Chavez v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC et al
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 29 Motion for Summary Judgment: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, Greg Banic, Tina Hoffman Lewis, and William Kuchenbrods Motion for Summary Judgm ent 29 as to all of Plaintiff Richard Chavezs claims is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to the following claims: disability discrimination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, interference with Family Medical Leave A ct leave, retaliation for taking Family Medical Leave Act leave, retaliation for filing a Kentucky Workers Compensation claim, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Defendants motion is DENIED as to all other claims.. Signed by Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 5/27/11. cc:counsel (JBM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-00540-JHM
RICHARD CHAVEZ
PLAINTIFF
V.
DAKKOTA INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, LLC, et. al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC (“Dakkota”),
Greg Banic (“Banic”), Tina Hoffman Lewis (“Lewis”), and William Kuchenbrod’s (“Kuchenbrod”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment [DN 29]. Fully briefed, this matter is
ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its
motion and of identifying that portion of the record which demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party
satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the non-moving party is required to do more than simply show there is some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). The rule requires the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine
factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “ showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II. BACKGROUND1
Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, is a flow through supplier of automotive parts for Ford
Motor Company. Dakkota is responsible for constructing the instrument panels (“IP”) for Ford
trucks, which includes assembling, among other things, the steering column, instrument gauges and
airbags into a single unit. Plaintiff Richard Chavez was hired as a Quality Engineer with Dakkota
on August 5, 2005. At the time of his hiring, Plaintiff held a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Tech
Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration. Plaintiff also had over twenty-five (25) years
experience working in the automotive industry including thirteen (13) years as a Quality Engineer.
On November 17, 2005, Plaintiff received his first evaluation following the end of his initial
probationary period. The evaluation was conducted by the Quality Manager Phillip Marksbury.
Plaintiff received a 3.6 out of 4.0. The following year, Plaintiff was again evaluated by Mr.
Marksbury and this time received a perfect 4.0 rating. Shortly after this evaluation, Mr. Marksbury
resigned. Defendant Greg Banic was then hired as the new Quality Manager on October 9, 2006.
In November 2006, Dakkota expanded its operation and added a second plant that assembled
cooling modules (“CMA”) for Ford trucks. Plaintiff was sent to the new CMA plant to set up the
1
As this is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants, the facts are written in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
2
quality department and was told by Wayne Allen, the Assistant Plant Manager at the time, that once
the department was up and running that Plaintiff would be named the Sr. Supplier Quality Engineer
at the CMA facility. Plaintiff brought along several employees from the IP plant to the CMA plant,
including Hopeann Doedyns. Ms. Doedyns had been a Quality Coordinator at the IP plant, but
Plaintiff began training her as a Quality Engineer at the CMA plant. Ms. Doedyns and another
quality coordinator, Octavio Castano, were eventually promoted to Quality Engineers on February
16, 2007.
On Friday, December 1, 2006, Plaintiff was working on a time sensitive production schedule
when he suffered a hand injury. He reported the injury to Defendant Tina Hoffman Lewis, the H.R.
Director, who instructed him to get it treated immediately. However, while Plaintiff was in
Defendant Lewis’s office, the plant manager, Mr. Hernandez, asked Plaintiff if he was able to forgo
treatment and finish his shift in order to remain on time with the production schedule. Plaintiff
agreed to do so and finished the remainder of his shift. After his shift, Plaintiff received treatment
at the local hospital. Plaintiff then completed a safety form detailing the injury over the weekend,
which he gave to the H.R. department the following Monday. Plaintiff was not counseled regarding
the tardiness of his treatment or his safety form. In fact, Plaintiff’s form actually notes that it was
timely filed.
On December 15, 2006, Plaintiff had organized a kick-off for the quality department at the
CMA facility and had prepared a final briefing to be given at the meeting. However, during the
meeting, Defendant Banic informed Plaintiff along with the rest of the CMA Supplier representatives
that Ms. Julie Mason was being promoted from H.R. Administrator to Sr. Supplier Quality Engineer
over CMA. Defendant Banic then instructed Plaintiff to turn over his report to Ms. Mason, who gave
the presentation. After this turn of events, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Lewis about his
3
concerns regarding his treatment at the hands of his supervisor, Defendant Banic. A meeting was
held on January 2, 2007, between Defendant Banic, Defendant Lewis, and Plaintiff. During the
meeting various issues were discussed, including Ms. Mason’s promotion to the Sr. Supplier Quality
Engineer position at the CMA plant. Both Defendant Banic and Plaintiff aired their concerns and
responses and the meeting ended with an agreement by all parties to be more involved with
communication.
Following this meeting and throughout the spring, Defendant Banic instructed the Quality
Coordinators to report directly to him instead of to Plaintiff. Defendant Banic claimed that this was
done so that he could become better acquainted with the production procedures at Dakkota.
However, Defendant Banic did not alter the Quality Coordinator reporting structure with the other
Quality Engineers. Then on May 6, 2007, Plaintiff was notified that a skid of airbags had fallen from
a forklift and had been placed in the Quality hold cage. The height from which the airbags fell was
unknown. Nevertheless, Plaintiff considered these airbags lost and began making preparations to
scrap them. However, on June 20, 2007, Defendant Banic authorized the release of the airbags back
into production. This was done over the objection of Plaintiff.2
Two days before the release of the airbags, Plaintiff suffered a second on the job injury.
