Anderson v. Vaughn et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 5/25/2017; Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against all Defendants and his claim for injunctive relief are DISMISSED. Within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint (as set forth). Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint (as set forth) within the allotted amount of time, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff should also submit a completed summons form for each named Defendant within the same 30-day period. Clerk of Court DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a 1983 complaint form with this case number and the word "Amended" affixed thereto, as well as six blank summons forms. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; Simpson County Attorney (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT BOWLING GREEN
THOMAS ANDERSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-00069-GNS

ERIC VAUGHN (JAILER) et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action brought by a convicted prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff Thomas Anderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This
matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 594
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed in part, but
Plaintiff will be allowed to amend his complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action against three Defendants in their official and individual
capacities: Simpson County Detention Center (SCDC) Jailer Eric Vaughn; SCDC Deputy Jailer
Brent DeWeese; and SCDC Major Tim Phillips.
At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he was incarcerated at SCDC.1 In his complaint,
he states that his incarceration at SCDC began on March 5, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that he has
suffered from seizures for almost four years and has been diagnosed with “bipolar disorder and
depression.” He states that while housed at SCDC he completed several medical requests “to get
help for [his] seizures and [his] mental health.” He indicates that, despite these requests, he did
not receive medical attention for either condition. He then writes: “I’ve been having bad mental

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The Court’s records indicate that Plaintiff has since been transferred to the Logan County Detention Center
(DN 10).

problems, and it’s continually getting worse. I have had several seizures since I’ve been, and yet
nothings being done to treat me medically.” He continues: “I have filed grievance after
grievance and no relief yet.” He concludes his complaint by stating: “This facility is denying me
medical and mental health treatment.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the
form of a transfer to a medical facility.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. In order to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, while liberal, this
standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia

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Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court’s duty “does not
require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. An Eighth Amendment claim requires a plaintiff to
prove two distinct components - one objective and one subjective. First, the alleged deprivation
must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” i.e., the “official’s act or omission must result in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970)

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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the official must have been
“deliberately indifferent” to the inmate’s health or safety. Id.
A. Official-Capacity Claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)).
Thus, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants are actually against Simpson
County. See, e.g., Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that civil
rights suit against county clerk of courts in his official capacity was equivalent of suing clerk’s
employer, the county); Griffin v. S. Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:12CV-P174-M, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17770, at *13-14 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2013).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality or private corporation is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The municipality is only liable when an
official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights. See
Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Monell involved a municipal
corporation, but every circuit to consider the issue has extended the holding to private
corporations as well.”). Municipalities cannot can be held liable under § 1983 for torts
committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat
superior. Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999).

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Because Plaintiff does not claim that any alleged constitutional deprivation was the result
of a Simpson County custom or policy, his official-capacity claims will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Individual-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff also sues Defendants in their individual capacities. However, he does not
mention them in the body of his complaint or explain how they were personally involved in the
denial of his medical and mental health treatment. To the extent that Plaintiff is suing these
Defendants based upon their supervisory authority at SCDC, his claims fails because the doctrine
of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in §1983 actions to
impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at
691; Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Rather, “[a] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676; Loy v. Sexton, 132 F. App’x 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In order for supervisory
liability to attach, a plaintiff must prove that the official ‘did more than play a passive role in the
alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the goings on.’”) (quoting Bass v. Robinson,
167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)
(stating that supervisory liability “must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot
be based upon ‘a mere failure to act’”) (quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206
(6th Cir. 1998)). “[S]imple awareness of employees’ misconduct does not lead to supervisor
liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996)).

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Plaintiff also fails to name as Defendants any other individuals who were personally
involved in the alleged denial of his medical care. Thus, as written, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, the Court will allow Plaintiff the
opportunity to amend his complaint to name as Defendants the individuals who were personally
involved in the alleged denial of treatment for his medical and mental health conditions.2
C. Injunctive Relief
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of “transfer to a
medical facility.” However, an inmate’s claim for injunctive relief regarding the conditions of
his confinement becomes moot due to his release from confinement or transfer to another
facility. See Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a prisoner’s
claims for injunctive relief became moot after he was transferred to another facility); Kensu v.
Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). Thus, because Plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated at SCDC, his claim for injunctive relief is moot and will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity
claims against all Defendants and his claim for injunctive relief are DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which names
as Defendants the individuals at SCDC who allegedly violated his rights by denying him
medical and mental health treatment. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff should explain

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“Under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject
to dismissal under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.
2013).

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how each Defendant personally took actions that allegedly caused the deprivation of his
constitutional rights.
The Court will conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to
§ 1915A. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint with the above information
within the allotted amount of time, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff should also submit a completed summons form for each named Defendant
within the same 30-day period.3
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 complaint form with this
case number and the word “Amended” affixed thereto, as well as six blank summons forms.
Date:

May 25, 2017

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Simpson County Attorney
4416.011

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Regarding the completion of the summons form, Plaintiff must: (1) prepare a summons for each Defendant sued;
(2) write or type Defendant’s name and address on the summons in the space provided; (3) write or type Plaintiff’s
name in the space provided; (4) do not fill in any other part of the summons form and do not mail the summons to
any of the defendants.

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