Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. et al v. Hewgley
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 10/5/2017. Petitioners' Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 3 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Respondent is ENJOINED from proceeding against Petitioners in the State Court Action, except for the wrongful death claims. The parties to this action are COMPELLED to arbitrate all claims (except the wrongful death claims), which are the subject of the State Court Action. Counsel SHALL promptly notify the Simpson Circuit Court of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (DN 8 ) is GRANTED IN PART as to the wrongful death claim only and DENIED IN PART as to all other claims. This case is STAYED until the conclusion of the ordered arbitration. cc: Counsel (CDR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-00127-GNS
PREFERRED CARE OF DELAWARE, INC.;
FRANKLIN HEALTH FACILITIES, L.P.
d/b/a FRANKLIN-SIMPSON NURSING &
PREFERRED CARE PARTNERS MANAGEMENT
GROUP, LP; PCPMG, LLC;
KENTUCKY PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LLC;
and FRANKLIN HEALTH FACILITIES GP, LLC
TAMMY HEWGLEY, as Administratrix of the
ESTATE OF JUNE HEWGLEY, Deceased
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 3) and
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (DN 8). The motions have been fully briefed by the parties and
are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons outlined below, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CLAIMS
On January 15, 2017, a Warren District Court jury determined that June Hewgley
(“Hewgley”) was wholly disabled and incapable of managing her personal affairs and financial
resources. (Pet. Ex. C, at 1, DN 1-3). The Warren District Court then appointed the Kentucky
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”) to act as Hewgley’s guardian. (Pet. Ex. C., at
For the period of time—exclusive of hospitalizations—from January 16, 2015, to July 18,
2016, Hewgley was a resident of the Franklin-Simpson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center in
Franklin, Kentucky, which is owned and operated by Franklin Health Facilities GP, LLC and
other entities.1 (Pet. Ex. A, ¶ 3, DN 1-1). At the time of her admission, Mark Smith (“Smith”),
who is a representative of CHFS and was acting as Hewgley’s guardian, executed the necessary
admission paperwork, which included a document entitled “Alternative Dispute Resolution
Agreement” (“Arbitration Agreement”). (Pet. Ex. B, at 5, DN 1-2).
In relevant part, the
Arbitration Agreement provided that “[t]he Parties voluntarily agree that any disputes covered by
this Agreement (herein after referred to as ‘Covered Disputes’) that may arise between the
Parties shall be resolved exclusively by an ADR process that shall include mediation and, where
mediation does not successfully resolve the dispute, binding arbitration.” (Pet. Ex. B, ¶ 3). As
defined, the term “Covered Disputes” included any dispute arising from or related to care
rendered by Preferred Care. (Pet. Ex. B, ¶ 4). The Agreement also defined the term “Resident”
[A]ll persons whose claim is or may be derived through or on behalf of the
Resident, all persons entitled to bring a claim on behalf of the Resident, including
any personal representative, responsible party, guardian, executor, administrator,
legal representative, agent or heir of the Resident, and any person who has
executed this Agreement on behalf of the Resident.
(Pet. Ex. B, ¶ 2(b)).
On June 26, 2017, Tammy Hewgley, as Administratrix of the Estate of June Hewgley
(“Estate”), filed a lawsuit in Simpson Circuit Court entitled Hewgley v. Preferred Care of
The Court will refer to Petitioners in this action collectively as “Preferred Care.”
Delaware, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-CI-00211 (the “State Court Action”). (Pet. Ex. A, at 1, DN
1-1). In the state court complaint, the Estate asserted claims for, inter alia, negligence, medical
negligence, and wrongful death.2 (Pet. Ex. A, ¶¶ 27-40, ¶¶ 55-66). Following the initiation of
the State Court Action, Preferred Care filed this action in federal court asserting jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and Section 4 (9 U.S.C. § 4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Preferred Care seeks to enforce the Arbitration Agreement executed by
Hewgley’s court-appointed guardian, and Respondent has moved to dismiss this case. (Pet. ¶¶
28-37, DN 1; Pet’rs’ Mot. Compel Arbitration, DN 3; Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss, DN 8).
In support of its motion to dismiss, Respondent asserts various bases pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7).
