Cornett v. SSA
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER : The Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence and shall be affirmed by the Court. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 2/19/19.(SYD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON
LINDA ANN CORNETT,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
V.
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
)
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)
Civil No. 6:18-cv-044-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
****
Plaintiff Linda Ann Cornett brought this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of an administrative
decision
of
the
Commissioner
of
Social
application for disability benefits.
Security
denying
her
The Court, having reviewed
the record, will AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision, as it is
supported by substantial evidence.
I.
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence and
was made pursuant to proper legal standards.
Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health
(6th
&
Human
Servs.,
25
F.3d
284,
286
Cir.
1994).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”
Id.
Courts are not to conduct a de novo review,
1
resolve
conflicts
determinations.
Id.
in
the
evidence,
or
make
credibility
Rather, we are to affirm the Commissioner’s
decision, provided it is supported by substantial evidence, even
if we might have decided the case differently.
See Her v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
The ALJ, in determining disability, conducts a five-step
analysis.
See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474
(6th Cir. 2003).
Step One considers whether the claimant is still
performing substantial gainful activity; Step Two, whether any of
the claimant’s impairments are “severe”; Step Three, whether the
impairments meet or equal a listing in the Listing of Impairments;
Step Four, whether the claimant can still perform his past relevant
work; and Step Five, whether significant numbers of other jobs
exist in the national economy which the claimant can perform.
As
to the last step, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to
the Commissioner.
Id.; see also Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
II.
In July 2014, Plaintiff filed her current applications for
disability insurance benefits (DIB), and supplemental security
income (SSI), alleging disability as of February 15, 2011 (Tr.
1026, 1033). Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration (Tr. 897, 898, 937, 938). After a hearing (Tr.8322
848), an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed the evidence of
record and denied plaintiff’s application (Tr. 12-33).
The ALJ’s
decision became the final determination of the Commissioner when
the Appeals Council declined review of it (Tr. 1-6).
This appeal
followed.
III.
Plaintiff
was
43
Statement of the Facts
years
old
at
the
time
of
her
alleged
disability onset date in February 2011 (Tr. 1026). She has a high
school education plus two years of college (Tr. 1065). Her past
relevant work was as a security guard (Tr. 845, 1065). In her
current
application
materials,
she
initially
alleged
she
was
unable to work due to both physical and mental impairments (Tr.
1064).
(a)
Medical records relevant to Plaintiff’s alleged impairments
from her currently alleged disability onset date of February
15, 2011 through the ALJ’s February 15, 2017 decision1
A January 2014 primary care record documented normal x-rays
of Plaintiff’s right shoulder and elbow. (Tr. 1213, 1277-1279). A
subsequent late April 2014 chest scan again showed “no active
cardiopulmonary process” but “with signs of chronic bronchitis
(Tr. 1208, 1210). In July 2014, scans of Plaintiff’s knees showed
only
early
abnormalities
arthritic
or
changes
without
neurological
significant
involvement
(Tr.
structural
1256-1258).
1Plaintiff
has restricted her developed arguments to the issue
specifically discussed below. Plaintiff’s Brief (Pl.’s Br. 16-20).
3
September 2014 primary care treatment records note that Plaintiff
had been in a pressure chamber to treat right arm cellulitis (i.e.,
hyperbaric oxygen therapy) and that the arm was healing fast (Tr.
1543). The following month, x-rays of Plaintiff’s right wrist and
chest were normal while contemporaneous scans of the right knee
revealed only mild degenerative changes (Tr. 1491, 1493, 1535).
June 2015 primary care records document a follow-up appointment
following arthroscopic surgery on Plaintiff’s right knee by Kirpal
Singh Sidhu, M.D., a week earlier to repair a meniscal tear (Tr.
1723-1724), at which time Plaintiff presented as “well appearing,”
“in no distress,” and without apparent signs of complications (Tr.
