Williams v. Unknown Federal Agents et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) pla Marshall DeWayne Williams' civil rights complaint 2 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2) Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this Memo Opinion & Order in favor of named dfts. 3) Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memo Opinion & Order & attached Judgment to Williams at the following address: Marshall DeWayne Williams, BOP Register No. 14130-077, USP-Atlanta, U.S. Penitentiary, P. O. Box 150160, Atlanta, Ga. 30315. 4) This proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from Court's docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 12/2/2015. (RKT) cc: Marshal DeWayne Williams via US mail w/NOE to USP-Beaumont & to USP-Atlanta
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION AT PIKEVILLE
MARSHALL DeEWAYNE WILLIAMS,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
V.
UNKNOWN FEDERAL AGENTS and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
***
***
Civil No.
7:15-CV-68-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
***
***
Plaintiff Marshall DeWayne Williams is an inmate confined by
the
Bureau
of
Prisons
Penitentiary (“USP”).1
(“BOP”)
in
the
Atlanta-United
States
On January 14, 2015, while confined in the
USP-Beaumont, located in Beaumont Texas, Williams filed a pro se
civil rights action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas asserting numerous constitutional claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to the doctrine announced in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).2
Williams
alleged
that
he
had
been
assaulted
and
1
The Court obtained Williams’s current location from the BOP’s website.
See http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on December 1, 2015, in
re: Williams, BOP Register No. 14130-077).
2
To state a claim that is cognizable in a Bivens action, the plaintiff
must plead two essential elements: first, that he has been deprived of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
second, that the defendants acted under color of federal law. Bivens,
403 U.S. at 397. This implied cause of action is “the federal analog
1
mistreated while confined in various federal prisons located in
Memphis, Tennessee; Forest City, Arkansas; Lexington, Kentucky;
Inez,
Kentucky;
Oklahoma
City,
Oklahoma;
and
Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania. [R. 2]. Williams named the United States of America
and “Unknown Federal Agents” as the defendants to the action.
On April 16, 2015, the Texas federal court severed all of the
claims except those arising in Memphis, Tennessee, and directed
the clerk of that court to create a new civil action for each set
of geographically-related claims. [R. 1]. See Williams v. Unknown
Federal Agents, No. 1:15-CV-16 (E.D. Tex. 2015).
The clerk of the
Texas court created a new civil action for the claims related to
alleged events at the USP-Big Sandy, located in Inez, Kentucky.
These claims form the subject matter of this action.
A magistrate
judge then determined the case should be transferred to this Court
based on venue considerations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1406.
The
transfer of the case was not effectuated until July 29, 2015 [R.
6], upon the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of Williams’s appeal for
want of prosecution. [R. 5, 6]. See Williams v. Unknown Federal
Agents, No. 1:15-CV-158 (E.D. Tex. 2015).
On August 26, 2015, this Court granted Williams’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.
See Order, R. 13.
The Court now
conducts a preliminary review of Williams’s complaint because he
to suits brought against state officials” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2 (2006).
2
asserts claims against government officials, and because he has
been granted in forma pauperis status in this action.
28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A. In such cases, a district court must dismiss
any action which (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id.
Because Williams is proceeding without an attorney, the Court
liberally construes his claims and accepts his factual allegations
as true.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
But as explained
below, the Court will dismiss Williams’s Bivens claims stemming
from his prior confinement at USP-Big Sandy.
WILLIAMS’S CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
On July 1, 2010, a federal grand jury in Frankfort, Kentucky,
handed down a two-count Indictment against Williams, charging that
on August 20, 2009, Williams: (1) forcibly assaulted, resisted,
opposed, impeded, intimidated, and interfered with a U.S. Secret
Service Special Agent, while the Special Agent was engaged in his
official duties, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111; and (2) while
an inmate in USP-Big Sandy, possessed a prohibited object, to wit
a shank, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2) and (b)(3).
United States v. Marshal Dewayne Williams, No. 3:10-CR-11-KSF-REW
(E. D. Ky. 2010) [R. 1, therein] (“the Frankfort Criminal Case”).
