Huang v. Presbyterian Church (USA) et al
Filing
59
OPINION & ORDER: Court DENIES DE 37 MOTION to Alter Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert E. Wier on 6/4/2019. (TDA) cc: COR (Yates via US Mail)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PIKEVILLE
JEFF HUANG,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PIKEVILLE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 7:18-CV-11-REW
OPINION & ORDER
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On October 11, 2018, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff Jeff Huang’s claims
against the Presbyterian Church. DE 28 (Opinion & Order). The Court also dismissed
eleven of Huang’s thirteen claims against his former school, the University of Pikeville,
and various past and present University personnel. Id. Plaintiff believes the Court got it
wrong. See DE 37 (Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate). Huang asks the Court to
reconsider the dismissals because they are supported “with little or no binding
precedential authority[.]” Id. at 4. Defendants responded. DE 38 & 39. Huang replied. DE
40. The motion stands ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Court sees no basis
to disturb its prior ruling and denies Huang’s motion.
Ironically, in a motion deriding the Court’s choices for supporting authority,
Huang relies on a procedural rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), that does not sanction the relief
sought. See DE 37 at 1. Rule 59(e) provides only that a “motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 59(e).1 Of course, the Court did not enter a judgment, which is an order from
which an appeal lies. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). When, as here, “an action presents more
than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct
entry of a final judgment as to . . . fewer than all[ ] claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 1513 (1962) (“The requirement
that a final judgment shall have been entered in a case by a lower court before a right of
appeal attaches has an ancient history in federal practice, first appearing in the Judiciary
Act of 1789.”). The Court has made no such determination. Moreover, even if the Court’s
October 11, 2018, decision was (or included) a judgment, Plaintiff’s December 6, 2018,
motion would be time barred. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (allowing a motion within “28
days”).2 Huang concedes in reply that Rule 59 is the wrong vehicle. See DE 40 at 3.
Because Huang cited no authority justifying the relief sought, the Court denies the
motion.3
The merits, too, warrant denial. “Under Rule 59, a court may alter the judgment
based on: ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening
change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.’” Leisure Caviar,
LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Intera
Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). Though Huang does not
1
Huang also cites Rule 7(b), DE 37 at 1, which simply governs the mechanics and form
for motion filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b).
2
The December 4, 2018, postmark date does not alter this conclusion.
3
The Court does not consider Huang’s fall-back argument, raised for the first time in
reply, that district “courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders[.]” DE
40 at 4; see Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 598 F.3d 257,
275 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments raised only in reply, and not in the original pleadings,
are not properly raised before the district court[.]”).
2
explicitly peg his argument to any of these particular avenues, he appears to argue clear
legal error. See DE 37 at 2 (“[T]he Court has misapprehended certain principles of law
applicable to this case.”).
The overarching theme of the reconsideration request is Huang’s apparent belief
that district courts must granularly support each aspect of their decisions with citations to
directly controlling caselaw. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the Court: (1) did not cite to
binding precedent for “[e]ach of the points in contention” in dismissing the Presbyterian
Church claims, DE 37 at 5; (2) cited non-binding precedent or dicta to support
limitations-based dismissals, id. at 6; (3) improperly relied on federal district court and
Kentucky Supreme Court decisions in determining the applicable statutes of limitations,
id. at 6–7;4 (4) misread the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi and
mischaracterized the Bivens holding as limited to Fourth Amendment claims and federal
officials, id. at 7–9; (5) cited only “seven unreported cases” in its “extensive discussion”
of continuing violations, id. at 9; (6) relied on non-binding precedent for its conclusions
regarding equitable tolling and “color of state law” under § 1983, id.; and (7) cited a
Sixth Circuit affirmance based, in part, on a non-binding Aristotelian logical principle in
rejecting Plaintiff’s RICO claims, id. at 10. From these sub-claims, Huang arrives at the
The Court notes that, in case context, Huang’s contention that holdings “of the
Kentucky Supreme Court . . . lack[ ] precedential authority in this federal court” (id. at 7)
is flatly wrong. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966)
(federal courts are “bound to apply state law to” pendent state claims); In re Dow
Corning Corp., 419 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In applying state law, we anticipate
how the relevant state’s highest court would rule in the case and are bound by controlling
decisions of that court.”). Plaintiff, relatedly, appears to rely (though, incorrectly) on an
analogous choice-of-law concept in his confusing Reply claim that “[i]n so far as the
instant action is premised on this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, [Kentucky Appellate Rule
76.12(4)(c)(v)] is applicable to the case at bar[.]” DE 40 at 5. But see Hanna v. Plumer,
85 S. Ct. 1136, 1141 (1965) (“[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity . . . are to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law[.]” (emphasis added)).
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conclusion that he has “clearly and irrefutably shown” that “the Court [ ] failed to
adequately support its decision with the citation of authority.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiff’s tack here is unique and, frankly, absurd. Most of Huang’s argument is
directed to proving that the Court cited cases that it was not institutionally bound to
follow. At the same time, Plaintiff acknowledges the obvious counterpoint that noncontrolling precedent’s “reasoning may be ‘instructive’ or helpful.” DE 37 at 3 (quoting
Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2011)). Huang, with minimal exceptions,
does not cite to contrary precedent of any kind—much less binding authority. Thus,
Huang mostly fails to dispute the legal rationale undergirding the Court’s rulings. Most
importantly, Huang wholly fails to explain why citation to non-binding precedent
amounts to “a clear error of law[.]” Leisure Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d at 615. Accordingly
(and given the failure, in the first instance, to cite supporting authority for the motion),
the Court rejects most of Huang’s contentions summarily. See, e.g., Simmons v. Kapture,
516 F.3d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 2008) (relying, in part, on prior ruling, though “nonbinding for present purposes” as “reinforc[ing] the logic of” holding); United States v.
