Fields v. Benningfield et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 11/13/2012, re 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (DN 33 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. A Judgment will be entered consistent with this Opinion. cc: Counsel (CDF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11CV-00041-JHM
JERRY FIELDS

PLAINTIFF

VS.
RICK BENNINGFIELD, Individually and
in his official capacity as Taylor County Jailer;
EDDIE “HACK” MARCUM, Individually and in
his capacity as Taylor County Jailer;
TAYLOR COUNTY FISCAL COURT; EDDIE
ROGERS, TAYLOR COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE;
JAMES JONES, MAGISTRATE; JOHN GAINES,
MAGISTRATE; TOMMY CORBIN, MAGISTRATE;
MATT PENDLETON, MAGISTRATE; ED GORIN,
MAGISTRATE; AND RICHARD PHILLIPS,
MAGISTRATE

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Defendants for summary judgment [DN 33].
Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jerry Fields, was hired as a deputy jailer at the Taylor County Detention Center on
October 23, 2008. The effective date of his employment was November 1, 2008. Plaintiff was
classified as temporary 12-month probationary employee. (Jerry Fields Dep., Exhibit 1 at 17.)1
Upon employment at the Taylor County Detention Center, Plaintiff was provided a copy of the
Taylor County Fiscal Court Employee Policy Manual. (Id. at 46, 52-53.) As policies and procedures
were revised, the revisions were provided to Plaintiff and he received training regarding them. (Id.

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Plaintiff testified that he did not recall he was subject to a temporary 12-month
probationary period. (Fields Dep. at 78.) Instead, Fields stated that he thought he was hired as
full-time hourly. (Id.)

at 79.) The Taylor County Fiscal Court Employee Policy Manual set forth the Fiscal Court’s
provisions for disciplinary action, discharge, and pre-termination hearing. (Employee Policy
Manual for Taylor County Fiscal Court at 22-25.) The Taylor County Fiscal Court Employee Policy
Manual provides in relevant part that
Pre-termination Hearing – The request for a pre-termination hearing must be made
in writing, to the County Judge/Executive within five (5) working days of the
employee’s receipt of the letter of intent to dismiss, excluding the day it was
received.
The pre-termination hearing shall be held within five (5) days after receipt of the
employee’s request, excluding the day it was received. The hearing is informal. It
gives the employee the opportunity to respond to charges contained in the letter of
notice of intent to dismiss.
(Id. at 24.) Likewise, the Taylor County Detention Center Employee Handbook also provides that
“[t]he employee may appeal Captain’s decision to the JAILER within five (5) working days,
excluding the date of the written notification of dismissal by the Captain.” (Taylor County Detention
Center Employee Handbook, Disciplinary Action, Right to Appeal, at 12.) The Handbook further
provides that “[a]n employee serving temporary probationary period may be dismissed at any time
without right of appeal.” (Taylor County Detention Center Employee Handbook at 9.)
At his deposition, Fields testified that he recalled receiving policies and procedures from the
Taylor County Detention Center and that he received those during training. (Fields Dep. at 46.)
Further, Taylor County Detention Center records reflect that Plaintiff received two hours of training
on Polices and Procedures on February 10, 2009. (Training Log, DN 33-7.) However, by affidavit
submitted with his response, Fields avers that he was never provided the Taylor County Detention
Center Employee Handbook and that his employee file does not indicate that he has signed for
receipt of the document labeled “Taylor County Detention Center Employee Handbook.” (Fields

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Affidavit at ¶¶ 2,3,5.)
On June 11, 2009, the Plaintiff was involved in a restraint of an inmate and, thereafter,
sought medical treatment for the work related injury. Plaintiff required surgery and received
treatment. He filed a workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff was released to light duty work on
December 15, 2009, but he was not released to return to work at the jail. The physician’s note
indicated that Plaintiff was “unable to physically restrain inmates” and was restricted to maximum
lifting of 20 pounds. (Plaintiff’s Dep., Ex. 1 at 31.) Fields’ physician indicated that he anticipated
a release to full duty in three months from the December 15, 2009, date. (Id.)
On March 15, 2010, Captain Kevin Wilson provided Plaintiff with written notification of his
intent to terminate Plaintiff. Captain Wilson’s notice of termination stated five reasons for the
termination: (1) Doctors excuse expired as of 03-10-2010, (2) Fields was not eligible for Family
Medical Leave Act leave; (3) Field’s current complaint of cervical neck injury was not related to the
shoulder injury which was the subject of the worker’s compensation claim; (4) no attempt had been
made to contact the Taylor County Detention Center; and (5) failure to contact employer on status
of injury. (Id., Ex.1 at 32.) The letter further provided that “[a]ny further questions need to be
addressed to the County Attorney.” Id.
Plaintiff testified that after receipt of the letter he met with Eddie Rogers, Taylor County
Judge Executive, and his secretary who referred him to the detention center. (Fields Dep. at 48.)
Judge Executive Rogers testified that Plaintiff came to his office one day and informed him that he
had been terminated from his employment with the Taylor County Detention Center. Rogers
testified that he “told him that he could ask for a hearing.” (Eddie Rogers Aff. at ¶ 2.) Rogers
further stated that Plaintiff did not inquire further regarding his right to a hearing concerning his

