Murillo et al v. Dillard

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. cc: Counsel(JWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-00069-GNS

MARTIN RICO MURILLO, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

TRACY DILLARD
BRUCE DILLARD and
CAROLYN DILLARD

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss (DN 30). The Motion has
been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED
I.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this case
arises under the laws of the United States.
II.

BACKGROUND

This action arises based upon a wage dispute between Plaintiff farmworkers and
Defendant farm owners. The parties had an agreement for Plaintiffs to harvest tobacco in
exchange for wages paid by Defendants. (Compl. 1, DN 1). Plaintiffs allege they were not paid a
minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Compl 1). Defendant Tracy Dillard
(“Dillard”) has filed a counterclaim alleging a breach of contract based upon Plaintiffs’ alleged
false reporting of the amount of tobacco harvested. (Answer & Countercl. 15-16, DN 29).

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M &
G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “But the district
court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move to dismiss Count I of Defendant Dillard’s counterclaim on the basis that
Defendant improperly alleges a fraud claim under the guise of a breach of contract claim. (Pls.’
Mem. in Supp. of Partial Mot. to Dismiss 2-4 [hereinafter Pls.’ Mot.], DN 30-1). Plaintiffs also
move to dismiss Dillard’s claim for attorney’s fees. (Pls.’ Mot. 3). The Court addresses each
argument in turn.
A.

Breach of Contract

Dillard alleges that Plaintiffs breached their agreement with him by “falsely reporting”
the yields of tobacco harvested in order to obtain additional payment under their agreement.

2

(Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 8-9, 19). While not disputing that Dillard has failed to meet the
elements of his breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs instead assert Dillard’s breach of contract
claim is truly a fraud claim and should be subject to the higher pleading standards of Rule 9(b).
(Pls.’ Mot. 3-4). The Court disagrees. It is well established that individual plaintiffs are the
“master of their complaints” in regards to which laws they may base their claims upon. See
Brown v. Tax Ease Lien Invs., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege the breach of contract counterclaim sounds in fraud. (Pls.’ Mot. 5). The
fact remains, however, Dillard is free to bring whatever type of action he chooses as long as he
can meet the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). The Court refuses to dismiss this action simply
because Dillard could have brought a fraud counterclaim based on the same facts and this
hypothetical claim would have failed a higher pleading standard. See Dodd v. Dyke Indus. Inc.,
No. 3:04CV-226-H 2006 WL 2850660, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2006) (finding that when both a
fraud claim and breach of contract claim can be made from identical facts, Rule 12(b)(6) rather
than Rule 9(b) is the applicable standard). The fact remains that Dillard did not allege fraud and
Plaintiffs do not assert Dillard’s breach of contract counterclaim fails under Rule 12(b)(6).
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion based upon Rule 9(b) will be denied.
B.

Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs also attempt to dismiss Dillard’s claim for attorney’s fees because an award for
attorney’s fees is not specifically provided for in the contract at issue in this case. (Pls.’ Mot. 6).
Plaintiffs are correct that generally “attorney’s fees are not allowable as costs in absence of
statute or contract expressly providing therefore.” Ky. State Bank v. AG Servs., Inc., 663 S.W.2d
754, 755 (Ky. App. 1984) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge, however, that the
“trial court may have the discretion to award attorney fees in certain situations beyond the
general rule, acting in equity.” Cummings v. Covey, 229 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Ky. App. 2007)
3

(citations omitted). At this early state of litigation, however, the Court cannot determine if equity
would require the award of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion as
to attorney’s fees.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss
(DN 30) is DENIED.

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
May 26, 2016

cc:

counsel of record

4