Gallo v. Louisville Metro Government et al

Filing 98

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 6/17/2011. For the reasons set forth, Plaintiff's motion to remand is SUSTAINED and the remaining claims are REMANDED to Jefferson Circuit Court. cc: Counsel, Jefferson Circuit Court (cert. copy) (AEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-223-H
HEIDI GALLO, Administratrix of the Estate of
JAMES HATCHER, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

V.
LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action originally included federal and state claims. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
all federal claims and subsequently moved to remand the case to state court.
The facts of the underlying case are not particularly pivotal to the current motion. The
case revolves around the circumstances of James Hatcher’s death while in the custody of
Louisville Metro Corrections Department (the “Corrections Department”). Among other things,
Plaintiffs claims that Mr. Hatcher was denied necessary medical attention and treatment.
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in state court against Correctional Medical Services, Inc.; Lorie
Hatcher; Jennifer Reese; Louisville Metro Government; Tom Campbell, individually and in his
official capacity; Wayne Mumford; Edward Dugan; William McFarland; Royce Standard; Chad
Puente; and Ron Anthony.
Defendants removed to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. After a
considerable time, Plaintiffs eventually dismissed all federal claims and dismissed Defendants
William McFarland and Louisville Metro Government. Plaintiffs have now moved to remand
the case because only state law claims remain. Defendants, Tom Campbell, Chad Puente,
Wayne Mumford, Edward Dugan, Royce Standard and Ron Anthony, have filed motions for

partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss all claims against them. The motions are fully
briefed and submitted. These same Defendants oppose remand, or in the alternative, ask that
remand occur after the motions for partial summary judgment have been decided.
A district court has broad discretion to decide whether to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). “In determining
whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should consider and weigh
several factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”
Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court recognizes
several factors weigh in favor of denying remand, such as the fact that the present action has
been before this Court since 2009, significant discovery has occurred, and motions for partial
summary judgment have been submitted for consideration. In addition, the Court has also
considered that Plaintiffs likely dismissed their federal claims in order to seek remand. Cohill,
484 U.S. at 357 (discussing how a plaintiff’s manipulation to secure remand should be
considered by the district court when deciding whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction).
However, the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s instruction that “if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). This Court has not been extensively
involved in the case to date, the pending motions are not dispositive of the case as a whole, and
the parties could resubmit the summary judgment motions in state court without significant
duplication of effort. See Harper v. AutoAlliance Intern., Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 211 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding it significant that the court had already “made several substantive rulings” and “invested
significant time in the litigation” in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). In

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fact, the instant action is still fairly early in its course, and significant court involvement is
expected between now and the final resolution of all claims. Furthermore, the pending motions
possibly raise a novel issue of state law concerning the liability of the Director of the Corrections
Department under KRS 71.040 when sued in his official capacity. See 28 U.S.C. §1367 (c)(1) (a
“district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law”).
For the reasons stated, and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to remand is SUSTAINED and the
remaining claims are REMANDED to Jefferson Circuit Court.

June 17, 2011

cc:

Counsel of Record

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