Santiago v. Doom et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 6/20/2011; for the reasons set forth, all Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' request for sanctions is DENIED. This is a final order.cc:Alberto Santiago, pro se; Counsel (SC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-039-H

ALBERTO SANTIAGO

PLAINTIFF

V.
NANCY DOOM, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, pro se, is a state inmate in the custody of the Kentucky Department of
Corrections (hereinafter, “DOC”). Plaintiff alleges that between October of 2008 and July of
2009, Defendants, who are employees assigned to the Green River Correctional Complex
(hereinafter, “GRCC”), subjected him to a series of unconstitutional First and Eighth
Amendment violations. Defendants, Nancy Doom, Janetta Fulkerson, Eric Woodward, Lorenza
Abrams, Rickie Williams, Steven Ford and Peggy Penrose have moved to dismiss and have
provided detailed responses to the allegations, including affidavits which factually discredit the
complaint. Even though the Court allowed Plaintiff an extension of time to respond, he has not
done so within the last three months.
I.
To establish a valid First Amendment claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must establish that: (1)
he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would
deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action
was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Here, although Plaintiff filed any
number of grievances, no evidence suggests that Defendants engaged in any improper adverse

action, much less, that an adverse action was taken against Plaintiff motivated, at least in part, by
Plaintiff’s filing of grievance. In fact, Plaintiff’s claims appear to be contradicted by the
documents which Defendants provided. Consequently, this Court will dismiss all of Plaintiff’s
First Amendment retaliation claims.
II.
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment challenge based on denial of minimal standards of
human existence, the inmate Plaintiff must establish: (1) a single, identifiable necessity of
civilized existence is being denied and (2) the defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
Defendants deny using excessive physical force against Plaintiff in any situation.
Plaintiff’s claims cannot be substantiated in any manner. Strikingly, several of Defendants
demonstrated their absence from the GRCC on the dates in question. Also, Defendants have
shown that some of Plaintiff’s complaints were virtually an impossibility.
On January 16, 2009, Plaintiff did fall against a fence and cut his hand. Defendant
Penrose had some tangential involvement in providing Plaintiff medical care on that day.
However, according to the information Plaintiff gave the medical staff during treatment, he
injured himself by falling while he was walking around GRCC and trying to grab hold of a chain
link fence as he fell.
Overall, the electronic medical records show that Plaintiff received medical care as
needed. For instance, though Plaintiff complains of not receiving medical care on or around
February 26, 2009, he spoke to the Medical Department a couple of days prior, on February 26,
2009, a few days later, on March 4, 2009, and then every day, multiple times a day from March

2

9, 2009 until March 13, 2009.
Plaintiff alleges his stitches came open but was denied medical treatment based on
Defendant Doom’s orders. Review of Plaintiff’s medical records shows that Plaintiff received
stitches following his first fall on January 16, 2009. Those stitches were then removed by GRCC
staff on February 2, 2009. Plaintiff did not again receive stitches until April 15, 2009, as a result
of an unrelated matter. Thus, on February 26, 2009, Plaintiff did not have any stitches anywhere
on his body.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied a wheelchair or that it was taken from him.
However, Plaintiff did not have a wheelchair with him upon his arrival to GRCC. No orders in
his medical record authorize him to have a wheelchair. The GRCC medical staff examined
Plaintiff upon his arrival and determined that Plaintiff had absolutely no medical need for a
wheelchair. During Plaintiff’s initial medical screen upon arriving at GRCC, Defendant Sgt.
Abrams informed Defendant Captain Woodward that Plaintiff was claiming that he needed a
wheelchair in order to get around. Because the wheelchair order was not in Plaintiff’s medical
file, Woodward then called Plaintiff’s previous medical providers, the Little Sandy Correctional
Complex Medical Department, who confirmed that a wheelchair was not authorized. Thus,
Plaintiff was denied a wheelchair because he had no medical need for a wheelchair, not due to
retaliation.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fulkerson denied Plaintiff adult diapers for urinary
incontinence and refused to allow him to have clean linens for several weeks after he repeatedly
wet himself when his legs went numb in his bed. Defendants again dispute Plaintiff’s claim.
Although Plaintiff claims he needs diapers to address an ongoing problem with urinary

3

incontinence, there is no indication that he had urinary incontinence. Sandra McKinney
examined Plaintiff specifically about his alleged incontinence. Her nursing assessment notes:
The incontinence that the inmate complains of has not been
reported to any staff at the dorm. He has not had an increase in the
amount of laundry he does or any complaints from other inmates.
He has never been seen with wet pants on. During this interview,
the inmate stated, “whoops, there it goes” and looked down at his
crotch. No area of wetness appeared although inmate states that he
had just urinated on himself.
In fact, on July 23, 2009, during GRCC’s standard medical assessment performed before
transferring an inmate to another correctional institution, Kentucky State Reformatory
(hereinafter, “KSR”), Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner Kristy Dietrich noted:
IM Santiago’s ambulation has improved well enough for him to
walk the considerable distance from his dorm to the dining hall for
most every meal, though he sometime skips breakfast. Though he
has repeatedly requested a wheelchair and adult diapers, IM
Santiago has done well without either of these. There have been
no complaints of incontinence from either his cellmate or his dorm
officers though we have been actively observing for a problem.
IM Santiago’s nervous tics and jerks improve dramatically when
he is unaware he is being observed and/or he is distracted.
Four days after ARNP Dietrich noted that he can walk considerable distances and had no
observed history of incontinence, Plaintiff again demanded a wheelchair and diapers at his new
institution, telling KSR medical staff that he can only walk short distances, he cannot walk far
enough to function in the general population of inmates, and also complained of urinary
incontinence.
As Plaintiff had no medical need for adult diapers or extra linens due to urinary
incontinence, the denial of unwarranted medical treatment is not an Eighth Amendment
violation.

4

Plaintiff’s claims amount to nothing more than a disagreement about medical treatment.
In virtually every instance no evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegations. “[W]henever prison
officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 5 U.S. 8, 6-7 (1992). It is thus axiomatic that there can be no valid claim of
excessive physical force if the Plaintiff-prisoner was never touched with force, as was the case
with Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants here.
Similarly, while denying an inmate medical care and other necessities commiserate with
minimal standards of human existence can violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment when the defendant acts with deliberate indifference, denial of
medically unnecessary care cannot serve as the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.
The Court will dismiss this part of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claim.
III.
The Court has reviewed the complaint, Defendants’ detailed responses to it and has noted
the absence of any response. All of the records produced show no evidence that Plaintiff’s
allegations are likely true. Though Defendants have made a compelling motion for sanctions,
the Court will deny it at this time in consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status.
Many of the allegations fall into the category of complaints about his medical care. The
responses demonstrate that Plaintiff received an abundance of medical care. His complaints
were certainly not ignored. To the extent Plaintiff complains about his care, those requests were

5

considered and rejected. These circumstances cannot form the basis for a constitutional claim.
As a consequence of the Court’s rulings, there are no claims remaining against those
originally named as Defendants. Some of those persons cannot be identified; some may never
have been served; and others have not actually moved for dismissal. Nevertheless, the absence
of an viable or supportable causes of action necessitates the dismissal of all Defendants as well.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED.
This is a final order.

June 20, 2011

cc:

Alberto Santiago, Pro Se
Counsel of Record

6