Minix v. SSA

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: 1) Pla's Motion for Summary Judgment 10 is DENIED; 2) Dft's Motion for Summary Judgment 12 is GRANTED, and; 3) Acting Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 10/27/2017. (RCB)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION AT PIKEVILLE
LINDA JAN MINIX,

)
)
) Action No. 7:16-cv-00236-JMH
)
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL1,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
**

**

**

**

**

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment (DEs 7 and 9) on Plaintiff’s appeal of the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB).2

The matter having been fully briefed by the

parties is now ripe for this Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
I.

Overview of the Process and the Instant Matter
In

determining

whether

an

individual

is

disabled,

an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) uses a five step analysis:
1. An individual who is working and engaging
in substantial gainful activity is not

1

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A.
Berryhill should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further
action needs to be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence
of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

2

These are not traditional Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. Rather, it is
a procedural device by which the parties bring the administrative record before
the Court.

disabled, regardless
medical condition.

of

the

claimant’s

2. An individual who is working but does not
have
a
“severe”
impairment
which
significantly limits his physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities is not
disabled.
3. If an individual is not working and has a
severe impairment which “meets the duration
requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or
equal to a listed impairment(s)”, then he
is disabled regardless of other factors.
4. If a decision cannot be reached based on
current work activity and medical facts
alone, and the claimant has a severe
impairment, then the Secretary reviews the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and
the physical and mental demands of the
claimant’s previous work. If the claimant
is able to continue to do this previous
work, then he is not disabled.
5. If the claimant cannot do any work he did
in the past because of a severe impairment,
then the Secretary considers his residual
functional capacity, age, education, and
past work experience to see if he can do
other work. If he cannot, the claimant is
disabled.

Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th
Cir. 1994)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(1982)).
II.
Plaintiff

filed

an

application

for

Disability

Insurance

Benefits (DIB), alleging disability beginning January 28, 2013
(Tr.

223).

The

application

was

denied

initially

and

on

reconsideration (Tr. 99, 100), and by an Administrative Law Judge

2

(ALJ) after two hearings (Tr. 72-81, 82-98).

The Appeals Council

declined Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6), making the ALJ’s
October 14, 2015 decision the final agency decision for purposes
of judicial review (Tr. 56-71). 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).3 This
appeal followed.
III.
Plaintiff was 49 years old at the time she allegedly became
disabled on January 28, 2013, and 52 years old at the time of the
Commissioner’s

October

14,

2015

final

decision

(Tr.

223).

Plaintiff has the equivalent of a high school education (GED) (Tr.
240), and past relevant work as an assistant store manager, store
manager, and dental office receptionist (Tr. 77-78, 97, 240). In
her application materials, Plaintiff alleged she became unable to
work due to back and wrist conditions (Tr. 239).
Plaintiff has restricted her arguments to the ALJ’s physical
residual functional capacity assessment.
Br.) at 7-12.

Plaintiff’s Brief (Pl.’s

Therefore, it is unnecessary to discuss Plaintiff’s

purported mental impairments.
Ira Potter, M.D., has treated Plaintiff as her family care
physician since at least late February 2013 (Tr. 325-326). However,
Dr. Potter’s exam findings were generally unchanged from 2013 to
2015, and Plaintiff’s visits were primarily for regular follow-up

3

All subsequent citations are only to part 404 of the regulations, which
pertain to DIB.

3

and medication refills (Tr. 329-333, 346-356, 363-365, 371-372,
415-428, 436, 439-446, 458-468). Dr. Potter’s treatment notes show
Plaintiff

had

a

normal

straight

leg

raise,

motor

strength,

sensation; no wrist swelling; generally normal lower extremities
and normal motor function and movement of all extremities; normal
joint stability of the upper extremities; and the ability to stand
without difficulty (Tr. 325-326, 346-356, 363-365, 371-372, 382386, 415-428, 439-446, 458-468). An associated April 2014 x-ray of
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine resulted in an impression of degenerative
disc disease with no acute fracture or subluxation (Tr. 438).
Nonetheless, Dr. Potter provided medical source statements in
March 2014 that contained very restrictive limitations (Tr. 376380).

