Schambon v. Orkin, LLC

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 4/4/2017. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 12 ) is GRANTED to the extent outlined (herein). The parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. This action is DISMISSED, and it shall be STRICKEN from the Court's active docket. cc: Counsel (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-00130-GNS
ROSS SCHAMBON

PLAINTIFF

v.
ORKIN, LLC

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 12),
which is ripe for adjudication. The motion is GRANTED to the extent outlined below.
I.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Orkin, LLC (“Orkin”) hired Plaintiff Ross Schambon (“Schambon”) in
February 2014 to work as a part-time employee in its Bowling Green branch. (Miller Decl. ¶ 3,
DN 14-2). In September 2014, Schambon was promoted to a full-time position. (Miller Decl. ¶
4).

As part of his promotion he was required to sign Orkin’s Agreement to Arbitrate

(“Agreement”), in which he agreed to abide by Orkin’s Dispute Resolution Policy (“DRP”) and
arbitrate any dispute regarding or arising out of his employment. (Agreement to Arbitrate, DN
12-1). The Agreement provides, in relevant part:
[I]n consideration of employment and the mutual promises, covenants, and
conditions set forth in this Agreement, I agree, as does the Company, to abide by
the Company’s Dispute Resolution Policy (“DRP”) and to arbitrate any dispute,
claim, or controversy regarding or arising out of my employment (as defined by
the Company’s DRP, a copy of which I may request at any time) that may arise
between me and the Company, its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other
persons or entities acting as its agent. The parties agree that the Company’s

operations directly affect interstate commerce to the extent that all procedures
hereunder contemplated shall be subject to, and governed by, the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). Unless the parties agree otherwise, the arbitration shall be
administered under the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”). The parties agree that the arbitrator shall follow the substantive law,
including the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
I specifically understand that by agreeing to arbitrate, I waive any right to trial by
judge or jury in favor of having such disputes resolved by binding arbitration. I
understand that any disputes presented to an arbitrator shall be resolved only in
accordance with the applicable federal, state, or local law governing such dispute.
The award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and binding, and judgment
may be entered on the award in any court having jurisdiction thereof. I agree that
any arbitration proceeding under this Agreement will not be consolidated or
joined with any action or legal proceeding under any other agreement or involving
any other employees, and will not proceed as a class action, collective action,
private attorney general action or similar representative action.
(Agreement to Arbitrate 1).
When Orkin hired Schambon in February 2014, it gave him a Field Employee Handbook,
which described the DRP in general terms:
The Dispute Resolution Policy establishes the procedures both you and the
Company are required to follow for resolving any “dispute” between us. The
policy applies to and legally binds the Company, together with you and the
Company’s current and/or former employees and applicants.
The Company believes that protracted and expensive court litigation often does
not serve the best interests of either you or the Company. The Company therefore
has instituted a Policy that is designed to be fair, efficient, and inexpensive. All
parties are required to use this process exclusively, rather than more formal court
litigation, so that the merits of such disputes are more promptly and efficiently
resolved.
This policy has been designed with the intent of assuring a reliable and efficient
method for addressing such disputes. These procedures reflect the Company’s
long-standing commitment to open communication and its continuing interest in
seeing that employment-related disputes are promptly, fully and fairly addressed.
To acknowledge and agree to the Dispute Resolution Policy, the Agreement to
Arbitrate form must be signed by employee either at the time of hire, during the
signing of bonus plans or at the time of job promotion. The Agreement to
Arbitrate from can be found the myOrkin intranet site.

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(Field Employee Handbook 1, DN 13-4).
The DRP itself is quite detailed and requires employees to adhere to certain procedures
when they have a “dispute.” (Dispute Resolution Policy 3-4, DN 13-1). First, employees must
file a “Request for Dispute Resolution,” describing the nature of the dispute, the relevant facts,
and remedies sought. (Dispute Resolution Policy 4-5). The request must be filed with Orkin
within the applicable contractual limitations period; if there is no such period, the request must
be filed within the statute of limitations provided by either statute or common law. (Dispute
Resolution Policy 4). Any dispute the request fails to name or describe is forever waived.
(Dispute Resolution Policy 4). Fourteen days after a Request for Dispute Resolution is filed,
Orkin’s Human Resources Department is to contact the employee filing the request and attempt
to resolve the dispute through informal means.1 (Dispute Resolution Policy 5). If the employee
and Orkin are unable to resolve the dispute informally, and the employee wants to pursue it
further, he or she must file a Demand for Arbitration form within 90 days after he or she filed the
Request for Dispute Resolution and pay a filing fee of $120.00. (Dispute Resolution Policy 6,
10). Once the employee properly files a Demand for Arbitration, Orkin and the employee select
an arbitrator.

