Norris v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl on 3/31/2017. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and judgment is granted for the Commissioner. cc: Counsel (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-00105-HBB

MELODY A. NORRIS

PLAINTIFF

VS.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Melody A. Norris (APlaintiff@) seeking judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the
Plaintiff (DN 16) and Defendant (DN 21) have filed a Fact and Law Summary.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case,
including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 12). By Order entered
September 1, 2016 (DN 13), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless
a written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.

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FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income Benefits on August 19, 2013 (Tr. 15, 182, 185). Plaintiff alleged that she became
disabled on August 6, 2013 as a result of Graves disease (Tr. 15, 182, 185, 235). Administrative
Law Judge David S. Pang (AALJ@) conducted a video hearing from Baltimore, Maryland on
January 12, 2015 (Tr. 15, 35-37). Plaintiff and her counsel, Richard Burchett, participated from
Bowling Green, Kentucky (Id.). James W. Primm testified as an impartial vocational expert
during the administrative hearing (Id.).
In a decision dated March 16, 2015, the ALJ evaluated this adult disability claim pursuant
to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 15-28). The
ALJ determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2018 (Tr. 17). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 6, 2013 the alleged onset date (Tr. 17). At the second
step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff=s Graves’ disease, diabetes, and visual impairment in
combination constitute a Asevere@ impairment within the meaning of the regulations (Tr. 17-18).
Notably, at the second step, the ALJ also determined that Plaintiff=s obesity and depressive
disorder are Anon-severe@ impairments within the meaning of the regulations (Tr. 18-21). At the
third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr.
21-22).
At the fourth step, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform
a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the
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claimant cannot work in unprotected heights, operate heavy machinery, or operate a motor
vehicle” (Tr. 22). Relying on testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is
“capable of performing past relevant work as a Cook, Child Care Attendant, and Dairy Helper”
(Tr. 26). Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff=s residual functional capacity, age, education,
and past work experience as well as testimony from the vocational expert (Tr. 27-28). The ALJ
found that Plaintiff is capable of performing a significant number of jobs that exist in the national
economy (Tr. 27-28).

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a

Adisability,@ as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 6, 2013 through the date of the
decision, March 16, 2015 (Tr. 28).
Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ=s decision (Tr.
9-11). In support of the request Plaintiff submitted additional medical evidence (Tr. 2, 5). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff=s request for review of the ALJ=s decision (Tr. 1-4). Notably,
the Appeals Council found the new medical evidence did not affect the ALJ’s decision because it
concerned Plaintiff’s condition after March 16, 2015 (Tr. 2).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard of Review
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final
decision of the Commissioner are supported by Asubstantial evidence,@ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton
v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d
680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). ASubstantial evidence exists when
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a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion,
even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.@ Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting
Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a
case for substantial evidence, the Court Amay not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in
evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.@ Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964
F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff=s request for review of the
ALJ=s decision (Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ=s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of
the Commissioner’s decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the
Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered
the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d
146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Commissioner’s Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II
Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The term
Adisability@ is defined as an
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12)
months.

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42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a),
416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
(6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential
evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See AEvaluation of disability in general,@ 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1)

Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2)

Does the claimant have a medically determinable
impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the
duration requirement and significantly limits his or her
ability to do basic work activities?

3)

Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within
Appendix 1?

4)

Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to
return to his or her past relevant work?

5)

Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience allow him or her to
perform a significant number of jobs in the national
economy?

Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff=s claim at the fourth step.
A
1. Plaintiff’s Argument
Plaintiff argues that Finding No. 5 is not supported by substantial evidence (DN 16 PageID
# 933). Plaintiff points out that the Sixth Circuit has indicated an Administrative Law Judge’s
failure to follow the agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even
where the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge may be justified based on the record (Id.
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PageID # 938-40 citing Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.2d 931, 939-40 (6th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff asserts
that 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2) require that an Administrative Law Judge give
“good reasons” for the weight accorded to a treating source’s opinion (Id.).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” when he assigned “little
weight” to the November 5, 2013 medical opinion of a treating source, Dr. Allison Campbell (DN
16 PageID # 933, 938-40 citing and Wilson v. Comm’r, 378 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff
points out that the ALJ merely indicated Dr. Campbell’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
treatment records and the findings of Drs. Sherman and Melson (DN 16 PageID 938-40).
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ’s explanation was inadequate as it identified no specific inconsistency
between Dr. Campbell’s statement and the medical evidence or the statements of the other treating
doctors, and that none is apparent (Id.).
2. Defendant’s Argument
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the ALJ gave Dr. Campbell’s
opinion little weight because it was “essentially a finding that the claimant [was] totally disabled
and unable to work” which is a finding reserved to the Commissioner ( Id. PageID # 959 citing
Tr. 25). Additionally, Defendant points out that the ALJ gave good reasons for giving Dr.
Campbell’s opinion little weight (Id. PageID #959-60). Defendant contends throughout the
opinion the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s treatment notes, including those from Drs. Sherman and
Melton, which showed Plaintiff’s visual acuity was 20/30 in the right eye, and 20/25 and the left
eye, that doctors characterized her condition as “fairly stable,” that Plaintiff did not require eyelid
retraction surgery, and that there was “consistent evidence” of Plaintiff’s improvement after
surgeries (Id. PageID #960-61 citing Tr. 24, 644, 646, 742). Defendant further points out that
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the ALJ also discussed doctors’ characterizations of Plaintiff’s eye swelling as mild, and that her
color vision was normal, her corneal dryness was “very minimal,” and she had no signs of optic
nerve compression (Id. citing Tr. 23-24, 617, 637, 643, 646). Defendant asserts that, contrary to
Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ did consider the record as a whole when he evaluated the medical
opinion of Dr. Campbell (Id.). Defendant contends the ALJ provided “good reasons” why Dr.
Campbell’s opinion was not supported by Plaintiff’s treatment notes
3. Discussion
Finding No. 5 sets forth the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment (Tr. 22). The
residual functional capacity finding is the Administrative Law Judge=s ultimate determination of
what a claimant can still do despite his or her physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.945(a), 416.946. The Administrative Law Judge makes this finding
based on a consideration of medical source statements and all other evidence in the case record.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.929, 416.945(a), 416.946; Social Security
Ruling 96-5p; Social Security Ruling 96-7p. In making this finding the Administrative Law
Judge must necessarily assign weight to the medical source statements in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c), 404.1529; Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Here, Plaintiff is challenging the ALJ’s
assignment of weight to the opinion of Dr. Campbell.
The Sixth Circuit has provided the following comprehensive explanation regarding the
standards for weighing medical opinions:
As a general matter, an opinion from a medical source who has
examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a source who
has not performed an examination (a “nonexamining source”), id. §
404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1), and an opinion from a medical source who
regularly treats the claimant (a “treating source”) is afforded more
weight than that from a source who has examined the claimant but does
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not have an ongoing treatment relationship (a “nontreating source”), id.
§ 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2). In other words, “[t]he regulations provide
progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties
between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker.”
Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin.
July 2, 1996).
The source of the opinion therefore dictates the process by which the
Commissioner accords it weight. Treating-source opinions must be
given “controlling weight” if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion “is
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques”; and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). If the Commissioner does not give a treating-source
opinion controlling weight, then the opinion is weighed based on the
length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, id.,
as well as the treating source's area of specialty and the degree to which
the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by
relevant evidence, id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
The Commissioner is required to provide “good reasons” for
discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. Id. §
404.1527(c)(2). These reasons must be “supported by the evidence in
the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating
source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Soc. Sec.
Rul. No. 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2,
1996). This procedural requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the
treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's
application of the rule.” Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir.2004).
On the other hand, opinions from nontreating and nonexamining
sources are never assessed for “controlling weight.”
The
Commissioner instead weighs these opinions based on the examining
relationship (or lack thereof), specialization, consistency, and
supportability, but only if a treating-source opinion is not deemed
controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Other factors “which tend to
support or contradict the opinion” may be considered in assessing any
type of medical opinion. Id. § 404.1527(c)(6).
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013).

