Robinson v. USA et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Judgment is entered in favor of HSA Wilson and RN Jackson with respect to Robinson's Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims; (2) Judgment is entered in favor of the United States with respect to R obinson's FTCA claim; (3) The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 22 ) is GRANTED; (4) The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 22 ) is DENIED AS MOOT;(5) This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket; and(6) The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with this order. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 09/07/2018.(KJA)cc: COR, mailed paper copy to pro se filer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AT LONDON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-27-DLB
MAURICE ROBINSON
VS.

PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

DEFENDANTS

*** *** *** ***
Maurice Robinson is a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in
Manchester, Kentucky. Proceeding without a lawyer, Robinson filed a complaint alleging
that, after he injured his ankle in July 2016, medical officials at the prison provided him
with legally inadequate medical care. (Doc. # 1).
The Court conducted an initial screening of Robinson’s complaint and dismissed
some of his claims. That said, the Court permitted Robinson to proceed on his claims
against Health Services Administrator (HSA) Angel Wilson and Registered Nurse (RN)
Randy Jackson in their individual capacities. Robinson claims that these Defendants
displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and, thus, violated his
Eighth Amendment right not to have cruel and unusual punishment inflicted upon him.
The Court also allowed Robinson to proceed on his Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim
against the United States of America. (Doc. # 11).
The Defendants responded to Robinson’s Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss
his claims or, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 22). Ordinarily,
Robinson would have been required to file a response to the Defendants’ motion within
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21 days. See Local Rule 7.1(c). However, given Robinson’s pro se status, the Court
extended that deadline.

The Court ordered Robinson to file his response to the

Defendants’ motion within 30 days, and it specifically warned him that if he failed to do
so, the Court may dismiss his case. (Doc. # 23 at 2). Despite the Court’s warning, more
than 60 days have now passed, and Robinson still has not responded to the Defendants’
dispositive motion. This matter is now ripe for a decision.
As an initial matter, the Court will treat the Defendants’ motion as one for summary
judgment because they have attached and relied upon documents and declarations
extrinsic to the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010). Notably, when, as here, the nonmoving party decides
not to file a response, the Court still holds “the moving party to the burden established by
the plain language of Rule 56.” Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 410
(6th Cir. 1992). In other words, the Court “cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the
movant simply because the adverse party has not responded.” Carver v. Bunch, 946
F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991). Instead, the Court “is required, at a minimum, to examine
the movant’s motion for summary judgment to ensure he has discharged [his] burden.”
Id. That said, the Court may “rely on the moving party’s unrebutted recitation of the
evidence, or pertinent portions thereof, in reaching a conclusion that certain evidence and
inferences from the evidence demonstrate facts which are uncontroverted.” Guarino, 980
F.2d at 410 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given this standard, the Court will not restate Robinson’s medical history at FCI
Manchester. Instead, the Court will rely on the Defendants’ unrebutted recitation of the
evidence, which is clearly laid out in their dispositive motion, see (Doc. # 22-1 at 6-11),
and turn to its analysis of Robinson’s claims.
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Robinson first asserts Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims against
HSA Wilson and RN Jackson. Such a claim has two components: one objective and one
subjective. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege a sufficiently serious medical need. Id. To satisfy
the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which “show that the official being
sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that
he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Id. (quoting
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)). Here, even if the Court
assumes that Robinson has alleged a sufficiently serious medical need, he has not
demonstrated that either HSA Wilson or RN Jackson acted with the culpable state of mind
required to satisfy the subjective component of a deliberate-indifference claim.
With respect to HSA Wilson, the unrebutted evidence she submits shows that she
manages and directs the administrative activities of a team of healthcare professionals at
the prison. See (Doc. # 22-12 at 1-2). However, this same evidence also establishes
that she neither treated Robinson nor was directly involved in making decisions about his
medical care. See id. at 2; (Doc. # 22-10). Ultimately, since liability in a civil-rights action
cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior and, instead, must be premised
on the personal involvement of the named defendant, see Moore v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
No. 6:14-cv-114-DLB, 2015 WL 65182, *3 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (internal citations omitted),
Robinson’s Eighth-Amendment claim against HSA Wilson is simply unavailing.
It is true that Robinson alleges in his complaint that HSA Wilson “fail[ed] to timely
respond to [his] serious medical need.” (Doc. # 1 at 7). Specifically, Robinson alleges
that he complained about his ankle to HSA Wilson during the afternoon meal on July 26,
2016, and, “[a]t that time, . . . Wilson told me to return to the housing unit and come to
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sick call the next day.” Id. at 5. Robinson then claims that, the next day, he “hobbled to
Health Services with the aid of another prisoner.” Id. HSA Wilson’s sworn declaration,
however, contradicts Robinson’s allegations, see (Doc. # 22-12 at 2), and HSA Wilson’s
other evidence makes it clear that Robinson reported to the prison’s Health Services
Department just five minutes after he allegedly hurt his ankle on July 26, 2016, and, at
that time, a nurse assessed him, scheduled him for an x-ray, and gave him crutches.
(Doc. # 22-8 at 2). Thus, despite Robinson’s allegations to the contrary, the evidence in
the record shows that HSA Wilson was not responsible for a delay in his treatment or
otherwise deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Thus, the Court will grant HSA
Wilson’s motion for summary judgment.
Robinson has also not established that RN Jackson acted with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. To be sure, Robinson alleges that, on July 27, 2016,
RN Jackson “threatened to have me placed in the hole (a.k.a. Special Housing Unit/SHU)
if I had someone else call Health Services or if I came back to Health Services again
concerning my right ankle.” (Doc. # 1 at 5-6). However, RN Jackson moves for summary
judgment and, in support his motion, he puts forth a sworn declaration which directly
contradicts Robinson’s bare allegation. (Doc. # 22-11 at 1-2). Indeed, RN Jackson
specifically states that he did not threaten Robinson for seeking medical services for his
ankle, was not involved in treating Robinson on July 26 or 27, 2016, and did not even find
out about Robinson’s ankle injury until September 1, 2016, after other medical
professionals examined Robinson and treated his ankle on multiple occasions. See id.
RN Jackson also submits other evidence which further indicates that he first examined
Robinson on September 1, 2016, see (Doc. # 22-8 at 3); (Doc. # 22-10 at 22), and there