In particular, Respondent raises the following
arguments: (i) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) Preferred Care failed to join
indispensable parties—namely nursing home personnel who are defendants in the State Court
Action—as parties to this action; (iii) the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction based
upon the Colorado River abstention doctrine; (iv) the Arbitration Agreement is invalid and
unenforceable; and (v) the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable. (Resp’t’s Mem. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 2-28, DN 8-1).
These same arguments have been unsuccessfully raised in
numerous other recent cases before this Court challenging the enforcement of arbitration
agreements between nursing homes and its residents or the residents’ estates.3 See GGNSC
Louisville St. Matthews v. Grevious, No. 3:16-cv-829-DJH, 2017 WL 3623805 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
The Estate also asserted claims against various individuals who are not parties to this federal
action. (Pet. Ex. B, ¶¶ 11-13, 49-62).
The Court notes that Respondent has failed to cite to or in any way seek to distinguish the
adverse decisions of this Court in which its counsel’s law firm represented many of the parties
unsuccessfully opposing arbitration.
23, 2017); GGNSC Louisville St. Matthews, LLC v. Phillips, No. 3:17-CV-00406-JHM, 2017
WL 3446181 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 2017); GGNSC Louisville Camelot, LLC v. Coppedge, No.
3:16-CV-00834-TBR, 2017 WL 3430579 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017); GGNSC Louisville St.
Matthews v. Madison, No. 3:16-CV-00830-TBR, 2017 WL 2312699 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2017);
GGNSC Louisville St. Matthews, LLC v. Saunders, No. 3:17-cv-00185-CRS-CHL, 2017 WL
2196752 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2017); GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly, LLC v. Turner, No. 3:16-CV00149-TBR, 2017 WL 537200 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2017); GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly LLC v.
Stevenson, No. 3:16CV-00423-JMH, 2016 WL 5867427 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 6, 2016); Preferred
Care of Del. Inc. v. Estate of Hopkins, No. 5:15-CV-00191-GNS-LLK, 2016 WL 3546407
(W.D. Ky. June 22, 2016); Diversicare Highland, LLC v. Lee, No. 3:15-CV-00836-GNS, 2016
WL 3512256 (W.D. Ky. June 21, 2016); Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC v. Fleshman, No.
3:15-CV-00891-GNS, 2016 WL 3406159 (W.D. Ky. June 17, 2016); Owensboro Health
Facilities, L.P. v. Henderson, No. 4:16CV-00002-JHM, 2016 WL 2853569 (W.D. Ky. May 12,
2016); Riney v. GGNSC Louisville St. Matthews, LLC, No. 3:16CV-00122-JHM, 2016 WL
2853568 (W.D. Ky. May 12, 2016); GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly, LLC v. Mohamed-Vall, No.
3:16-cv-136-DJH, 2016 WL 9024811 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 6, 2016); Preferred Care of Del., Inc. v.
Crocker, No. 5:15-CV-177-TBR, 2016 WL 1181786 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2016); GGNSC
Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v. Watkins, No. 3:15-cv-902-DJH, 2016 WL 815295 (W.D. Ky. Feb.
29, 2016); Sun Healthcare Grp., Inc. v. Dowdy, No. 5:13-CV-00169-TBR, 2014 WL 790916
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2014); Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Estate of Neblett, No. 5:14-CV-00124TBR, 2014 WL 5439623 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2014). See also Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell,
187 F. Supp. 3d 796 (E.D. Ky. 2016); GGNSC Frankfort, LLC v. Tracy, No. CIV. 14-30-GFVT,
2015 WL 1481149 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015).
After considering the arguments of the parties and the cases referenced above, the Court
denies the motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth in Estate of Neblett and Crocker. In short,
the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction; that the nursing home personnel are not
indispensable parties to this action; and that abstention is not appropriate. See Estate of Neblett,
2014 WL 5439623, at *2-7; Crocker, 2016 WL 1181786, at *4-6. With regard to the specific
circumstances here, the Court will address the validity, unconscionability, and enforceability of
the Arbitration Agreement executed by Hewgley’s court-appointed guardian below.
Under the FAA, a written agreement to arbitrate concerning a dispute arising out of a
contract involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Stout v. J.D.
Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Respondent asserts that the
Arbitration Agreement is invalid because it does not evidence a transaction involving interstate
Specifically, Respondent argues that“[t]he mere fact that the ADR Agreement
asserts that it is a contract involving interstate commerce does not make it so.” (Resp’t’s Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss 24).
This argument, however, lacks merit. As this Court reasoned in Turner:
The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “involving commerce” in the FAA
as signaling the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. Based upon that interpretation, this Court has found on multiple prior
occasions that nursing home admission agreements implicate interstate
commerce. In [GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v. Warner, No. 3:13-CV-752H, 2013 WL 6796421 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2013)], this Court emphasized that
while the nursing care may occur wholly within the borders of Kentucky, the
food, medicine, medical, and other supplies all likely come from elsewhere and
that it would be impracticable for the nursing home to procure all goods necessary
for the daily operations purely through intrastate channels. The Warner Court
also noted that, like here, Defendant’s state court complaint alleged that foreign
entities owned, operated, managed, controlled, and provided services for the
Id. at 83 (internal citations omitted) (citation omitted).
Because the present facts are
indistinguishable from Turner, the Court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement is a contract
involving interstate commerce.
Guardian’s Execution of Arbitration Agreement
Respondent also challenges whether Hewgley’s court-appointed guardian had the
authority to bind any claims that she or the Estate may have had against Preferred Care.
(Resp’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 25-26).
In particular, Respondent maintains that the
guardian could not have waived Hewgley’s right to a jury trial. (Resp’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot.
As a sister court has explained regarding the legal authority of court-appointed guardians
under Kentucky law:
Guardians have broad powers to ensure a ward’s “care, comfort, and
maintenance” and to “enable the ward to receive medical or other professional
care.” Further, guardians are tasked with protecting and effecting the ward’s
“personal, civil, and human rights.” And when a guardian is appointed, the ward
is stripped of several rights, including “the right . . . to enter into contractual
relationships.” So it follows that these rights, once taken from the ward, are
vested in the guardian to care for him. Guardians then retain that power unless a
court says otherwise.
Preferred Care, Inc. v. Bleeker, No. 16-152-ART, 2016 WL 6636854, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 8,
2016) (internal citations omitted) (citing KRS 387.660). In this case, the order of appointment
does not impose any limitation of the authority of Hewgley’s guardian to preclude the CFHS
from entering into the Agreement on her behalf. (Pet. Ex. B, at 2). As a result, the Arbitration
Agreement is valid as applied to Hewgley’s personal injury claims asserted in the State Court
Action by the Estate. While it does not appear that this Court has considered this issue before,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has upheld the enforceability of an
arbitration provision executed by a guardian under Kentucky law.
In Richmond Health
Facilities-Madison, L.P. v. Shearer, No. 5:17-255-KKC, 2017 WL 3273381 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 1,
2017), that court noted:
Nothing about this case is novel. Shearer is not the first guardian of a nursing
home resident who, after signing an arbitration agreement, decided to take her
case to the courts instead of to an arbitrator. Nor is she the first to move to
dismiss an action to compel arbitration using the arguments she puts forth here.
Without doubt, Shearer’s motion looks up at [a] mountain of precedent that has
uniformly considered and rejected, in one way or another, the main thrust of her
Id. at *2 (citing Turner, 2017 WL 537200, at *3). Other decisions from that court reach the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell, 187 F. Supp. 2d 796, 809 (E.D. Ky. 2016);
Preferred Care, Inc. v. Roberts, No. 5:16-203-KKC, 2017 WL 424868, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Jan.
31, 2017); Golden Living Ctr.-Vanceburg v. Reeder, No. 16-9-HRW, 2016 WL 4706924, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2016); Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. v. Walker, No. 5:15-CV-206-KKC, 2016
WL 1255722, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2016); Brandenburg v. Stanton Health Facilities, L.P.,
No. 5:14-183-DCR, 2014 WL 4986569, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 6, 2014). Thus, the Court
concludes the Estate is required to arbitrate its claims in this case, with the exception of the
wrongful death claim as discussed below. The Court will deny the motion to dismiss and grant
the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the Estate’s other claims.
