LeBlanc et al v. Hagan et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 6/27/2017; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (DN 8 , 9 , 12 , 15 , 17 , 18 ) are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment (DN 21 , 27 ) are DENIED AS MOOT. cc: Plaintiffs, pro se; Counsel; Montgomery Co. Sheriff's Office (CDR) Modified distribution on 6/27/2017 (CDR).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-00178-GNS
AMENA LEBLANC, et al.
PLANTIFFS
v.
ALEDA HAGAN, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (DN 8, 9, 12, 15,
17, 18) and Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment (DN 21, 27).1 For the reasons stated
below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ motions.
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a pro se civil rights case filed by Amena LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”) on behalf of herself
and her minor children, M.S. and D.L., and by LeBlanc’s boyfriend, Roy J. Majors (“Majors”).2
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 alleging
Defendants conspired to violate their constitutional rights when an investigation into
dependency, abuse, and neglect allegations led to the removal of the children from LeBlanc’s
custody.
(Am. Compl., DN 11).
Plaintiffs have brought suit against various government
organizations and employees for their role in the investigation, court proceedings, or removal of
the children. Defendants include: Kentucky Cabinet for Family and Health Services (“CHFS”)
1
Plaintiffs filed two identical summary judgment motions; however, only one contained a
certificate of service.
2
It is not clear from the pleadings why Majors believes he has standing to bring this action. He
is neither the father of LeBlanc’s children nor was he a party to the underlying juvenile court
cases.
1
and its employees Cindy Branstetter (“Branstetter”) and Aleda Hagan (“Hagan”); the Warren
County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”); Assistant Warren County Attorney Leslie Bucklew; Warren
County Family Court Judge Catherine Holderfield; the Montgomery County (Tennessee)
Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”); and the Tennessee Department of Children Services (“DCS”).
Plaintiffs seek $500 million dollars and “an injunction on all rulings made by Hon. Catherine
Holderfield regarding Plaintiff Amena LeBlanc’s Warren County family court case.” (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 110-11).
Defendants (excluding MCSO, and Branstetter and Hagan in their individual capacities)
each filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs filed Motions for Summary Judgment against MCSO
for failure to answer. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment against Branstetter, Hagan, and
Bucklew for failure to answer in their individual capacities. These matters are ripe for decision.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may, before pleading, move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There are two categories of motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1): facial attacks and factual attacks. See
United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). A facial attack challenges the court's
subject matter jurisdiction based upon the sufficiency of the pleadings. In considering a facial
attack, a court will consider the material allegations of fact set forth in the complaint as being
true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. A factual
attack challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction based upon the facts as alleged in the
pleadings; instead of presuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true the court will
weigh the conflicting evidence to determine whether proper jurisdiction exists. See id.
2
In most circumstances, a plaintiff bears the burden to survive Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682
(1946). Indeed, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). With that being said, pro se pleadings
are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). The Court need not, however, abrogate the basic
pleading standards of a motion to dismiss when considering a pro se pleading. See Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” and is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). When considering a
motion to dismiss, courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Total Benefits Planning
Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615
F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
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III.
A.
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
1.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, and the
Younger abstention doctrine.
Plaintiffs’ request for this Court to issue “an injunction on all rulings made by Hon.
Catherine Holderfield regarding Plaintiff Amena LeBlanc’s Warren County family court case” is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Am. Comp. 36). Under this doctrine, “lower federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court proceedings.”
Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted)
(citation omitted). Only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court
judgments. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine acts as a limitation on
federal courts’ jurisdiction, “if the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court
are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.
To determine whether a claim is inextricably intertwined, “the federal court must analyze
whether the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court
decision or void its ruling.” In re Singleton, 230 B.R. 533, 536-37 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1065
(8th Cir. 1997)). In a similar case, this Court concluded that a family’s request to enjoin a family
court’s decision to remove two children was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Evans v.
Downey, No. 1:15-CV-00117-GNS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 23,
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2016). Here, Plaintiffs’ request for this Court to issue injunctive relief would be equivalent to
overturning the state court’s decision. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are therefore denied.
This Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the domestic relations exception
to federal jurisdiction. See Evans, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *4. “Generally, federal
courts have no jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. Rather, state courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over these matters.” Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 54 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992)). “Although this domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction does not apply to a civil action that merely has domestic
relations overtones, federal courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and the
suit is actually concerned with domestic relation issues.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In
other words, just because a plaintiff “styles his claim as a civil rights violation [it] does not
change this calculus.” See Rigney v. Hesen, No. 3:12-CV-541-R, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96110,
at *14 (W.D. Ky. July 9, 2013) (citation omitted). In determining whether the domestic relations
exception applies, “we must focus on the remedy that the plaintiff seeks: Does the plaintiff seek
an issuance or modification or enforcement of a divorce, alimony, or child-custody decrees?”
Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In this
case, Plaintiffs seek a modification of a child custody decree, which is unquestionably a domestic
relations determination. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the domestic relations exception.
Plaintiffs’ claims must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the Younger abstention doctrine. “Younger abstention requires federal courts to abstain from
granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial
proceedings.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971)). In Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2008), the court held:
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Three factors determine whether a federal court should abstain from interfering in a state
court action: (1) whether the underlying proceedings constitute an ongoing judicial
proceeding, (2) whether the proceedings implicate an important state interest, and (3)
whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise a constitutional
challenge.
Id. at 775 (citation omitted).
Just as in Evans, this Court must abstain pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. See
Evans, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *4. In regards to the first issue, Plaintiffs’ state court
case is pending before the Kentucky Court of Appeals. As to the second issue, “the Sixth Circuit
has recognized that the realm of domestic relations is an important state interest.” Id. (citing Zak
v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Lastly, the birth mother may appeal Judge
Holderfield’s decision and has done so. KRS 22A.020. All three factors, therefore, weigh
against the Plaintiffs which warrants dismissal under the Younger abstention doctrine.
2.
Personal Jurisdiction
Even if this Court were to have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court would lack personal
jurisdiction over DCS. KRS 454.210, Kentucky’s long-arm statute, sets forth nine instances of
conduct which permit Kentucky courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants. Any person whose activities fall outside these categories cannot be subjected to
long-arm jurisdiction in Kentucky. See Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d
51, 56 (Ky. 2011). Applying long-arm jurisdiction consists of a two-step process:
First, review must proceed under KRS 454.210 to determine if the cause of action
arises from conduct or activity of the defendant that fits into one of the statute’s
enumerated categories. If not, then in personam jurisdiction may not be
exercised. When that initial step results in a determination that the statute is
applicable, a second step of analysis must be taken to determine if exercising
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant offends his federal due
process rights.
Id. at 57.
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DCS’s alleged constitutional violations occurred when it removed D.L. from his
grandmother’s home in Clarksville, Tennessee. This claim could only reasonably fall under the
subsection of Kentucky’s long-arm statute which provides:
A [Kentucky] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person’s . . . [c]ausing
tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth, provided that the tortious
injury occurring in this Commonwealth arises out of the doing or soliciting of
business or a persistent course of conduct or derivation of substantial revenue
within the Commonwealth . . . .
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(4).
DCS is a Tennessee state agency whose activities are limited to the State of Tennessee.
See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-5-102(a). There is no evidence indicating that it “regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth . . . .” KRS
454.210(2)(a)(4). Further, the actions allegedly taken by DCS consist of removing D.L. from a
residence in Tennessee. Under these circumstances, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
DCS, and the claims against DCS must be dismissed.
3.
Service of Process
Even if this Court were to have jurisdiction over Defendants, Plaintiffs claims must be
dismissed for failure to perfect service. Rule 12(b)(5) permits the dismissal of a complaint when
a Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require that “[a] state, municipal corporation, or any other state created
government organization that is subject to suit must be served by: (A) delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the
7
manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a
defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Plaintiffs failed to serve DCS and WCSO under either
method.
When serving DCS, an agency of Tennessee, Plaintiffs neither served the Governor of
Tennessee nor did they serve a copy of the summons and complaint in the manner prescribed by
state law. Tennessee law requires service “[u]pon the state of Tennessee or an agency thereof,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the attorney general of the state or
to any assistant attorney general.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(6). Although the docket indicates that
Plaintiffs issued a summons to DCS, they did not actually serve the Tennessee Attorney General.