1854). A July 2015 chest x-ray was normal while a month later an
MRI of the right knee showed moderate joint effusion, arthritis
and a meniscal tear (Tr. 1781-1782, 1787). In August 2015, a lumbar
MRI revealed “signs of degenerative disc disease at L3-L4, L4-L5
and L5-Sl”, but “no signs of a herniated nucleus pulpous or spinal
stenosis” (Tr. 1788). In October 2015, chest imaging again showed
no active cardiopulmonary process in addition to stable signs of
chronic bronchitis that had appeared on previous studies (Tr.
1852). Also, in October 2015, Plaintiff followed up for chronic
bronchitis, exacerbated by continuing a long-term, heavy cigarette
smoking habit (Tr. 1846-1847). Additional October 2015 lab tests
showed Plaintiff had good electrolyte levels, good liver and kidney
4
function, good lipid levels, and normal thyroid readings (Tr.
1887).
In September 2016, primary care records reflected continuing
noncompliance
with
dietary
exercise,
and
smoking
treatment
recommendations in response to reporting of upper respiratory
symptoms.
Nevertheless,
examination
documented
Plaintiff’s
“grossly intact” neurological profile and a normal mental status
exam (Tr. 1895).
In October 2014, William Rigby, Ph.D., documented a largely
unremarkable
mental
status
exam
of
Plaintiff
that
accurately
typified the conservative treatment record. Dr. Rigby diagnosed
Plaintiff with anxiety and opiate abuse in sustained remission and
opined
that
Plaintiff
had
no
impairment
in
understanding,
retaining, and following simple instructions and no impairment in
sustaining concentration and persistence to complete tasks in a
normal time. Dr. Rigby further opined that Plaintiff had a mild
impairment in adapting and responding to the pressures of a normal
day-to-day
work
activity;
and
a
moderate
restriction
in
maintaining social interactions with supervisors, friends, and the
public, commensurate with a global assessment functioning (GAF)
score of 70. Dr. Rigby also observed that Plaintiff’s “posture is
erect” and “gait is normal” (1478-1481).
State agency physician P. Saranga, M.D., reviewed the record
during the current administrative proceedings and opined that
5
Plaintiff had a physical functional capacity consistent with light
exertion with additional postural limitations (Tr. 912-914).
State
agency
psychologist
Tonya
Gonzalez,
Psy.D.,
and
physician, Alex Guerrero, M.D., also reviewed the record during
the current administrative proceedings with both mental health
consultants opining that Plaintiff was subject to no more than
mild
limitations
in
her
activities
of
daily
living
and
in
maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or
pace; with no repeated episodes of decompensation of extended
duration (Tr. 873-875, 910-911).
(b)
October 2016 Administrative Hearing Testimony
Plaintiff testified that she was 48 years old, had a GED, and
that she lived with her mother (Tr. 835). She said that she had a
driver’s license and drove a car (Tr. 836). She then described her
past work and that she had stopped working in 2011 (Tr. 836-837).
Plaintiff testified that she had degenerative disc disease, had
not received surgical treatment, but that prescription medication
provided relief (Tr. 838). Plaintiff also testified that she had
arthroscopic surgery on her right knee as well as injections that
had not helped (Tr. 838-839). She said she had breathing problems
that she treated with an inhaler. However, she testified that she
continued to smoke cigarettes and that she had “cut down very,
very little” (Tr. 839). Plaintiff also said that she had burned
her right forearm and had no feeling on the top of her right hand
6
(Tr. 839). She said that she also took thyroid and high blood
pressure medication that was “working fairly well” (Tr. 839-840).
Plaintiff
testified
that
she
was
also
taking
prescription
medication for anxiety and depression that helped (Tr. 840).
Plaintiff testified that she could sit and stand for ten
minutes at a time but could lift and carry only three pounds (Tr.
841). She said that she did not help much with cooking and cleaning
but spends her time watching television (Tr. 841-842). She said
that she had experienced back problems for ten to 15 years that
had worsened over that period (Tr. 842). Plaintiff testified that
she used a cane but that a physician had not prescribed it (Tr.