Respondent also seeks dismissal of this action on the basis that the arbitration provision is
unconscionable. (Resp’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 26-28). Under Kentucky law, “[t]he
doctrine of unconscionability is recognized as a narrow exception to Kentucky’s fundamental
rule of enforcing validly executing contracts according to their terms.” Davis v. Glob. Client
Sols., LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (citation omitted). To determine whether
this doctrine precludes enforceability of the arbitration provision, the Court must conduct “a two
step process—first, a review focused on the procedures surrounding the making of the arbitration
clause (procedural unconscionability) and second, a review of the substantive content of the
arbitration clause (substantive unconscionability).” Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P.,
376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted).
With regard to procedural unconscionability, this Court has noted:
Procedural unconscionability, also known as unfair surprise . . . pertains to the
process by which an agreement is reached and the form of an agreement,
including the use therein of fine print and convoluted or unclear language. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that an arbitration clause was not
procedurally unconscionable where: the clause was not concealed or disguised
within the form; its provisions are clearly stated such that purchasers of ordinary
experience and education are likely to be able to understand it, at least in its
general import; and its effect is not such as to alter the principal bargain in an
extreme or surprising way.
Davis, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted)
Respondent maintains that the arbitration provisions are procedurally
unconscionable because the agreements were boilerplate and executed as part of the numerous
documents signed during the admissions process. (Resp’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 27). The
Court rejects these arguments.
“That the ADR Agreement is a ‘boiler-plate, pre-printed’
document does not render it unconscionable.” Warner, 2013 WL 6796421, at *9. A lengthy
admissions process with numerous forms to execute does not rise to the level of
unconscionability. See Watkins, 2016 WL 815295, at *6 (“[M]any situations—such as buying a
house or a car, visiting the doctor, or starting a new job—involve a lengthy process in which an
individual must complete a substantial amount of paperwork. This alone does not make a
contract procedurally unconscionable.”).
Likewise, the arbitration provision is not precluded by substantive unconscionability. As
this Court has explained:
Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably or
grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.
As for substantive unconscionability, courts consider the commercial
reasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the
allocation of the risks between the parties, and similar public policy concerns.
Davis, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted)
(citation omitted). Respondent maintains that the provisions were substantively unconscionable
because of the gross disparity in bargaining power and the fact that the costs of arbitration were
not disclosed. (Resp’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 27-28). These arguments also lack merit. A
difference in bargaining power alone does not amount to unconscionability. See Conseco Fin.
Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Ky. App. 2001). From the agreement itself, the
arbitration provisions are not substantively unconscionable because:
(i) the provisions are
plainly stated; (ii) the implications are in capitalized bold type;4 (iii) the provisions are reciprocal
and do not limit recovery by either party; and (iv) the Arbitration Agreement granted Hewgley’s
guardian the right to opt out of the arbitration provision within thirty days of execution of the
agreement. (Pet. Ex. B, at 1-5). While it is true that the fees associated with the arbitration are
The Arbitration Agreement specifically contained the following notation on the page
immediately preceding the parties’ signatures:
THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND, ACKNOWLEDGE, AND AGREE THAT
BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT THEY ARE GIVING UP
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR DISPUTES
DECIDED BY A COURT OF LAW OR TO APPEAL . . . . THIS
AGREEMENT GOVERNS IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS.
SIGNATURE BELOW INDICATES YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF AND
AGREEMENT TO THE TERMS SET OUT ABOVE. PLEASE READ IT
COMPLETELY, THROUGHLY AND CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING.
(Pet. Ex. B, at 4).
not disclosed, there is nothing in the record to otherwise support Respondent’s naked assertion
that arbitration fees are necessarily higher than litigating this dispute in court. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that there is no substantive unconscionability.
For these reasons, the doctrine of unconscionability does not preclude the enforcement of
the arbitration provision in this case. The motion to dismiss on this basis will be denied.
Wrongful Death Claim
A different outcome, however, results with respect to Petitioners’ attempt to compel
arbitration of the wrongful death claims. Under KRS 411.130, a wrongful death claim may be
pursued by the decedent’s personal representative, and state law specifies the beneficiaries of
such claims. See KRS 411.130. See also KRS 411.140 (providing that a wrongful death claim
survives the decedent’s death and may be brought by the personal representative). Thus, under
Kentucky law, the personal representative of the decedent has the legal duty to bring a wrongful
death action even though the personal representative may not be a beneficiary entitled to recover
for the decedent’s death. See Vaughn’s Adm’r v. Louisville N.R. Co., 179 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Ky.
In Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291 (Ky. 2013), the Kentucky Supreme Court reiterated
the premise that the wrongful death claim belongs to the statutory heirs of the decedent as
opposed to the decedent’s estate, explaining:
[T]his Court’s recent decision in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d
581 (Ky. 2012) puts to rest any dispute as to whether the statutory beneficiaries
are the real parties in interest to a wrongful death action. In Ping, the
administrator of the estate of a woman who had been a long-term care facility
resident brought suit against the operators of the facility alleging negligence
resulting in injuries causing the woman’s death. Our opinion, which resolved the
question of whether a decedent can bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate a
wrongful death claim, examined the distinction between the wrongful death
statute and the survival statute, KRS 411.140. We concluded that while a survival
action is derivative of a personal injury claim which belongs to the estate, a
wrongful death action is an independent claim belonging to the intended
beneficiaries under KRS 411.130, a claim that “accrues separately to the wrongful
death beneficiaries and is meant to compensate them for their own pecuniary
loss.” Based on the plain language of KRS 411.130 and our holding in Ping, we
must reject Pete’s contention that the wrongful death action belongs to the estate.
Id. at 300 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). See also Moore v. Citizens Bank of Pikeville,
420 S.W.2d 669, 672 (1967) (“KRS 411.130 creates a cause of action for wrongful death. This
is a statutory right of action which did not exist prior to the wrongful death but arises by reason
thereof. It has been pointed out that the wrongful death action is not derivative. It is brought to
compensate survivors for loss occasioned by the death and not to recover for injuries to the
decedent. The cause is distinct from any that the deceased may have had if he had survived. The
damage caused by the wrongful death begins with, and flows from, the death.”). Instead, Pete
clarifies that, under Kentucky law, wrongful death claims belong to the statutory beneficiaries,
not to the decedent’s estate.
Recently, in Richmond Health Facilities-Kenwood, LP v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192 (6th Cir.
2016), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a decedent could contractually bind his heirs to
arbitrate claims for his wrongful death. See id. at 193-94. The court noted that the wrongful
death beneficiary was not a party to the arbitration agreement and held that wrongful death
claims were not required to be arbitrated based upon Ping and its progeny. See id. at 197. The
Sixth Circuit also concluded that Ping was not preempted by the FAA because Ping did not
disfavor arbitration agreements, but held that only the wrongful death beneficiaries had the right
to limit any rights related to those claims. See id. at 197-201. In particular, the Sixth Circuit
Wrongful-death beneficiaries are thus no more or less bound by a decedent’s
agreement to arbitrate than they are by a decedent’s waiver of certain claims,
selection of a forum to litigate disputes, or selection of the law governing an
agreement. To illustrate, suppose that a decedent and the long-term facility enter
into an agreement in which the parties select a Kentucky state court as the forum
to litigate the wrongful-death claim. Under Ping, the wrongful-death beneficiary
is not bound by this forum-selection clause because the decedent never had an
interest in the claim itself. And because the beneficiary is not bound by the
clause, the beneficiary could very well elect to arbitrate the wrongful-death claim
instead—so long as the long-term facility agrees. Ping is thus indifferent to
Id. at 199.
In this case, the Court concludes that Hewgley’s court-appointed guardian did not have
the authority to waive any rights of the wrongful death beneficiaries under Kentucky law because
those claims did not belong to Hewgley. See id.; Pete, 413 S.W.3d at 300. Accordingly,
Petitioners are not entitled to compel arbitration regarding the wrongful death claim because
Hewgley’s guardian lacked the authority to constrain the claims of her wrongful death
For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 3) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Respondent is ENJOINED from proceeding against Petitioners in the
State Court Action, except for the wrongful death claims.
The parties to this action are
COMPELLED to arbitrate all claims (except the wrongful death claims), which are the subject
of the State Court Action. Counsel SHALL promptly notify the Simpson Circuit Court of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (DN 8) is GRANTED IN PART as to the
wrongful death claim only and DENIED IN PART as to all other claims.
This case is STAYED until the conclusion of the ordered arbitration.
Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
October 5, 2017
counsel of record
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