3
On April 7, 2011, Williams was indicted in the Pikeville
Division of this Court, charged with twenty-one (21) counts of
mailing threatening letters to various state and federal officials
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1)(A) in July and August 2009.
United States v. Marshal DeWayne Williams, Case No. 7:11-CR-10KSF-REW-1 (E. D. Ky. 2011) [R. 1, therein] (“the First Pikeville
Criminal Case”).3
When Williams was indicted in the various
federal cases in Kentucky, he was already serving a ninety-nineyear sentence for maliciously destroying a newspaper dispenser
with a pipe bomb, which resulted in the death of his step-father,
and a ten-year consecutive term for possession of the pipe bomb
and the making of the pipe bomb without required approval.
United
States v. Williams, 775 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Williams, 819 F.2D 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1987)
On April 18, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice the two charges filed in the Frankfort Criminal
Case.
[R. 128, therein]
On April 19, 2011, the Court granted
that motion and dismissed the Frankfort Criminal Case without
3
On July 1, 2010, a federal grand jury in Pikeville, Kentucky, returned yet
another indictment charging that Williams did “forcibly assault, resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, and interfere with a U.S. Secret Service Special Agent,
while the Special Agent was engaged in his official duties, all in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111.” See United States v. Marshal DeWayne Williams, No. 7:10-CR17-DCR-REW-1 (E. D. Ky. 2010) [R. 1, therein; Indictment Count 1] (“the Second
Pikeville Criminal Case). In Count 2 of the Indictment, the grand jury charged
that Williams possessed a prohibited object while an inmate at the USP-Big
Sandy, a federal prison located in the Eastern District of Kentucky, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) and (b)(3). On August 17, 2010, the Court
entered an Order directing that “…all future pleadings should be filed in
Frankfort Criminal Action No. 3: 10-11-DCR.” [R. 25, therein]
4
prejudice.
[R. 129, therein].
Invoking his rights under the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), Williams then moved to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice [R. 130, therein], but the
Court denied that motion [R. 132, therein].
Williams appealed
both orders, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because both of the orders from
which Williams appealed were non-appealable, interlocutory orders.
[Id., R. 137, therein; United States of America v. Marshal DeWayne
Williams, No. 11-5549 (6th Cir. June 30, 2011)]
On June 1, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice the twenty-one criminal charges filed in the
First Pikeville Criminal Case. [R. 42, therein]. On June 2, 2011,
the Court granted that motion and dismissed the First Pikeville
Criminal Case without prejudice. [R. 43, therein]. Again invoking
his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)
Williams moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, see id.
R. 44, therein, but the Court denied that motion, see id., R. 46,
therein.
William appealed, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that both
of the orders from which Williams appealed were interlocutory.
[Id., R. 51, therein; United States of America v. Marshal DeWayne
Williams, No. 11-5723 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011)]
5
ALLEGATIONS OF WILLIAMS’S BIVENS COMPLAINT
Williams
asserts
two
sets
confinement in USP-Big Sandy.
of
claims
relating
See R. 2, pp. 7-8.
to
his
In his first
set of claims, Williams alleges that between May 2009 and December
2012, unidentified federal agents:
…did psychologically force plaintiff to mail into the
community (approximately 50 at this time-but totaling
103 individual incidents with the TN calls, etc) hoax
bomb, anthrax, small pox, and nuclear waste dust letter
containing various substances, subjected plaintiff to
egregious torture; hypothermia, assault and battery,
property damage, sensory deprivation and overload,
indicted plaintiff and completely dismissed all the
charges, due apparently to government corruption and
experimentation in the psychological realm and torture.
[R. 2, p. 7]
Williams alleges that these actions “…caused directly or
proximately physical and psychological injuries that continue to
effect [sic] plaintiff presently.”
[Id.]
Next, Williams alleges that in August 2010, while confined in
USP-Big Sandy, unidentified federal agents:
…did psychologically force plaintiff to physical [sic]
kidnap a Secret Service Agent and hold him hostage and
then subjected plaintiff to assault and battery,
physical and mental torture, sensory deprivation and
overload, hypothermia, etc. and did indict plaintiff in
the USDC in the Eastern District of KY in Lexington, KY.
