Creek v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl on 10/17/2017. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDER that judgment is GRANTED for the Commissioner. cc:counsel (JWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-00040-HBB

ROY L. CREEK

PLAINTIFF

VS.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM, OPINION,
AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Plaintiff Roy L. Creek seeking judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the
Plaintiff (DN 13) and Defendant (DN 14) have filed a Fact and Law Summary.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case,
including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 11). By Order entered May
16, 2017 (DN 12), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a
written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits
on July 14, 2014 (Tr. 313, 323). Plaintiff alleged that he became disabled on September 28,
2012 as a result of chronic back pain, glaucoma, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure,

high blood pressure, high cholesterol, COPD, diabetes, neuropathy pain in all extremities, sleep
apnea, depression, anxiety, and difficulty concentrating and focusing (Tr. 351). Administrative
Law Judge Richard Guida (“ALJ”) conducted a video hearing on October 27, 2015 from
Baltimore, Maryland. Plaintiff appeared remotely from Bowling Green, Kentucky and was
represented by attorney Mary Burchett-Bower.

Also present and testifying was impartial

vocational expert Samuel Edelmann.
In a decision dated December 10, 2015, the ALJ evaluated this adult disability claim
pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr.
12-31). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since September 28, 2012, the alleged onset date (Tr. 17).

At the second step, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s coronary artery disease, hypertension, degenerative disc disease,
degenerative joint disease, diabetes, neuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, depressive disorder,
and borderline intellectual functioning are “severe” impairments within the meaning of the
regulations (Tr. 17). Also at the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s glaucoma, sleep
apnea, and COPD are “non-severe” impairments within the meaning of the regulations (Tr. 18).
At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr.
18).
At the fourth step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform
a limited range of light work (Tr. 19).

More specifically, the ALJ assigned Plaintiff the

following limitations:
[H]e can only occasionally push or pull, cannot climb ladders, can
occasionally climb stairs, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch, and crawl,
can engage in frequent bilateral handling and fingering, requires
the option to sit or stand at will without leaving the workstation,
2

and cannot have concentrated exposure to temperature extremes,
unprotected heights, and moving machinery. In addition, he is
limited to performing simple, routine tasks.
(Tr. 19). Relying on testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable
to perform his past relevant work as a truck driver (Tr. 23).
The ALJ proceeded to the fifth step where he considered Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and past work experience as well as testimony from the vocational
expert (Tr. 23-24). The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing a significant number of
jobs that exist in the national economy (Tr. 24). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has
not been under a “disability,” as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 28, 2012
through the date of the decision (Tr. 24).
Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision (Tr.
9). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 1-6).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard of Review
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final
decision of the Commissioner are supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied.
Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial
evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the
challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton, 2
F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.

3

1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court “may not try the case de novo,
nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” Cohen v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383,
387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the
ALJ’s decision (Tr. 1-6). At that point, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality
of the Commissioner's decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not
the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ
rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Commissioner’s Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II
Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The
term “disability” is defined as an
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12)
months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a),
416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
(6th Cir. 1990).

4

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential
evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See “Evaluation of disability in general,” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1)

Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2)

Does the claimant have a medically determinable
impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the
duration requirement and significantly limits his or her
ability to do basic work activities?

3)

Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within
Appendix 1?

4)

Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to
return to his or her past relevant work?

5)

Does the claimant's residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience allow him or her to
perform a significant number of jobs in the national
economy?

Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim at the fifth step. For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, and Plaintiff's claim is denied.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff first alleges error at the second step, arguing the ALJ erred in failing to find
Somatoform disorder to be a severe impairment (DN 13 at PageID # 1417-18).

Plaintiff

contends that Plaintiff's orthopedist, Dr. Singer, completed a medical source opinion that
indicated severe somatic pain (Tr. 1258-61). Plaintiff contends that, because the ALJ did not
account for the pain disorder when assessing Plaintiff's RFC, this case should be remanded so
that the ALJ can properly account for the effects of the somatic disorder.
Defendant responds that Plaintiff has failed to prove the somatic disorder is a medically
determinable impairment (Tr. 1429-30).