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Dr. Alison Campbell is Plaintiff’s primary care physician (Tr. 380-453, 647-701). Dr.
Campbell prepared a letter dated November 5, 2013, that reads as follows:
I am writing this letter in regard to Ms. Melody Norris, a
46-year-old lady followed in my practice for several years. Ms.
Norris has several medical issues including Graves disease with
thyrotoxic exophtholmos, low back pain, and kidney stones. She
has a severe case of thyrotoxicosis and is followed by a specialist in
Nashville. This disease affects her vision and causes a great deal of
pain, even though her disease is controlled she still suffers from pain
and vision problems. Flares can be painful and she often is not able
to work. She also suffers from low back pain that flares at times.
During the time I have followed her, she has had increasing flares,
even with maximized treatment. She has recently suffered a bout
with kidney stones that has added to her issues. It is my opinion
with her issues, she is no longer able to continue to work. The
stress and prolonged standing required [sic] her job exacerbate her
condition. I have recommended that she proceed with disability.
(Tr. 642). After considering the evidence in the record, the Court concludes that Dr. Campbell is
a “treating source” within the meaning of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902.
The ALJ provided an accurate summary of the letter and noted that Dr. Campbell had
opined that Plaintiff “is no longer able to continue to work” (Tr. 25). The ALJ indicated that he
gave “little weight to this opinion, as it is essentially a finding that the claimant is totally disabled
and unable to work” (Id.). The ALJ explained that “[t]he finding of a claimant’s disability is one
of the issues reserved to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (20 CFR
404.1527(c)(1); SSR 96-5p)” (Tr. 25).
The Court concludes that Dr. Campbell’s opinion goes beyond a medical judgment
regarding what Plaintiff can still do and is a finding on the issue of disability that is reserved to the
Commissioner. See Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2-5 (July 2, 1996).
While Dr. Campbell’s opinion must not be disregarded, it is not entitled to controlling weight or
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to be given special significance. Id. at *5. Therefore, the ALJ has set forth a “good reason” for
not according controlling weight to Dr. Campbell’s opinion. Moreover, the ALJ has provided a
“good reason” for giving “little weight” to Dr. Campbell’s opinion. In sum, the ALJ’s reason for
giving “little weight” to Dr. Campbell’s opinion comports with applicable law and is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
The ALJ gave an alternative reason for according “little weight” to Dr. Campbell’s
opinion. Specifically, the ALJ indicated “this opinion is inconsistent with claimant’s treatment
records, as well as the findings of Dr. Sherman and Dr. Melson, and the undersigned gives it little
weight” (Tr. 25). The Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to view this sentence in a vacuum and
conclude that the ALJ has failed to satisfy the “good reasons” requirement. Instead, the Court has
considered the preceding paragraphs in the decision where the ALJ discussed the medical records
from Drs. Campbell, Sherman, and Melson (Tr. 23-24) and explained why Plaintiff’s allegations
are inconsistent with those medical records (Tr. 24-25). When these paragraphs within the
decision are considered, the specific inconsistencies between Dr. Campbell’s statement and
Plaintiffs treatment records as well as the findings of Drs. Sherman and Melson are readily
apparent. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ has satisfied the “good reasons”
requirement. Moreover, the ALJ’s findings regarding the weight accorded to Dr. Campbell’s
opinion are supported by substantial evidence in the record and comport with applicable law.
B
1. Plaintiff’s Argument
Plaintiff argues that Finding No. 5 is not supported by substantial evidence because the
ALJ made an improper assessment of her credibility (DN 16 PageID # 933- 37 citing 20 C.F.R. §§
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404.1529, 416.929, and Social Security Ruling 96-7p). Plaintiff points out that she alleged her
Graves’ disease with visual impairments caused intermittent ocular pain, reoccurring bulging of
the eyes (known as “exophthalmos”), inability to fully close her eyelids (lagopthalmos), and
double vision (diplopia) (Id.). Plaintiff also points out that she alleged these symptoms flared on a
reoccurring basis and interfered with her ability to maintain full-time employment (Id.). Plaintiff
argues there was significant evidence in the record to substantiate the severity of her allegations,
consisting of the medical records of Drs. Melson and Campbell, Dr. Campbell’s opinion,
Plaintiff’s own testimony, and the third-party report of Plaintiff’s former supervisor, Kay Spears
(Id.).
2. Defendant’s Argument
Defendant contends that the ALJ, when assessing Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms,
reasonably considered the consistent evidence that Plaintiff’s condition improved after her
surgeries, and that doctors characterized her condition is stable (DN 21 PageID #954-57).
Further, Defendant points out that Dr. Sherman, an ophthalmic specialist, believed plaintiff did not
require eyelid retraction surgery because a lubrication regime would adequately treat her stable
thyroid eye disease (Id.). Additionally, Defendant points out that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
other allegations that were not supported by the record (Id.). Defendant asserts that the ALJ
considered other factors in the record including Plaintiffs ability to work after her alleged onset
date and her ability to carry out a number of activities, including cleaning, grocery shopping, and
cooking on a regular basis (Id.). Defendant contends that the ALJ’s consideration that Plaintiff
continued to work after her alleged onset date is harmless error in light of other findings regarding
Plaintiff’s physical abilities (Id.). Defendant indicates that the ALJ gave “little weight” to the
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statements from Plaintiff’s former supervisor because those statements were not from a medical
professional and were not entirely supported by other evidence in the record (Id.).
3. Discussion
As previously mentioned, Finding No. 5 sets forth the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
assessment (Tr. 22). In making the residual functional capacity finding, the Administrative Law
Judge must consider the subjective allegations of the claimant and make credibility findings. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 404.1529; Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
A claimant's statement that she is experiencing pain or other symptoms will not, taken
alone, establish that she is disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which
show the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to give rise to the
pain and/or other symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). In determining
whether a claimant suffers from debilitating pain and other symptoms, the two-part test set forth in
Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986), applies. First the
Administrative Law Judge must examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition.
Here, the ALJ examined the medical evidence and found that Plaintiff suffers from Graves’
disease, a visual impairment related to the Graves’ disease, and diabetes and that these conditions
are severe impairments within the meaning of the regulations (Tr. 17). Further, the ALJ found
Plaintiff has hypertension, obesity, and depressive disorder, but these conditions are non-severe
impairments within the meaning of the regulations (Tr. 18-21). Thus, the ALJ concluded there is
objective medical evidence of several underlying medical conditions.