843).
She
said
concentrating
that
but
she
became
that
agitated
prescription
and
had
difficulty
medication
helped
significantly (Tr. 844). Plaintiff testified that she would lay
down two or three times a day for one hour each time (Tr. 844).
A vocational expert (VE), William Ellis, also testified (Tr.
845-848). After testifying as to Plaintiff’s past work, the ALJ
asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s
age, education, and work experience with limitations the same as
those ultimately determined by the ALJ to be those of Plaintiff.
The
VE
testified
Plaintiff’s
past
that
such
relevant
an
work
individual
but
could
could
perform
not
perform
other
work
including the representative unskilled, light exertion occupations
of food prep worker, dishwasher, and packer (Tr. 846-847). The VE
7
testified that other than where noted, his testimony had been
consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) (Tr.
847-848).
(c)
ALJ’s February 2017 Decision2
After a careful review of the record, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff
had
severe
impairments
consisting
of
obesity,
degenerative disc disease, history of degenerative joint disease,
arthritis of the right knee post arthroscopic surgery, chronic
bronchitis with heavy tobacco abuse, history of cellulitis and
fasciitis
of
the
right
forearm,
vision
changes,
anxiety
and
depression (Tr. 817-818; Finding No. 3), but that Plaintiff’s
impairments
did
not
meet
or
equal
the
severity
of
a
listed
impairment (Tr. 818-819; Finding No. 4). The ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
light
exertion
work
with
additional
postural,
manipulative
environmental, and mental limitations (Tr. 819-823; Finding No.
5), and that her complaints of disabling limitations were not
2
The record contains a prior ALJ’s decision issued in February
2013 (Tr. 852-864). The Commissioner notes that in the current
ALJ’s decision now before the Court, the ALJ considered the prior
administrative findings in accordance with Drummond v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997) and Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 98-4(6), which were in effect at the time
of the current ALJ’s decision. The Sixth Circuit has since changed
its approach to prior administrative findings. See generally
Earley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018). But,
in any event, here, the ALJ determined that new evidence provided
for different findings than those previously made (Tr. 814). Thus,
the ALJ’s decision here does not run afoul of Earley.
8
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other record
evidence (Tr. 820). Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able
to perform the representative unskilled light exertion occupations
of food preparation worker, dishwasher, and packer, existing in
significant numbers in the national economy (Tr. 824; Finding No.
10). Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under
the Act through the date of his decision (Tr. 824; Finding No.
11).
Plaintiff provides a largely undeveloped argument that the
ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and
includes a brief description of her alleged physical and mental
health conditions. She then follows with conclusory statements
either
that
the
ALJ
did
not
consider
these
conditions
in
combination or that the ALJ’s assessments did not adequately
account
for
Otherwise,
alleged
Plaintiff
unsubstantiated
associated
only
challenge
limitations.
presents
to
the
one
ALJ’s
Pl.’s
specific
Br.
16-18.
and
narrow
consideration
of
her
disability claim. She argues that the ALJ did not consider the
effects of her subjective complaints in assessing her RFC. Pl.’s
Br. 18-20. Plaintiff has thus waived any arguments as to any other
issue not raised or argued with specificity in her brief. See
Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]e limit our consideration to the particular points that [the
claimant] appears to raise in her brief on appeal.”); United States
9
v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]ssues adverted
to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (internal quotation
omitted)).
In her brief to the Court, Plaintiff makes a general assertion
that the ALJ erred in that “the ALJ’s restrictions placed on her
from a physical standpoint simply do not equate to the actual
objective testing that has been performed in this case.” Pl.’s Br.
17.
As
pointed
out
above,
Plaintiff’s
vague
assertions
are
accompanied by essentially undeveloped arguments, without support,
which merely reference medical records associated with her alleged
impairments. However, Plaintiff does not set forth with any real
degree of specificity the nature of the ALJ’s purported errors.
Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions are without merit.
