Ohio River Trading Co., Inc. v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 3/12/2012 granting in part and denying in part 17 Motion to Alter Judgment or Motion to Amend/Correct. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant CSX Transportation's motion to alter or amend the Court's Opinion granting Plaintiff ORTC's motion to remand is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Footnote 6 of this Court's 10/26/11 Memorandum Opinion and Order 16 is hereby stricken. cc:counsel (PHB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CASE NO. 1:11-CV-133-TBR
OHIO RIVER TRADING CO., INC.

PLAINTIFF

V.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant CSX Transportation’s motion to alter or
amend the Court’s Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff Ohio River Trading Company’s motion
to remand (DN 17). Plaintiff has responded (DN 19). Defendant has replied. This matter is now
ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ohio River Trading Company (ORTC) filed a Verified Petition for
Condemnation in Todd County Circuit Court pursuant to the Kentucky Eminent Domain Act,
KRS 277.040 and KRS 416.540 et seq. The real property that is the subject of this action is
located in Todd County, Kentucky. Defendant CSX Transportation (CSXT) filed a Petition for
Removal (DN 1) based on § 1332 diversity jurisdiction. ORTC then filed a motion to remand.
By Opinion and Order dated October 26, 2011, this Court granted ORTC’s motion to remand
finding that the Court lacked § 1332 diversity jurisdiction because CSXT could not show that the
amount in controversy requirement had been met. DN 16. Additionally, the Court denied
CSXT’s motion for leave to file an amended petition for removal based on federal question
jurisdiction, concluding that there was no basis for finding that the Interstate Commerce

Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the relevant state law in this action. Id.
Specifically, the Court stated the following:
Here, there is no design for the railroad crossing before this Court. The only
statement as to the proposed design of the crossing comes from ORTC, which
stated that three vehicles will be able to occupy the widened crossing at the same
time: one entering, one exiting right, and one exiting left. Besides CSXT’s
assertion that allowing multiple trucks to simultaneously cross the track will
increase collision risks, there is no evidence that this design poses undue safety
risks. Trucks already use this crossing to access U.S. Highway 41 and it is
difficult to ascertain how the already-present risk of collision is increased by
widening the crossing.5 In fact, this type of risk is present at all railroad crossings
and does not impede railroad operations or pose undue safety risks.6 Accordingly,
there is not a sufficient basis for finding that the ICCTA preempts this matter.
-------5
Plaintiff ORTC points out that because trucks already using the crossing must
cross one at a time, allowing multiple trucks to cross simultaneously will reduce
the amount of time that trucks are crossing the tracks.
6
Additionally, Judge McKinley has previously ruled that if CSXT wishes to add
safety features it must do so at its own expense
CSXT now moves this Court to amend its October 26, 2011 Opinion and Order “for the
limited purpose of ensuring the record in this matter is clear for purposes of continued
proceedings in the state court on remand.” Specifically, CSXT requests that this Court strike the
reference to Judge McKinley’s Opinion and Order entered September 29, 2000 in footnote 6 and
explicitly limit its ruling to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction so as not to have any preclusive
effect upon subsequent proceedings on issues related to safety or preemption. In response,
ORTC contends that this Court’s ruling should be construed as a substantive ruling on the issues
of safety and preemption.
ANALYSIS
1. Reference to Judge McKinley’s Opinion and Order
CSXT requests that this Court strike the reference to Judge McKinley’s Opinion and
Order entered September 29, 2000 in footnote 6. ORTC quoted that Opinion and Order in its

Reply in Support of its Motion to Remand in this action: “Judge McKinley held that if CSX
wishes to add safety features it must do so at its own expense. That ruling should be res judicata
for any claim CSX would make as to safety.” DN 15 at p. 9-10. However, Judge McKinley’s
subsequent January 27, 2001 Memorandum Opinion and Order explicitly struck that statement
from his earlier opinion. Because this footnote was based on a subsequently stricken statement,
footnote 6 is stricken from the Memorandum Opinion and Order.
2. Effect of Court’s Ruling on Motion to Remand
CSX also requests that this Court clarify its basis for finding a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and explicitly state that its Order is not preclusive in subsequent proceedings on any
issues related to safety or preemption. ORTC requests this Court to make the affirmative
determination that its Order is preclusive in subsequent proceedings.
The Court’s basis for finding a lack of federal question jurisdiction is clear in its
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Stating that subject matter jurisdiction is based on the facts
surrounding the railroad crossing design on record at the time of removal, the Court noted that
there was “no design for the railroad crossing before this Court” and that there was “no evidence
that [a design allowing multiple trucks to simultaneously cross the track] poses undue safety
risks.” DN 16 at 8-9. The Court concluded that “there is not a sufficient basis for finding that
the ICCTA preempts this matter.” Id. at 9. This Court’s ruling on its motion to remand is clearly
limited to a finding that, based on the record before the Court at the time of removal, there was
no evidentiary basis for finding that the ICCTA preempted this matter.
As CSX has noted in its motion to amend or alter, a district court’s jurisdictional ruling
remanding an action to state court generally has no preclusive effect on the merits of the action
and does not preclude a party from arguing the issue of preemption before the state court. See

Zuniga v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 52 F.3d 1395, 1399 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The fact
that a defendant may ultimately prove that a plaintiff’s claims are pre-empted . . . does not
establish that they are removable to federal court. The federal preemption defense in such
nonremovable cases would be decided in state court . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); see also
Baldridge v. Kentucky-Ohio Transp., Inc., 983 F.3d 1341, 1343 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
district court’s findings in relation to its order remanding action to state court for a lack of
jurisdiction were purely jurisdictional and that defendants could raise merits of their preemption
defense in state court). However, this Court’s opinion as to the issue of res judicata is
immaterial. If ORTC does argue that this Court’s Order should be res judicata as to any
arguments on the issues of safety or preemption, such an argument would be made in, and
determined by, the state court to which this Court remanded this action. For this reason, the
Court declines the invitation of the parties to make a finding as to the effect of its Order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant CSX
Transportation’s motion to alter or amend the Court’s Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff Ohio
River Trading Company’s motion to remand (DN 17) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Footnote 6 of this Court’s October 26, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order (DN 16)
is hereby stricken.

March 12, 2012