Dr.

Potter

opined

that

Plaintiff

would

be

subject

to

restrictions with lifting 10-15 pounds occasionally; standing and
walking for 2 hours a day; and sitting for 3 hours a day. Dr.
Potter opined that Plaintiff could not perform sustained lifting,
carrying, handwork, standing, or working with the arms and hands
for six to eight hours due to severe lumbar degenerative disc
disease, severe osteoarthritis of the bilateral upper extremities
and

hips,

moderate

bilateral

wrist

pain,

and

moderate

osteoporosis. Dr. Potter provided an additional one-page checkthe-box medical source statement in August 2015. Dr. Potter opined
that Plaintiff experiences wrist and hand pain and would be limited
to occasional fine and gross manipulation with her hands (Tr. 471).
4

In late June 2013, Stephen Nutter, M.D., saw Plaintiff for a
consultative

physical

examination

(Tr.

336-340).

Plaintiff

reported her chief complaint to be disability due to her back. Dr.
Nutter’s physical examination revealed that Plaintiff ambulated
with a normal gait and did not require a handheld assistive device.
Straight leg raise test was normal in both the sitting and supine
positions.

Dr.

Nutter

noted

that

there

was

range

of

motion

abnormalities of the dorsolumbar spine but intact sensory testing
in her lower extremities except for loss of pinprick and light
touch in the right leg. Examination of the legs revealed crepitus
in the knees, but not the ankles or feet. There was no tenderness,
redness, warmth, swelling, fluid, or laxity.

Physical examination

revealed pain and tenderness in Plaintiff’s left wrist but no pain
or tenderness in her right wrist. Examination of the hands revealed
no

tenderness,

redness,

warmth

or

swelling.

Plaintiff’s

grip

strength as 5/5 with normal range of motion of the finger joints
in both hands. Dr. Nutter opined that Plaintiff would be subject
to limitations in walking, bending, stooping, lifting, crawling,
squatting, carrying and traveling as well as in pushing and pulling
heavy objects. However, Dr. Nutter did not set forth specific
limitations in any of these areas (Tr. 470-475).
In April 2015, medical expert Louis Fuchs, M. D., opined that
Plaintiff could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally; sit two hours
at a time up to eight hours total; stand one hour at a time up to
5

three hours total; and walk one hour at a time up to three hours
total in an eight-hour workday; with frequent fine and gross
manipulation; no climbing of ladders and scaffolds; and mostly
occasional

postural

limitations

including

stooping,

kneeling,

crouching, and crawling; with no limitation in balancing. Dr. Fuchs
further opined that Plaintiff could tolerate frequent exposure to
moving mechanical parts and operation of a motor vehicle, but no
exposure

to

vibrations

and

occasional

exposure

to

humidity,

wetness, and extreme temperatures. In support of his assessment,
Dr. Fuchs pointed out that exams showed decreased spinal motion,
decreased grip in the left hand, and occasional reflex alteration,
but generally intact neurological findings (Tr. 448-456).
State agency physician Jack Reed, M.D., reviewed the records
in late August 2013 and opined that Plaintiff was limited to light
exertion

work

limitations

with

consisting

additional
of

no

postural
climbing

and

ladders,

environmental
ropes,

and

scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and avoid concentrated exposure
to extreme temperatures and hazards (Tr. 118-120).
At the March 2015 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified
that the primary reason she was unable to work was due to back
pain with numbness and tingling that went down into her hip, leg,
and foot (Tr. 88). She also said that she experiences pain in her
left wrist that was made worse with changes in the weather and
6

that her right wrist was weak (Tr. 91). Plaintiff said that she
had a GED and had not worked since January 2013 (Tr. 87). Plaintiff
described her past work activities and said that she could stand
for 30-45 minutes at a time; sit for 30 minutes at a time; and
walk for one-quarter mile (Tr. 87-90). She also testified as to
her daily activities (Tr. 94-95). At the August 2015 hearing,
Plaintiff testified that she had trouble with both hands, mostly
the left hand and numbness, tingling, and grip in the right hand
(Tr. 76).
A vocational expert, Anthony T. Michael, Jr., testified at
both the August 2015 and March 2015 administrative hearings (Tr.
77-80, 96-97). The vocational expert testified that his testimony
was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, as
applicable

(Tr.

