Sturgill v. SSA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Pla's Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and Dft's Motion for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of Dft will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 8/8/2011. (RCB)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
at PIKEVILLE
Civil Action No. lO-64-HRW
JAMIE STURGILL,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge
a final decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The Court having
reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties,
and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons set forth herein, finds that
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence
and should be affirmed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his current application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits on April 20, 2006, alleging disability
beginning on August 13,2005, due to back pain (Tr. 137). This application was
denied initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 73-75). On August 6, 2008, an
administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Ronald
Kayser (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified.
At the hearing, Betty Hale, a vocational expert (hereinafter "VB"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the
following five-step sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff
was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not
disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his
impairment(s) must be severe before he can be found to be disabled based
upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a
severe impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for
a continuous period of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or
impairments) meets or medically equals a listed impairment contained in
Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No.4, the claimant is disabled without
further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him
from doing his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from
performing his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant
numbers in the national economy that accommodates his residual functional
capacity and vocational factors, he is not disabled.
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On September 23, 2008, the ALJ issued his decision finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled (Tr. 15-22).
Plaintiff was 35 years old at the time of the hearing decision (Tr. 107). He
has a 9th grade education (Tr. 141). His past relevant work experience consists of
work as a fence installer (Tr. 137-138).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability
(Tr. 18).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from low back
pain secondary to mild bulging and mild degenerative disc disease, which he
found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr. 18).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or
medically equal any of the listed impairments (Tr. 18).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant
work (Tr. 20) but determined that he has the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
to perform a wide range of medium work with certain restrictions as set forth in
the hearing decision (Tr. 18-20).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in
the national and regional economies, as identified by the VB (Tr. 20-21).
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Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the
sequential evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the
ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner on April 26, 2010 (Tr. 1
5).
Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a reversal of the
Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment
[Docket Nos. 11 and 13] and this matter is ripe for decision.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is
supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d
383,387 (6 th Cir. 1984). lfthe Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary ofHealth
and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524,535 (6 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957
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(1983). "The court may not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence,
nor decide questions of credibility." Bradley v. Secretary o/Health and Human
Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6 th Cir. 1988). Finally, this Court must defer to the
Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence
supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273
(6th Cir.1997).
B.
Plaintiff's Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's finding of no disability is erroneous
because: (1) the ALJ improperly considered Jay Athy, Ph.D. 's January 17, 2007
assessment substantial evidence in support of finding Plaintiff not disabled and (2)
the ALJ acted as a medical expert.
C.
Analysis of Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly considered Jay Athy, Ph.D. 's
January 17,2007 assessment substantial evidence in support of finding Plaintiff
not disabled.
On January 17,2007, Jay Athy, Ph.D., a state agency reviewing
psychologist, reviewed the records and opined that Plaintiff had no medically
determinable mental impairment (Tr. 235-250). Dr. Athy was tasked with
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reviewing the records in January 2007, at the reconsideration level after Plaintiffs
claim was denied initially (Tr. 235-250). As such, Dr. Athy's review did not
include records from Kentucky River Community Care ("KRCC"). Indeed,
Plaintiff did not submit records from KRCC in connection with the instant
application so Dr. Athy had no access to them. Thus, it appears Dr. Athy was
correct, in January 2007, that there was no medically determinable mental
impairment based on the then-present records (Tr. 235).
In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789
(6th Cir. 1994). He implies that Barker stands for the proposition that where a
nonexamining medical source's opinion is accepted over an examining medical
source's opinion, the nonexamining source should have access to the entire record.
Yet, nowhere in Barker did the Court impose an absolute rule in this
regard. Rather, the Court listed several reasons why the ALI could accept the
opinion of a medical expert who was present at the hearing over that of an
examining source. One such reason was that the expert had access to the
entire record. Plaintiffs reading of Barker is too narrow
In the instant case, the ALJ did not specifically state that he was accepting
Dr. Athy's report over any other reports from examining doctors, including the
KRCC reports (Tr. 15-22). Plaintiff has conceded that at the time Dr. Athy
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reviewed the records, he had not raised any significant issue as to any alleged
mental impairment (Pl.'s Br. at 3).
Moreover, the time-relevant 2006 and 2008 KRCC treatment records are
very limited, showing only that Plaintiff presented to KRCC once in April 2006
for depression and once in May 2008 (Tr. 292-293, 295-297, 306-307, 310-311).
In April 2006, a KRCC staff member wrote that Plaintiff needed to work on
coping with life changes and diagnosed moderate depression; and in May 2008, a
KRCC staff member wrote that Plaintiff had a limited ability to cope with the
demands of living (Tr. 295,297,307). Treatment was very limited and does not
support work-related restrictions.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ acted as a medical expert. However, the
Court, having reviewed the hearing decision in detail, finds no instance where the
ALJ articulated a medical opinion. Rather, the ALJ determined the RFC based
upon the medical evidence of record. The ALJ bears the ultimate responsibility
for reviewing the medical evidence and formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. §
404. 1527(e)(2). The Court finds no error in this regard.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence
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on the record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant
will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This 8th day of August, 2011.
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