Jessie v. Dixion et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., conducting initial review of the complaint. The official-capacity claims against Defendants Dixon and Gossett are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The First Amendment retaliation and free-exercise claims and the Eighth Amendment safety/protection claims shall proceed against Defendants Dixon and Gossett in their individual capacities. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; Hart Co. Attorney (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT BOWLING GREEN
DAVID LEE JESSIE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14CV-P31-M

SHELBY DIXON et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Lee Jessie filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter
is before the Court for initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the officialcapacity claims but allow the individual-capacity claims to proceed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner incarcerated at the Hart County Detention Center
(HCDC). He sues HCDC Officers Shelby Dixon and James Gossett in their individual and
official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that on several occasions Defendants Dixon and Gossett
have threatened him with mace and taser guns if he did not stop asking to go to church. He also
alleges that he has been denied the right to go to church or have a Bible, although other prisoners
are allowed. He states that Defendant Dixon has called him a “honky and cracker and spit into
my food.” Finally, he asserts that he has seen several inmates assaulted by Defendants and that
“I’ve been threatend by these same officers! I feel like my life is in danger!” As relief, Plaintiff
seeks monetary and punitive damages.1

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As discussed later in the opinion, the Court also broadly construes, as it must, the
complaint as seeking injunctive relief in the form of safety/protection from Defendants.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
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III. ANALYSIS
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Although Plaintiff did not specify the violation of a federal right, the Court construes the
complaint as alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim (threats of mace/taser gun for seeking
to go to church); a First Amendment free-exercise claim (denial of church and a Bible); and
Eighth Amendment duty-to-protect claims (fear of being maced/tased and fear of assault due to
threats and verbal abuse).
A. Official-capacity claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)).
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Dixon and Gossett, therefore, are actually
against Hart County. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that
civil rights suit against county clerk of courts in his official capacity was equivalent of suing
clerk’s employer, the county).

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When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v.
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is
designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in original). To demonstrate
municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the
policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution
of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff does not identify a municipal policy or custom that was the
moving force behind his injuries. Accordingly, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability
against the municipality and fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Consequently, the officialcapacity claims against Defendants Dixon and Gossett must be dismissed.

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B. Individual-capacity claims
Upon consideration, the Court will allow the First Amendment retaliation and freeexercise claims and the Eighth Amendment safety/protection claims to proceed against
Defendants Dixon and Gossett in their individual capacities. In the relief section, Plaintiff
indicates that he seeks monetary and punitive damages, but because he also alleges threats of
harm by Defendants and a fear for his life, the Court also construes the complaint as seeking
injunctive relief in the form of protection and safety from Defendants.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the official-capacity claims against Defendants Dixon and Gossett
are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the First Amendment retaliation and free-exercise
claims and the Eighth Amendment safety/protection claims shall proceed against Defendants
Dixon and Gossett in their individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief. In permitting
these claims to proceed, the Court passes no judgment on the merit and ultimate outcome of the
action. A separate Scheduling Order will be entered to govern the continuing claims.
Date:

March 29, 2014

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Hart County Attorney
4414.005

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