Defendant argues that, while Dr. Singer's report
5

indicated a potential somatic disorder, it is the only reference to any such disorder in the entire
record, and it is unsupported by any other objective findings. Additionally, Defendant points out
a previous note by Dr. Singer indicating that Plaintiff suffered from facet joint disease and facet
oriented pain, but observing that facet nerve blocks significantly relieved Plaintiff's symptoms
(DN 14 at PageID 1430). Dr. Singer noted "exaggerated" pain at that visit, but he did not
attribute those pain symptoms to a somatic pain disorder (Id.). Finally, Defendant notes that
Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation but did not mention any sort of preoccupation
with pain symptoms that might be indicative of a somatic disorder (Id.).
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ committed reversible error when he improperly discounted
the opinions of Plaintiff's treating orthopedist, Dr. Singer, and Plaintiff's primary care physician,
Dr. Dils. Plaintiff argues that, as treating physicians, Drs. Dils and Singer's opinions are entitled
to controlling weight unless the opinions are not supported by the objective medical record, and
unless the ALJ gives good reasons for his or her decisions.

Defendant responds that the

objective medical record does not support the extent of limitations recommended by Drs. Singer
and Dils (DN 14 at PageID # 1432). Defendant notes that physical examination revealed
reduced range of lumbar motion but also revealed that Plaintiff was neurologically intact (Id.).
Moreover, Defendant contends Dr. Singer opined there was no objective support for Plaintiff's
allegations of pain, and while Dr. Singer suggested the possibility of a somatic pain disorder, this
opinion is not supported anywhere else in the record (Id.).
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ failed to give specific reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's
subjective allegations of pain (DN 13 at PageID # 1422-23). Plaintiff argues the ALJ offered a
boiler plate summation of Plaintiff's credibility, and the problem is exacerbated by the ALJ's
failure to consider the alleged Somatoform disorder.

6

Defendant responds that an ALJ's

credibility determination is entitled to great deference from this Court because the ALJ is
uniquely situated to observe Plaintiff's demeanor (DN 14 at PageID # 1433). Defendant further
contends that, while the ALJ did not provide extensive analysis with regard to his opinion of
Plaintiff's credibility at the hearing, the decision should not be remanded because the ALJ
provided substantial evidence from other portions of the record to support his credibility findings
(Id. at 1434).
Next, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in relying on a prior RFC from a 2012
administrative decision (DN 13 at PageID # 1423-24). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the medical
evidence of a bone fragment and bone-on-bone arthropathy in the L5-S1 facet joint demonstrate
a substantial change in condition justifying a deviation from the prior RFC (Id. at PageID #
1423). The Defendant responds that, while the ALJ ultimately decided not to deviate from the
prior RFC, he first engaged in a full review of the medical record, including the most recent
diagnostic findings, treatment notes, and physician opinions (DN 14 at PageID # 1435). The
Defendant argues the latest findings are consistent with the adopted RFC.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert cannot actually determine whether
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform
because the vocational expert made his determination pursuant to a faulty hypothetical built on a
faulty RFC. Defendant responds, in short, that the RFC was properly assessed for the reasons
discussed previously, so the hypothetical was also proper.
DISCUSSION
A. SOMATOFORM DISORDER
The undersigned will first address Plaintiff's claim that the ALJ erred in not considering
Somatoform disorder to be a severe impairment. At the second step in the sequential evaluation

7

process, Plaintiff must demonstrate he has a "severe" impairment.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam). To satisfy this burden, Plaintiff must show he suffers from a "medically determinable"
physical or mental condition that satisfies the duration requirement (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509,
416.909) and "significantly limits" his ability to do one or more basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) and (c); Social Security Ruling 96-3p; Social
Security Ruling 96-4p; Higgs, 880 F.2d at 863. Alternatively, Plaintiff must show he suffers
from a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c).
To satisfy the "medically determinable" requirement, Plaintiff must present objective
medical evidence (i.e., signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings) that demonstrates the existence
of a physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.908; Social Security Ruling 96-4p, 1996
WL 374187, at *1; Social Security Ruling 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181, at *2. Thus, symptoms and
subjective complaints alone are not sufficient to establish the existence of a "medically
determinable" physical or mental impairment. Social Security Ruling 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187,
at *1. Finally, to satisfy the "duration" requirement the impairment "must have lasted or must be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. Again, the
claimant must present objective evidence to satisfy the "duration" requirement.
Here, Plaintiff alleges error on the basis of one note in Dr. Singer's medical source
statement suggesting that Somatoform disorder may be the cause of Plaintiff's exaggerated pain
symptoms (Tr. 1261).