(d)
Medical Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council
The Appeals Council’s denial of review is not judicially
reviewable pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff submitted additional records for the period from
September-October 2017 to the agency’s Appeals Council (Tr. 9806), with the Appeals Council noting that the ALJ decided the
case through February 15, 2017. Thus, the additional records did
not relate to the period at issue in the case before the Court
(Tr. 2). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)-(b); see also Foster v. Halter,
279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding evidence submitted to
10
the Appeals Council after the ALJ's decision is not considered
part of the record for purposes of substantial evidence review).
This Court can consider new evidence – evidence that is not
in the certified administrative transcript – only in connection
with a request for sentence six remand. Id., 279 F.3d at 357.
Sentence six of § 405(g) provides that, if there is “new evidence
which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding,”
the court may remand the case to the agency for consideration of
this new evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When ordering sentence six
remand, the court does not address the merits of the agency’s
decision itself. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991).
Here, Plaintiff has not requested remand under sentence six,
and, instead, she uses the medical records from September-October
2017 to briefly and vaguely argue that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. Pl.’s Br. 17-18. Even if she
had requested sentence six remand – which she has not and has thus
waived the argument, see Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 273
n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Masterson does not request a remand in light
of the new evidence, so he has waived the argument.”) – sentence
six remand based on this evidence is not appropriate because the
evidence
satisfied
is
not
her
material
burden
of
to
the
proving
issue
of
whether
disability
prior
Commissioner’s final decision on February 15, 2017.
11
Plaintiff
to
the
This portion
of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, therefore, is not relevant
to the period at issue. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.620(a) (where there is
an ALJ hearing decision, the claimant’s application remains in
effect until the ALJ hearing decision is issued). To the extent
Plaintiff’s later-submitted evidence concerns the relevant period,
which the Commissioner denies, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently
demonstrate how this evidence shows that the ALJ’s findings were
unsupported by substantial evidence. This evidence is, at best,
merely
cumulative
or
reflective
of
a
condition
that
either
initially existed or worsened only after February 15, 2017 and
should not be a basis for remand. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)-(b)
(when additional evidence is submitted, Appeals Council will grant
review
if
the
additional
evidence
is
new,
material,
period-
relevant, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional
evidence would change the outcome of the decision).
(e)
The ALJ’s Decision Was Supported by Substantial Evidence
Contrary to Plaintiff’s undeveloped argument that the ALJ’s
decision
was
not
supported
by
substantial
evidence,
the
ALJ
specifically discussed the objective medical evidence associated
with Plaintiff’s complaints of allegedly disabling physical and
mental conditions; including consideration of the chronologically
relevant medical records (Tr. 1208-1213, 1256-1258, 1491, 1493,
1535, 1543, 1723-1724, 1781-1782, 1787-1788, 1846-1847, 1852,
1854, 1887, 1895); Dr. Rigby’s October 2014 examination findings
12
and opinion (Tr. 1478-1481); and the opinions of state agency
reviewing
medical
consultants
(Tr.
873-875,
910-914),
in
the
making of his justifiable RFC finding (Tr. 819-823; Finding No.
5). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399 (“We . . . are
presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical
evidence.
The
trier
of
fact
has
the
duty
to
resolve
that
conflict.”)
In her brief to the Court, Plaintiff does not adequately
explain why the ALJ’s assessment of her functional mental abilities
was unreasonable in light of the probative evidence set forth
above. Instead, Plaintiff simply argues that “the combined effects
of Mr. Clark’s physical and mental impairments, reflect that he
could not perform a wide range of even sedentary work on a regular
and sustained basis.Pl.’s Br. 16. In her brief to the Court,
Plaintiff provides no argument as to contrary probative evidence
for the period at issue and justifiably relied on by the ALJ, and
does not explain why the ALJ’s reasonable RFC finding did not
adequately account for her physical and mental limitations. Pl.’s
Br. 16-18. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to
prove to us that you are . . . disabled.”); see also Ferguson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 275 (6th Cir. 2010) (the burden
of proving disability lies with the claimant).
