Estate of Pamela Faye et al v. Mathis

Filing 97

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 3/14/2012 re 71 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; motion for partial summary judgment regarding offensive collateral estoppel is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks to estop Mathis from denying that (1) he drove recklessly, (2) he injured Faye, (3) he left the parking lot where Faye was injured, (4) he consumed alcohol at home and went to a public place intoxicated, and (5) he pled guilty toviolations of Indiana law in engaging in these acts. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.cc:counsel (TLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE

ESTATE OF PAMELA FAYE, by and through
APRIL PINKSON and AMANDA PINKSON,
Co-Administratrix, et al.

v.

PLAINTIFFS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09CV-157-S

MICHAEL B. MATHIS

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arose from an unfortunate public confrontation between the decedent, Pamela
Faye and her former boyfriend, Michael Mathis, at the Conservation Club (“the club”) in Clark
County, Indiana on the night of December 6, 2008. The Estate of Pamela Faye and Faye’s adult
daughters (collectively, “the Estate” or “plaintiffs”) have filed wrongful death and loss of
consortium claims against Mathis.
Presently before the court are various motions for partial summary judgment which seek to
define the contours of the claims herein.
It is undisputed that Mathis entered the club with a female companion. After seeing Mathis
there, Faye allegedly confronted him and grabbed him around the neck and stated that she intended
to “hurt him” (Ferree Depo., p. 11) or “f___ [him] up.” (Mathis Depo., p. 52). Mathis purportedly
pushed her away, stated “get off of me,” and left the building, getting into his pick up truck parked
in the club’s dimly-lit parking lot. Mathis’ companion had not left the building with him, as she had
apparently also been confronted by Faye at the door. Mathis claims that he moved his vehicle
toward to the front of the building to find her, but Faye allegedly came outside and walked toward

front of his vehicle, and beat her fists on the hood. Mathis purportedly backed the truck up as far
as possible in the parking lot. Faye allegedly came around the driver’s side of the truck, beat on the
window and tried to open the door at which time Mathis sped out of the parking lot and went to his
home a short distance away. Faye was discovered injured in the parking lot. Faye subsequently
died. There is, at present, nothing in the record before this court documenting the date or cause of
death. However, the plaintiff concedes that Faye died as a result of injuries she sustained in the
accident. (Mathis’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DN 62), p. 3).

I.
Mathis has moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that Indiana law limits the
damages that can be recovered in a wrongful death action. He asserts that, as he has conceded that
Faye died from injuries sustained in the accident, all personal injury damages are precluded, and the
Estate is limited to damages allowed by the Indiana wrongful death statute, IC 34-23-1-2.
IC 34-23-1-2(c)(3) limits damages for the loss of Faye’s love and companionship to an
aggregate sum of $300,000.00. IC 34-23-1-2(c)(2)(B) bars punitive damages, and IC 34-23-12(c)(3)(G) bars a recovery for lost earnings.
While the plaintiffs maintain the right to appeal the court’s earlier ruling that Indiana law
applies in this action, they agree that Indiana law imposes these limitations on their claims.
Therefore, the motion for partial summary judgment (DN 62) is GRANTED to the
extent that Mathis seeks to limit the recovery of damages to those provided for by the Indiana
wrongful death statute IC 34-23-1-2.

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II.
Mathis also urges that recovery is precluded if a jury finds that Faye’s contributory fault in
causing her own injuries was greater than his own; that is, if Faye is assigned greater percentage of
fault. The plaintiffs have not responded to this assertion. Instead, they have filed their own motion
for partial summary judgment seeking to preclude a finding of comparative fault, on the ground that
Mathis has insufficient proof to support such an affirmative defense (DN 97). We will address
Faye’s motion separately herein. However, there appears to be no dispute that IC 34-51-2-6(a)
provides that “...the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater
than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” To the
extent that Mathis seeks affirmation that this is a correct statement of Indiana law, the motion
for partial summary judgment (DN 62) is GRANTED.

III.
Finally, in their response to the motion for partial summary judgment concerning damages,
the plaintiffs stated that Indiana law permits recovery of medical and burial costs, and attorney fees
and costs of litigation. While the plaintiffs have demanded medical and funeral expenses in their
complaint, we note that $30,277.37 for medical expenses and $10,371.24 for funeral expenses was
ordered to be paid in restitution when the court entered judgment of conviction for the crimes to
which Mathis pled guilty in Indiana. These expenses, of course, may not be recovered twice. The
propriety of an award of attorney fees and costs will be taken up at the conclusion of the case.