Plaintiff was working with some metal wiring, when one of the wires came loose and hit Plaintiff in
the eye. At the time of the injury, Plaintiff went to the H.R. office to report the injury but no one was
2
It is unclear what the manufacturer’s policies state regarding the use of dropped airbags.
From the record, the Court believes that an airbag that falls from a height greater than 1.5 meters
is considered suspect and is not to be used. However, there is also an issue regarding whether the
manufacturer considers an airbag to be “dropped” if it remains within its protective packaging.
This is the crux of the issue between Plaintiff and Defendant Banic. Plaintiff felt that these
airbags and others that were later dropped should not have been used per the manufacturer’s
policies. However, Defendant Banic disagreed with Plaintiff’s interpretation of the policies and
felt that the airbags met the manufacturer’s standards and were still safe and usable.
4
present. Believing that the injury was not severe, Plaintiff decided not to report it and simply went
home at the end of his shift. The following morning, Plaintiff awoke to blurred vision in the eye that
had been hit. Plaintiff called Defendant Banic to report the injury. Defendant Banic instructed
Plaintiff to call H.R., who instructed Plaintiff to go to the hospital. At the hospital, Plaintiff was told
that he needed to see an eye specialist, which he did that day. The specialist told Plaintiff that he had
a scratched cornea and that he needed to take a few days off to allow the eye to heal itself. When
Plaintiff called Defendant Banic to inform him of the specialist’s diagnosis, Defendant Banic told
Plaintiff that he had to come into work immediately, which he did. The following day, Plaintiff filled
out a safety form for the injury.
After this incident, H.R. recommended that Plaintiff be issued a corrective action for filing
a second untimely safety report. H.R. argued that Plaintiff had already been counseled for a late
filing resulting from his first hand injury. Plaintiff disagreed that he had received a prior counseling
and argued that the corrective action was not in accordance with Dakkota’s progressive discipline
policy. On June 25, 2007, Defendant Banic issued the corrective action, nevertheless.
Three days later, Defendant Banic issued Plaintiff a second corrective action for failing to
attend meetings and input necessary information into a Ford database. These meetings were with
Ford and were conducted via teleconference. Plaintiff believed that he was only required to attend
meetings when he had reportable data for Ford. Plaintiff also argued that he was unable to enter the
necessary information because he did not have the appropriate username and password to access the
Ford database. Plaintiff made Defendants aware of his need for this information through email during
the preceding month. Defendants, however, believed that Plaintiff failed to take proper action or
demonstrate sufficient initiative to fix a problem regarding his job duties.
After receiving what he deemed to be two baseless corrective actions, Plaintiff wrote a letter
5
to Defendant Lewis regarding his concern that he was being discriminated and/or retaliated against.
This letter discussed the various actions that Plaintiff felt were discriminatory and also highlighted
the fact that Plaintiff had constantly received high performance evaluations from Dakkota and praise
from Ford. On July 30, 2007, a meeting was held between Defendant Banic, Defendant Lewis, the
current plant manager, Wayne Allen, and Plaintiff. During this meeting Plaintiff received a letter
from Defendant Lewis outlining the justification for the corrective actions and stating that the actions
were valid and would stand. The letter also informed Plaintiff that, contrary to his belief that he was
being set up for termination, his corrective actions would be removed from his personnel file so long
as he did not receive another corrective action in the following twelve months. Plaintiff’s concerns
regarding the use of dropped airbags was also discussed at this meeting. Mr. Allen concluded the
meeting by telling Defendant Banic and Plaintiff that they needed to work to improve their
communication with one another.
On October 24, 2007, 192 dropped airbags were placed in the Quality hold cage by Plaintiff.
Without Plaintiff’s knowledge, Defendant Banic placed all 192 airbags back into production on
October 30, 2007. The following day, Plaintiff once again brought his concerns regarding the use
of the dropped airbags to Defendant Banic’s attention. Plaintiff was reassured by Defendant Banic
that he, Defendant Banic, would take full responsibility for the use of the airbags, which is evidenced
by Defendant Banic’s signature on the form authorizing the airbags movement back into production.
Later that day, Plaintiff received his annual evaluation, which was the first time that
Defendant Banic had formally evaluated Plaintiff. The result of this evaluation was that Plaintiff
scored 2.4 out of 4.0, which fell into the competent range. The other Quality Engineers received the
following scores: (1) Ms. Mason, 3.6; (2) Mr. Castano, 3.22; and (3) Ms. Doedyns, 3.12. After
Defendant Banic issued the evaluation, it was sent throughout Dakkota’s corporate channels and
6
vetted by different levels of Human Resources. The evaluation was returned to Defendant Banic and
he reviewed it with Plaintiff on December 19, 2007. Plaintiff was asked to sign the evaluation after
having reviewed it. Plaintiff did sign the evaluation, but he first wrote a note at the bottom stating
that he disagreed with the evaluation and did not believe that it was a true reflection of his
performance.
