Sparks v. SSA

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER : Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 3/14/19.(SYD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
at LONDON
Civil Action No. 18-72-HRW

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DONNA NORRIS SPARKS,

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for supplemental security income
benefits. The Court having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by
the parties, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial
evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her current application for supplemental security income benefits on
August 26, 2014, alleging disability beginning on December 8, 1993, due to chronic lymphocytic
leukemia stage 2, depression and bipolar disorder (Tr. 238). This application was denied
initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing
was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Jonathon Stanley (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein
Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, William J. Braunig, a vocational
expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following five-

step sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s)
must be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff was 56 years
old at the time of the hearing decision. She has a 12th grade education (Tr. 239). She has no
past relevant work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.965.
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the date of her current application for disability 1.
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease
of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine with history of pain / sciatica; chronic lymphocytic
leukemia; depressive disorder/ mood disorder/ major depressive disorder; bipolar disorder and

1 The record shows that Plaintiff collected SST benefits from 1997 through June 2012, when they
were terminated because she went to prison (Tr. 12). SSI is payable only as of the month after
the claimant files an application, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.335.

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anxiety disorder, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments.
Although Plaintiff has no past relevant work, the ALJ determined that she has the
residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform unskilled work and can understand, remember,
and carry out short, simple instructions and make simple work-related judgments; maintain
attention and concentration to perform simple tasks on a sustained basis with normal
supervisions; manage and tolerate simple changes in the workplace; and adapt to the pressures of
simple work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
and regional economies, as identified by the VE.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment and this matter is ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner

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v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6 th Cir. 1984).

If the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not try the case de nova nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."

Bradley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6 th Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even ifthere is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273 (6th
Cir.1997).
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical evidence
in the record pertaining to her mental impairments.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited, but not disabled, due to her mental
impairments. Indeed, in crafting the RFC, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to the least mentally
demanding type of work possible. Yet, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in making this
finding, claiming that the ALJ erred in giving weight to examining psychologist Timothy Baggs,
Psy. D.'s opinion while not sufficiently considering the notes of treating psychologist Stephan
Lamb, M.D. and the notes and opinion of Sara Parman, ARPN.

A.

Dr.Lamb

In 2014, Plaintiff saw Stephan Lamb, M.D., for psychiatric treatment five times over the
next four months (Tr. 396-401 ). Dr. Lamb noted that she had persistent cycling depression and
some days of mania, but that she had improved mood stabilization on medications (including

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Wellbutrin (an antidepressant), Prozac (an antidepressant), and lithium carbonate (used to treat
bipolar disorder) (Tr. 397,399,400,401).
Dr. Lamb diagnosed anxiety and mood disorder with rule out bipolar disorder (Tr. 397).
Dr. Lamb did not submit a medical source opinion.

B.

Sara Parman

Beginning in December 2014 and continuing through early 2017, Plaintiff saw advanced
practice registered nurse Sara Parman approximately every three months for psychiatric
medication management (Tr. 537-59, 915-23, 1061-70). Plaintiffs psychiatric medications
during this time period included varying dosages of Wellbutrin, lithium carbonate, Clonazepam
(an anti-anxiety medication), and Brintellix (an antidepressant) (Tr. 552, 1062, 1064).
According to treatment notes, at times, Plaintiff reported that she was crying a lot with a
depressed mood and having persistent anxiety and panic attacks (see, e.g., Tr. 919, 1069). At
other times, however, Plaintiff reported that she was "doing okay" or "fairly well" on her
medications, despite still having some symptoms and some bad days (Tr. 915, 1061, 1063, 1065;
see also Tr. 455 (reporting the same to her primary care provider)).

Ms. Parman initially diagnosed depression and opioid dependence and later changed
Plaintiffs diagnosis to bipolar disorder.
Ms. Parman routinely noted normal mental status examinations (Tr. 1062, 1064, 1066,
1068, 1070).
In June 2016, Ms. Parman completed a medical source statement in which she opined that
Plaintiff had difficulty focusing, concentrating, completing tasks, maintaining routine, making
decisions, and exercising judgment and impulse control, and would have frequent work absences

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due to her mood fluctuations (Tr. 1122-23). She further opined that Plaintiff had moderate
limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short, simple instructions and
marked limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions;
making judgments on simple work-related decisions; interacting with the public, supervisors, and
coworkers; responding appropriately to work pressure; and responding to changes in a routine
work setting (Tr. 1122-23).
C.

