposite. Id. at 721.
Regardless, the Court must deny this Motion because only Watford’s custodian in
this district, not the sentencing court, can grant him relief under § 2241. Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435, 442-43 (2004) (“The plain language of the habeas statute thus
confirms the general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical
confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a) (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief “within their respective
jurisdictions.”). And the mere fact that the proposed transferee jurisdiction operates under
legal precedent that the movant perceives to be more amenable to his claims provides
no legitimate basis for transfer in any event. Yoder v. Ryan, 318 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (“... plaintiffs’ belief that this venue is more favorable to their claim is not a
justification for denial of a motion to transfer.”).
This matter is before the Court to conduct an initial screening of Watford’s second
amended petition (Doc. # 13-1). 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).
In September 1997, a jury in South Bend, Indiana found Watford and his cohort
guilty of three armed bank robberies, resulting in six convictions: three for assault with a
deadly weapon during the commission of a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d), and three more for using and carrying a firearm during the commission of a
crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c). There was also evidence of uncharged
bank robberies in Indianapolis and Anderson, Indiana, but it did not inform either his
convictions or sentences.

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The presentence report indicated that Watford had prior convictions in 1990 in
Florida for burglary of a dwelling and in 1994 in Pennsylvania for aggravated assault. The
trial court concluded that both convictions were for “crimes of violence,” the former under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), and the latter as one involving the use of force under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Because Watford had two or more prior convictions for crimes of violence,
he was subject to the career offender enhancement found in § 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing
Guidelines. This increased his offense level from 25 to 34. It also established a criminal
history category of VI, although this would have been true even without the enhancement
in light of his 13 criminal history points.
Watford was thus subject to a sentencing range under the guidelines of 262 to 327
months imprisonment for the three § 2113(d) convictions. By statute, Watford also faced
a mandatory 60-month prison term for his first § 924(c) conviction and mandatory 240month prison terms for each of his second and third § 924(c) convictions, each of which
must be served consecutively to any other prison term. As a result, Watford’s sentencing
range was 802 to 867 months imprisonment. The trial court considered at length the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and in February 1998 sentenced Watford to 802
months imprisonment, at the very bottom of the permissible sentencing range. United
States v. Watford, No. 3: 97-CR-26(2)-RLM (N.D. Ind. 1997) (Doc. #27, 61, 99, 101
therein). The Seventh Circuit affirmed on direct appeal in all respects. United States v.
Watford, 165 F. 3d 34, 1998 WL 743924 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 1998).
Since that time, Watford has filed several dozen motions, petitions, or requests for
various forms of relief from his convictions, sentences, fines and restitution, all without
success. So extensive and repetitive were Watford’s filings that in 2016 the Seventh

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Circuit imposed a $500.00 sanction and conditional filing restrictions upon him. Watford
v. United States, No. 16-1404 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2016).
In his present § 2241 petition, Watford contends that his prior offenses did not
properly constitute “crimes of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) in light
of Mathis, Descamps, and Begay, and thus his sentence was improperly enhanced as a
career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). (Doc. # 13-1 at 5).
Use of § 2241 petition as a vehicle to challenge the validity of a sentence is only
permissible where (1) the petitioner’s sentence was imposed when the Sentencing
Guidelines were mandatory before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); (2) the petitioner was foreclosed from asserting the claim
in a successive petition under § 2255; and (3) after the petitioner’s sentence became final,
the Supreme Court issued a retroactively applicable decision establishing that—as a
matter of statutory interpretation—a prior conviction used to enhance his federal sentence
no longer qualified as a valid predicate offense. Hill v. Masters, 836 F. 3d 591, 599-600
(6th Cir. 2016).
Watford’s claims clearly satisfy the first criteria and likely the second, but not the
third, and hence are not cognizable in this § 2241 proceeding. First, his claim under
Begay necessarily fails because that decision’s analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s
residual clause—a provision not even at issue in Watford’s case—was abrogated by the
Supreme Court’s invalidation of that provision on constitutional grounds in Johnson v.
United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
Watford’s reliance upon Descamps and Mathis is likewise misplaced. First, neither
decision even discussed the substantive reach or meaning of either the phrase “crime of