80).

The

vocational

expert

testified

that

Plaintiff’s past work was semi-skilled to skilled and ranged from
sedentary to light exertion as generally performed in the national
economy (Tr. 77, 96-97). At the August 2015 hearing, the ALJ asked
the vocational expert to assume a hypothetical individual of
Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience with limitations
the same as those ultimately determined by the ALJ to be those of
the

Plaintiff.

individual

The

could

vocational

perform

expert

Plaintiff’s

testified
past

that

relevant

such
work

an
(as

generally performed in the national economy) at the light and
sedentary levels of exertion as well as additional representative
7

occupations at the light and sedentary levels of exertion (Tr.
79). The ALJ then asked if the individual would be able to work if
she had other limitations not part of his ultimate residual
functional capacity finding.

The vocational expert said that the

first

limitations

set

of

hypothetical

would

allow

for

the

performance of Plaintiff’s past work as generally performed as
well as additional positions at the light and sedentary levels of
exertion (Tr. 78), while the third set of hypothetical limitations
would preclude employment (Tr. 80). Plaintiff’s counsel had no
questions of the vocational expert (Tr. 80).
After a careful review of the record, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff

had

severe

physical

impairments

including

lumbar

degenerative disc disease with history of L5-S1 microdiskectomy,
thoracic

degenerative

myofasciitis,

disc

osteoporosis,

disease,
and

osteoarthritis,

history

of

left

chronic

wrist

open

reduction and internal fixation surgery (Tr. 58; Finding No. 3).
The

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff’s

impairments,

singly

or

in

combination, did not meet or equal the severity of a listed
impairment

(Tr.

58-59;

Finding

No.

4).

The

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling limitations were not entirely
credible (Tr. 60). Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
residual

functional

capacity

to

do

light

exertion

work

with

additional postural, manipulative and environmental limitations
(Tr. 59-64; Finding No. 5), including her past relevant work as an
8

assistant

store

manager,

store

manager,

and

dental

office

receptionist (Tr. 64; Finding No. 6). Thus, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was not a disability from her alleged disability onset
date of January 28, 2013, through October 19, 2015, the date of
the Commissioner’s final decision (Tr. 66; Finding No. 7).
IV.
When reviewing a decision made by the ALJ, the Court may not
“‘try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide
questions of credibility.’” Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d
709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506,
509 (6th Cir. 2007).

“The ALJ’s findings are conclusive as long

as they are supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept.” Foster, 279 F.3d at 353.
Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving disability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987); Richardson v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1984).
The regulations require Plaintiff to offer the evidence he believes
will

prove

disability.

See

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1512(a),

(c),

404.1513(e), 404.1516 (2016); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20
(2003)

(the

Commissioner’s

regulations

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden.
V.
9

deserve

deference).

Beyond a general argument that the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment was not supported by substantial evidence,
Plaintiff

presents

two

narrow

challenges

to

the

ALJ’s

consideration of her disability claim. She argues that in assessing
her residual functional capacity, the ALJ did not properly evaluate
medical source opinions and that his residual functional capacity
finding was improperly based on the limitations assessed by medical
expert Dr. Fuchs. Pl.’s Br. at 7, 10. Plaintiff has thus waived
any arguments as to any other issue not raised or argued with
specificity in her brief. See Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 447
F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e limit our consideration to
the particular points that Hollon appears to raise in her brief on
appeal.”); United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.
1996)

