McCarley v. Gill
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.; For the reasons set forth, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (EM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT BOWLING GREEN
RICKY DOUGLAS McCARLEY
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14CV-P64-M
TYLER GILL
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ricky Douglas McCarley, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated in the
Kentucky State Reformatory, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is
before the Court for initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff names Judge Tyler Gill1 as the sole Defendant in this action. From the facts set
forth in the complaint, it appears that Judge Gill presided over criminal court proceedings in
which Plaintiff pled guilty to criminal charges brought against him. Plaintiff sues Judge Gill in
his individual capacity seeking monetary damages.
In his complaint, Plaintiff states that on July 11, 2013, he entered a “plea that [he]
Agree[d] to touching A 17 year old Female BREASt on, AuDIo and VIDEO to A term of 5
YEAR SENTENCE to RUN CONCURRENT with timE [he] wAs AlREAD[y] SERVIng AND,
[he] SIgnED the CouRt chARge PAPERs AgaInst [him] . . . .” Plaintiff states that when he went
back for final sentencing on July 25, 2013, Judge Gill breached the “SIGNED Agreement.”
According to Plaintiff, Judge Gill breached the plea agreement by running Plaintiff’s sentence
1
The Court takes judicial notice that Judge Gill is a circuit court judge in Logan County, Kentucky.
consecutive to rather than concurrent to a prior sentence he was serving. Plaintiff also states that
the court papers he recently received state that he “sexually PENTERAtED the FemALE AND,
[Judge Gill] BREACH ouR AgReement of the 1st ABUSE SexuAlly Assult AND, StAting that
[he] RapED the GiRL which, [Plaintiff] NEVER DID AnD, [Plaintiff] DID Not PlEA Guilty to
SexuAlly PENtERATION But, to touching the GIRLS BREAST.” Plaintiff states that if he had
known that Judge Gill “was gonna BREACh ouR AgRement [he] NEVER would have tAken the
charge.” Further, Plaintiff states that on July 25, 2013, Judge Gill did not let him review “the
chArge pApers whIch [he] is ENtitlED to Do IN Court AND, [Judge Gill] wAs tRying PRetty
GOOD to tAKe [him] to tRIAL which, Im thInkIng ENtRApmENt . . . .” Plaintiff states that he
has “[n]ever BEEN CHARgED wIth or EVER AccusED oF NoNthing likE this EVER oR Any
thIng SIMILAR to thIs kINd of chARge AND [Judge Gill] totAlly Put AgANist [Plaintiff] 20
YEARSs REgISTER Sex OFFENDER AND 5 YEARS ConDItIonally DIschArge AND StAtEs
thAt [Plaintiff is] At HIgh RIsk oF DoIng this KIND of thIng AgaIN.”
Plaintiff states that he is suing Judge Gill for
[b]REACH of contRAct (AgReement PlEA). PREJURIE fAlsifing charge
PApeRS, prejudice AgINIST whAt [he] was 1st PlEA BARgIN guilty to AND
chAnge to SexuAlly PENtRAtion, DAmaging [his] NAMe In Public NEwspAper,
RADIo StAtIoN AND, In public tAlk of people ABout [him], mENtAL AND
EmotIonAlly ABusE, suffeRing BECAUSE Now [he] hAvE to ExplAIn to thIs
Sex class [he has] to tAKE at K.S.R., to sAy thAt [he] Done whAt [Judge Gill]
hAs wRItten In [his] couRt chARge PApeRs so, thAt [he] want get KICKED out
of the clAss FOR SAYIing something DIFFERENT whIch [he] tRuly PLEA to.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
2
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not
require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
3
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Immunity
Judge Gill is immune from liability in his individual capacity. “Like other forms of
official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment
of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)). “[I]mmunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.” Id.
“First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken
in the judges’s judicial capacity.” Id. “Whether an action is judicial depends on the nature and
function of the act, not the act itself.” Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1440-41 (6th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 13) (internal quotation marks omitted). Two factors are
used to perform this functional analysis. Id. at 1441. Courts must first determine whether the act
“‘is a function normally performed by a judge.’” DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770,
784 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Second, “courts
must assess whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.” Id.
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 12. A judge acts in clear
absence of all jurisdiction only if the matter acted upon is clearly outside the subject matter of his
court. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1441. Acting in error, maliciously, or in excess of his
authority is not enough. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355.
4
In the present case, the alleged wrongful acts about which Plaintiff complains involve
rulings and decisions Judge Gill made in his capacity as a state court judge during the course of
presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. Presiding over a criminal proceeding and
making decisions therein are functions normally performed by a judge, and Plaintiff dealt with
Judge Gill in his capacity as a judge. Therefore, the alleged wrongful acts performed by Judge
Gill were judicial in nature. Further, because Kentucky district courts (KRS §§ 24A.010 et seq.)
and circuit courts (KRS §§ 23A.010 et seq.) have subject matter jurisdiction over criminal
matters, Plaintiff has not shown that Judge Gill acted “in clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
As such, Judge Gill is absolutely immune from liability, and the federal claims against
him must be dismissed.
B. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff’s claims are also barred under the Heck doctrine. Under this doctrine:
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thereafter, the Supreme Court held
that Heck and its progeny indicate that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter
the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
5
The claims Plaintiff makes, if successful, would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of his conviction and/or sentence. Therefore, his federal claims must also be
dismissed since they are barred by the Heck doctrine.
C. State-Law Claims
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges various state-law claims. To the extent he is attempting
to bring state-law claims in this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court will dismiss the
federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice. See Runkle v.
Fleming, 435 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen, as here, ‘all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law
claims.’”) (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this complaint by separate Order.
Date:
July 22, 2014
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.003
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?