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Next, the Administrative Law Judge must determine: "(1) whether objective medical
evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the
objectively established medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to
produce the alleged disabling pain." Duncan, 801 F.2d at 853. Here, the ALJ concluded that the
objectively established medical conditions were not of such severity that they could reasonably be
expected to produce the degree of alleged pain and other symptoms (Tr. 23).
When the reported pain and other symptoms suggest an impairment of greater severity than
can be shown by objective medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge will consider other
information and factors which may be relevant to the degree of pain alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). In pertinent part, the ALJ’s decision reads as follows:
The medical evidence of record demonstrates that the claimant’s
allegations are not entirely credible. First, as to her alleged back
pain, she has no musculoskeletal testing demonstrating limitation
and postural activities, and had a noted normal gait during her
consultative examination, with no difficulty walking (Ex. 15F/1-2).
As to her alleged mental limitations, the undersigned considered
these in Finding 3, and found they were not fully credible. The
claimant’s alleged frequent kidney stones are demonstrated by only
a single kidney stone in the record, though the claimant reported a
kidney stone in October 2014, but it was not documented on
objective imaging. Therefore, the undersigned finds the allegation
of frequent kidney stones is not fully credible. As to the claimant’s
primary complaint of visual problems, including swelling of both
eyes, after her surgery there is consistent evidence of improvement
in this area. The claimant has increased visual acuity, though she
does have mild decreases in her visual fields. Specifically, Dr.
Sherman, an ophthalmic specialist, noted that the claimant did not
require any eyelid retraction surgery, finding that a lubrication
regimen with Selenium supplements would adequately treat the
claimant’s stable thyroid eye disease (Ex. 20F). Dr. Melson’s
examination of the claimant, and his analysis of her visual acuity
and visual fields, supports Dr. Sherman’s findings, indicating the
claimant’s allegations of visual difficulty are not as extensive as
alleged. Furthermore, the claimant’s examinations with her
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treating physician, Dr. Campbell, support the findings of a stable
condition, though continued flares are possible. The claimant is
also able to work on a regular basis, demonstrating an ability to
stand and walk greater than alleged. Finally, the claimant stated
she cooked, grocery shopped, and cleaned on a regular basis,
demonstrating an ability to complete tasks and see items to a degree
greater than alleged (Ex. 10E/4-5). The undersigned notes that the
claimant’s blood sugar, hemoglobin Alc, and thyroid levels are
fairly stable in the record, indicating the claimant’s diabetes mellitus
and Graves’ disease are stable and managed on medication.
Therefore, the undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations not
entirely credible.
(Tr. 24-25). The ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s level of daily activity in determining
the extent to which her pain and other symptoms are of disabling severity (Tr. 18). See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1993);
Blacha v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990) (As a matter of law,
the Administrative Law Judge may consider household and social activities in evaluating
complaints of disabling pain.). Additionally, the ALJ properly considered whether there are any
inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between Plaintiff’s
statements and the rest of the evidence (Tr. 18-19, 22-25). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4),
416.929(c)(4).
In the context of assessing whether Plaintiffs depressive disorder is a severe impairment,
the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “works four hours a day, five days a week, in a school cafeteria” (Tr.
19). The ALJ observed that “[t]his demonstrates an ability to interact with coworkers and
students on a regular basis” (Tr. 19). In the context of assessing the credibility of Plaintiff’s
allegations, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff “also is able to work on a regular basis, demonstrating
an ability to stand and walk greater than alleged” (Tr. 25). These findings are related to Plaintiff’s
claim that she became disabled on August 6, 2013 (Tr. 15, 182, 185, 235) yet continued to work in
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the school cafeteria through April 30, 2014 (Tr. 329, 332, 345, 347, 350). Although the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s earnings for work after the alleged onset of disability did not rise to level of
substantial gainful activity (Tr. 17), the ALJ could still consider Plaintiff’s work in assessing the
degree to which her depressive disorder impaired social functioning (Tr. 18-19) and in weighing
the credibility of her subjective allegations (Tr. 24-25). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in
mentioning Plaintiff’s work at the school cafeteria.