(“[I]ssues

unaccompanied

by

adverted
some

to

effort

in

at

a

perfunctory

developed

manner,

argumentation,

are

deemed waived.” (internal quotation omitted)). As discussed below,
Plaintiff’s arguments about the ALJ’s consideration of the medical
opinions of record, and her residual functional capacity finding
do not withstand scrutiny. The Court finds that the ALJ reasonably
considered

the

total

record

in

the

making

of

his

residual

functional capacity finding and in determining that Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform her past relevant work as well as
the

identified

representative

light

occupations.
10

and

sedentary

exertion

While Plaintiff may have had physical and mental limitations
that negatively affected her ability to work, the mere existence
of impairments such as those alleged by Plaintiff is insufficient
to establish disability under the stringent standards of the Act.
Instead,

Plaintiff

had

to

show

that

her

impairments

caused

functional limitations so severe that she was unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of at
least 12 months. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002);
42

U.S.C.

§

423

423(d)(1)(A).

The

disability,

not

just

the

impairment, must last 12 months. Walton, 535 U.S. at 220. Here,
the

evidence

simply

does

not

support

Plaintiff’s

claims

of

completely disabling limitations through the date of the ALJ’s
decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must
consider inconsistencies in the evidence); see also Walters v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The
absence of sufficient objective medical evidence makes credibility
a particularly relevant issue, and in such circumstances, this
court will generally defer to the Commissioner’s assessment when
it is supported by an adequate basis.”).
The real question before this Court is whether the ALJ’s
residual functional capacity finding was reasonable. A claimant’s
residual functional.

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is

assessed by the ALJ between steps three and four and is “the most
[a claimant] can still do despite [his] impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §§
11

404.1520(a)(4), 404.1545(a)(1) & (5). An ALJ is required to “assess
a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all of the
relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
Thus, no medical source opinion is alone conclusive on this issue.
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2, 4-5. While there is a limited
burden shift to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential
evaluation to identify work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy that a claimant can perform, the claimant retains
the

burden

of

establishing

her

residual

functional

capacity

limitations. Jordon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (“The SSA’s burden at the fifth step
is to prove the availability of jobs in the national economy that
the claimant is capable of performing . . . The claimant, however,
retains the burden of proving his lack of residual functional
capacity.”); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388,
391 (6th Cir. 1999).
In his October 2015 decision, the ALJ carefully and reasonably
considered the total record (Tr. 56, 58, 59; Finding No. 5),
including the findings and opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and
examining physicians, the opinions of the state agency medical
expert expressed in responses to interrogatories, and the opinions
of a state agency medical consultant (Tr. 59-64). Further, the ALJ
determined

that

in

addition

to

her

past

relevant

work,

a

significant number of jobs remained in the national economy that
12

Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform (Tr. 64-66; Finding No.
6).
The ALJ reasonably declined to afford Dr. Potter’s medical
source statements as to the extent of Plaintiff’s functional
limitations more than “little weight,” noting that there was
insufficient
Potter’s

own

evidence

in

examination

treatment

records,

findings,

to

including

support

in

Dr.

Plaintiff’s

allegations of disabling limitations (Tr. 63-64; Tr. 325-326, 346356, 363-365, 371-372, 382-386, 415-428, 439-446, 458-468). See
Dyer v. Soc. Sec. Admin, 568 F.App’x 422, 425 (6th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (the opinion of a treating source may be discounted
“where that opinion was inconsistent with other evidence of record
or the assessment relied on subjective symptoms without the support
of objective findings.”) Further, the ALJ pointed out that he had
reasonably accounted for Plaintiff’s diffuse pain, numbness, and
limited

mobility

from

lumbar

and

thoracic

degenerative

disc

disease, osteoarthritis, chronic myofasciitis, osteoporosis, and
history of left wrist open reduction and internal fixation surgery
by restricting her to a range of light work, with an additional
limitation of standing and/or walking no more than one hour and
sitting two hours at a time in an eight-hour workday (Tr. 62). See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399 (“We . . . are presented
with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence.
The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.”)
13