But Plaintiff cannot satisfy either the medically determinable or

durational requirements. A treating physician's diagnosis should receive substantial deference
when considering whether a claimant has shown a severe impairment and complete deference

8

when that diagnosis is not contradicted. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). However, this medical source statement is only part of the evidence that the
ALJ considers, and the Sixth Circuit has said in no uncertain terms that an opinion in a medical
source statement unsupported by objective findings does not necessitate deference. Buxton v.
Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001).
Because no objective testing accompanies the lone statement concerning somatic pain in
Dr. Singer's opinion, Plaintiff has not satisfied the "medically determinable" requirement, and the
ALJ did not err in his decision to exclude Somatoform disorder from Plaintiff's list of severe
impairments.

It is also worth noting that the medical source statement at issue is dated

November 1, 2015 (Tr. 1257). This is mere weeks before the ALJ issued his decision in
Plaintiff's case (Tr. 12). Dr. Singer's note makes no mention of how long Plaintiff has suffered
from this alleged Somatoform disorder nor how long he may continue to suffer. As a result,
Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the durational requirement with objective evidence. For all
these reasons, the ALJ's decision to exclude Somatoform disorder from Plaintiff's list of severe
impairments is well-supported by substantial evidence. This claim is denied.
B. DRS. SINGER AND DILS
The next issue is whether the ALJ improperly discounted the weight afforded to the
medical source statements of treating physician Dr. Dils and treating orthopedist Dr. Singer. The
Sixth Circuit has provided the following comprehensive explanation regarding the standards for
weighing medical opinions:
As a general matter, an opinion from a medical source who has
examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a source
who has not performed an examination (a “nonexamining source”),
id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1), and an opinion from a medical
source who regularly treats the claimant (a “treating source”) is
afforded more weight than that from a source who has examined
9

the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment relationship (a
“nontreating source”), id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2). In other
words, “[t]he regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests
for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion
and the individual become weaker.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p,
1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996).
The source of the opinion therefore dictates the process by which
the Commissioner accords it weight. Treating-source opinions
must be given “controlling weight” if two conditions are met: (1)
the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques”; and (2) the opinion “is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case
record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the Commissioner does
not give a treating-source opinion controlling weight, then the
opinion is weighed based on the length, frequency, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship, id., as well as the treating
source's area of specialty and the degree to which the opinion is
consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant
evidence, id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
The Commissioner is required to provide “good reasons” for
discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. Id. §
404.1527(c)(2). These reasons must be “supported by the evidence
in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”
Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec.
Admin. July 2, 1996). This procedural requirement “ensures that
the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful
review of the ALJ's application of the rule.” Wilson v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.2004).
On the other hand, opinions from nontreating and nonexamining
sources are never assessed for “controlling weight.”
The
Commissioner instead weighs these opinions based on the
examining relationship (or lack thereof), specialization,
consistency, and supportability, but only if a treating-source
opinion is not deemed controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Other factors “which tend to support or contradict the opinion”
may be considered in assessing any type of medical opinion. Id. §
404.1527(c)(6).
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013). In this instance, the
commissioner does not dispute that Drs. Singer and Dils were treating physicians. Thus, the
10

issue becomes whether the ALJ offered good reasons for his decision to discount their opinions.
In order to constitute "good reasons," the explanation offered by the ALJ must be "supported by
the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent
reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the
reasons for that weight." Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting SSR 96-2p).
The purpose for this rule is to ensure a claimant understands how and why the Commissioner
reached the decision it did. A claimant could be understandably bewildered to be informed by
their doctor that they are disabled, only to have this assessment contradicted by an administrative
bureaucracy. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
Beginning with Dr. Dils, the ALJ in this case explained in detail why he discounted the
treating source opinion. For example, the ALJ noted that where the medical source statement
asked for "clinical findings and objective signs" to support his opinion, Dr. Dils wrote nothing
(Tr. 23). The ALJ noted that Dr. Dils restrictions are inconsistent with the evidence of record,
including an MRI of the lumbar spine (Id.). Finally, the ALJ identified inconsistencies between
Dr. Dils opinion and the neurologist, the consultative examiner, and office notes from Dr. Dils
own treatment of Plaintiff (Id.). It is clear to the undersigned what weight the ALJ assigned Dr.
Dils' opinion, and it is clear why he gave the opinion little weight. The ALJ's assessment is
therefore supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable law.
With regard to Dr. Singer, the ALJ offered similarly good reasons for discounting the
weight afforded his opinion. For instance, under the heading marked "clinical findings and
objective signs," Dr. Singer wrote "severe pain exaggeration and response to minimal stimuli, no
relief with variety of treatment" (Id.). The ALJ further pointed out that Dr. Singer stated that the
source of Plaintiff's pain is "not objectively notable" (Id.). The ALJ noted that Dr. Singer