(Dispute Resolution Policy 7).

Once an arbitrator is selected, a six-month

discovery period begins, and the arbitration hearing is to be held within ninety days from the
close of discovery. (Dispute Resolution Policy 8-9).
Orkin fired Schambon in August 2015. (Wallace Decl. ¶ 5, DN 14-1). Despite the
Agreement, he filed this action alleging violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-22, DN 1).
Schambon’s attorney initially believed that USERRA claims were not arbitrable, but he
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Only employees can participate in the informal dispute resolution process; attorney participation
is prohibited. (Dispute Resolution Policy 5).
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eventually emailed Orkin, indicating: “after speaking with my client, he will agree to an order
staying this proceeding and referring it to arbitration if Orkin agrees in said order to pay the full
cost of arbitration . . . .”

(Goetz-Anderson Decl. Ex. A, DN 14-3). Orkin agreed, and its

attorney prepared a joint motion to stay and compel arbitration which it sent to Schambon’s
counsel for review. (Goetz-Anderson Decl. Exs. B-C, DN 14-3). Schambon, while recognizing
“[Orkin’s] legal right to stay this case and compel [him] to arbitrate,” declined to join the motion.
(Goetz-Anderson Decl. Ex C). As a result, Orkin restyled the joint motion as an unopposed
motion to stay and compel arbitration. (Goetz-Anderson Decl. Ex. D, DN 14-3). Orkin sent a
draft to Schambon’s attorney, who gave Orkin permission to file the motion as unopposed but
noted, “this should not be interpreted as an admission or agreement with the contents of the
motion.” (Goetz-Anderson Decl. Ex. D). After Orkin filed its motion Schambon’s attorney
emailed Orkin requesting a copy of the DRP, which it sent the next day. (Goetz-Anderson Decl.
Ex. E, DN 14-3).

Subsequently, Schambon filed a response in opposition to Orkin’s motion

arguing that the Agreement is unenforceable because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
his right to trial by jury. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Unopposed Mot. Stay Action & Compel Arbitration
1, DN 13 [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.]). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
II.

DISCUSSION

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, a written agreement to
arbitrate involving a dispute arising of a contract that affects interstate commerce “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 2). “The FAA expresses a strong public policy favoring arbitration of a wide class of
disputes.” Cooper v. MRM, Inc., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004). Consequently, “arbitration

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agreements must be read liberally to effect their purpose[,]” and any doubts regarding
arbitrability are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moore v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d
740, 745 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-91
(2000); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also
Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Further, the
FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration
agreement has been signed . . . absent a ground for revocation of the contractual agreement.”
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
According to the Sixth Circuit, a court has four tasks when ruling on a motion to compel
arbitration:
[F]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must
determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are
asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be
nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the
claims in the action are subject to arbitration, it must determine whether to stay
the remainder of the proceedings pending arbitration.
Stout, 228 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). In this case, the third and fourth tasks are undisputed.
The Agreement covers Schambon’s USERRA claim, which is arbitrable. See Landis v. Pinnacle
Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, Schambon stated in his surreply that, if the Court grants Orkin’s motion, he does not object to the Court dismissing this
action without prejudice, as opposed to staying it pending arbitration. (Pl.’s Sur-Reply Def.’s
Unopposed Mot. Stay Action & Compel Arbitration 2, DN 18).
Schambon argues that the Agreement is unenforceable because he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. The Sixth Circuit applies “ordinary contract principles
in determining whether a binding arbitration agreement that include[s] a waiver of a right to sue
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in court [is] valid.” Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 973-74 (6th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d
646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). In determining whether a waiver was executed knowingly
and voluntarily, the Court considers: “(1) plaintiff’s experience, background and education; (2)
the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the
employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4)
consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the circumstances.” Morrison, 317
F.3d at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d
580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995)).
In his response, Schambon admits that he is “not uneducated,” but claims that his lack of
a legal background indicates his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. (Pl.’s Resp. 6). This
argument is unpersuasive. Schambon has not cited a single case suggesting that a person needs a
legal background in order to execute a knowing and voluntary wavier. Courts have upheld
waivers when the plaintiff had only a high school education. Sako v. Ohio Dep’t of Admin.
Servs., 278 F. App’x 514, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s decision that the
plaintiff, who had only a high school education and was not a native English speaker, executed a
knowing and voluntary waiver); Dunn v. Gordon Food Servs., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577
(W.D. Ky. 2011). Therefore, Schambon’s experience, background, and education weigh in favor
of finding that he executed a knowing and voluntary wavier.
Schambon argues that the Agreement is unenforceable because he was given a brief
amount of time to sign “several dense, legalistic documents that he did not understand, and he
was never offered the opportunity to consult an attorney.” (Pl.’s Resp. 6). In Shupe v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Co., 566 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2014), the plaintiff argued that her waiver was not

