Johnson v. Collins

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Dft Tiffany Collins's motion to dismiss, R. 15 , is GRANTED. (2) Plai Louvenna Johnson's Complaint, R. 1 , is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (3) Pla's Reply, R. 7 , and Motion to Compel Discovery and for Injunction, R. 11 , are DENIED AS MOOT. (4) This matter is STRICKEN from Court's active docket. Signed by Judge Amul R. Thapar on 7/28/2015. (RCB)cc: COR, Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PIKEVILLE
LOUVENNA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIFFANY COLLINS,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 15-31-ART

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

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Louvenna Johnson is living a nightmare that every parent fears: she has lost custody
of her children. Johnson wants her children returned to her. Rather than work with her
children’s social worker, Johnson has come to federal court asking for her children back.
But federal courts are not the appropriate forum to deal with cases involving child custody.
Instead, family courts provide the best solution: they have more flexible standards, and they
are more familiar with the parties and the latest circumstances in the case. They are better
equipped to evaluate all of the facts and find a situation that best balances Johnson’s rights as
a parent with the safety and welfare needs of her children. For these reasons, the Supreme
Court has removed federal court jurisdiction over cases involving child custody decrees. The
Supreme Court has also mandated that federal courts not interfere with these types of state
proceedings. As such, Collins’s motion to dismiss must be granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Louvenna Johnson is a 50-year-old woman who identifies as fifty percent
Cherokee, and is the mother of two boys, ages 8 and 13. R. 15-6 at 1; R. 1 at 2 (complaint).1
The Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”) has been involved with
Johnson and her children since 2006.

That is when CHFS received unsubstantiated

allegations of child abuse and neglect by Johnson and her then-husband, Kenny Jacobs. Id.
at 12–14. But in the summer of 2009, CHFS substantiated Jacobs’ abuse of his children
when they discovered marks on the children consistent with abuse. Id. at 8–9. Initially,
CHFS allowed Jacobs to remain with his family. Id. at 9. That changed, however, on July 7,
2014, when the abuse escalated. On that date, Jacobs pointed a gun at Johnson’s older son
and threatened to “blow his head off.” Id. at 3, 7. The state court granted Johnson an
emergency order of protection against Jacobs, which directed Jacobs to have no contact with
Johnson’s children. R. 15-4 at 1–2. On January 13, 2015, Jacobs pled guilty to wanton
endangerment for the incident and was sentenced to up to five years in prison. R. 15-5 at 1–
3.
After the incident involving Jacobs, CHFS continued its involvement with Johnson’s
family due to allegations of child neglect, specifically that Johnson had difficulties obtaining
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Generally, a court may only consider the facts from the complaint and its exhibits in deciding a motion to dismiss.
See Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989). However, “a defendant may introduce certain
pertinent documents if the plaintiff fails to do so.” Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted). Documents attached to a motion to dismissed are “considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to
in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.” Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys.
Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, Johnson’s complaint briefly references the state court proceeding
and the circumstances under which her children were taken, but includes very few facts and contains no attached
documentation. See R. 1. Defendant attached to its motion to dismiss the relevant state court documents and the
documents the state court considered. See 15-2–11 (exhibits attached to Collins’ motion to dismiss). Because the
Court must examine the nature of the state court proceedings to determine whether abstention is appropriate, the
Court includes facts from these documents in the background section. Any other facts are included to provide more
background to the case, but are not used to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction or whether abstention is
appropriate.

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food, water, and electricity. See, e.g., R. 15-1 at 2–3 (motion to dismiss); R. 15-6 at 6
(describing allegations that Johnson’s home had no electricity or way to heat her home); R.
15-3 at 8 (noting that Johnson failed last two inspections of her apartment). In March and
April of 2015, conditions for Johnson’s family worsened. See R. 15-6 at 2. CHFS received
reports that Johnson left her children unsupervised for hours at a time, and the children’s
school reported that the children were unkempt and dirty. Id.; R. 15-3 at 5 (noting that
Johnson’s youngest child was “very dirty and unkempt” and “had a very foul odor that
smelled of feces.”). During this period, Jacobs was released from prison. See R. 15-3 at 7.
On April 16, 2015, CHFS received an allegation that Johnson’s youngest child reported
sexual abuse by Jacobs. R. 15-3 at 4–5; R. 15-6 at 2. The report also alleged that Johnson
allowed Jacobs to visit the children on multiple occasions. R. 15-3 at 4; R. 15-6 at 2. That
was not all. Johnson’s case worker, defendant Tiffany Collins, discovered that Johnson’s
youngest child was not taking his daily mental health medications. R. 15-8 at 1; see also R.
13-3 at 26, 33 (prescribing Seroquel for Johnson’s son every night). Collins attempted to
contact Johnson multiple times without success. R. 15-3 at 2–6.
On April 17, 2015, Collins arrived at Johnson’s home to find her oldest son home
alone. R. 15-8 at 1. He reported to Collins that Johnson left him home alone on several
nights while she was staying at her new boyfriend’s home, and that he had no way of
contacting his mother. Id. Letcher Family Court issued an emergency custody order that
placed both children in the emergency custody of CHFS. R. 15-8 at 1–4. CHFS placed the
children with a foster family. R. 15-1 at 7. The foster family took the children to Tennessee
for a trip that weekend. Id. Collins alleges that Johnson gave permission for the trip, R. 1510 (permission slip signed by Johnson), but Johnson disputes this fact. See R. 1; R. 7 at 10
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(plaintiff’s “reply”).