In March of 2008, Plaintiff developed bronchitis and pneumonia and was admitted into the
local hospital. When Defendant Lewis learned of Plaintiff’s illness, the H.R. department sent FMLA
forms to Plaintiff and his wife. These forms were properly filled out and returned and Plaintiff took
FMLA leave from March 27, 2008 through April 16, 2008. Following his return from FMLA leave,
Plaintiff was explaining a report regarding supplier issues to Defendant Banic when Defendant Banic
yelled “Dammit, just give me the damn information.” At this point, Plaintiff handed the report to
Defendant Banic and turned and left the room. As he walked out of the room, Plaintiff heard
Defendant Banic utter the term “wetback.” Plaintiff immediately went into the office and confronted
Defendant Banic, but Defendant Banic simply acted as if nothing had been said and ignored
Plaintiff’s questions. Plaintiff did not report this incident because he felt that Defendant Lewis in
H.R. had already ignored or dismissed his other complaints of discrimination.
In late June or early July, Plaintiff approached the newest Plant Manager, Defendant William
Kuchenbrod to discuss Defendant Banic’s use of dropped airbags. Plaintiff told Defendant
Kuchenbrod that Defendant Banic was not following the manufacturer’s policies regarding the
airbags. Defendant Kuchenbrod then told Plaintiff he would look into the matter. Defendant
Kuchenbrod did just that and was satisfied that the proper procedures were followed by Defendant
Banic.
During this time period in July 2008, Dakkota was forced to reduce its labor and production
7
costs as a result of the Ford Motor Company reducing its costs and production. To that end,
Defendant Kuchenbrod gathered all of the managers and discussed the various positions that would
need to be cut or combined in a reduction-in-force (RIF). The decision was made to completely cut
Dakkota’s second shift. With that determination, other first shift positions were also cut or combined,
including Plaintiff’s Supplier Quality Engineer position. The job responsibilities for the Supplier
Quality Engineer position were then split up and given to the remaining two Quality Engineers. On
July 23, 2008, Plaintiff was informed that his position was being eliminated in the RIF and that he
was being permanently laid off. In January 2009, Dakkota was able to reinstate most of its second
shift again. However, Plaintiff’s position was not reinstated or filled.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 26, 2009, in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The action
was timely removed on July 30, 2009. With discovery having closed, Defendants have filed this
motion for summary judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s age, national origin, and
disability claims under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), interference and retaliation claims
under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), retaliation claim under the Kentucky Workers’
Compensation Act (KWCA), and wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim. Plaintiff
has conceded that summary judgment is appropriate for Plaintiff’s disability claim under the KCRA
and interference claim under the FMLA. Plaintiff challenges summary judgment as to all other
claims.
A. Plaintiff’s Affidavit
As an initial matter, Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiff’s affidavit. Defendants
contend that the affidavit is a sham and was improperly created to defeat summary judgment. “A
8
party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has
been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition testimony.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 790
F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986). The rule in Reid is a limited one, it was not designed to “prevent[] a
party who was not directly questioned about an issue from supplementing incomplete deposition
testimony with a sworn affidavit. Such an affidavit fills a gap left open by the moving party and thus
provides the district court with more information, rather than less, at the crucial summary judgment
stage.” Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir. 2006).
When determining the “admissibility of a post-deposition affidavit at the summary judgment
stage [the district court] must first determine whether the affidavit directly contradicts the nonmoving
party's prior sworn testimony. . . . A directly contradictory affidavit should be stricken unless the
party opposing summary judgment provides a persuasive justification for the contradiction.” Id. at
908. If the affidavit is not directly contradictory then the court should only strike it if it “‘constitutes
an attempt to create a sham fact issue.’” Id. (quoting Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th
Cir. 1986)). The Sixth Circuit in Aerel overturned the district court’s decision to strike two
paragraphs of an affidavit because the paragraphs did not directly contradict the witness’s deposition,
but instead “revealed information that was not fully explored during that testimony.” Id. at 909. The
court found that nothing in the record indicated that these paragraphs were included in an attempt to
create a sham affidavit and that they should not have been struck.
Defendants have argued that paragraphs 6, 8, 11, 13, 20, and 25 of Plaintiff’s affidavit
“contain new facts that purport to tell a more complete version of Plaintiff’s story.” Def.’s Reply 20.
However, outside of a contradiction of dates found in paragraph 25, the Defendants have offered no
evidence that the affidavit is contradictory to Plaintiff’s deposition. Rather, the affidavit expands
areas of testimony that were not fully developed during the deposition or discusses areas of testimony
9
that were not explored at all. As for the contradictory date, Plaintiff contends that he was without
his personnel file at the time and that he was merely confused as to the date of the alleged incident.
The Court finds that nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff’s affidavit was intended to be a
sham affidavit, therefore, Defendants motion to strike Plaintiff’s affidavit is denied.
B. Age and National Origin Discrimination in Violation of the KCRA
Plaintiff alleges that he was chosen for the RIF due to his age and/or his national origin in
violation of the KCRA, K.R.S. § 344.040(1)(a). Under § 344.040(1)(a), it is unlawful for an
employer
[t]o fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of the individual's . . . national origin, . . . [or] age forty (40)
and over[.]