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knowingly and voluntarily executed because she was presented several documents at one time,
directed to sign them without further explanation of what the documents were, and not given the
opportunity to have the waiver reviewed by an attorney. Id. at 482. Rejecting these arguments,
the court explained, “[i]n the absence of any evidence that [the plaintiff] requested more time to
review the Waiver, indicated she did not understand the Waiver, or asked for time to have an
attorney review the waiver, this factor weighs in favor of [the plaintiff] having knowingly and
voluntarily executed the Waiver.” Id. at 483; see also Sako, 278 F. App’x at 518-19 (holding
that a waiver was voluntary even when the plaintiff only had a few minutes to decide whether to
sign); Moore, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (finding a knowing and voluntary waiver where the
plaintiff did not ask for more time to complete the application or to consult an attorney, or
indicate in any fashion that he did not understand the terms).
In this case, Schambon has not alleged that he requested additional time to review the
Agreement, asked questions about it, or indicated that he did not understand it. (See Schambon
Aff., DN 13-2). Furthermore, he has not alleged that he requested time to consult with an
attorney. (See Schambon Aff.). Indeed, both Wanda Wallace (“Wallace”) and Shellie Miller
(“Miller”), the Orkin employees who Schambon says had him sign the Agreement, have declared
that their typical practice is to give employees the Agreement, allow them time to review it, and
then ask if they have any questions. (Schambon Aff. ¶¶ 3-4; Wallace Decl. ¶ 6; Miller Decl. ¶
6). If requested, Wallace and Miller give employees additional time to review the Agreement
and allow employees to consult with an attorney before signing it. (Wallace Decl. ¶ 7; Miller
Decl. ¶ 7). Neither recalls Schambon asking questions or indicating that he did not understand
the Agreement. (Wallace Decl. ¶ 8; Miller Decl. ¶ 8). As a result, the amount of time Schambon

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had to consider whether to sign the waiver and his opportunity to consult with a lawyer weighs in
favor of finding that he executed a knowing and voluntary waiver.
Similarly, the Court finds unpersuasive Schambon’s argument that his waiver was not
knowing and voluntary because, at the time he signed the Agreement, he did not know what
arbitration was and did not understand the implications of waiving his right to a jury trial.
Quoting the United States Supreme Court, Kentucky’s highest court has stated:
It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and when called upon to respond
to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know
what it contained. If this were permitted, contracts would not be worth the paper
on which they are written. But such is not the law. A contractor must stand by
the words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is
responsible for his omission.
United Talking Mach. Co. v. Metcalf, 191 S.W. 881, 883 (Ky. 1915) (quoting Upton v.
Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875)).
It is undisputed that Schambon signed the Agreement. On the page Schambon signed, he
and Orkin agreed “to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy regarding or arising out of” his
employment. (Agreement to Arbitrate 1). Additionally, the Agreement states, “I specifically
understand that by agreeing to arbitrate, I waive any right to trial by judge or jury in favor of
having such disputes resolved by binding arbitration.” (Agreement to Arbitrate 1). The DRP
defined some terms in the Agreement, such as “dispute”; by its terms, however, the Agreement
requires Schambon to arbitrate any “claim” or “controversy regarding or arising out of” his
employment. (Dispute Resolution Policy 3; Agreement to Arbitrate 1). Because Schambon’s
USERRA claim clearly arises out of his employment with Orkin, he must arbitrate it.
However, Schambon’s argument that his waiver was not enforceable because no one at
Orkin gave him a copy of the DRP before he signed the Agreement (which the Court construes
as addressing the scope of the Agreement) carries some force. In Alonso v. Huron Valley
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Ambulance Inc., 375 F. App’x 487 (6th Cir. 2010), the employer included a provision in its
employment application requiring applicants to agree to resolve all employment-related claims
through an internal “Grievance Review Board.”