But completely dismissed the indictment. These acts
caused
directly
or
proximately
physical
and
psychological injuries that continue to effect plaintiff
presently.
[Id., p. 8]
6
Finally,
under
the
heading
of
“No
Specific
Location,”
Williams asserts a series of claims challenging specific past
conditions of his confinement, such as being placed in isolation,
being denied bed clothes, a toothbrush, toothpaste, and toilet
paper; being subjected to abuse and torture; being the target of
a conspiracy; deliberate indifference to his safety and medical
needs; and the confiscation of his papers and mattress.
12]
[Id., p.
Williams alleges that these actions occurred between June
2008 and December 2014, but he does not specify where (or in which
federal prison) these alleged events transpired.
seeks
unspecified
defendants.
compensatory
and
punitive
[Id.] Williams
damages
from
the
[Id., p. 4; p. 13]
DISCUSSION
Williams’s claims stemming from his confinement at USP-Big
Sandy suffer from various defects, any and all of which require
immediate dismissal.
2009
and
First, Williams alleges that between May
December
2012,
unidentified
federal
agents
psychologically forced him to mail “hoax” bomb, anthrax, small
pox,
and
officials;
nuclear
that
in
waste
dust
August
letters
2010,
to
various
unidentified
government
federal
agents
psychologically forced him to kidnap a Secret Service Agent and
hold him hostage; and then subjected him to assault and battery,
physical and mental torture, sensory deprivation and overload and
hypothermia.
7
As discussed, a district court must dismiss any prisoner civil
complaint if it is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). A frivolous complaint is one that lacks a
rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915); Lawler
v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990).
An action has
no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or
rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340
(1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.4
Statutes allowing a complaint
to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only the authority
to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's
factual
allegations
and
dismiss
contentions are clearly baseless.”
those
claims
whose
factual
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Here, Williams’s allegation on page 7 of his complaint, that
unidentified federal officials “forced” him to mail letters to
dozens of state and federal government officials in which he
alleged he had included illegal and toxic contents or substances,
is, on its face, a fantastic, “wholly incredible,” and delusional
4
Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must
accept all factual allegations as true, Ascroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009), a district judge does
not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true
in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327–28.
8
assertion.
The same can and must be said for Williams’s other
allegation set forth on page 8, which is that unidentified USPBig Sandy officials forced him to kidnap and hold hostage a Secret
Service official in August 2010.
Claims such as these must be
dismissed as delusional and frivolous.
See Henry v. Caruso, No.
13-12881, 2014 WL 525032, at *4 (E. D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2014)
(recommending that state prisoner’s claims alleging that Michigan
Department
of
Corrections
officials
had
surgically
implanted
transmitters in his neck, were subject to sua sponte dismissal as
frivolous because they were based upon irrational and delusional
factual averments); See Golden v. Coleman, 429 F. App'x 73 (3d
Cir.2011) (prisoner's allegations that prison employees violated
his
constitutional
rights
by
planting
“Government
Micro
Eye
Cameras” in his food, which then attached to his visual cortex and
sent images to a computer, were fantastic, delusional, and simply
unbelievable, and warranted dismissal of his § 1983 action);
Abascal v. Jarkos, 357 F. App'x 388 (2d Cir. 2009) (claim that
prison doctors and officials were deliberately indifferent in
using high-tech equipment to control the plaintiff's thoughts and
to cause him pain and injury was properly dismissed sua sponte as
fantastic or delusional).
Second,
even
were
the
Court
to
assume
that
Williams’s
allegations were not delusional, all of his claims relative to his
confinement in USP-Big Sandy are barred by Kentucky’s one year
9
statute of limitations.
Williams’s alleged Bivens claims arose in
Kentucky, and in Kentucky, the one-year limitation period under
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) applies to claims alleging the
commission
of
constitutional
torts.
Ky.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
§
413.140(1)(a); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir.