“Because the KCRA is modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [] federal decisions
interpreting the federal act are ‘most persuasive, if not controlling, in interpreting the Kentucky
statute.’” Stacy v. Shoney’s, Inc., 142 F.3d 436, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998) (table decision) (quoting White
v. Rainbo Baking Co., 765 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988)). A plaintiff may establish a violation
of the KCRA through direct or circumstantial evidence. In the present case, Plaintiff has no direct
evidence of discrimination and relies solely on circumstantial evidence. As such, his claims are
analyzed under the burden shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Woods v. Western Ky. Univ., 303 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or national origin discrimination using
circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he was a
member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than
10
similarly situated, non-protected employees. Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 677 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, in a reduction-in-force case, the Sixth Circuit has modified the fourth element and required
that a plaintiff provide “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate
that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Barnes v.
GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990).
The first two factors in the prima facie analysis are not at issue because Defendants have
conceded that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class (59 and Mexican-American) and that he was
qualified for his job. However, the third and fourth factors are hotly contested. Plaintiff has argued
that he was subjected to approximately six different adverse employment actions: (1) failure to
promote Plaintiff to CMA Senior Quality Engineer in December 2006; (2) removal of supervisory
duties over quality coordinators in Spring 2007; (3) authorization of two baseless corrective actions
in June 2007; (4) reception of a low annual evaluation score in October 2007; (5) selection for lay
off during the RIF in July 2008; (6) failure to rehire Plaintiff in January 2009.
An “adverse employment action” is one that “affect[s] employment or alter[s] the conditions
of the workplace.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006).
Generally, it involves changes in the terms of employment, such as “hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in
benefits,” and usually “inflicts direct economic harm.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 761-62 (1998); White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 402 (6th Cir. 2008). Such a
change “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.”
Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when he was
selected for lay off in the July RIF. This was clearly an adverse employment action. However,
11
Plaintiff contends that there are several other adverse employment actions that are also actionable.
First, Plaintiff contends that he was denied the position of Sr. Supplier Quality Engineer over the
CMA facility when Defendant Banic gave the position to Julie Mason instead of Plaintiff. The Court
finds that Plaintiff has not adduced evidence that this denial was materially adverse because he has
not shown that he suffered a significant change in benefits by being denied this promotion/transfer.
He has not identified an increase in salary, health benefits, or responsibility that the CMA position
would have afforded him, nor has he identified any privileges that would have accompanied the CMA
position. Plaintiff has claimed that his title at the time of the RIF was Sr. Supplier Quality Engineer,
so it appears to the Court that this promotion/transfer would not even have changed his title.
Therefore, the Court finds that the denial of the promotion/transfer was not an adverse employment
action.
Plaintiff has also argued that he suffered an adverse employment action by and through the
removal of his supervisory duties, the issuance of two corrective actions against him, and the issuance
of a low annual evaluation. It is clear from the record that these actions do not constitute adverse
employment actions because they did not materially affect or alter Plaintiff’s employment. At the
time these actions were taken, Plaintiff did not suffer any reduced benefits or incur any direct
economic harm. It was more than a year later that the repercussions of these actions were felt, when
Plaintiff was selected for lay off in the RIF. As such, the adverse employment action was his
inclusion in the RIF, not the individual actions themselves.
Plaintiff contends that these three actions demonstrate a larger pattern of discrimination or
a “papering” of his file that is actionable. Plaintiff cites only the unpublished case of Handshoe v.
Mercy Med. Ctr., 34 Fed. Appx. 441, at *6 (6th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that the Sixth Circuit
has recognized that a disciplinary measure or poor evaluation can be an adverse employee action
12
when it is done as a pattern of discrimination. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s reading of
Handshoe. While the Handshoe court recognized that other circuits have found disciplinary measures
or evaluations can constitute adverse employment actions as part of a larger discriminatory scheme,
the court specifically said “[i]n any event, the Sixth Circuit has not agreed with these other circuits[.]”
Id. This is at best an indication by the Sixth Circuit that it has neither accepted nor rejected such a
theory of recovery. Absent an indication by the Sixth Circuit or the Kentucky Supreme Court, the
Court declines to find such a theory actionable. The Court recognizes that the actions about which
Plaintiff complains do support his claim of discrimination. However, the Court does not believe that
they are independently actionable, rather, they are more appropriately to be used as evidence to
establish that Defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reason for selecting Plaintiff for lay off in
the RIF was a pretext.
The final action that Plaintiff claims is materially adverse is the Defendants’ failure to rehire
him after the RIF was lifted and the second shift was reinstated. While Defendants contest whether
this is an adverse employment action in their Reply, they actually appear to argue that Plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case because he cannot demonstrate that any Quality Engineers were rehired.
To establish a prima facie case for failure-to-rehire Plaintiff must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) that he is qualified for the rehire
or recall position; (3) that he applied for the available position or can establish that the employer was
otherwise obligated to consider him; and (4) that the position went to an individual outside the
protected class or that other reasonable evidence exists for inferring that he was denied a position
because of his membership in the protected class. See Wanger v. G.A. Gray Co., 872, F.2d 142, 145
(6th Cir. 1989).