Id. at 488.

The provision provided no

information about the board or the procedures that would be used in place of a judicial
proceeding. Id. at 493. Specifically, the waiver provided:
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of my employment by
the Company, or termination thereof, including by way of example but not
limitation, disputes concerning alleged civil rights violations, breach of contract
or tort, shall be exclusively subject to review by the Grievance Review Board.
Any decision of the Review Board shall be binding to both parties, and
enforceable in the circuit court.
Id. The plaintiffs were not given any information regarding the Grievance Review Board until
approximately one month after they were hired, at which point they received a general overview
of the process. Id. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were educated, gave no indication that they
did not understand the waivers, and successfully used the grievance process on multiple
occasions, because the plaintiffs were not informed of the Grievance Review Board procedures
until a month after they began working and were never informed of their right to revoke their
waiver, the Sixth Circuit found that they had not knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to
a judicial forum. Id. at 493-94.
In the present case, Schambon has stated that he “was never presented with a copy of
[Orkin’s DRP].” (Schambon Aff. ¶ 7). Orkin does not refute this and, instead, attempts to
distinguish Alonso. (Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Stay Action & Compel Arbitration 10, DN 14
[hereinafter Def.’s Reply]). Orkin explains that this case is different because “[u]nlike the
Alonso plaintiffs . . . [Schambon] had the ability to review the DRP before, at the time, and after
he signed the Agreement.” (Def.’s Reply 10). According to Orkin, Alonso merely stands for the
proposition that employees must have “access” to the procedures taking place of a judicial forum
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before their waiver of that forum can be considered knowing and voluntary. (Def.’s Reply 10).
The Court disagrees with Orkin’s interpretation of Alonso. The Sixth Circuit’s decision indicates
that an employee must be informed of the alternative procedures at the time he waives his right
to a judicial forum. Alonso, 375 F. App’x at 494; see also Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto.,
LLC, No. 12-11756, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7083, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2013) (“Just as in
Alonso, Plaintiff cannot be said to have knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a judicial
forum when she was never informed of Defendant’s arbitration rules or process at any time
during her employment.”).
Schambon was not informed of the contents of the DRP at the time he signed the
Agreement, or any other time during his employment. The Agreement itself merely states that,
by signing, an employee agrees to follow the DRP and that the employee can request a copy of
the DRP at any time. (Agreement to Arbitrate 1). Orkin correctly points out that Schambon was
given a Field Employee Handbook two years before he signed the Agreement, the DRP is
available in full on Orkin’s myOrkin intranet site, and each Orkin branch including the Bowling
Green branch where Schambon worked has a kiosk at which employees can access myOrkin.
The Field Employee Handbook, however, does little more than describe the DRP’s general
purpose. It does not contain the policy’s detailed procedures, summarize them, or state that the
full DRP is available online—only that the Agreement to Arbitrate form (not the DRP) can be
found on myOrkin. The portion of the handbook that describes the DRP is merely the first page
of the DRP following the index. (Compare Field Employee Handbook, with Dispute Resolution
Policy 2). Moreover, the fact that the DRP was on the myOrkin site is of little importance when
there is nothing in the Handbook pointing to the website and there is no indication that
Schambon otherwise knew it was there. Because Schambon was not informed of the contents of

