Hamontree v. United States
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 9/29/2016; Because a review of the complaint reveals that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter contained therein, the Court will dismiss the action. A separate Order dismissing the action will be entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; U.S. Attorney (CDR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN
RICHARD D. HAMONTREE
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-00084-GNS
UNITED STATES
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Richard D. Hamontree filed this pro se action proceeding in forma pauperis.
Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Because a
review of the complaint reveals that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter
contained therein, the Court will dismiss the action.
In the caption of his complaint, Plaintiff lists the United States as the sole Defendant in
this action. However, in the first sentence of his complaint, Plaintiff states that this “cause of
action lies with the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Jacob J. Lew” for violating “the statutes of the
Constitution and the federal laws governing his office, while acting under the directives of
Congress without legal authority.” Thus, although Plaintiff does not identify Mr. Lew as a
Defendant in this action, the Court construes Plaintiff’s action as being against both the United
States and Mr. Lew in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Lew has “in part or in whole committed derelection of
duty to the American Citizens he was appointed to protect.” Plaintiff specifically alleges that
Defendant Lew has violated:
Title II, Section 201(b) of the Social Security Act . . . codified at 42 U.S.C. § 401
(a) . . . [which] states: It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
invest such portion credited to the account (Social Security tax money collected
by the Federal Government) as not in his judgment required to meet current
withdrawals . . . . The Secretary is further directed each month to certify that one
hundred percent (%100) of all money collected from Social Security Taxes are
accounted for, appropriated to fund the Social Security System or deposited into
accounts of the Social Security System from which loans may be acquired.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lew has “violated these rules and has demonstrated fits
of improvident generosity (not providing for the future) by not depositing funds in the Social
Security system that will accrue for the future payments.” As relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to
issue a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. He specifically asks the Court to order
Defendant “to stop the illegal removal of funds from the Social Security System, funds
belonging to the Citizens of the United States of America” and to have all funds returned that
were “removed by congress without a legal authority.” Plaintiff also seeks to be awarded
compensation for the time he has been spent researching this action and reimbursement for the
travel and purchases he has made in relation to such.
It is axiomatic that federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and their
powers are enumerated in Article III of the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is
well established that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power
authorized by the Constitution and statute.”). “Jurisdiction defines the contours of the authority
of courts to hear and decide cases, and, in so doing, it dictates the scope of the judiciary’s
influence.” Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assoc. Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1998), overruled
on other grounds by Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 548-49 (6th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, federal courts have an independent duty to determine whether they have jurisdiction
and to “police the boundaries of their own jurisdiction.” Douglas, 150 F.3d at 607 (citing
Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997)). The party who
2
seeks to invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the court’s
authority to hear the case. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must have standing to
bring an action in order for a federal court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the
action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-6051 (1992). “To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff “must show: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341-42 (2014). “An
injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 2341. Further, “when the asserted harm is a ‘generalized
grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm
alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975). As stated by the Supreme Court:
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large - does not state an Article III case or
controversy.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
The Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff
does not have standing. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a judicially cognizable injury in fact
because he has not alleged that he has suffered, or will imminently suffer, any injury that would
cause him harm “in an individual and personal way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 n.1. Put another
way, Plaintiff’s claim is not particularized; it is a generalized grievance brought on behalf of the
“American Citizens.” See, e.g., Lichtman v. United States, 316 F. App’x 116, 119 (3rd Cir.
3
2008); Peterson v. Obama, No. 15-cv-411-PB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166200 (D.C.N.H. Nov.
30, 2015). In addition, although Congress has given federal courts the power to issue writs “in
aid of their respective jurisdictions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1651, “if there is no jurisdiction to aid, there is
no mandamus to grant.” United States v. Carroll, No.10-1400, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9520, at
*2 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2012).
Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity bars a claim against the United States and its employees acting in their official
capacity save consent “unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,
192 (1996). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80, provides a
limited waiver of the sovereign’s immunity for money damages “under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.” Id., § 1346(b)(1). The United States has not
consented to be sued for conduct stemming from “the failure of the United States to carry out a
federal statutory duty in the conduct of its own affairs.” Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v.
United States, 569 F.3d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nor has it consented to be sued for constitutional violations. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 476-78 (1994).
Accordingly, a separate Order dismissing the action will be entered consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion.
Date:
September 29, 2016
Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
U.S. Attorney
4416.011
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?