Notwithstanding, the ALJ identified a

number of other factors or reasons that support his findings that Plaintiff has a mild limitation in
social functioning (Tr. 18-19) and that Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely credible (Tr. 24-25).
With regard to statements from third-parties, the ALJ commented as follows:
The undersigned gives partial weight to the statement of the
claimant’s mother, Ms. Norris (Ex. 11E). Ms. Norris lives with the
claimant and observes her on a daily basis, and to the extent her
observations are consistent with the evidence of record the
undersigned gives them weight. However, Ms. Norris is not a
medical professional, into the extent that her statements indicate
symptoms greater than those supported by the medical evidence of
record, the undersigned gives them little weight.
The undersigned gives little weight to the statement of claimant’s
supervisor, Ms. Spears (Ex. 23E). The undersigned gives this
opinion little weight for the reasons stated in the preceding
paragraph. In addition, Ms. Spears does not see the claimant as
often as her mother, and does not interact to the same degree,
leading the undersigned to give her opinion less weight. However,
to the extent Ms. Spears gives an objective account of the claimant’s
decreased work efficiency, the undersigned gives her statements
some weight.
(Tr. 25-26). The ALJ’s assignment of weight to the opinions of Ms. Norris and Ms. Spears is
sufficiently specific to make clear to Plaintiff and any subsequent reviewers the weight that the
ALJ gave to their statements and the reasons for that weight. See Social Security Ruling 96-7p.

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Therefore, the court concludes that the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the opinions of Ms. Noris
and Ms. Spears is supported by substantial evidence in the record and comports with applicable
law. In sum, Finding No. 5 is supported by substantial evidence in the record and comports with
applicable law.
C
Plaintiff also argues that Finding Nos. 6 and 7 are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record for the reasons previously given (DN 16 PageID # 940). For the reasons set forth
above, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJs residual functional capacity
assessment. Further, the vocational expert’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support
Findings Nos. 6 and 7 because the testimony was based on a hypothetical question that accurately
portrayed Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987).

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is granted for the Commissioner.

March 31, 2017

Copies:

Counsel

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