Contrary
to
Plaintiff’s
unsupported
assertions,
the
ALJ
reasonably found that Plaintiff did not have physical or mental
13
limitations beyond those accounted for by his justifiable RFC
finding and his well-reasoned evaluation of Plaintiff’s alleged
impairments that is supported by substantial evidence (Tr. 819823; Finding No. 5).
Plaintiff’s argument challenging the ALJ’s treatment of lay
testimony and application of the so-called “two-step process”
under Social Security Ruling 96-7p53—are essentially challenges to
the
ALJ’s
finding
persistence,
and
that
her
limiting
statements
effects
of
as
her
to
the
intensity,
symptoms
were
not
supported by the record. Pl.’s Br. at 15.
In the case before the Court, Plaintiff relies on her own
subjective reports about her symptoms to establish her alleged
disability,
which,
contrary
to
Plaintiff’s
argument,
the
ALJ
reasonably discounted. Pl.’s Br. 18-20. Specifically, the ALJ
3
The agency’s sub-regulatory guidance regarding the evaluation of
symptom testimony, found in SSR 96-7p, was superseded by SSR 163p effective March 2016. 2016 WL 1237954 (Mar. 24, 2016). As such,
SSR 16-3p was in effect at the time of the ALJ’s March 2017
decision, and Plaintiff’s citation to SSR 96-7p is misplaced. In
any event, the analysis in this case does not turn on which SSR
applies as the ALJ appropriately evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms
using the regulatory framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529,
which has not changed. The most salient point in SSR 16-3p is that
subjective symptom evaluation is not about an individual’s general
character or truthfulness, see SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *10,
and Plaintiff does not suggest that the ALJ’s findings here were
based on an evaluation of his overall character or truthfulness,
so as to contravene SSR 16-3p. As explained in detail above, the
ALJ’s regulation-based and well-supported reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s symptoms is consistent with the guidance in SSR 163p.
14
pointed out that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living as well as
the objective medical record were not entirely consistent with her
assertions
effects
regarding
of
her
the
intensity,
subjective
persistence
complaints
(Tr.
and
limiting
820-822).
Thus,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the record
did not include objective findings or other record evidence that
would
support
Plaintiff’s
argument
that
she
was
subject
to
disabling symptoms.
Further, the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s symptom complaints
is entitled to deference from this Court. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003).
The ALJ discussed
relevant medical evidence, including the findings from Plaintiff’s
treating or examining medical sources, in reasonably determining
that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform physical and mental
activities associated with unskilled work at the light level of
exertion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399.
As set forth above, the objective medical and mental health
evidence
supported
the
ALJ’s
conclusion
that
Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms were not fully
believable.
Plaintiff’s
treatment
records
showed
insufficient
objective findings to support her claims of disabling physical
pain as well as other alleged symptoms attributed to her alleged
depression and anxiety through the date of the ALJ’s decision
before the Court. Again, Plaintiff’s overall physical and mental
15
health treatment records through the date of the ALJ’s decision
all detract from Plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms. See
Curler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F. App’x 464, 475 (6th Cir.
2014) (unpublished) (testimony describing pain contrasted starkly
with medical evidence showing no significant abnormalities in his
cervical spine). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (“We will consider
whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the
extent to which there are any conflicts between your statements
and the rest of the evidence, including your history, the signs
and laboratory findings, and statements by your treating and
nontreating source or other persons about how your symptoms affect
you.”)