Dr. Baggs

In November 2014, Timothy Baggs, Psy.D., performed a one-time psychological
evaluation of Plaintiff in connection with her disability application (Tr. 441-4 7). Dr. Baggs
noted that Plaintiff presented in a manner that suggested moderate generalized anxiety with rule
out mood disorder and opiate dependency in sustained remission (Tr. 446). He believed she had
a fair to fairly good prognosis (Tr. 447).
Dr. Baggs opined that Plaintiff could understand and remember simple instructions, could
relate adequately with people in the workplace and socially, and could adapt and respond
effectively to workplace pressures and changes, but had mild deficiencies in her ability to sustain
concentration and persistence (Tr. 447).
D.

Analysis

When evaluating medical opinions, an ALJ considers numerous factors, including
whether the physician examined the claimant, whether the doctor treated the claimant, whether
evidence the doctor presents to support his or her opinion, whether the doctor's opinion is
consistent with the record as a whole, and the doctor's specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(Generally,
a treating physician's opinion is entitled to more weight and an ALJ must give good reasons for

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discounting the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902, 416.927(c)(2); See also, Gayheart v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). An examining physician's opinion, however, is not

entitled to any special deference or consideration. Smith v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873,
876 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover, an ALJ may discount a physician's opinion, treating or otherwise,
when the physician does not provide objective medical evidence to support his or her opinion or
if the doctor's opinion is inconsistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927( c). In
addition, although a physician's opinion about what a claimant can still do or the claimant's
restrictions may be relevant evidence, such opinions are not determinative because the ALJ has
the responsibility of assessing the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(b)(2), 416.913(b)(6),
416.927(d)(2), 416.945(a)(3), 416.946( c).
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in giving weight to Dr. Baggs' opinion because he
did not review her medical records, did not complete any mental health testing, and only
examined her one time. It is clear from the decision that the ALJ reviewed Dr. Baggs' opinion
pursuant to using the same factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 and found that Dr. Baggs'
opinion was "generally consistent with the overall evidence of record and [Plaintiffs] level of
functioning" (Tr. 22). The Court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Baggs'
opinion.
As for Plaintiffs implication that Dr. Baggs' examination was incomplete or insufficient,
his opinion consists of seven single-spaced pages of observations and findings, including a
review of Plaintiffs mental health complaints and history of psychiatric hospitalizations as well
as the doctor's own mental status examination findings (Tr. 441-47). It appears that that Dr.

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Baggs' was quite thorough and there is nothing in his opinion which would call into question its
credibility.
Plaintiff also argues that the notes from her treating psychologist, Dr. Lamb somehow
undermine the opinion of Dr. Baggs.

Yet, the record shows otherwise. Dr. Lamb treated

Plaintiff five times in 2014 and his notes reflect that she had cycling moods but improved when
prescribed lithium carbonate. This is not at odds with Dr. Baggs' findings.
Plaintiff also relies Dr. Lamb's notation of a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)
score of 45 (Pl. Br. 7-8). However, GAF scores are problematic. First, GAF scores are not used
in the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) due
to their "conceptual lack of clarity." See Rose v. Colvin, 634 F. App'x 632,636 (10th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished). Further, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a "GAF score is not particularly
helpful by itself." Oliver v. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec., 415 F. App'x 681,684 (6th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished). In other words, a GAF score, without other evidence, is not dispositive and
certainly not substantial evidence.
The decision clearly shows that the ALJ reasonably considered Dr. Lamb's treatment
notes, but nothing in these notes undermined the ALJ' s decision to give great weight to Dr.
Baggs' opinion or generally undermined the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform the
minimal mental demands of simple work.
Finally, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in rejecting Ms. Parman's opinion,
insinuating that the ALJ rejected it solely because Ms. Parman is a non-acceptable medical
source. However, the ALJ did not reject the opinion solely for that reason. The ALJ did note
that Ms. Parman was not an acceptable medical source and therefore her opinion was entitled to

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less weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902 (defining "acceptable medical source"); 416.913(a)
(listing sources who can provide evidence to establish an impairment (i.e., acceptable medical
sources)); see also SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (other medical sources are "[m]edical
sources who are not 'acceptable medical sources,' such as nurse practitioners, physician
assistants, licensed clinical social workers, naturopaths, chiropractors, audiologists, and
therapists .... "). However, the ALI analyzed Ms. Parman's opinion and set forth specific
reasons for rejecting it, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. Specifically, the ALI noted that the
extreme moderate and marked limitations set forth in the nurse's opinion "overstate[d]"
Plaintiff's mental limitations because as noted repeatedly by Ms. Parman, her examinations of
Plaintiff's mental status were entirely normal (see Tr. 1062, 1064, 1066, 1068, 1070). As such,
the ALJ reasonably discounted Ms. Parman's opinion as inconsistent with the record and her
own treatment notes. The Court finds no error in this regard.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be
SUSTAINED.

A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously

herewith.
This

Signed By:

Hen,x R. WllhQlt. Jr.
United Stat•• Dlttriot Judge
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