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termination. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff testified that he also met with Captain Wilson at the Taylor
County Detention Center on the same day and was referred to the county attorney. (Id. at 49.)
Fields did not speak with the county attorney or request a hearing of any kind after his termination
from the Taylor County Detention Center. (Fields Dep. at 47, 49.)
As a result of his termination, Plaintiff filed this action asserting claims of violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and pendent state claims of wrongful discharge and
retaliation. (Complaint ¶¶12-28.) Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its
motion and of identifying that portion of the record which demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party
satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the non-moving party is required to do more than simply show there is some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). The rule requires the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine
factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

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“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
were violated because he was terminated from employment with the Taylor County Detention
Center without any due process. Specifically, in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he had a
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment and pay as a Deputy Jailer pursuant
to KRS § 61.310, KRS § 71.060, KRS § 441 et. seq., the Kentucky Administrative Regulations, and
the Taylor County Administrative Code. According to Plaintiff, Defendants acting under color of
state law denied Plaintiff his property rights without due process “by dismissing him from his
employment without giving him any type of pre-termination procedure to afford him an opportunity
to refute any alleged reasons for his firing.” (Complaint at ¶13.)2 Further, in response to the motion
to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that because the termination letter did not provide for an opportunity to
seek relief from the termination through a grievance or judicial proceeding, he was denied
procedural due process. (Plaintiff’s Response at 3.)

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In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that there is a jury
question as to whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights when
Plaintiff was dismissed without cause on March 15, 2010. (Plaintiff’s Response at 4.) However,
Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint reflects only a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
claim. (Complaint ¶¶ 6-15.) Furthermore, in as much as Plaintiff attempts to raise a substantive
due process claim for his alleged termination without cause in violation of KRS § 71.060(2), a
“‘statutory right to be discharged only for cause is not a fundamental interest protected by
substantive due process.’” Reeves v. City of Georgetown, 2012 WL 3962334, *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept.
10, 2012)(citing Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1351 (6th Cir.1992) (citations
omitted)).
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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. The Sixth Circuit has
held that a court should undertake a two-step analysis when considering claims for the violation of
due process rights. Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2004). First, the court must
determine whether the Plaintiff has a “life, liberty, or property” interest entitled to due process
protection. Id. Second, if the court finds that the Plaintiff has a protected interest, it must then
determine what process is due. Id.
To prevail on his procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must have a property interest in
continued employment with the Taylor County Detention Center. If the Plaintiff does not have a
property interest in his position, then he is not entitled to any pre-deprivation process. See, e.g.,
Curby v. Archon, 216 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2000). “A property interest exists and its boundaries
are defined by ‘rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.’” Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). KRS § 71.060
provides that “the jailer may dismiss his deputies at any time with cause.” KRS § 71.060(2).
Defendants do not address in detail Plaintiff’s property interest in his job. Instead, Defendants
merely state that it is not clear that he had a property interest sufficient to trigger due process
protections at all given his temporary, twelve-month probationary status. For purposes of this
motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff had a property interest in continued employment with
the Taylor County Detention Center.
Accordingly, the question becomes whether the process offered during Plaintiff’s termination
satisfies the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The tenured public

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employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Upton v. City of Royal
Oak, 2012 WL 1662024, *8 (6th Cir. May 11, 2012)(internal citation omitted). The pre-deprivation
hearing need not be elaborate. Id. “If an employee is not afforded due process before the
deprivation, then an adequate post-deprivation remedy may satisfy his right to due process of law.”
Id. (citing Walsh v. Cuyahoga County, 424 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2005)).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff received a discharge notification letter in March of 2010
informing him of Captain Wilson’s intent to discharge Plaintiff, the reason for the discharge, and
the date of the discharge. (Fields Dep., Exhibit 1 at 32.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was
provided with a copy of the Taylor County Fiscal Court Policy Manual which contained the
grievance procedure available to him following the decision of Captain Kevin Wilson to terminate
him. In fact, Plaintiff testified that he recalled receiving both the policies and procedures of the
Taylor County Fiscal Court and the policies and procedures from the Taylor County Detention
Center. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff further testified at his deposition that he received the policies and
procedures of both the county and the detention center during his training and that he understood
at the time of his termination that he could obtain another copy of them. (Id. at 52-53.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the record reflects that the process afforded Plaintiff was
adequate. He was notified of the charges against him, was notified of the reasons for the discharge,
had full opportunity under the Taylor County Fiscal Court Employee Policy Manual3 to respond to
those charges by requesting a hearing, and was notified of such an opportunity by both the Taylor

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For purposes of this motion, the Court has considered only the due process afforded
under the Taylor County Fiscal Court Employee Policy Manual.
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County Fiscal Court written policy and Judge Executive Rogers. The fact that Plaintiff failed to
request a hearing does not warrant a finding that the process afforded him was deficient. Similarly,
Plaintiff submitted no authority in support of his argument that the discharge notification letter was
constitutionally deficient because it did not contain any reference to any grievance or judicial
proceedings. For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that procedural due process has been
satisfied in this case, and the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s
procedural due process claims is granted.
Having dismissed the Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” Id. at 726.). Therefore, Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims are dismissed
without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment [DN 33] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. A Judgment will be entered consistent
with this Opinion.

cc: counsel of record
November 13, 2012

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