Moreover, Dr. Nutter’s June 2013 consultative examination
revealed that Plaintiff ambulated with a normal gait and did not
require a handheld assistive device. Straight leg raise test was
normal in both the sitting and supine positions. Dr. Nutter noted
that there was range of motion abnormalities of the dorsolumbar
spine but intact sensory testing in her lower extremities except
for loss of pinprick and light touch in the right leg. Examination
of the legs revealed crepitus in the knees, but not the ankles or
feet. Dr. Nutter’s physical examination of Plaintiff revealed pain
and tenderness in the left wrist but no pain or tenderness in her
right wrist. Examination of the hands revealed no tenderness,
redness, warmth or swelling. Plaintiff’s grip strength was 5/5
with normal range of motion of the finger joints in both hands.
Dr. Nutter opined that Plaintiff would be subject to limitations
in

walking,

bending,

stooping,

lifting,

crawling,

squatting,

carrying and traveling as well as in pushing and pulling heavy
objects. Dr. Nutter did not set forth specific limitations in any
of these areas (Tr. 336-340).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court’s review of the
objective

findings

contained

in

Dr.

Nutter’s

consultative

examination report reveals nothing that would be appreciably at
odds

with

the

ALJ’s

reasonable

residual

functional

capacity

determination and ultimate decision that Plaintiff could perform

14

her past relevant work as well as the representative light and
sedentary exertion jobs as identified by the vocational expert.
The ALJ’s reasonable residual functional capacity finding is
buttressed by the opinions of both the medical expert, Dr. Fuchs,
and the state agency medical consultant, Dr. Reed. In April 2015
responses to interrogatories, Dr. Fuchs opined that Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity for light exertion work
with

additional

postural,

manipulative

and

environmental

limitations (Tr. 448-456). Specifically, Dr. Fuchs opined that
Plaintiff could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally; sit two hours
at a time up to eight hours total; stand one hour at a time up to
three hours total; and walk one hour at a time up to three hours
total in an eight-hour workday; with frequent fine and gross
manipulation; no climbing of ladders and scaffolds; and mostly
occasional

postural

limitations

including

stooping,

kneeling,

crouching, and crawling; with no limitation in balancing. Dr. Fuchs
further opined that Plaintiff could tolerate frequent exposure to
moving mechanical parts and operation of a motor vehicle, but no
exposure

to

wetness,

and

vibrations
extreme

and

occasional

temperatures.

The

exposure
ALJ

gave

to

humidity,

Dr.

Fuchs’s

opinions reasonable consideration and accorded them “great weight”
(Tr. 62).
Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Fuchs did not consider the
remote September 1999 operative report from St. Mary’s Hospital
15

(over 13 years before Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date),
and an April 2014 x-ray of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine (Tr. 300-316,
438), Pl.’s Br. At 10-12, is without merit. Plaintiff has no basis
for

her

unsupported

assertions

that

Dr.

Fuchs’s

own

report

indicates that he did not review the above noted records. Review
of Dr. Fuchs’s interrogatory responses reveals nothing of the sort
and Plaintiff’s argument is, at the very least, disingenuous.
Instead, Dr. Fuchs merely pointed out evidence that supported his
opinions as to the extent of Plaintiff’s physical limitations (Tr.
448-456). See Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 275
(6th Cir. 2010) (the burden of proving disability lies with the
claimant).
Further, the ALJ accorded the opinions of state agency medical
consultant, Dr. Reed, “considerable weight” (Tr. 62-63). The ALJ
reasonably pointed out that although Dr. Reed’s opinions were
consistent with the medical evidence at the time of his evaluation,
newer

evidence

merited

additional

limitations

in

Plaintiff’s

ability to stand, walk, and perform fine and gross manipulation
(Tr.

62-63).