The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the failure-to-rehire
13
claim because Plaintiff cannot establish the third prong of the prima facie case. There is no evidence
that the Supplier Quality Engineer position or any other Quality Engineer position was reinstated or
filled during the recall in January 2009. To the extent that Plaintiff claims he was discriminated
against by the internal hiring of Jason Harden as a Quality Engineer in place of Ms. Doedyns,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he applied for the position or that Defendants were obligated to
recall him for that position. The Dakkota Employee Handbook states that a laid off employee retains
his right of recall for six months after a RIF. The record is not clear as to when Mr. Harden was hired
as a Quality Engineer, but it appears that it occurred after February 2010. See Pl.’s Ex. LL (includes
a letter of recommendation written on behalf of Mr. Harden by Defendant Banic for the position of
Quality Engineer written after February 2010). This evidence demonstrates that Mr. Harden’s
promotion occurred more than nineteen months after the RIF and thirteen months after Plaintiff’s
right of recall had expired. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
failure-to-rehire claim.
The Court will now address the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
requirement for the only remaining actionable adverse employment action, the RIF. Defendants
contend that Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was singled
out for discharge based on his age or his national origin. The Court disagrees. In Barnes, the Sixth
Circuit discussed the fourth prong of a reduction-in-force age discrimination case and stated that “a
plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by showing that he or she possessed qualifications superior
to those of a younger co-worker working the same position as the plaintiff.” Barnes, 896 F.2d at
1466. Plaintiff has presented such evidence. Plaintiff holds a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Tech
Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration. Plaintiff also has over sixteen years
experience as a Quality Engineer, three of which were with Dakkota. Neither of the two Quality
14
Engineers that were chosen to remain with Dakkota in place of Plaintiff, Ms. Doedyns or Mr.
Castano, had that level of education or that experience. From the record it appears that neither Ms.
Doedyns nor Mr. Castano had a Bachelor’s degree let alone an M.B.A. Furthermore, at the time of
the RIF, Ms. Doedyns and Mr. Castano each had only one and a half years of experience as Quality
Engineers. This evidence demonstrates that at the time of the RIF, Plaintiff had qualifications
superior to those of the other two Quality Engineers who were approximately twenty-years younger
than Plaintiff. The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the fourth prong of the prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence and demonstrated that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he was chosen for the RIF for the impermissible reason of his age.
The Court sees no reason why the same analysis and logic applied to the age discrimination
claim should not be applied to the national origin claim as well. The fact that Plaintiff had superior
qualifications to the non Mexican-American Quality Engineers but was instead included in the RIF
creates an inference that Plaintiff was singled out for discharge for impermissible reasons. Plaintiff
also offers Defendant Banic’s use of a derogatory term directed at Plaintiff as further circumstantial
evidence that Defendants included Plaintiff in the RIF for impermissible reasons. Plaintiff alleges
that three months prior to the RIF that Defendant Banic cursed at Plaintiff and then uttered under his
breath the term “wetback.” While this isolated comment does not demonstrate direct evidence of a
discriminatory intent, see Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 661 (6th Cir. 1999), it
certainly should be considered as circumstantial evidence in the prima facie case.
Given the significant difference in qualifications between Plaintiff and the remaining two
Quality Engineers and the use of a derogatory comment directed at Plaintiff three months before the
RIF, a reasonable trier of fact could find that this evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff was chosen for
the RIF for the impermissible reason that he was Mexican-American. Therefore, the Court finds that
15
Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case for both age and national origin discrimination under the
KCRA.
As Plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendants to put forth
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s inclusion in the RIF. Defendants proffered nondiscriminatory reason is that Dakkota was required to implement an RIF because its labor and
production demands decreased significantly. Dakkota’s labor and production demands were tied to
those of the Ford Motor Company because Dakkota was a flow through supplier of automotive parts
to Ford. Therefore, when Ford reduced its labor costs and production in May 2008, Dakkota was
required to do the same. In order to reduce its own labor costs and production, Dakkota eliminated
its entire second shift. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s position was eliminated because with half
as many parts being manufactured in the plant, there was not enough demand to warrant having a
Quality Engineer whose focus was primarily on supplier issues.
With the Defendants articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
discharge, the burden again shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the proffered non-discriminatory reason is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. To
establish such pretext, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason (1) had no basis in fact;
(2) did not actually motivate the adverse employment action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate that
action. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff
does not contest the fact that Dakkota needed to reduce the number of shifts at its plant. Nor does
Plaintiff appear to contest the elimination of the Supplier Quality Engineer position. What Plaintiff
does contest is the reason that he was chosen for permanent lay off instead of one of the younger, non
Mexican-American Quality Engineers, when he was significantly better qualified for the job.
In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008), the Sixth Circuit
16
found that plaintiff, who was African-American, had produced credible evidence that the employer’s
proffered non-discriminatory reason for hiring a white candidate over plaintiff was merely a pretext.
The Court quoted the D.C. Circuit and found that
[i]f a factfinder can conclude that a reasonable employer would have found the
plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job, but this employer did not, the
factfinder can legitimately infer that the employer consciously selected a
less-qualified candidate-something employers do not usually do, unless some other
strong consideration, such as discrimination, enters into the picture.
Id. (quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998). While White
addressed discrimination in the context of a hiring decision, the Court finds the rationale underlying
the White decision appropriate and applicable where an employer’s proffered reason for laying off
an employee is that the remaining employees are better qualified for the position.