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Orkin’s DRP at the time he signed the Agreement, or any other time, he cannot be said to have
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a judicial forum in favor of Orkin’s DRP process.
See Alonso, 375 F. App’x at 494; Williams, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7083, at *2, 8.
The Agreement provides, “if any provision, or portion thereof, of this Agreement is found
to be invalid or unenforceable, it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other part of
this Agreement.” (Agreement to Arbitrate 1). In light of Alonso, the Court believes that
requiring Schambon to adhere to the DRP would render the Agreement unenforceable. Striking
the DRP provision, however, the remainder of the Agreement remains intact per the savings
clause quoted above. Indeed, “[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set
of procedural rules . . . .” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
The DRP laid out the procedures governing arbitration between Orkin and its employees,
including how the parties would select an arbitrator. Since that process is not binding here, the
question becomes how arbitration will proceed in the absence of the DRP. Generally, questions
regarding “what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to” is “for the arbitrator, not
the courts, to decide.” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality
opinion). In this case, the Agreement provides that “[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, the
arbitration shall be administered under the applicable rules of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”).” (Agreement to Arbitrate 1). Thus, without the DRP, this provision
becomes operative.
One could argue that because Schambon did not have a copy of the AAA rules at the time
he signed the Agreement, allowing those rules to govern would raise the same issue as the DRP

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under Alonso.2 Ultimately, given the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, the Court does
not believe the holding of Alonso would extend as far as to invalidate all arbitration agreements
that rely on the AAA rules just because the employer does not provide a copy of those rules to
the employee up front.3 In fact, the employee in Cooper agreed to arbitrate according to the
“prevailing rules of the American Arbitration Association[,]” and the employer never provided
her with a copy of the AAA’s rules. Cooper, 367 F.3d at 497. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
found that the employee executed a knowing voluntary waiver of her right to a judicial forum.
Id. at 508. Under the present circumstances, Schambon is required to arbitrate under the AAA
rules per the terms of the Agreement.
A final consideration is whether the Court should dismiss or stay this action pending
arbitration. According to Orkin, it initially requested that the Court stay this action only in
exchange for Schambon’s agreement not to oppose its motion to compel. Now, it argues that
dismissal is appropriate because Schambon’s only claim must be resolved through binding
arbitration. Furthermore, Schambon has explained that if Orkin’s motion is granted he does not
object to dismissal of this action without prejudice. This Court and others within the Western
2

Even if the fact that Schambon did not have the AAA rules at the time he signed the Agreement
raised an issue, the Agreement would be enforceable despite lacking specific procedures
governing arbitration. See, e.g., McNeil v. Haley S., Inc., No. 3:10cv192, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95658, at *20 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding agreement to arbitrate enforceable and valid
despite the fact that it did not establish a specific set of applicable rules and procedures) (citing
Randolph, 531 U.S. at 89-92). Furthermore, the FAA allows courts, upon the motion of either
party, to appoint an arbitrator when the agreement fails to include a method of selecting
arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
3
The alternative dispute resolution procedures used by the employer in Alonso were unique. The
Grievance Review Board process was purely internal, culminating in the employee’s
presentation of his claim in a meeting before a panel of managers and employees jointly selected
by the claimant and the employer. Alonso, F. App’x at 489. The panel then issued a final
decision based on majority vote, either granting or denying the employee’s claim. Id. There was
no formal hearing before a third-party arbitrator. See id. Furthermore, while it cited several
arbitration decisions, the Alonso court never even mentioned the FAA. See generally id. at 49293.
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District have held that an action in which all claims are referred to arbitration may be dismissed.
See, e.g., Braxton v. O’Charley’s Rest. Props., LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 722, 728-29 (W.D. Ky. 2014);
Mullins v. U.S. Bancorp Invs., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00126-GNS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47488, at
*11-12 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 7, 2016); W. IP Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Fid., L.P., No. 3:14CV357-JHM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125534 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2014).

Because the Court

concludes that Schambon’s sole claim must be arbitrated, this action will be dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration (DN 12) is GRANTED to the extent outlined above. The parties have a valid
agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. This action
is DISMISSED, and it shall be STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
April 4, 2017

cc:

counsel of record

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