Chojecki v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl on 6/5/2024. The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings to remedy the defect in the original proceeding. cc: counsel (DeW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00074-HBB
MARCIN C.1

PLAINTIFF

VS.
MARTIN O’MALLEY, ACTING COMMISSIONER
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION2

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Marcin C. (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review
of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both Plaintiff (DN 11)
and Defendant (DN 19) filed Fact and Law Summaries. Plaintiff filed a reply brief (DN 20). For
the reasons that follow, the final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is
REMANDED, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties have consented to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case,
including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 12). By Order entered August
29, 2023 (DN 13), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written
request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.

1 Pursuant to General Order 22-05, Plaintiff’s name in this matter was shortened to first name and last initial.
2 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this suit.

FINDINGS OF FACT
On June 8, 2015, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability and disability
insurance benefits (Tr. 72, 238-44). Plaintiff alleged that he became disabled on May 7, 2014, as
a result of a brain cyst impairing ocular nerve left eye, gout, and skin and joint psoriasis, and
depression (Tr. 72, 152, 167, 269). The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration
(Tr. 187-90, 193-95). Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing, and ALJ Roxanne J. Kelsey
(“ALJ”) held a hearing on May 23, 2017 (Tr. 112-50). On August 30, 2017, the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from May 7, 2014 through the date of
the decision (Tr. 71-85). Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review
on April 11, 2018 (Tr. 1-7). Plaintiff appealed the decision in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (Tr. 764-65).

The district court issued an Order granting

Defendant’s agreed motion to remand the decision (Tr. 762-71).
On July 23, 2019, the ALJ held a remand hearing, and on August 26, 2019 issued an
unfavorable decision (Tr. 686-719, 656-85). In the 2019 decision, the ALJ evaluated this adult
disability claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the
Commissioner (Tr. 659-78). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 7, 2014 (Tr. 662). Plaintiff last met the insured status
requirements through December 31, 2019 (Id.). At the second step, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: migraines, psoriatic skin disease with psoriatic
arthritis; gout; major depressive disorder; general anxiety disorder; degenerative disc disorder of
the knee; history of brain cyst/tumor with visual field changes of the left side (Id.). The ALJ found
Plaintiff has the following non-severe impairments: mild osteopenia of the hands, and cysts on the
hands (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or

2

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in
Appendix 1 (Tr. 662-63).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) except medium work, as defined by
the regulations with frequent climbing; he may have no more than occasional concentrated
exposure to hazards such as dangerous, moving machinery or unprotected heights; he may
frequently perform tasks requiring fine vision; he lacks the ability to understand, remember, and
carry out detailed instructions because of moderate limitations in concentration, but retains the
sustained concentration necessary for simple work of a routine type if given normal workplace
breaks, meaning two 15 minute breaks after two hours of work and a 30 minute break mid-shift;
he may occasionally work in coordination with or proximity to others; he should not be required
to interact with the general public as part of the job (Tr. 665).
Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work (Tr.
676). At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform (Tr. 677). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a “disability,”
as defined in the Social Security Act from May 7, 2014 through the date of the decision (Tr. 678).
The Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction over the ALJ’s decision, making it
“the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after remand by the court” (Tr. 63637).

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard of Review
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final
decision of the Commissioner are supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton
v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 974 F.2d
680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence exists when a
reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even
if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for
substantial evidence, the Court “may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence,
nor decide questions of credibility.” Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528
(6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the
ALJ’s decision (Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of
the Commissioner’s decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the ALJ’s decision and the
evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996);
Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695-696.

4

The Commissioner’s Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II
Disability Insurance Benefits). The term “disability” is defined as an
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v.
Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential
evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See “Evaluation of disability in general,” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1)

Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2)

Does the claimant have a medically determinable
impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the
duration requirement and significantly limits his or her
ability to do basic work activities?

3)

Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within
Appendix 1?

4)

Does the claimant have the RFC to return to his or her past
relevant work?

5)

Does the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work
experience allow him or her to perform a significant number
of jobs in the national economy?

Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim at the fifth step.