Green, 554 F. App'x 491, 496 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Green also takes issue with the
lower court’s reliance on United States v. Micou, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1995) . . .
because it is an unpublished case and thus is non-binding. This does not take away from
its factual similarity or its persuasive authority on the vitality of probable cause despite
changes in circumstance.”).5
5
The Court must note that Plaintiff steps very close to the line between zealous advocacy
and contumacious conduct with his characterization of DE 28 at 6 n.7. Huang contends
that the quoted language “was taken, not from a judicial holding, but from [a] journal
article” and impertinently remarks that the Court “conveniently fail[ed] to note” this fact.
DE 40 at 7. Plaintiff goes on to criticize the Court for “[e]levating the observations of a
4
Only Plaintiff’s Bivens contentions warrant additional discussion. Plaintiff,
responding to the University Defendants’ motion to dismiss, stated:
Defendants also suggest that there is no private cause of action for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, except through 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs [sic] are mistaken. Such a private
cause of action was recognized by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390-95 (1971) (the
Constitution provides “an independent claim both necessary and sufficient
to make out the plaintiffs cause of action”).
DE 12 at 17. Addressing Huang’s only contention, that the Bivens Court recognized a
private Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, the Court directly quoted the Ziglar
Court’s description of the Bivens holding. See DE 28 at 11 n.12.
Huang, now, suggests that the Court “misread the holding of Ziglar” and, for the
first time, cites to later cases applying Bivens in other contexts. See DE 37 at 7. There are
several problems with Plaintiff’s theory. First, the Court never purported to apply
Ziglar’s holding. Rather, the Court quoted Ziglar’s description of a prior holding because
it directly refuted Huang’s sole Bivens-based contention. Second, Huang’s attempt to
raise a new Bivens-based argument at this stage does not suggest that the Court’s
rejection of his original Bivens argument was error. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A]rguments which
law journal to the status of a federal appellate court holding[.]” Id. The Court did no such
thing. The quoted language comes directly from the Sixth Circuit’s published opinion in
Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prod., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009). As the nested
quotation marks make clear, the Sixth Circuit was quoting another source and, indeed, in
this case “[e]levating the observations of a law journal to the status of a federal appellate
court holding[.]” DE 40 at 7. Plaintiff is free to “question[]” this practice before the Court
of Appeals, but he is not free to misrepresent this Court’s rulings. SCR 3.130(3.3) (“A
lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal[.]”);
see also Thompson v. Paasche, 950 F.2d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Lawyers also have,
however, a duty of candor to the court. The job of a lawyer is to present the law in the
light most favorable to the client, but not to misrepresent the law when it clearly goes
against the client.”).
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could, and should, have been made” on initial consideration are barred for
reconsideration purposes.). While subsequent decisions have indeed expanded the Bivens
remedy to certain Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims, Bivens, itself, recognized no such
cause of action. Huang originally argued the latter and now pursues the former. Third, the
Court already anticipated the possibility that Huang, though failing to truly make the
claim, may have intended to argue the type of theory he now presents. The Court,
anticipatorily rejected the claim.6
Huang does not confront the crux of the Court’s rejection of the Bivens expansion
he now proposes—i.e., that neither Bivens or its progeny authorizes a private FourteenthAmendment cause of action and that further expansion is disfavored.7 He cites to no
Fourteenth Amendment applications of the Bivens remedy. Also notable, given Plaintiff’s
tirade against non-binding precedent, is Huang’s citation to an obviously distinguishable,
non-binding District of Rhode Island decision for his contention that Bivens supports a
6
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that the Court may apply Bivens
expansively, to include the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation, he is
mistaken. See [Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857] (“[T]he Court has made clear
that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.
Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675, 129 S. Ct. 1937. This is in accord with the Court's
observation that it has ‘consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new
context or new category of defendants.’” (quoting Correctional Services
Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 520 (2001)).
DE 28 at 11 n.12.
7
The Fourteenth Amendment (which addresses state actors) is a round hole for the
Bivens (which addresses federal actors) square peg. See Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 521 (2001)
(“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing
constitutional violations.” (emphasis added)); Life Savers Concepts Ass'n of California v.
Wynar, No. 18-CV-02252-LHK, 2019 WL 2144630, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2019)
(noting that “the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state actors”). Further, as the
Supreme Court clearly held in Malesko, Bivens does not extend to claims against a
private entity. See Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 519 (declining to extend the “limited [Bivens]
holding to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color
of federal law”).
6
cause of action against private entities. DE 37 at 8. Finally, Defendant’s reliance on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title IX in Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211
(1984) hardly shows that the Court clearly erred by failing to authorize disfavored
Bivens-expansion for an entirely novel Constitutional basis and defendant class.
For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES DE 37.
This the 4th day of June, 2019.
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