11

referred to potential somatic pain symptoms, but provided no evidence, objective or otherwise,
for this opinion (Id.). Again, the ALJ offered good reasons for discounting Dr. Singer's opinion.
His decision was supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable law. This
claim is therefore denied.
C. PLAINTIFF'S SUBJECTIVE ALLEGATIONS OF PAIN
Plaintiff's next argument is that the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff's subjective
allegations of pain. In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the Administrative
Law Judge must necessarily consider the claimant's subjective allegations and make credibility
findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Social Security Ruling 96-7p. A claimant's statement
that they are experiencing pain or other symptoms will not, taken alone, establish that they are
disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show the existence of a
medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain and/or other
symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). In determining whether a claimant
suffers from debilitating pain and/or other symptoms, the two-part test set forth in Duncan v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986), applies.

First the

Administrative Law Judge must examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition. If there is, then the Administrative Law Judge must determine:
"(1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from
the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such severity
that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain." Id. When, as in this
case, the ALJ believes the reported pain and/or other symptoms suggest an impairment of greater
severity than can be shown by objective medical evidence, the ALJ will consider other
information and factors which may be relevant to the degree of pain alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§

12

404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). These factors include, among others, the claimant's daily activity
(20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i)) and inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony
and the medical evidence (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4) and 416.929(c)(4)).
In this case, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's credibility finding, but the undersigned
finds it well-supported. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff's use of a cane is not credible because
multiple doctors described his gait as normal or noted he could walk without difficulty (Tr. 21).
Additionally, the ALJ noted a visit with Dr. Singer wherein Dr. Singer described Plaintiff's
"general appearance as one of exaggerated pain, . . . but he remains neurologically intact in both
lower extremities" (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff was suspected of drug
diversion when he came up thirty pills short at an appointment and was subsequently not
permitted to continue in a pain treatment program (Id.). Moreover, The ALJ is in a unique
position to judge the credibility of a claimant, and this Court is reluctant to disturb these findings.
See Gooch v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). The ALJ
supported his credibility determination with substantial evidence, and this claim is denied.
D. THE PRIOR RFC
The next issue is whether the ALJ erred in adopting the RFC from a prior ALJ's decision.
In Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Sixth Circuit held the doctrine of res judicata applies
to the residual functional capacity finding in a final decision of the Commissioner. 126 F.3d
837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1997). For this rule to apply, there must be (1) a final decision of the
Commissioner; (2) an application for benefits addressing a later unadjudicated period of time;
and (3) an inability by the Commissioner to show the claimant's condition has improved. Id.
The Social Security Administration subsequently issued Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6), directing
Administrative Law Judges adjudicating a claim for a subsequent unadjudicated period to adopt

13

the residual functional capacity finding in an earlier final decision unless there "is new and
material evidence relating to such finding or there has been a change in the law, regulations or
rulings affecting the finding or the method for arriving at the finding."
Here, while the ALJ eventually adopted the prior RFC, it was not without a thorough
review of new evidence and a reasoned determination that the Plaintiff's condition has not
materially changed (Tr. 20). For instance, the ALJ noted an MRI from December, 2013 showing
only mild to moderate abnormality (Id.).

And, the ALJ added carpal tunnel syndrome to

Plaintiff's list of severe impairments based on the results of an EMG study from May of 2012
(Tr. 17). The ALJ ultimately concluded that the new evidence did not materially alter the prior
RFC. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable law.
This claim is therefore denied.
E. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
The final issue is whether the ALJ's hypothetical question reflected an inaccurate RFC
which would thereby preclude the vocational expert from making a true statement regarding
whether there exist jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform. Because the undersigned has reviewed the ALJ's RFC finding and found no issue with
is conclusions, this claim is necessarily without merit and is therefore denied.

14

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is GRANTED for the
Commissioner.

October 17, 2017

Copies:

Counsel

15