5

1. Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to determine whether an opinion by a treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Walczyk, should be granted controlling weight and the ALJ’s rejection of parts
of the opinion is “illogical and contradicted by the facts” of the record (DN 11 PageID # 1103-04).
Additionally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ incorrectly applied the treating physician rule because the
“ALJ failed to determine first whether Dr. Walczyk’s opinions were entitled to ‘controlling
weight’” but, instead, the “ALJ skipped straight to weighing the factor of ‘consistency’” (Id.at
PageID # 1105). Plaintiff contends that if the ALJ applied the treating physician rule correctly,
the ALJ would have given Dr. Walczyk’s opinion controlling weight and more weight to Plaintiff’s
subjective symptom allegations (Id. at PageID # 1107-08). Further, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s
analysis cannot withstand scrutiny as the ALJ mischaracterized evidence of the record and applied
her own lay opinion (Id. at PageID # 1108-10).
Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence as the ALJ
properly weighed Dr. Walczyk’s opinion. Defendant asserts that an ALJ is not required to
expressly consider each of the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and that as long as a court can
understand how the ALJ granted weight to the treating source remand is not required (DN 19
PageID # 1138).
In reply, Plaintiff states that the ALJ’s handling of Dr. Walczyk’s opinion cannot be
harmless because “the ALJ failed to articulate ‘good reasons’ for discounting Dr. Walczyk’s
opinion” (DN 20 PageID # 1147). Plaintiff reiterates that the ALJ did not properly consider
evidence as she ignored evidence when weighing Dr. Walczyk’s opinion and that the ALJ applied
her own lay medical opinion (Id. at PageID # 1151).

6

2. Discussion
As Plaintiff filed his claim prior to March 27, 2017, the old regulations apply.3 The earlier
regulations require the Commissioner to give more weight to opinions of treating sources than to
those of non-treating sources under appropriate circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) states:
Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from your
treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of
your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
In Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013), the Sixth
Circuit emphasized that the ALJ must first consider if the treating source’s opinion should receive
controlling weight. “The opinion must receive controlling weight if (1) well-supported by clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and (2) not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in
the administrative record.” Hayes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16 CV 365, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38029, at *8-9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and
416.927(d)(2)). Only if the Commissioner does not give a treating-source opinion controlling
weight, then the opinion is weighed by balancing factors: “length, frequency, nature, and extent of
the treatment relationship, as well as the treating source’s area of specialty and the degree to which
the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant evidence.”
Thaxton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 815 F. App’x 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gayheart, 710
F.3d at 376).
The ALJ must assign specific weight to the treating source, and if the opinion is found not
to be controlling, then the ALJ must give good reasons for not giving the opinion controlling

3 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the rules in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c apply.

7

weight. The good reasons must be more than statements that the treating source opinion disagrees
with the opinion of a non-treating physician or that objective medical evidence does not support
the opinion.
[a]n ALJ should structure the decision to remove any doubt as to the
weight given the treating source’s opinion and the reasons for
assigning such weight. In a single paragraph the ALJ should state
what weight he or she assigns to the treating source’s opinion and
then discuss the evidence of record supporting that assignment.
Where the treating source’s opinion does not receive controlling
weight, the decision must justify the assignment given in light of the
factors set out in §§ 1527[(c)(1)-(6)].
The Sixth Circuit has identified certain breaches of the Wilson rules
as grounds for reversal and remand:
• the failure to mention and consider the opinion of a treating
source,
• the rejection or discounting of the weight of a treating
source without assigning weight,
• the failure to explain how the opinion of a source properly
considered as a treating source is weighed (i.e., treating v.
examining),
• the elevation of the opinion of a nonexamining source over
that of a treating source if the nonexamining source has not
reviewed the opinion of the treating source,
• the rejection of the opinion of a treating source because it
conflicts with the opinion of another medical source without
an explanation of the reason therefore, and
• the rejection of the opinion of a treating source for
inconsistency with other evidence in the record without an
explanation of why “the treating physician’s conclusion gets
the short end of the stick.”
Hayes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38029, at *11-12 (internal citations omitted). However, a violation
of these procedural requirements can be deemed “harmless error” if one of the following
requirements is satisfied:

8

(1) a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the
Commissioner could not possibly credit it; (2) if the Commissioner
adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings
consistent with the opinion; or (3) where the Commissioner has met
the goal of § 1527(d)(2) ... even though she has not complied with
the terms of the regulation.
Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011). Notably, the failure to follow the Agency’s
procedural rule does not qualify as harmless error when the Court cannot engage in “meaningful
review” of the ALJ’s decision. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ discussed Dr. Walczyk’s opinion with the following:
Next, the undersigned considered the treating source opinion and
records from Marek Walczyk, M.D., who began treating the
claimant in 2015 (Ex. 8F, 25F, 36F). In December 2016, she
completed a form indicating that the claimant had depression,
anxiety and insomnia and he had no interest in any activity and
neglected household duties (Ex. 25F). She noted that he avoided
social interactions, his mood and affect was sad, depressed and
restricted. His thought process was goal oriented but slow. The
claimant was oriented and there was some impairment of memory.
As such, she opined that the claimant may have difficulty
performing simple routine repetitive tasks and that he was not
capable of socializing with coworkers and supervisory personnel
due to social avoidance. The undersigned gives little weight to the
opinion that he may have difficulty performing simple tasks because
even her own notes show that his memory is intact at times. She
noted that he could remember 4 of 5 items forward but only 2 of 5
items backwards. This would tend to support the claimant lacks the
ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions
because of moderate limitations in concentration, but retains the
sustained concentration necessary for simple work of a routine type
if given normal workplace breaks, meaning two 15 minute breaks
after two hours of work and a 30 minute break mid-shift. On the
other hand, there is some evidence of his social limitations and the
fact that he was embarrassed about this psoriasis. As such, the
opinion that he was not capable of socializing with coworkers and
supervisory personnel due to social avoidance is given some weight.
The treatment record shows that this doctor has given the claimant
training in coping skills for his anxiety and depression but it remains
to be of concern to him. As such, the undersigned finds that the
claimant may occasionally work in coordination with or proximity

9

to others. He should not be required to interact with the general
public as a part of the job.
Dr. Walczyk answered “no” to the question can claimant achieve
production requirements and tolerate work pressures generally
associated with unskilled work?” Yet, she opined that the claimant
could manage his own funds. She also opined that he was
moderately limited in performing simple and repetitive tasks. These
statements are contradictory. If he maintains the mental capacity to
perform simple math collections to handle his own money, then he
retained the capacity to handle unskilled tasks. Indeed, his
calculation ability was intact often between 2015 and 2019 per her
own treatment notes (Ex. 36F/9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 28, 32, 34, 41).
In addition, memory testing revealed no significant problems
despite the claimant’s report of significant difficulty concentrating
(Ex. 11F). As such, the undersigned gives less weight to this portion
of the opinion. The record shows that the claimant maintains
capacity for unskilled tasks. The undersigned gives little weight to
the opinion that he may have difficulty performing simple tasks
because even her own notes show that his memory is intact at times.
She noted that he could remember 4 of 5 items forward but only 2
of 5 items backwards. Also the claimant is able to perform the
multitasking and sequencing necessary to drive a car, operate a
smart phone, understand and follow rule, and apply the information.
While his wife helps him remember his medications and handles
their household finances, these tasks are not necessarily simple and
routine. This tends to support the claimant lacks the ability to
understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions because of
moderate limitations in concentration, but retains the sustained
concentration necessary for simple work of a routine type if given
normal workplace breaks, meaning two 15 minute breaks after two
hours of work and a 30 minute break mid-shift.
Next, the undersigned gives significant weight to the opinion by Dr.
Walczyk that the claimant’s ability to relate to other people, respond
to coworkers and customary work pressures was moderately severe
for the following reasons. The claimant had a moderately severe
degree of constriction of interest and in understanding, carrying out
and remembering instructions. The claimant had a moderately
severe impairment to perform complex tasks and varied tasks (Ex.
25F). As stated previously, the claimant has anxiety and depression
and it relates to his psoriatic arthritis. Although he takes
medications for his physical impairments, as well as mental
impairments and attends counseling, he still has anxiety and
depression that affect his social interactions. Thus, the undersigned
finds it is best that he is provided some limitations socially. There