Therefore, the medical (including mental health) evidence
supported
the
ALJ’s
reasonable
conclusions
that
Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the
medical and other evidence; and that Plaintiff retained the RFC to
perform unskilled work activity at the light level of exertion
through the ALJ’s decision now before the Court (Tr. 819-824;
Finding Nos. 5, 10). Further, as noted above, the ALJ pointed out
that Plaintiff’s “broad range” of activities of daily living
including caring for her own personal needs, caring for a pet dog,
leaving the house on a daily basis, driving a vehicle, attending
church, and “helping” with household chores, suggested that she
16
would
be
successful
in
performing
work
activities
at
the
significantly reduced light exertion level (Tr. 822; Tr. 10751080, 1093-1094, 1098-1103, 1125-1130, 1480). See Torres v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)
(allegations of impairments could be considered inconsistent with
claimant’s own testimony about the daily activities she is able to
perform). Because the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints
was
supported
by
substantial
evidence,
the
ALJ’s
decision should be affirmed. Bowman v. Chater, No. 96-3990, 1997
WL 764419, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 1997) (unpublished).
Here, although Plaintiff’s argument as to her subjective
complaints to the Court is vague and without sufficient supportive
probative evidence, to the extent that Plaintiff suggests that the
evidence before the Court is open to another interpretation that
favors her claim, the Court should give deference to the ALJ’s
analysis of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). The ALJ discussed relevant
medical evidence, including the findings from Plaintiff’s treating
or
examining
Plaintiff
medical
retained
sources,
the
RFC
in
to
reasonably
perform
determining
physical
and
that
mental
activities associated with unskilled work at the light level of
exertion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399.
As set forth above, the objective medical and mental health
evidence
supported
the
ALJ’s
17
conclusion
that
Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms were not fully
believable.
Plaintiff’s
treatment
records
showed
insufficient
objective findings to support her claims of disabling physical
pain as well as other alleged symptoms attributed to her alleged
depression and anxiety through the date of the ALJ’s decision
before the Court. Again, Plaintiff’s overall physical and mental
health treatment records through the date of the ALJ’s decision
all detract from Plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms. See
Curler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F. App’x 464, 475 (6th Cir.
2014) (unpublished) (testimony describing pain contrasted starkly
with medical evidence showing no significant abnormalities in his
cervical spine).
In reaching his justifiable RFC finding, the ALJ reasonably
evaluated
Plaintiff’s
alleged
disabling
physical
and
mental
impairments including his consideration of the opinions from state
agency medical consultants (Tr. 819-823; Finding No. 5). In doing
so, the ALJ accorded “significant weight” to Dr. Saranga’s opinion
that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work activities
consistent
declined
with
to
Plaintiff’s
the
accord
mental
performance
of
weight
Dr.
to
impairments
were
light
exertion
Guerrero’s
not
severe
work,
opinion
because
but
that
he
determined that Plaintiff’s alleged depression and anxiety were
severe impairments based on his favorable interpretation of Dr.
Rigby’s October 2014 consultative opinion (Tr. 822; Tr. 931-933,
18
1478-1481). Dragon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 470 F. App’x 454, 463
(6th Cir. 2012).
A claimant’s allegations are less believable if the objective
medical evidence or her mental health treatment history does not
support her allegations. Symptoms are subjective complaints about
a claimant’s condition and cannot be the basis for a finding of
disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain
or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”).
It is fundamental that an ALJ can base his decision that a
claimant’s symptoms are not as limiting as she alleges based on
inconsistencies between those claims and the rest of the record.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (“We will consider whether there
are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which
there are any conflicts between your statements and the rest of
the evidence, including your history, the signs and laboratory
findings, and statements by your treating and nontreating source
or other persons about how your symptoms affect you.”)
Finally, the ALJ made his reasonable RFC finding after careful
consideration of the entire record, including the evidence before
him associated with Plaintiff’s claims of both disabling physical
and mental symptoms (Tr. 815, 817, 819, 820; Finding No. 5).
Because the ALJ’s findings as to extent of Plaintiff’s work-related
limitations
and
her
subjective
complaints
were
supported
by
substantial evidence, the Court shall affirm the ALJ’s decision.
19
See Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854-55 (6th Cir.
2010) (“Even if this Court might have reached a contrary conclusion
of fact, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed so long as
it is supported by substantial evidence.”).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision
is supported by substantial evidence and shall be affirmed by the
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED this the 19th day of February, 2019.
20
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