Defendants respond arguing that when the decision was made to eliminate Plaintiff’s position
that it was done on an objective basis among all of the managers at the plant. Defendants contend
that Plaintiff was not selected for the other Quality Engineer positions because his primary focus was
with supplier quality issues while the other two Quality Engineers, Ms. Doedyns and Mr. Castano,
“had as much experience with their primary duties and responsibilities: the CMA facility quality
issues and customer interfacing, respectively.” Def.’s Reply 9. Defendants further argue that they
considered the flexibility of the different employees and which positions could be combined.
Defendants contend that they did not consider Plaintiff’s age or national origin whatsoever.
Plaintiff argues that he should not have been laid off because he had more experience as a
Quality Engineer and a higher level of education than either of the other Quality Engineers. As
discussed above, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff had significantly more education and
experience than either Ms. Doedyns or Mr. Castano. Furthermore, Plaintiff has produced evidence
that he was heavily involved in setting up the CMA Quality Engineering department and had
17
supervised Ms. Doedyns as a Quality Coordinator and had trained her for her position as a Quality
Engineer in that department. Plaintiff’s superior qualifications and the fact that Plaintiff was
significantly involved with the establishment of the CMA Quality department as well as the training
of Ms. Doedyns creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason was actually a pretext for discriminating against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also contends that the decision to lay him off was made in part because of previous
discriminatory conduct. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Banic took several discriminatory actions
against him that made it possible to lay him off. Plaintiff argues that he was viewed as less flexible
or vital because of his diminished job duties, corrective actions, and low evaluation. This is
supported by Defendants’ written discovery responses where Defendants cite Plaintiff’s low
evaluation score compared to the other two Quality Engineers as a factor in the decision to terminate
Plaintiff. The questions surrounding Defendant Banic’s actions in these respects, and the inferences
to which they give rise, reinforce the genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants’ nondiscriminatory reason for including Plaintiff in the RIF was pretextual.
All of this evidence, coupled together, is more than enough for a reasonable trier of fact to
infer that Defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reason for laying off Plaintiff was a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s age
and national origin discrimination claims is denied.
C. Retaliation for FMLA Leave
Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants selected him for RIF because he exercised his right
to FMLA leave just three months before the RIF. “The issue in an FMLA retaliation claim is whether
an employer retaliated or discriminated against an employee because the employee invoked her
FMLA rights.” Brady v. Potter, 476 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (N.D. Ohio 2007). The Sixth Circuit
18
employs the burden-shifting approach from McDonnell Douglas for retaliation claims brought under
the FMLA. Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 Fed. Appx. 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2009).
“To establish an initial prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show the following by a
preponderance of the evidence: ‘(1) he engaged in an activity protected by the [FMLA]; (2) that this
exercise of his protected rights was known to the defendant; (3) that defendant thereafter took an
employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.’” Id. (quoting Arban v. West Pub. Corp., 345
F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 2003)).
To establish a causal connection, the plaintiff must “proffer evidence sufficient to raise the
inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” EEOC v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997). “In determining whether there is a causal
relationship between a plaintiff's protected activity and an allegedly retaliatory act, courts may
consider whether the employer treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated individuals and
whether there is a temporal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.”
Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2009). In Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die
Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008), the Sixth Circuit found that
[w]here an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer
learns of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is
significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of
satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. But where some time elapses between
when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse
employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other
evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.
Id. at 525.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation for taking
FMLA leave because he is unable to show a causal connection between his exercise of his FMLA
19
rights and his inclusion in the RIF. Plaintiff contends that the temporal proximity of his inclusion in
the RIF to his request for FMLA leave coupled with the Defendants praise for Mr. Castano’s perfect
attendance satisfies the causal connection prong.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to raise an inference that he was
included in the RIF in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Unlike the plaintiff in Mickey, who was
laid off the very day that the defendant learned of plaintiff’s protected activity, Plaintiff Chavez was
not included in the RIF until four months after he had taken his FMLA leave. Four months is not
“very close in time,” such that it produces an inference that Plaintiff was retaliated against for
exercising his FMLA rights. Therefore, Plaintiff must produce other evidence of retaliatory conduct
taken by Defendants. The only evidence that Plaintiff has produced on this issue is that in 2008,
Defendants recognized another Quality Engineer, Mr. Castano as an outstanding performer for his
perfect attendance, among several other things. Evidence that a fellow Quality Engineer was
recognized for perfect attendance in a performance award does not create an inference that Plaintiff
was retaliated against for missing work while on FMLA leave. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to show a prima facie case because he has not produced sufficient evidence of a causal
connection between his FMLA leave and his inclusion in the RIF. Therefore, Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on this issue is granted.
D. Retaliation for Filing a KWCA Claim
Plaintiff also contends that he was retaliated against for filing a worker’s compensation claim
in violation of K.R.S. § 342.197(1).3 Kentucky courts apply a modified version of the McDonnell
3
K.R.S. § 342.197(1) states: “No employee shall be harassed, coerced, discharged, or
discriminated against in any manner whatsoever for filing and pursuing a lawful claim under this
chapter .” (Chapter 342 is the chapter of the Kentucky statutory code dealing with workers’
compensation.)