10

is no evidence to support that he is unable to interact entirely with
others or that he cannot leave the home. Indeed, he has developed
good interactions with his treating sources including this doctor
whom he has met many times. He has good relations with his
family. Once again, the claimant has alleged having limitations
socially because of his physical impairments. The undersigned
notes that the claimant feels uncomfortable in public and dealing
with people because of his psoriasis. However, he does socialize
with people on the phone, goes out, and goes to doctors’
appointments, but does not go anywhere on a regular basis. In his
functioning report, the claimant reported that he avoids being seen
by other people. He indicated that he has difficulty getting along
with others (Ex. 5E). Sadly, the undersigned recognizes that at the
consultative psychological examination, the claimant reported that
he no longer has friends because people are afraid that he has AIDS
due to his skin disease (Ex. 11F).
(Tr. 672-74). In his discussion of Dr. Walczyk’s opinion, the ALJ did not address that as a treating
source, there is a presumption that the opinion is entitled to controlling weight. Thaxton, 815 F.
App’x at 959. The ALJ did address the opinion’s supportability and consistency when deciding
which portions of the opinion she gave significant and little weight. However, missing from the
ALJ’s discussion is the good reasons analysis required by the regulations.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2)-(6). The ALJ’s discussion seems to collapse the treating-source analysis’s two
distinct steps into one when discussing the opinion’s supportability and consistency. Hayes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16 CV 365, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38029, at *9, 11 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
16, 2017). Here, in addition to the lack of acknowledgment that Dr. Walczyk was a treating source
and entitled to controlling weight, neither Dr. Walczyk’s specialty nor the length of the treating
relationship was directly discussed. Due to the condensed analysis and for reasons discussed
below, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s treating source analysis is not harmless error and thus
not supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ placed his own lay impressions regarding Plaintiff’s memory
and concentration without citing to medical evidence of the record when finding Dr. Walczyk’s

11

opinion was entitled to less weight (DN 11 PageID # 1110-12). Defendant does not directly
respond to this argument, but Defendant counters that it was reasonable for the ALJ to consider
his daily activities in light of the record as a whole to discount Dr. Walczyk’s more extreme opined
limitations.
Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff’s ability to conduct math calculations
and handle his own money indicates he has the capacity to handle unskilled tasks is an improper
lay opinion that fails “to recognize the difference between activities performed at home versus
those performed at work” (DN 20 PageID # 1153). Additionally, when finding Plaintiff can
perform simple tasks, the ALJ cites to Plaintiff’s ability to drive and use his smart phone. The
ALJ makes these statements without citations to the record or a medical opinion that connects the
two assertions.
When weighting medical opinions, the ALJ “may not substitute his own medical judgment
for that of the treating physician where the opinion of the treating physician is supported by
medical evidence.” Meece v. Barnhart, 192 F. App’x 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2006); Rohan v. Chater,
98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating “ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor
and make their own independent medical findings”). However, the ALJ “may weigh the evidence
and draw [her] own inferences.” McCain v. Dir, OWCP, 58 F. App’x 184, 193 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s reasoning—Plaintiff’s ability to conduct some
mathematic equations, handle funds, his ability to drive a car, operate a smart phone, understand
and follow rules, and apply the information—is an improper lay opinion that goes beyond drawing
her own inference regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform simple tasks in a work environment.
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007) (indicating the ALJ erred when
they emphasized the plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities such as driving, cleaning their

12

home, caring for dogs, laundry, reading, stretching, and watching the news because these were
minimal daily functions that were not comparable to typical work activities.). Here, the ALJ does
not provide enough of a framework to show how Plaintiff’s activities were related to his job
performance capacity.
In sum, the ALJ failed to assess whether the medical opinion of the treating source, Dr.
Walczyk, was entitled to “controlling weight” as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), and the
ALJ relied on her own flawed lay opinions to find that Dr. Walczyk’s opinion was not consistent
and supported by the evidence of record. In assessing whether these violations of the procedural
requirements can be deemed “harmless error,” the undersigned concludes that Dr. Walczyk’s
medical opinion is not so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it; the
Commission did not adopt Dr. Walczyk’s opinion or make findings consistent with the opinion;
and the Commissioner has not met the goal of § 404.1527(c)(2). See Cole, 661 F.3d at 940.
Consequently, the final decision of the Commissioner will be reversed, and the case will be
remanded to the Commissioner to conduct additional proceedings consistent to remedy the defects
identified above. See Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1994).
Conclusion
As the Court noted previously, “[a]s long as substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, we must defer to it, ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record
that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d
387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Regardless of how this Court may view the evidence, it is not this Court’s place to re-try or reevaluate the findings of the ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Rather, this Court is only to find if
substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision and if the ALJ followed the applicable

13

law. (Id.). After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s determination is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record and correctly followed the applicable law.
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to relief regarding his challenge.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that the Commissioner’s findings are
not supported by substantial evidence and failed to comport with applicable law. IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is
REMANDED for further administrative proceedings to remedy the defect in the original
proceedings as discussed above. Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 175 (6th
Cir. 1994).
June 5, 2024

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

14