The children returned to Kentucky on April 19, 2015, and have

remained in Kentucky with their foster family since that date. R. 15-1 at 7. On May 8, 2015,
the state court held a temporary removal hearing, at which it found “beyond a preponderance
of [] evidence that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the [children] would be . . .
neglected . . . if left in the custody of the mother.” R. 15-11 at 2, 5. The court ruled that both
children should remain in the temporary custody of CHFS. Id. at 1, 4. The state court case is
still ongoing. R. 15-1 at 7; see also R. 7 at 10 (moving for Judge Mullins to be recused from
state court case).
On April 20, 2015, while state court proceedings were pending, Johnson brought suit
against Collins in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See R. 1. In her complaint, Johnson
alleges that Collins kidnapped her children, forced Johnson to sign papers she did not read or
understand, and told Johnson that her children were being placed in a foster home and taken
out of state to Tennessee. See id. at 1. Johnson argues that Collins did not have just cause to
remove her children from her custody. Id. (“The social worker said cause was shown . . . but
I know these charges are not clear and convincing evidence of abuse and neglect . . . .”).
Johnson claims that Collins’s actions violated the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) and
the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. at 2. Johnson seeks injunctive relief—in the form of the
return of her children, the removal of Collins from her position in CHFS, and the prosecution
of the “wrongdoers”—as well as punitive damages. Id. at 2–3. Johnson also has two
motions pending before this Court along with her complaint. On May 5, 2015, Johnson filed
a motion (styled as a reply) for state court Judge Kevin Mullins to be recused from her case,
and for Judge Mullins and Collins to produce blood test results and medical records. R. 7.
On May 15, 2015, Johnson filed a motion to compel discovery and for an injunction, in
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which she again moved for the immediate return of her children, the removal of Collins from
her position, and the recusal of Judge Mullins. See R. 11 at 1–4.
On May 22, 2015, Collins filed a motion to dismiss Johnson’s complaint, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 15. The deadline to respond passed without
any response from Johnson. See LR 7.1(c) (noting that a party opposing a motion must file a
response memorandum within 21 days of service and that a failure to respond “may be
grounds for granting the motion”). On June 22, 2015, the Court ordered Johnson to show
cause as to why she did not respond to defendant’s motion to dismiss and why the Court
should not grant the motion as a result. R. 19. Johnson responded to the order to show
cause, stating that her reply, R. 7, was her response to Collins’s motion to dismiss. R. 20.
But Johnson filed her reply on May 5, 2015, 17 days before Collins filed the motion to
dismiss. So Johnson’s reply could not have responded to Collins’s future motion to dismiss.
Despite Johnson’s failure to respond, the Court must still examine Collins’s motion to ensure
that dismissal is appropriate. See Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 486 (6th Cir.
2000).

For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that dismissal of Johnsons’

complaint is warranted.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Court must first establish that it has jurisdiction over the
case before proceeding to the merits of the motion to dismiss. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as
a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
States and is inflexible and without exception.” (internal quotations omitted)). Here, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, so the case must be dismissed.
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See Ex parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed
at all in any cause.”).

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue child custody decrees.