Plaintiffs have also failed to properly serve WCSO as prescribed in the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(j)(2).
WCSO is an agency of Warren County; therefore, Kentucky law
requires that “[s]ervice shall be made upon a county by serving the county judge or, if he is
absent from the county, the county attorney.” Ky. CR 4.04(7). Here, Plaintiffs merely mailed
the summons and Complaint to the County Attorney’s office, but did not serve the county judge
or show that the judge was absent.
Next, Plaintiffs improperly served Judge Holderfield, Bucklew, Hagan, and Branstetter in
their individual capacities. Kentucky law provides:
Service shall be made upon an individual within this Commonwealth…by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint (or other initiating
document) to him personally or, if acceptance is refused by offering personal
delivery to such person, or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint (or other initiating document) to an agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process for such an individual.
Ky. CR 4.04(2). Plaintiffs neither served these individual Defendants personally, nor did an
authorized person accept service on their behalf. Instead, the summonses and complaints were
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mailed to their offices. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to properly serve these Defendants in
accordance to the rules of civil procedure.
4.
Immunity
In addition to this Court’s lack of jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ failure to properly serve
Defendants, Plaintiffs have brought suit against multiple parties who are immune from liability
in this case. Specially, Judge Holderfield, Bucklew, and CHFS and its social workers are
immune from suit.
First, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge Holderfield in her
official capacity, and absolute judicial immunity bars claims against her individually. Bennett v.
Thorburn, 843 F.2d 1390, 1988 WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir. 1988). “State judges enjoy absolute
immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Absolute immunity may be defeated in two instances: “[f]irst, a
judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)). The alleged constitutional violations stem from actions
taken by Judge Holderfield as a family court judge; therefore, the first exception does apply
because clearly Judge Holderfield was acting in her judicial capacity.
Second, Judge
Holderfield’s decisions were made in a custody removal case, which is the exact kind of case to
be heard in Family Court. Thus, neither exception to judicial immunity applies and Judge
Holderfield is immune from suit.
Plaintiffs have brought suit against Bucklew as an Assistant Warren County Attorney.
These claims are also barred by immunity. “State prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil
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liability when acting within the scope of their prosecutorial duties.” Evans v. Downey, No. 1:15CV-00117-GNS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *6 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
420 (1976)). Specifically, the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman held “that in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages under § 1983.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. A functional approach is used to determine
whether a prosecutor is acting within the scope of his duties. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
491 (1991). In Burns, the Supreme Court concluded that absolute prosecutorial immunity is
justified “only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings,
not every litigation-inducing conduct.” Id. at 494. Thus:
[A]bsolute prosecutorial immunity protects only those acts falling within a
prosecutor’s role as advocate for the state and intimately associated with the
judicial process and not for administrative or investigative acts antecedent or
extraneous to the judicial process. Investigative acts undertaken in direct
preparation of judicial proceedings, including the professional evaluation of
evidence, warrant absolute immunity, whereas other acts, such as the preliminary
gathering of evidence that may ripen into a prosecution are too attenuated to the
judicial process to afford absolute protection.
Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1445 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 273 (1993)).
Bucklew’s alleged constitutional violations relate to his search of county and state
records to see if LeBlanc had any outstanding arrest warrants. Plaintiffs argue that these actions
are outside the scope of his prosecutorial duties because the records search was not relevant to
the determination of abuse and neglect. To the contrary, research into the criminal history of the
litigants in family courts is clearly relevant to an evaluation of the charges. Plaintiffs also argue
that Bucklew is not entitled to absolute immunity because he was acting as an investigator as
opposed to a prosecutor.
As previously stated, “investigative acts undertaken in direct
preparation of judicial proceeding . . . warrant absolute immunity . . . .” Id. However, in the
10
event that the state prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity, qualified immunity “provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Burns, 500 U.S at 495. Here, there is no indication of either incompetence or intentional legal
violations; therefore, Bucklew is immune from suit.