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is no evidence in the record that Robinson was ever punished for seeking medical
attention.
In light of RN Jackson’s summary judgment motion and supporting evidence,
Robinson “cannot rest on [his] pleadings but must come forward with some probative
evidence to support [his] claim.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Epsy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.
1994); see also United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1993) (“A trial
court is not required to speculate on which portion of the record the non-moving party
relies, nor is there an obligation to ‘wade through’ the record for specific facts.”).
Robinson, however, did not file any response whatsoever. Ultimately, the Court has fully
examined RN Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting evidence, and it
is clear he has discharged his burden. Therefore, the Court will grant RN Jackson’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Finally, Robinson has also not made out a FTCA claim against the United States.
Robinson claims that the prison staff provided him with medical care that fell below the
applicable standard of care and caused his injuries, and therefore the United States is
liable pursuant to the FTCA. Robinson cannot, however, survive the Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment.
“[T]he FTCA does not create liability, it merely waives sovereign immunity to the
extent that state-law would impose liability on a ‘private individual in similar
circumstances.”’ Myers v. U.S., 17 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
Here, because the United States would not be liable under Kentucky law, Robinson has
not made out a FTCA claim that would survive a motion for summary judgment. Under
Kentucky law, a plaintiff is generally required to put forth expert testimony to establish the
relevant standard of care, any breach of that standard, causation, and the resulting injury.
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See Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 667, 675 (Ky. 2010); Jackson v. Ghayoumi,
419 S.W.3d 40, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). Moreover, the Kentucky courts have clearly said
that, “[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case in which
a medical expert is required, the plaintiff must produce expert evidence or summary
judgment is proper.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). Here,
Robinson has not provided any expert testimony and, thus, he has failed to establish a
prima facie case of medical malpractice.
The Court recognizes that there is a “common knowledge” exception to the expert
witness rule. This exception provides that, under certain limited circumstances, expert
testimony may not be required in a medical malpractice case. See id. That exception
only applies in a situation in which “any layman is competent to pass judgment and
conclude from common experience that such things do not happen if there has been
proper skill and care,” and it is “illustrated by cases where the surgeon leaves a foreign
object in the body or removes or injures an inappropriate part of the anatomy.” Id.
Robinson’s claim does not meet this very narrow exception. While Robinson
argues that the prison staff was responsible for a delay during a critical time in his medical
care, see (Doc. #1 at 9-10), this Court has recognized that “delay-based allegations . . .
are fundamentally different from a surgeon leaving a foreign object in a person or
operating on the wrong party of the body.” Earle v. United States, No. 6:13-cv-184, 2016
WL 8814363, *6 (E.D. Ky. 2016). The Kentucky courts have said essentially the same
thing. See, e.g., Jones v. Gaes, No. 2009-SC-780, 2011 WL 1642225, at *3 (Ky. 2011)
(recognizing that, without expert testimony, a layperson is not competent to determine
whether an alleged delay in treatment was the cause of a plaintiff’s medical problems).

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In short, the common knowledge exception is inapplicable and, thus, Robinson’s FTCA
claim does not even get off the ground.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1)

Judgment is entered in favor of HSA Wilson and RN Jackson with respect

to Robinson’s Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims;
(2)

Judgment is entered in favor of the United States with respect to Robinson’s

FTCA claim;
(3)

The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 22) is GRANTED;

(4)

The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 22) is DENIED AS MOOT;

(5)

This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket; and

(6)

The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with this order.

This 7th day of September, 2018.

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