20
Douglas burden-shifting scheme to retaliation claims. Ky. Ctr. For Arts v. Handley, 827 S.W.2d 697,
701 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, by showing that “(1) he engaged
in a protected activity; (2) the [employer] knew that the plaintiff had done so; (3) adverse
employment action was taken; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Dollar General Partners v. Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d 910,
915 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). The fourth element of the test requires the employee to demonstrate that
her engagement in a protected activity was “a substantial and motivating factor but for which the
employee would not have been discharged.” Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir.
2001) (quoting First Property Mgmt. Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Ky. 1993)).
Defendants concede that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing two workers’
compensation claims, that they were aware of Plaintiff’s activity, and that he was eventually
discharged. However, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that his filing
of two workers’ compensation claims nineteen months and twelve months prior to the RIF were
substantial and motivating factors but for which the employee would not have been discharged.
Plaintiff argues that several adverse actions were taken immediately following his workers’
compensation claims that demonstrate that his pursuit of those claims was a substantial and
motivating factor that led the Defendants to take the adverse actions. Plaintiff further argues that “but
for” those adverse employment actions that he would not have been included in the RIF.
As discussed above, the failure to promote Plaintiff, the removal of some supervisory duties,
the issuance of two corrective actions, and the issuance of a low evaluation were not in themselves
adverse actions. The adverse action taken by Defendants was the inclusion of Plaintiff in the RIF,
therefore, Plaintiff must put forth evidence that his filing of two workers’ compensation claims was
21
a substantial and motivating factor that led the Defendants to lay off Plaintiff in the RIF. Plaintiff
has failed to do that. The temporal proximity between the claims and the adverse action does not give
rise to an inference of causal connection, as the workers’ compensation claims occurred twelve and
nineteen months, respectively, before Plaintiff was laid off. Nor is there any evidence that these
claims were considered by Defendants when they chose to lay off Plaintiff. Plaintiff has produced
no evidence that these workers’ compensation claims were a factor in Defendants’ actual decision
whatsoever, let alone a substantial and motivating one. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on this issue is granted.
E. Retaliatory Discharge/Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Plaintiff also claims that his termination was in violation of public policy. Although
Kentucky is a terminable-at-will state, the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that wrongful
terminations that violate public policy are actionable. Firestone Textile Co. Div. v Meadows, 666
S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983). In order to succeed under such a claim, the plaintiff must show that she
was discharged “contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing
law” and that “[t]he public policy [is] evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.” Id.
(citation omitted). “Whether a public policy is fundamental, well-defined, and evidenced by existing
law is a question for the court to decide.” Mitchell v. Coldstream Lab., Inc., ---S.W.3d---, 2010 WL
3717282, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2010).
In Gryzb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985), the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the holding
of the Michigan Supreme Court in Suchodolski v. Mich. Consolidated Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710
(Mich. 1982), and found “that only two situations exist where ‘grounds for discharging an employee
are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable’ absent ‘explicit legislative statements prohibiting
the discharge[:]’” (1) where the alleged reason for the discharge of the employee was the employee’s
22
failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment; or (2) when the reason for the
discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by well-established legislative enactment.
Gryzb, 700 S.W.2d at 402 (quoting Suchodolski, 316 N.W.2d at 711-12)).
Plaintiff has claimed that he was discharged in violation of the public policy as set out in the
Consumer Protection Act, K.R.S. § 367.170,4 and the Deceptive Business Practices section of the
penal code, K.R.S. § 517.020.5 Plaintiff argues that “he was asked to violate the Consumer Protection
Act and Deceptive Business Practices laws, which violations could have subjected him to criminal
action, by being asked to place defective airbags into production” and that his refusal to do so
resulted in his inclusion in the RIF. Pl.’s Sur-reply 14. Plaintiff also contends that his repeated
complaints to management regarding the use of dropped airbags played a significant role in his
selection for the RIF.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that his discharge for refusing to use dropped
airbags was contrary to a fundamental well-defined policy evidenced by either the Consumer
Protection Act or the Deceptive Business Practices section of the penal code. Plaintiff has not
produced evidence that the actual use of these airbags was a violation of the Consumer Protection Act
or the Deceptive Business Practices laws. In Farrell v. American Retirement Corp., the plaintiff
worked in a nursing home and believed that several of the nursing home polices violated Kentucky
alcohol and child labor laws. 2006 WL 2519562 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2006). The defendant
employer conducted an investigation into the policies but asked plaintiff to maintain the status quo
4
K.R.S. § 367.170 states in pertinent part that “false misleading or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”
5
K.R.S. § 517.020 states in pertinent part that “[a] person is guilty of deceptive business
practices when . . . he knowingly . . . exposes for sale adulterated commodities; or . . . exposes
for sale mislabeled commodities.”
23
and continue the policies until the conclusion of the investigation. The plaintiff informed his
employer that he was refusing to continue the policies. The investigation revealed that the nursing
home’s policies substantially complied with Kentucky liquor and child labor laws. Id. at *2.
Nevertheless, the employer modified a few policies to bring them more in-line with Kentucky law.