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IV.
The Estate has moved for partial summary judgment regarding expected allegations that Faye
was contributorily at fault for her injuries and subsequent death. (DN 87). The plaintiffs contends
that there is no evidence to support a finding of any fault on the part of Faye.
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are no genuine
issues of fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151-60, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 16 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Felix v. Young,
536 F.2d 1126, 1134 (6th Cir. 1976). Not every factual dispute between the parties will prevent
summary judgment. The disputed facts must be material. They must be facts which, under the
substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The dispute must also be genuine. The facts must be
such that if they were proven at trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Id. at 2510. The disputed issue does not have to be resolved conclusively in favor of the nonmoving party, but that party is required to present some significant probative evidence which makes
it necessary to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the dispute at trial. First National Bank of
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). The evidence must be construed in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King
Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962).
There is evidence in the record concerning Faye’s angry pursuit of Mathis out of the club and
into the parking lot, and her attempt to prevent his vehicle from leaving. (Ferree and Mathis depos.).
There is evidence that at some point Faye moved to the side of his vehicle and was attempting to

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open the driver’s side door. (Mathis depo.). There is also evidence that, after she was injured, Faye
stated that Mathis had run over her. (Ferree depo.).
There is no doubt that Faye had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances for her own protection. See, Van Dayn v. Cook-Teague, 694 N.E.2d 779, 781
(Ind.App. 1976). There are facts of record the veracity and significance of which a jury may
evaluate to determine whether Faye unreasonably place herself in harm’s way, or whether, under
the circumstances, she had no opportunity to protect herself from Mathis’ reckless act. The motion
for partial summary judgment regarding comparative fault (DN 87) is DENIED.

V.
The plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment regarding offensive collateral estoppel
(DN 71). The parties agree that, as a general rule, collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of
issues or facts which were adjudicated in a prior action. Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616
N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ind. 1993), citing Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct.
645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The plaintiffs seek to recover for wrongful death by proving that
Faye’s death was caused by the wrongful act or omission of Mathis. IC 34-23-1-2(b). The plaintiffs
seek by this motion to preclude Mathis from denying liability for wrongful death by virtue of his
entry of a guilty plea to charges of criminal recklessness (IC 35-42-2-2), leaving the scene of an
accident involving injury (IC 9-26-1-1), and public intoxication (IC 7.1-5-1-3). They contend that
the crimes to which he pled guilty and admissions made in the guilty plea colloquy mandate that
Mathis be estopped to deny liability for wrongful death.

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Mathis’ plea of guilty to criminal recklessness in violation of IC 35-42-2-2 estops him from
denying that he knowingly or intentionally created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Faye. He
is also estopped from denying that his conduct, in fact, resulted in injury to Faye. Additionally,
Mathis has admitted that Faye’s death resulted from the injuries she sustained in the accident. (DN
62, p. 3).
Mathis admitted during the guilty plea colloquy that he drove recklessly and that his conduct
caused injury to Faye and violated Indiana law, and thus he is precluded from denying these facts.
However, Mathis’ plea of guilty to criminal recklessness does not equate to an admission of liability
for wrongful death.
Under Indiana law, a recovery for wrongful death is precluded when a claimant’s
contributory fault exceeds the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the
claimant’s damages. IC 34-51-2-6(a). The court has declined under the facts of this case to preclude
Mathis from asserting that Faye’s actions contributed in causing her injuries and death. Thus
causation is in issue, and the matter of liability under the wrongful death statute remains an open
question.
The plaintiffs also urge that Mathis’ guilty plea to leaving the scene of an accident involving
an injury, in violation of IC 9-26-1-1 must estop him from denying that he knew Faye was injured
when he left the scene.
In the guilty plea colloquy, Mathis admitted that he pulled away at a high rate of speed
knowing that there was a pedestrian nearby, and that the act did result in injuries to Faye. Mathis
did not admit that he knew that Faye was injured when he drove off. Rather he admitted that his

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reckless conduct did, in fact, result in the injuries to Faye. He did not admit to liability for wrongful
death thereby.
Finally, Mathis’ guilty plea to public intoxication, in violation of IC 7.1-5-1-3 has not been
shown to be relevant to the claims in this case. In the guilty plea colloquy, Mathis admitted to going
home from the scene, consuming alcohol, and then proceeding to a public place. All of this took
place after the accident, however. Mathis is estopped to deny these facts, but they do relate to the
wrongful death or consortium claims.
The motion for partial summary judgment regarding offensive collateral estoppel (DN
71) is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks to estop Mathis from denying that (1) he drove
recklessly, (2) he injured Faye, (3) he left the parking lot where Faye was injured, (4) he
consumed alcohol at home and went to a public place intoxicated, and (5) he pled guilty to
violations of Indiana law in engaging in these acts. In all other respects, the motion is
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 14, 2012

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