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violence” as used in § 4B1.2(a) or whether the prior state offenses from Florida and
Pennsylvania used to enhance Watford’s sentence qualified as such. Instead, both
decisions were merely procedural, discussing the analytical framework established in
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), a decision issued well before Watford’s
sentence was imposed. In Descamps, the Supreme Court only clarified that under Taylor,
resort to the modified categorical approach is not appropriate where the underlying state
conviction was pursuant to an indivisible statute. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261-62 (citing
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). For its part, Mathis merely reiterated that a statute is divisible,
hence permitting resort to the modified categorical approach, only when it sets forth
alternative elements, hence defining multiple crimes in a single statute, but not when it
merely sets forth alternative factual means to commit a single offense. Mathis, 136 S. Ct.
at 2249, 2251-52 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
Watford does not allege the trial court impermissibly used the modified categorical
approach to analyze his prior offenses, and hence makes no claim actually grounded in
Mathis or Descamps at all. Instead, he merely argues a claim predicated upon Taylor:
that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes under which he was convicted are broader
than their “generic” counterparts. (Doc. # 13-1 at 5). Because that decision was issued
nearly a decade before his sentence was imposed, Watford was obligated to pursue any
claim under on it direct appeal, and resort to § 2241 is unavailable. Capaldi v. Pontesso,
135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 2003); Hernandez v. Lamanna, 16 F. App’x 317, 320 (6th
Cir. 2001).
Finally, even if this were not so, Watford’s claims do not fall within the scope of the
narrow exception carved out in Hill because neither of these decisions is retroactively

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applicable to cases on collateral review. The Supreme Court in Mathis made plain that
its decision, being “all but resolved” by 25-year-old precedent, was not retroactive.
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. The Sixth Circuit has expressly so held. In re: Conzelmann,
872 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2017). Descamps is likewise not retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review in order to permit resort to § 2241. See United States v. Davis, 751
F. 3d 769, (6th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not
announcing a new rule, but was simply reaffirming the Taylor/Shepard approach, which
some courts had misconstrued. Id. at 2283 (“Our caselaw explaining the categorical
approach and its ‘modified’ counterpart all but resolves this case.”)); United States v.
Montes, 570 F. App’x 830, 831 (10th Cir. 2014); Rucker v. Cross, No. 15-CV-206-DRH,
2015 WL 1344435, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015); Greer v. Wilson, No. 13-3185 SRN/FLN,
2015 WL 179387, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2015) (collecting cases).1
Because Watford’s claims are not actually based upon Descamps and Mathis, and
could not be pursued under § 2241 even if they were, his petition must be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1)

Watford’s Motion to file an amended petition (Doc. # 13) is GRANTED;

1 Hill is not to the contrary, as the Sixth Circuit merely accepted for purposes of that particular
case the government’s concession of the issue. Hill, 836 F. 3d at 596 (“... the Government
concedes that Descamps and Royal apply retroactively.”). In addition, the panel undertook no
independent analysis and reached no conclusion on that legal question. It is a separate question
whether it is ever appropriate for a federal trial or appellate court to uncritically accept a party’s
“concession” that a particular claim is or is not cognizable under § 2241. See Chaplain v. Warden,
U.S. Atty. Gen., 564 F. App’x 438 (11th Cir. 2014) (“… we may no longer rely on the Government’s
concession [] [b]ecause the applicability of the savings clause is a threshold jurisdictional issue
that cannot be waived.”) (citing Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013)).
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(2)

Watford’s Motion to transfer his petition to the Northern District of Indiana

(Doc. # 13) is DENIED;
(3)

Watford’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. # 13-1) is DENIED;
(4)

Watford’s Motion for an order directing the respondent to show cause why

the petition should not be granted (Doc. #14) is DENIED;
(5)

The Court will enter a corresponding Judgment; and

(6)

This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.

This 22nd day of March, 2018.

K:\DATA\ORDERS\ProSe\17-322-DLB Order.docx

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