Plaintiff was pleased with these changes but felt that other changes should also have been made. The
defendants then gave the plaintiff an ultimatum that was labeled “Action Plan for Success,” and gave
the plaintiff 24 hours to decide whether to comply with the plan or resign his employment. The
plaintiff resigned and filed a wrongful termination suit.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and found
that there were “legitimate legal issues about exactly what the law requires” and that “[i]t [was] not
at all clear about what practices may violate the law.” Id. at *3. The circuit court found that because
of the uncertainty of the policies legality that it was ok to ask that they be continued while an
investigation was conducted. Id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed that decision and found
that “a legitimate question existed as to whether [the nursing home] was operating legally or illegally
under the applicable alcohol laws. For this reason . . . [the] request to [plaintiff], that the status quo
be maintained pending the result of the investigation was quite reasonable.” Id. at *6.
In Mill v. Viclen, Inc., the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of
a directed verdict in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. 2007
WL 4553666 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2007). The Mill Plaintiff had claimed that she was ordered to
violate two Medicare laws and that she was fired in retaliation for refusing to do so. The court of
appeals found, based partly on Plaintiff’s testimony, that “when [the defendant] ordered her to bill
Medicare in such a fashion, he was not ordering her to violate the law, regardless of her own beliefs.”
Id. at *6. The court found that because the actions were not violations of the law, that Defendants
24
were entitled to a directed verdict on Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Id.
Like the Mill plaintiff, Plaintiff Chavez may have believed that Defendants’ actions were
violations of Kentucky law, but his subjective belief does not determine whether an action is one that
is violative of public policy. Plaintiff must put forth evidence that the Defendants actions were in fact
violations of Kentucky law, which Plaintiff has failed to do. While Plaintiff may have disagreed with
the Defendants interpretation of the manufacturer’s standards regarding the use of dropped airbags,
he has not shown that the Defendants’ interpretation or their actions in placing the airbags into
production was a violation of any law. Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that Defendant
Banic did investigate whether the airbags were suitable for use by contacting the supplier. While this
investigation did not occur immediately, like the investigation in Farrell, it nevertheless vindicated
the Defendants’ use of the dropped airbags. Although Plaintiff has alleged that the use of the dropped
airbags was a violation of Kentucky law, he has not identified facts in the record that show that such
use was a violation, and in turn that their request to Plaintiff to place the airbags into production was
a request to violate Kentucky law.
While Plaintiff cites Northeast Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001), in support of its claim, the Court finds Cotton distinguishable. In Cotton, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals found that an employee could maintain a public-policy wrongful termination claim when
she was terminated in retaliation for refusing to backdate a document. The court found that such an
action would have violated K.R.S. § 517.050, which prohibits the falsification of business records.
While the employee in Cotton was able to show that the employer’s request would have resulted in
an actual violation of Kentucky law, Plaintiff in the instant case has not made such a showing.
Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that Defendant Banic’s request that he certify the airbags as
“good” and place them back into production was a violation of Kentucky law. See Farrell, 2006 WL
25
1519562, at *3 (discussing and affirming the circuit court’s decision which distinguished Cotton on
the basis that perjury is clearly a violation of the law, while it was not at all clear whether the
defendant’s liquor policy violated the law).
As for Plaintiff’s contention that he was terminated for his repeated complaints to
management about the use of the dropped airbags, the Court finds that such actions do not constitute
protection under the public-policy exception to Kentucky’s terminable-at-will employment doctrine.
To claim such protection, Plaintiff must present evidence that he brought his alleged complaint to the
attention of public authorities, and not just Dakkota’s management. See Zumot v. Data Mgmt. Co.,
2004 WL 405888, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. March 5, 2004) (“[Plaintiff’s] report of Daoud’s illegal activity
to those other than public authorities is not protected activity under the public policy exception.”);
Airdrie Stud, Inc. v. Reed, 2003 WL 22796469, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. November 26, 2003) (finding
that plaintiff’s termination after reporting illegal drug use to management did not create a wrongful
termination claim because “while it is true that the public has an interest in the use of illegal drugs,
[plaintiff] reported the use only to Airdrie management, not to authorities.”). There is no evidence
in the record that Plaintiff complained of the dropped airbag issue to any authority outside of Dakkota
management, therefore, he cannot maintain a claim for retaliation for his complaints under the public
policy exception. For the above stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of public-policy claim is granted.
F. Retaliation for Complaining of KCRA violations
In his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that he has
a claim for retaliation in violation of the KCRA. Plaintiff contends that he complained to the
Defendants that he was being discriminated against under the KCRA and that Defendants then
retaliated against him for those complaints. The Court does not believe that Plaintiff’s Complaint
26
alleges a claim of retaliation in violation of the KCRA, nor does it appear that Defendants believed
so. Before we address such a claim, Plaintiff must convince us otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Dakkota
Integrated Systems, LLC, Greg Banic, Tina Hoffman Lewis, and William Kuchenbrod’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [DN 29] as to all of Plaintiff Richard Chavez’s claims is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to the following claims: disability discrimination in
violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, interference with Family Medical Leave Act leave,
retaliation for taking Family Medical Leave Act leave, retaliation for filing a Kentucky Workers’
Compensation claim, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Defendants’ motion is
DENIED as to all other claims.
May 27, 2011
cc: counsel of record
27
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?