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (“[T]he domestic relations exception . . .
divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”).
Even when a plaintiff raises other claims, federal courts do not have jurisdiction when the
“core” issue is one of domestic relations, meaning that the plaintiff seeks a divorce, alimony,
or child custody decree. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 291 (6th Cir. 1998), opinion
amended on rehearing, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Coles v.
Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 859 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the key question is whether
the case is “a ‘core’ domestic relations case, seeking a declaration of marital or parental
status, or a constitutional claim in which it is incidental that the underlying dispute involves a
[domestic relations dispute]”); see also Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and the suit
is actually concerned with domestic relations issues.”).
In this case, Johnson asserts the violation of two federal rights, but she “essentially
raises domestic issues” because she is challenging the state’s removal of her children from
her custody and seeking relief in the form of the return of her children. Partridge v. State of
Ohio, 79 F. App’x 844, 845 (6th Cir. 2003). Johnson does raise claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, specifically alleging violations of ICWA and the Federal Kidnapping Act. R. 1 at 2.
But Johnson’s core concern is clear on the face of her complaint: she believes Collins
improperly removed her children from her custody. First, Johnson alleges that Collins
lacked cause to remove Johnson’s children from her custody, and she lists facts to support
this claim. Id. at 1–2. Second, she asserts that Collins kidnapped her children from her, id.
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at 1, which implies that Collins did not have the authority to remove her children. Finally,
Johnson’s main request is to have her children returned to her. See id. at 3 (“I demand
[i]mmediately, give my children back to me and stop kidnap[p]ing them . . . .”). Because the
core issue in Johnson’s case involves a child custody decree, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
decide Johnson’s case. See Hughes v. Hamann, 23 F. App’x 337, 338 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction when a plaintiff claimed his constitutional
rights had been violated by the state’s removal of his children, and the plaintiff sought an
injunction returning his children to his custody).
Even if the Court had jurisdiction over the case, though, the Court would still be
required to abstain under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Generally, pending parallel state court proceedings do not bar a federal court from exercising
its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584,
588 (2013). However, the Supreme Court has identified certain “exceptional” situations in
which a federal court must abstain from interfering with ongoing state court actions. Id.; see
also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989). Younger specifically requires abstention when there is an ongoing state criminal
proceeding. See 401 U.S. 37. However, the Supreme Court has extended Younger to a
limited number of civil proceedings that concern state proceedings “akin to a criminal
prosecution” in “important respects.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
State child removal proceedings are one of the criminal-like state proceedings to which
Younger extends. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). In Moore, the Supreme Court
reasoned that Younger abstention was appropriate because the temporary removal of a child
in the child abuse context is “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.” Id. at 423
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Like the other civil extensions of Younger, child removal
cases are often initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, include a state actor who initiates the
state action, and involve investigations that may culminate in the filing of charges or a formal
complaint. See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (describing the characteristics of civil proceedings
that the Supreme Court has deemed similar to criminal proceedings).
Younger bars federal courts from interfering in applicable state court proceedings that
(1) are ongoing; (2) involve an important state interest; and (3) provide adequate opportunity
to raise a constitutional challenge. Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2008). In this
case, all three requirements are met, so Younger mandates dismissal. See Tenet v. Doe, 544
U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999))
(explaining that courts may dismiss under Younger without addressing jurisdiction or the
merits). First, Johnson does not dispute that the state custody proceedings are still ongoing,
R. 11-2 (Defendant’s motion to hold discovery in the state court proceeding in abeyance
pending the resolution of this case). See R. 1 (complaint); R. 7 (Johnson’s reply); R. 11
(Johnson’s motion to compel); R. 18 (Johnson’s final answer); R. 20 (Johnson’s response to
the order to show cause). In fact, by moving for Judge Mullin’s recusal, Johnson admits that
the state proceedings are still pending. See R. 7; R. 11. Second, the state has a compelling
interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect. Moore, 442 U.S. at 435 (“Family
relations are a traditional area of state concern.”); Kottmeyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“The right is limited by an equally compelling government interest in the
protection of children, particularly where the children need to be protected from their own
parents.”). Finally, Johnson raises only statutory challenges, not constitutional challenges, so
the third Younger requirement does not apply. Even if Johnson did have constitutional
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challenges, though, there is nothing to suggest that the state court would not provide an
adequate forum to raise them.2 See Moore, 442 U.S. at 435 (“We are unwilling to conclude
that state processes are unequal to the task of accommodating the various interests and
deciding the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare litigation.”). Because all
three requirements of Younger are met, Younger mandates abstention in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Court recognizes the hardships Johnson faces. The loss of child custody is
devastating to a parent. But the difficult task of determining the best situation for Johnson’s
children, taking into account their safety and welfare needs as well as their emotional needs,
is something best left to state family courts and CHFS—both of which deal with child
custody issues much more frequently than federal courts do. State family courts are also
equipped with the best tools and information necessary to accomplish this task. Most
importantly, though, federal courts are equal to state courts, not superior. And the Supreme
Court, through both the domestic relations exception to jurisdiction and Younger abstention,
reasonably bars federal courts from interfering in this type of dispute.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1)

Defendant Tiffany Collins’s motion to dismiss, R. 15, is GRANTED.

2

Johnson did file a motion to recuse Judge Mullins from the state court proceedings, alleging that Judge Mullins
refused to provide her due process and equal protection. See R. 7 at 8–9; R. 11 at 3–4. This might, at first glance,
suggest that the state court does not provide an adequate forum for Johnson to raise potential constitutional
challenges. But state courts are fully capable of handling motions of recusal. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.015(2)
(2015) (describing the situations in which judicial recusal is required, including where the judge has a personal bias
concerning a party); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.020(1) (2015) (permitting a party to file an affidavit with the circuit clerk
“that the judge will not afford him a fair and impartial trial,” in which case “the circuit clerk shall at once certify the
facts to the Chief Justice who shall immediately review the facts and determine whether to designate a . . . judge of
the Court of Justice as special judge”). Johnson may file an affidavit with the circuit clerk asking for Judge
Mullins’s recusal, and the Chief Justice will impartially review the facts to determine if Judge Mullins should be
recused.

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(2)

Plaintiff Louvenna Johnson’s Complaint, R. 1, is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

(3)

Plaintiff’s Reply, R. 7, and Motion to Compel Discovery and for Injunction, R.
11, are DENIED AS MOOT.

(4)

This matter is STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.

This the 28th day of July, 2015.

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