As

“[s]tate

agency

medical

and

psychological

consultants . . . are highly qualified physicians and psychologists
who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i), the decision to give more weight to a
state agency doctor over treating and examining doctors is, indeed,

16

permissible. Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 409
(6th Cir. 2009).
Because the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding was
supported by substantial evidence, the Court should affirm the
ALJ’s decision.

Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854-

55 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Even if this Court might have reached a
contrary conclusion of fact, the Commissioner’s decision must be
affirmed so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”).
Further, because the ALJ carefully considered the entire record
(Tr. 56, 58, 59; Finding No. 5), and reasonably weighed all medical
opinions and considered all relevant medical findings before him
including those provided by treating and examining physicians,
medical

experts,

and

state

agency

medical

consultants,

his

evaluation of these medical findings and opinions does not support
Plaintiff’s request for remand but, rather, establish that his
decision was, in fact, supported by substantial evidence (Tr. 5964).
Other than her unsupported argument that Dr. Fuch did not
review remote records from Plaintiff’s back surgery in 1999 and an
April 2014 x-ray of her lumbar spine, Plaintiff essentially argues
that the evidence could be weighed differently to support a finding
of disability. Pl.’s Br. at 7-12. However, that is not the Court’s
role on substantial evidence review. Kyle, 609 F.3d at 854-55.
Regardless of whether the Court would have made the same findings
17

in the first instance, the Court shall affirm the ALJ’s findings
because they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. Contrary
to Plaintiff’s arguments, and as review of the ALJ’s October 14,
2015 decision and associated List of Exhibits clearly shows (Tr.
56-71), because the ALJ carefully considered the entire record
before him including all medical source opinions about Plaintiff’s
physical

limitations

as

well

as

findings

and

opinions

from

treating, examining and state agency medical consultants, his
reasonable

treatment

of

these

medical

opinions

and

relevant

medical findings does not support Plaintiff’s request for remand.
In

summary,

the

ALJ

properly

considered

and

reasonably

weighed the medical source opinions. Moreover, determining whether
Plaintiff was disabled is ultimately the responsibility of the
ALJ. Id. Again, even if substantial evidence existed to support
Plaintiff’s

claim,

the

Court

would

affirm

the

Commissioner’s

decision because it is supported by substantial evidence. See
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d at 772; see also Smith v. Chater, 99
F.3d 780, 782 (6th Cir. 1996) (even if the Court would have decided
the matter differently than the ALJ, if substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision, it must be affirmed).
The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform light exertion
work

with

additional

specific

postural,

environmental

and

manipulative limitations, including her past relevant work, was
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §
18

404.1560(b)(2)

(stating

that

a

vocational

expert

may

offer

relevant evidence concerning the demands of the claimant’s past
relevant work (as generally and actually performed), and may
testify in response to a hypothetical question about whether a
person with the claimant’s limitations can meet the demands of the
claimant’s past relevant work); 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51160 (Aug.
26,

2003)

(comments

to

final

rule)

(“VE

testimony

is

not

a

requirement at step 4, but . . . VE testimony may be obtained at
step 4 to provide evidence to help us determine whether or not an
individual can do his or her past relevant work.”). The vocational
expert’s response to the ALJ’s hypothetical question that included
Plaintiff’s credible limitations constitutes substantial evidence
in support of the ALJ’s finding that there were jobs in the
national economy that Plaintiff could perform including her past
relevant work as generally performed in the national economy and
the

additional

representative

light

and

sedentary

exertion

positions identified by the vocational expert (Tr. 64-66, Finding
No. 6; Tr. 78-79).
The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Acting
Commissioner’s final decision that she was able to perform her
past relevant work as generally performed in the national economy
as well as the representative positions at the light and sedentary
levels of exertion lacks substantial evidentiary support.
Acting Commissioner’s final decision shall be affirmed.
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The

VI.
For all of the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED:
1)

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 10) is

DENIED;
2)

that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 12) is

GRANTED, and;
3)

The Acting Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

This the 27th day of October, 2017.

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