Plaintiffs also allege constitutional violations against CHFS and its social workers in their
official and individual capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims against
CHFS. As this Court has previously held:
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state and its
agencies may not be sued in federal court, regardless of the relief sought, unless
the state has waived its immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated states’
immunity. CHFS is an arm of the state. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has not
waived its immunity, and in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override
the traditional sovereign immunity of the states. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims
against CHFS cannot proceed. Moreover, CHFS is not a person subject to suit
under § 1983.
Fleet v. Commonwealth Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., No. 3:15-CV-00476-JHM, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40165, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2016) (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted). Since CHFS is immune, any claims against its employees in their official capacity are
also barred because “although officials literally are persons, an official capacity suit is a suit
against the official’s office and thus against the state itself.” Evans, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82237, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989)). While Hagan and Brantsetter, who are social workers, are not yet before the court in
their individual capacities, they are immune from personal liability.3 “Employees of CHFS are
still entitled to absolute immunity even in an individual capacity when performing tasks that are
intimately associated with judicial proceedings determining child welfare.” Evans, 2016 U.S.
3
Although the Complaint purports to assert claims against Hagan and Branstetter in both their
official and individual capacities, Plaintiffs have not properly served either Defendant in her
individual capacity.
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Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). See also Pittman
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 2011).
Hagan’s investigation into the dependency, abuse, and neglect allegations, including her visit to
the parent’s home and testimony at trial, represent precisely the sort of conduct social workers
are expected to perform in order to protect the health and well-being of children. Even if Hagan
intentionally made misrepresentations in her report, she would still be entitled to absolute
immunity. Evans, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82237, at *3.
Lastly, DCS is also immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity. As previously stated a state agency may not be sued in federal court, regardless of the
relief sought, unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has overridden it.
See Fleet, No. 3:15-CV-00476-JHM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40165, at *8. Tennessee has not
waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). “[S]ection 20-13-102(a) of
the Tennessee Code, which expressly prohibits any suits in state court against the state or where
state treasury funds are potentially involved, also extends impliedly to suits brought in federal
court.” Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Therefore,
suits against DCS, an agency of the state of Tennessee, are barred by sovereign immunity. See
Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the “Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services . . . [is] the State” for sovereign immunity purposes (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted)).
5.
Failure to State a Claim of a Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242
Plaintiffs have also asserted claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242,
which are penal statutes. Generally, there is no private right of action for violations of criminal
statutes. Am. Postal Workers Union v. Indep. Postal Sys. of Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir.
1973). “Equally important is the firmly established principle that criminal statutes can only be
12
enforced by the proper authorities of the United States Government and a private party has no
right to enforce these sanctions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bass Angler
Sportsman’s Soc’y of Am. v. U.S. Steel, 324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (M.D. Ala. 1971)). Specifically,
the Sixth Circuit has concluded that private citizens may not recover under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and
242. United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2003); Kafele v. Frank &
Wooldridge Co., 108 F. App’x 307, 308 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if Plaintiffs were to bring their
claim under the proper civil conspiracy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, it would fail because Plaintiffs
make no allegations “that the conspiracy was motivated by racial, or other class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999). For
these reasons, Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
B.
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment
Finally, Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment against MCSO, and Branstetter,
Hagan and Bucklew, in their individual capacities for their failure to respond to the Complaint.
Not only is the issue denied as moot, but this Court must deny Plaintiffs’ motions because
Defendants have not yet been properly served; therefore, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over these Defendants. See Miles v. Bottom, No. 5:15-CV-126-JMH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145878, at *4-5 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 28, 2015) (federal courts cannot acquire personal jurisdiction
over a defendant unless the defendant is properly served with process) (citing Robertson v. R.R.
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925)). “Absent personal jurisdiction, the court cannot give the
defendant the notice and an opportunity to be heard that due process requires, let alone grant
summary judgment against them.” Id. at *5. In order to properly serve MCSO, Tennessee law
requires service “upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
13
chief executive officer of the county, or if absent from the county, to the county attorney if there
is one designated.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(7). Plaintiffs simply mailed the summons and
complaint to MCSO.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs also failed to perfect service against
Branstetter, Hagan, and Bucklew, in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment must be denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss (DN 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 18) are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary
Judgment (DN 21, 27) are DENIED AS MOOT.
Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
June 27, 2017
cc:
counsel of record
Plaintiffs, pro se
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