2003);
Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181–82 (6th
Cir. 1990).
Thus, Bivens claims have a one-year statute of
limitations under Kentucky law.
Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 825;
McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1987).
The next step requires the Court to determine when that oneyear period began to run.
Federal law governs when the statute of
limitations begins to run.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267
(1985); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996);
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984).
A cause of
action accrues when “... the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
that
the
occurred.”
act
providing
the
basis
of
his
or
her
injury
has
Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273.
Under that framework, and based on his own allegations,
Williams either knew or should have known about the basis of claims
set
forth
officials
on
page
seven
“forced”
communications
to
December 31, 2012.
(7)
of
him
to
mail
various
his
government
complaint
illegal
(that
and
officials)
federal
threatening
on
or
before
Thus, Williams was required to have asserted
10
any claims based on those alleged events within one year of that
time, which would have been no later than December 31, 2013.
Williams did not assert these claims until January 14, 2015, when
he
filed
his
Bivens
complaint
in
the
Texas
federal
court.
Admittedly, the BOP’s administrative remedy process set forth in
28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14-18 can take 90 days to complete—sometimes 120
days if time extensions are granted—but even liberally allowing
additional
time
for
compliance
with
that
process,
Williams’s
claims set forth on page 7 of his complaint are time-barred.
The same logic applies to Williams’s other allegations set
forth on page eight (8) of his complaint--that unidentified USPBig Sandy officials “forced” him to kidnap and hold hostage a
Secret Service official, Williams alleges that the unidentified
prison officials forced him to take that action in August 2010,
which means that Williams was required to have assert any Bivens
claim stemming from those facts within one year of that date, or,
on or before August 31, 2011.
Again, Williams did not assert this
claim until January 14, 2015, the date on which he originally filed
his Bivens complaint in federal court in Texas.
As
for
Williams’s
“No
Specific
Location”
condition
of
confinement claims set forth on page 12 of his complaint (that he
was denied certain items such as a toothbrush, toothpaste, a
mattress, and that unidentified prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs), Williams fails to allege
11
where the alleged actions (or inactions) about which he complains
occurred.
passage,
Williams makes no reference to USP-Big Sandy in that
but
he
specifically
alleges
that
he
was
allegedly
mistreated while confined in the USP-Lewisburg, in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, between December 2012 and August 2014.
Based on
Williams’s allegations, his confinement at USP-Big Sandy appears
to have ended in December 2012, and he was then transferred to the
USP-Lewisburg. To the extent that Williams challenges various
conditions of his confinement at USP-Big Sandy, dating back to
December 2012, at the latest, those claims are also time-barred
for the reasons previously discussed.
Third
shields
Loeffler
and
the
finally,
Federal
v.
Frank,
absent
Government
486
a
waiver,
and
U.S.
its
549,
sovereign
agencies
554;
immunity
from
Federal
suit.
Housing
Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244. Sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional
in
nature.
Indeed,
the
“terms
of
[the
United
States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). See
also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961,
2965, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United
States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence
of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction”).
12
Bivens actions may not be maintained against the United
States.
See e.g., Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990, 994 (6th
Cir. 1992) (“a Bivens action may be brought only against individual
federal
officials,
not
against
the
United
States”);
Nuclear
Transport and Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 1352
(6th Cir. 1989) (United States cannot be sued under Bivens because
it “has not waived sovereign immunity and consented expressly to
be sued in a Bivens-type action”).
For these reasons, the Court
will dismiss Williams’s complaint, with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff Marshal DeWayne Williams’ 28 U.S.C. § 1331
civil rights complaint [R. 2] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this
Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the named defendants.
3.
The
Clerk
of
the
Court
shall
send
a
copy
of
this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, and attached Judgment, to Williams
at the following address:
Marshall DeWayne Williams, BOP Register
No. 14130-077, USP-Atlanta, U.S. Penitentiary, P.O. Box 150160,
Atlanta, GA. 30315.
4.
This
proceeding
is
DISMISSED
Court’s docket.
13
and
STRICKEN
from
the
This December 2, 2015.
14
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