Davis v. SSA
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for S/J be OVERRULED & Defendant's Motion for S/J be SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of Defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 9/28/2015. (RKT) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
at PIKEVILLE
Civil Action No. 14-119-HRW
JOANIE LEANNE DAVIS,
v.
PLAINTIFF,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits . The
Comi having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and
being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge is suppmied by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her cunent application for disability insurance benefits on March 13,2012,
alleging disability beginning on April27, 2011, due to "imtable bowel syndrome, kidney disease,
multiple kidney stones, thyroid problems, high blood pressure, back problems, torn meniscus of
right knee, carpal tunnel of! est wrist, high cholesterol, migraines, acid reflex, gout and
depression." (Tr. 228). This application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter,
upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge
Maria Hodges (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the
hearing, Leah Salyers, a vocational expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.P.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following five-
step sequential analysis in order to detetmine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step I: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not perf01ming substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F .R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impaitments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impaitments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No.4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquity.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.
The AU issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 11-21). P1aintiffwas
32 years old at the time she allegedly became disabled on April27, 2011, and 34 years old at the
time of the Commissioner's May 7, 2013 final decision that is now before this Com1 (Tr. 21, 201 ).
Plaintiff has a high school education (Tr. 229), and previously worked as a cook and a food service
coordinator and manager (Tr. 29, 52).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the AU found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr. 13).
The AU then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome of
the left upper extremity, degenerative joint disease and degenerative disc disease, which she
found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr. 13-15).
At Step 3, the AU found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
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of the listed impailments (Tr. 15-16).
The AU further found that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work (Tr. 19)
but determined that she has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of
medium exe11ion work (limited to no more than four hours standing and walking during an eighthour workday), with additional postural and environmental limitations (Tr. 16 ).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and
regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 20).
Accordingly, the AU found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the AU's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summmy
Judgment [Docket Nos. 7 and 8) and this matter is ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the AU's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6'h Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretmy ofHealth and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6'h Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The comi may
not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
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Bradley v. Secretmy a/Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6'h Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even ifthere is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir.l997).
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ened by discounting the opinion of her treating
physician, Dr. Gopal Majmundar.
In order to be given controlling weight, the opinions of a treating source on issues
involving the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments must be well supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and be consistent with other
substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). The Court is mindful of the
fact that the Commissioner is not bound by a treating physician's opinion. Such opinions receive
great weight only if they are supported by sufficient medical data. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d
431,435 (6'h Cir. 1985).
In her brief, Plaintiff states that Dr. Majmundar treated her for her multiple complaints,
which included pain in her back; left shoulder; left elbow; right hip and right knee and, ultimately,
refened her to Dr. Michael Heilig. (Tr. 794-803). She emphasizes that he treated her on numerous
occasions. Yet, the duration of the doctor-patient relationship, alone, does not wan-ant controlling
weight. Plaintiff fails to specifY which evidence or opinion was not considered properly by the
ALJ. Indeed, she does not cite a functional capacity assessment or any other opinion offered by
Dr. Majmundar. As such, her argument in this regard is without merit. The United States Comt
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
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decline[ d] to formulate arguments on [a claimant's] behalf, or to
undetiake an open-ended review of the entirety of the
administrative record to determine (I) whether it might contain
evidence that arguably is inconsistent with the Commissioner's
decision, and (ii) if so, whether the Commissioner sufficiently
accounted for this evidence. Rather, we limit our consideration to
the particular points that [a claimant] appears to raise in [his /her]
brief on appeal.
Hollon ex rel. Hollan v. Commissioner ofSocial Security, 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6'h Cir. 2006). In
Hollan, the comi also refused to consider claimant's generalized arguments regarding the
physician's opinions of record:
[Claimant] has failed to cite any specific opinion that the ALJ
purportedly disregarded or discounted, much less suggest how such
an opinion might be impetmissibly inconsistent with the ALJ's
findings. In the absence of any such focused challenge, we decline
to broadly scrutinize any and all treating physician opinions in the
record to ensure that they are properly accounted for in the ALJ's
decision.
ld. See also, McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-996 (6'h Cir. 1997) (" ' [I]ssues advetied
to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are
deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most
skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones."') (citations omitted); United States v.
Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1080 n. 12 (6'h Cir. 1993)(noting that "it is not our function to craft an
appellant's arguments").
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ did not properly consider her subjective complaints.
Again, she does not provide specific support for her argument. Nonetheless, the undersigned has
reviewed the ALJ's decision as well as the record and finds no error in this regard.
An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses' demeanor and to make an appropriate
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evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir.l997). Therefore, an ALI's credibility assessment will not be disturbed "absent compelling
reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377,379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531
(recognizing ALJ's credibility assessment is entitled to "great weight and deference"). In making
a credibility detetmination, Social Security Ruling 96-7p provides that the ALI must consider
the record as a whole, including objective medical evidence; the claimant's statements about
symptoms; any statements or other inf01mation provided by treating or examining physicians and
other persons about the conditions and how they affect the claimant; and any other relevant
evidence. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Here, the ALI properly
recognized the factors that the regulations require to be considered in evaluating a claimant's
credibility with regard to their pain. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). He further
identified numerous contradictions between Plaintiffs allegations of disabling impairment and
the medical records.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALI's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be
SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
:j::b
ThistZt day of
_
.
'-4;/;ir/uA, 2015.
Signed By:
Henry R. Wllhf'J11...Jr..
United States Dletrlct Judge
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