Martin v. James et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 12/9/2016; Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants Whittlesey and James and the claim relating to Plaintiff being assaulted by county inmate Steven Sales are DISMISSED f or failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may within 30 days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order file an amended complaint. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (w/42:1983 form marked "Amended"); Defendants (CDR) Modified distribution on 12/12/2016 (CDR).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CHAD ALLEN MARTIN
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-P114-GNS
KIMBERLY JAMES et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Chad Allen Martin, filed a pro se complaint on this Court’s form for prisoners
bringing a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set
forth below, the action will be dismissed in part and allowed to proceed in part.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he was a pretrial detainee at the Warren County
Regional Jail (WCRJ). He names as Defendants in their individual and official capacities,
WCRJ Captains Kimberly James and Shawn Whittlesey, WCRJ Chief Jailer Missi Causey, and
WCRJ Jailer Jackie Strode. His complaint concerns four separate incidents while he was
incarcerated at WCRJ.
First, Plaintiff alleges that on August 22, 2015, Defendant Whittlesey administered a
“tazer blast [that] exceeded normal punishment when he repeatedly shocked” Plaintiff while he
was handcuffed to a restraint chair because Plaintiff attempted to remove a sheet that was
covering him.
Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant James sprayed him with mace on December 22,
2015, when he would not stop striking himself in the face. According to the complaint,
Defendant James “tazed [Plaintiff] in an attempt to stop [Plaintiff’s] uncontrollable urge of
causing self harm.” He states that at the time he was “experiencing a severe depression and
anxiety attack to the extent I felt like I had to harm myself to stop thoughts about the nature of
the crime I committed and the very long sentence I must serve.”
Third, Plaintiff complains that during a physical altercation with another inmate he was
struck in the mouth by the other inmate causing an injury requiring 13 stitches. Plaintiff alleges
that “county and federal inmates are not supposed to be housed together by law . . . again
negligence by WCRJ guards has left me with a horrible scar on the left side of my upper lip.”
Plaintiff states that looking at the scar “triggers severe depression and anxiety attack.” He
alleges “8th Amendment violation cruel and unusual punishment.”
Plaintiff next alleges that on June 17, 2016, he told “guards” that he could not go to “H7” “due to a danger to me I told them money was on my head at the amount of $60 phone cards
and he had buddys up there.” He states that he was taken to H-7 anyway and that no one brought
him “a p.c. sheet to sign when I told them the danger to me.” He states that in H-7 he was
“jumped” twice, suffering injuries to his face, jaw, and hand.
As relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
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dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether Plaintiff has
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
First claim
The Court will allow Plaintiff’s claim that on August 22, 2015, Defendant Whittlesey
administered a “tazer blast [that] exceeded normal punishment when he repeatedly shocked”
Plaintiff while he was handcuffed to a restraint chair to proceed against Defendant Whittlesey
but only in his individual capacity.
If an action is brought against an official of a governmental entity in his official capacity,
the suit should be construed as brought against the governmental entity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Whittlesey
in his official capacity is actually brought against the Warren County government. See Matthews
v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, like Warren County, the Court must
consider not only whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation but also if
the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503
U.S. 115, 120 (1992). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
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superior theory.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d
1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in Pembaur).
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th
Cir. 1993). Simply stated, the plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the city
itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.”
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of
Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Frantz v. Vill. of
Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of
the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under
§ 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)
(citation omitted)); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)
(indicating that plaintiff must demonstrate “deliberate conduct”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendant Whittlesey administered the tazor pursuant to a custom or policy of Warren
County. Therefore , the official-capacity claim against Defendnat Whittlesey will be dismissed.
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Second claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant James sprayed him with mace on December 22, 2015,
when he would not stop striking himself in the face and “tazed me in an attempt to stop my
uncontrollable urge of causing self harm.” The Court will allow this claim to go forward against
Defendant James in her individual capacity. Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant
James was acting pursuant to a custom or policy of Warren County, the Court will dismiss the
official-capacity claim against Defendant James. See Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286.
Third claim
Plaintiff complains that during a physical altercation with another inmate, county inmate
Steven Sales, he was struck in the mouth by the other inmate and that “county and federal
inmates are not supposed to be housed together by law . . . again negligence by WCRJ guards
has left me with a horrible scar on the left side of my upper lip.” Plaintiff alleges “8th
Amendment violation cruel and unusual punishment.”
Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim simply based on county and federal inmates
being housed together. See, e.g., Howard v. Osborne, No. 4:13CV-P129-M, 2014 WL 1491245,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 15, 2014). To the extent that Plaintiff is raising a failure-to-protect claim, a
pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to protect is analyzed
using the same standard as the Eighth Amendment. See Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720,
723 (6th Cir. 1985). In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison
officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). “Deliberate indifference of a constitutional magnitude may occur
when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another.” Walker v. Norris, 917
F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). However, in order to support an action under § 1983, a plaintiff
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must establish something more than a lack of ordinary due care, inadvertence, or error. See
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that
Defendants were aware of a risk to Plaintiff from being housed with county inmates. Therefore,
Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim with regard to this incident.
Fourth claim
Plaintiff alleges that on June 17, 2016, he told “guards” that he could not go to H-7 “due
to a danger to me I told them money was on my head at the amount of $60 phone cards and he
had buddys up there.” He states that, despite his protest, he was taken to H-7 and that no one
brought him “a p.c. sheet to sign when I told them the danger to me.” He alleges that he was
then jumped twice. He states:
The second time was when a guard finally caught it and it wasn’t the guard just
sitting at the desk. I’m bleeding out my nose, eyes blacked, hard to eat because
my jaw was injured, left side of face swollen, nose swollen, right hand lumpy
swollen, not to mention I had to do 48 hours punishment when this should and
could have been avoided. Captain Kim James claims I was trying to manipulate
the system, policy or whatever.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he notified “guards” that putting him in H-7 would be
dangerous, yet he was put in H-7 and not given a chance to ask for protective custody. Plaintiff
further alleges that he suffered harm from having been placed in H-7. However, Plaintiff does
not explain which “guards” he told about the danger. Although he mentions Defendant James, it
appears only to be in the context of her comments after the alleged injuries occurred.
The Court will give Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amendment to his complaint to
explain which Defendant(s) or guard(s) committed the alleged constitutional violation. See
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013) (a district court may allow a prisoner to
amend a complaint to avoid sua sponte dismissal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Whittlesey
and James and the claim relating to Plaintiff being assaulted by county inmate Steven Sales are
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may within 30 days of entry of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order file an amended complaint. After that 30-day period has
expired, the Court will, if necessary, conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint
and/or enter a Scheduling Order to govern the development of the claims permitted to go
forward.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form, with the
word “Amended” and this case number written in the caption along with three blank summons
forms.
Date:
December 9, 2016
Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4416.009
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