Jones v. Warren County Regional Jail et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 2/2/2024 - IT IS ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff's claims against the WCRJ, Jailer Harman in his individual and official capacity, and CCC are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Since no claims remain against them, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate these Defendants as parties to the action. (2) Plaintiff's official-cap acity claim against Nurse Nora Jones is also DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (3) The Court will enter a separate Service and Scheduling Order to govern thedevelopment of the claim it has allowed to proceed. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (EAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00122-JHM
HENRY EARL JONES

PLAINTIFF

v.
WARREN COUNTY REGIONAL JAIL, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Henry Earl Jones filed this pro se civil-rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint [DN 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss some claims and allow some claims
to proceed.
I.
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently housed at the Warren County Regional Jail
(“WCRJ”). He alleges that the following Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments: WCRJ, Comprehensive
Correctional Care (“CCC”), and Jailer Stephen Harman and Nurse Nora Jones in their individual
and official capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that on May 9, 2023, when he arrived at the WCRJ he was wearing a brace
for his fingers and a sling. Plaintiff represents that he had recently received a tendon transfer to
his right hand and due to the nerve damage, the finger brace was molded to his hand to aid in
healing and to help with his daily activities. Plaintiff states that despite repeated requests,
Defendants have refused to give him his brace. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive

relief of “sending me to a hand specialist to correct this” and “getting a brace molded to fit.” [DN
1 at 5].
II.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or
employees, this Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the
Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d
1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald
v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

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III.
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations
of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th
Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element,
a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. WCRJ
WCRJ is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such
as detention centers or jails, are not suable under § 1983. Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983); see also Marbry
v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 238 F.3d 422, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000)
(holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). In this situation, Warren County
is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky.
1990). The Court therefore will construe the claim against Defendant WCRJ as a claim brought
against Warren County. See Matthews v. LMPD, No. 3:19-CV-P581-RGJ, 2019 WL 5549209, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2019).
B. Official-Capacity Claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Thus,

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Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Jailer Harman or Nurse Jones are actually
against their employer, Warren County or CCC respectively.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality such as Warren
County, the Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality as an entity is responsible for that
violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). A municipality
cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691. To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must
be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a
government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
This standard also applies to a private medical provider, such as Comprehensive
Correctional Care, which contracts with a jail to provide medical services to inmates. See, e.g.,
Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 904 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A private entity ... that contracts to
provide medical services at a jail can be held liable under § 1983 because it is carrying out a
traditional state function.”) (citing Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005)). Thus,
liability of CCC must be based on a policy or custom of the entity as well.

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Here, Plaintiff does not allege a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the
alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claim against CCC,
WCRJ, and Defendants Harmon and Jones in their official capacity for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
C. Individual Liability Claims
1. Jailer Harman
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Harman liable based on his supervisory
authority as jailer, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not
apply in

§ 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor

v. Mich Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80–81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421
(6th Cir. 1984). “Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat
superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.”
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005). “At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff
must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy, 729 F.2d at
421. The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon
the mere failure to act. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,
310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002); Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004); Owens v.
Williams, No. 5:23-CV-P127-JHM, 2024 WL 102995, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2024).
Plaintiff makes no allegations of personal involvement in the alleged events by Defendant.
Therefore, the individual-capacity claim against Defendant Harman will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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2. Nurse Jones
The Court will allow Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs to continue against Defendant Nurse Jones in her individual capacity.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s claims against the WCRJ, Jailer Harman in his individual and official
capacity, and CCC are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Since no claims remain against them, the Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to terminate these Defendants as parties to the action.
(2) Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Nurse Nora Jones is also DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(3)

The Court will enter a separate Service and Scheduling Order to govern the

development of the claim it has allowed to proceed.
Date: February 2, 2024

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4414.014

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